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This thesis is about how our syntactic choice changes with linguistic experience. Stud-
ies on syntactic priming show that our decisions are influenced by sentences that we
have recently heard or recently spoken. They also show that not all sentences have an
equal amount of influence; that repetition of verbs increases priming (the lexical-boost
effect) and that some verbs are more susceptible to priming than others. This thesis ex-
plores how and why syntactic decisions change with time and what these observations
tell us about the cognitive mechanism of speaking.
Specifically, we set out to develop a theoretical account of syntactic priming. The-
oretical accounts require mathematical models and this thesis develops a sequence of
mathematical models for understanding various aspects of syntactic priming. Cog-
nitive processes are modelled as dynamical systems that can change their behaviour
when they process information. We use these dynamical systems to investigate how
each episode of language comprehension or production affects syntactic decisions. We
also use these systems to investigate how long priming persists, how groups of con-
secutive sentences affect structural decisions, why repeating words leads to greater
syntactic priming and what this tells us about how words, concepts and syntax are
cognitively represented.
We obtain two kinds of results by simulating these mathematical models. The first
kind of results reveal how syntactic priming evolves over time. We find that structural
priming itself shows a gradual decay with time but the lexical enhancement of prim-
ing decays catastrophically – a result consistent with experimental observations. We
also find that consecutive episodes of language processing add up nonlinearly in mem-
ory, which challenges the design of some existing psycholinguistic experiments. The
second kind of results reveal how our syntax module might be connected to other cog-
nitive modules. We find that the lexical enhancement of syntactic priming might be a
consequence of how the modules of attention and working memory influence syntactic
decisions.
These models suggest a mechanism of priming that is in contrast to a previous
prediction-based account. This prediction-based account proposes that we actively pre-
dict what we hear and structural priming is due to error-correction whenever our pre-
dictions do not match the stimuli. In contrast, our account embodies syntactic priming
in cognitive processes of attention, working memory and long-term memory. It asserts
that our linguistic decisions are not based solely on abstract rules but also depend on
the cognitive implementation of each module.
Our investigations also contribute a novel theoretical framework for studying syn-
tactic priming. Previous studies analyse priming using error-correction or Hebbian
learning algorithms. We introduce the formalism of dynamical systems. This formal-
ism allows us to trace the effect of information processing through time. It explains
how residual activation from a previous episode might play a role in structural deci-
sions, thereby enriching our understanding of syntactic priming. Since these dynamical
systems are also used to model neural processes, this theoretical framework brings our
understanding of priming one step closer to its biological implementation, bridging the
gap between neural processes and abstract thoughts.
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1.1 Purpose and Character of the Investigation
This thesis lies on the cusp of two human activities. The first one is speaking,
which allows people to exchange information with others. The second one is learning,
which helps people accumulate information over time. Our intention is to examine
how the act of speaking relies on learning.
On the surface, the two activities seem largely separate. The domain of one is
external while the domain of the other is internal. Speaking is a social activity and
involves two or more people while learning is largely a personal activity. However,
beneath the surface, speaking is so intimately connected with learning that it seems
impossible for the former to exist without the latter. After all humans are not born
speaking a language, but must learn it through their environment over a period of time.
There is another way in which speaking relies on learning. When we participate in
a conversation, we engage in a social activity which requires us to be informative to our
listener and relevant to the conversation (Grice, 1975). When we are not informative
or relevant, we break a social contract and the communication is unsuccessful. To
be informative and relevant we must store information from the conversation in our
memory and access this memory before we speak.
So the question is not whether speaking relies on learning – it is plain that it does
– but how it relies on learning. What are the mechanics of this relationship? The
difficulty in answering this question arises from the fact that both speaking and learning
are complex processes. We will soon review evidence which shows that speaking is
not a unitary process but a sequence of separate processes. Similarly, learning is the
name given to a number of different forms of information storage. Learning can be
from visual, auditory or contextual information; it can be transient or long-lived; it can
13
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be the result of gradual accumulation over a series of events, or a large change in the
system as a result of a single event. Understanding the relationship between speaking
and learning involves deciphering a group of relationships between different forms of
learning and stages of speaking.
Amongst the different stages of speaking, the one that will concern us most in this
thesis is the stage of grammatical encoding. At this stage, speakers decide how they
arrange words in an utterance. Not all arrangements are valid. John gave the book to
Mary is acceptable, but The book Mary John to gave is not. Naturally, speakers must
learn how to produce a grammatically valid arrangement of words. Usually, there will
be many grammatically valid arrangements for an utterance. John gave the book to
Mary is valid, but so is John gave Mary the book. How do speakers choose between
these utterances? Do they choose on a whim, or do they choose based on what they
have learnt previously about grammatical arrangements? Do their preferences change
and if they do, what kind of information leads to this change? Some insight into
these questions comes from experiments which investigate how speakers’ choice of
the grammatical form of an utterance is influenced by previous utterances that they
have heard or produced.
Structural priming: Insight into how we learn
Let us be clear on the question we are discussing. We said we were interested in in-
vestigating the relationship between speaking and learning. We saw that this was a
very broad question which led to a series of questions about the relationships between
different forms of learning and stages of speaking. Therefore, we chose to focus on
one stage of speaking – grammatical encoding – and one form of learning – that from
previous utterances that the speaker has heard or produced. The first study to system-
atically investigate this relationship was Bock (1986), which observed how speakers’
choice of grammatical form of an utterance varied based on the grammatical form of
previous utterances during the experiment.
Bock (1986) found that subjects were more likely to choose a grammatical form
such as John gave Mary the book over John gave the book to Mary when they had pre-
viously heard (and then produced) a sentence such as The rock star sold an undercover
agent some cocaine as compared to when they had previously heard (and produced) a
sentence such as The rock star sold some cocaine to an undercover agent. This finding
shows a tendency in subjects to repeat the grammatical form, or syntactic structure, of
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an utterance and has been called structural priming. A series of experiments conducted
since this study have reproduced these results and repeatedly found that subjects tend
to be structurally primed, not only after producing an utterance, but also after hearing
it. Further studies also showed that structural priming increases when the verb repeats
between the prime and target sentence – the lexical-boost effect (Pickering & Brani-
gan, 1998) and that structural priming seems to last a long time (Bock & Griffin, 2000)
while lexical boost decays quickly (Hartsuiker, Bernolet, Schoonbaert, Speybroeck, &
Vanderelst, 2008).
Why do subjects show this tendency to repeat the syntactic structure of an utter-
ance? Subjects seem to store information regarding the first utterance and use this
stored information while producing the second utterance. But how exactly is this in-
formation stored? Is it stored in the same part of the cognitive system that is responsible
for sequencing words into valid arrangements? Or is it stored separately as a memory
of the whole utterance? How does this stored information evolve over time and why
does it seem to last for a longer time as compared to its lexical boost? These are the
core questions we will try to answer in this thesis. In answering these questions we
will tease apart the processes and learning mechanisms that are involved in the act of
speaking.
Method: Computational modelling
An analysis of mechanistic principles behind speaking can be made in two stages. The
first stage is observation through psychological experiments and the second is inter-
pretation of these results through systematic inference. One way of making systematic
inferences is to develop a theoretical account which describes the computational pro-
cesses that can generate the given data. We intend to develop such a theoretical account
of structural priming. Theoretical accounts require mathematical models and this the-
sis develops a sequence of mathematical models. Each mathematical model tries to
explain a set of experimental observations and outlines the assumptions required to
replicate these observations.
In this thesis, we adopt the theory of dynamical systems to model the computational
processes underlying language production. The theory of dynamical systems provides
a mathematical apparatus to track the evolution of the system through time. Because
we are interested in the temporal properties of structural priming – i.e. the effect of
an episode of learning at different points in time – this theory helps us investigate the
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influence of listening or speaking on future utterances. In the following chapters, we
will see that a number of phenomena associated with dynamical systems (hysteresis,
adaptation, competition) provide a formal way to think about the changes to our cogni-
tive system as a result of linguistic processing. Dynamical systems have also been used
to model neural processes underlying information processing in the brain, so adopting
this framework brings the computational implementation of language production close
to the underlying physiological processes.
Key assumptions and findings
In a series of four models, we explore how information can be stored as a result of
linguistic processing and how this stored information decays. We treat linguistic pro-
cessing (both comprehension and production) as a flow of information through the
cognitive system. We claim that as information flows through the system, it gets trans-
formed into different forms, suitable for representation in a set of disjoint modules.
Each module is implemented as a dynamical system. As information flows through
different modules, it stimulates the dynamical systems. Such stimulation could lead to
a change in the state of these systems. In this manner, the dynamical systems record
the effect of each flow of information during an episode of linguistic processing. We
also assume that the behaviour of these dynamical systems depends on their existing
state. Therefore, once the information during a particular episode is recorded as the
state of a dynamical system, it interferes with subsequent episodes of linguistic pro-
cessing. In this manner every episode of linguistic processing comes to depend on
previous episodes.
Our first model shows that this scheme of recording information in a set of dynami-
cal systems can lead to structural priming. We also explore how grammatical encoding
during a particular episode of speaking depends on the choice of verb used in the ut-
terance. We hypothesise that the relationship between the structure of an utterance and
the verbs used in it could be modulated by the degree of automaticity in the system
(i.e. how automatically we are making linguistic decisions while speaking). We show
how varying this automaticity could lead to a change in the lexical enhancement of
structural priming and could be a reason for the lexical boost effect.
Two subsequent models explore how dynamical systems that store information
about linguistic processing could lose this information over time. We hypothesise that
structural representations and their lexical context are recorded by two different kinds
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of dynamical systems. We show that these two kinds of dynamical systems can have
different longevities and this difference in longevity is responsible for a gradual decay
in structural priming and a quick decay in its lexical boost. These models also look at
two different kinds of learning mechanisms that could be at play during linguistic pro-
cessing. One kind of mechanism records short-term information between a prime and
a target trial, while the other mechanism accumulates learning over a series of trials.
We show how a combination of these mechanisms can lead to the pattern of results
observed in some psychological experiments.
Our final model extends the previous models and encodes the series of steps in
which the different types of dynamical systems could be activated during comprehen-
sion and production. This model overcomes some of the computational limitations
of the previous models and shows how symbolic structures can be represented in our
mathematical models. By encoding the processes involved in comprehension and pro-
duction, this model allows us to explore how comprehension and production might
overlap and how the linguistic processing during one can structurally prime the other.
This model also allows us to understand the role of a speaker’s grammatical knowledge
during comprehension and production. In our scheme, learning in modules does not
change a speaker’s grammatical knowledge and simulations of this model demonstrate
that structural priming may be separable from a change in grammatical knowledge.
1.2 Organisation of the thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part consists of chapters 2 and
3 and provides the background to the thesis. The second part consists of chapters 4
and 5, which develop the mathematical models. Finally, chapter 6 provides a general
discussion of the models and a review of the major findings.
We begin with Chapter 2 which surveys the literature on language production with
special emphasis on structural priming. We review the evidence for dividing language
production into different stages. Of particular interest to us is the stage of grammati-
cal encoding during which speakers arrange given concepts into a sequence. We will
review the reasons for dividing this stage into a number of processes and show how
experiments on structural priming provide a key investigative tool for studying gram-
matical encoding. The dual role of structural priming as both an investigative tool and
a psychological phenomenon motivates our study of the learning mechanisms behind
structural priming.
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Ours is not the first attempt to develop a theoretical account of structural priming
and in Chapter 3 we review two popular accounts – one mathematical and the other
conceptual. This chapter focuses on the types of learning mechanisms that can allow
us to model structural priming and classifies each account based on these learning
mechanisms. The first account uses error-based learning while the second account uses
‘trailing-activation’ to explain structural priming. Each account has its shortcomings
– the first one fails to account for some experimental observations while the second
lacks formal details. These shortcomings motivate the need for a formal account with
an alternative learning mechanism.
In Chapter 4 we start to develop a formal account of our own to explain structural
priming and its properties. We present three models, in increasing order of complexity,
that try to replicate several psychological experiments on structural priming. These
models rely on the theory of dynamical systems and we begin the chapter by reviewing
this theory and discussing how and why this theory can be used for modelling the
processes of grammatical encoding. The discussion of each model is divided into three
parts. The first part discusses the architecture of the model; the second part provides
a formal description; the third lists the simulations performed on the model and the
results. We discuss the results of all three models together at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 5 discusses several shortcomings of the models developed in Chapter 4.
None of these shortcomings make the models incorrect, but they do leave these models
open to criticism about their plausibility. Therefore, in Chapter 5, we develop an ex-
tended model which remains true to the principles of the models discussed in Chapter
4, but overcomes their limitations. This model sheds further light on the representa-
tion of information during language production and allows us to explore issues like the
overlap between production and comprehension. The validity of this model is demon-
strated by replicating several experimental findings related to structural priming.
Finally, Chapter 6 sums up our findings and broadens the scope of our discussion
from structural priming to the nature of learning and information flow in the human
cognitive system. We discuss how the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 contribute
to the debate about the nature of learning during comprehension and production and
the purpose of structural priming. We also identify the limitations of the models and
the direction in which our work can be taken in the future.
The computational models reported in this thesis were developed using MATLABTM
and the code for the different models is available as a zip file on the attached CD-ROM.
2
Structural priming and language production
2.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is twofold: to outline the properties of structural priming
and to review the importance of structural priming in the study of language production.
The second goal provides the context and tells us why we study structural priming. The
first goal then fills in the details and enumerates the gaps in our knowledge.
We begin by reviewing what we know about language production in humans and
the place of syntactic decisions during production. There are a number of questions
about making syntactic decisions that require careful consideration: at what stage are
syntactic decisions made during language production; what information influences
these decisions; how do we learn to make such decisions? We will see that there
seems to be a consensus about how to answer some of these questions, while answers
to others are as yet unknown, or controversial. This is where the study of structural
priming comes in. Structural priming helps us understand the processes and represen-
tations that underlie syntactic decisions. Researchers have already conducted studies
that show how syntactic decisions are influenced by other kinds of choices made during
language production. We will be interested in two kinds of choices that can influence
syntactic decisions – the choice of words used in an utterance and the choice of the
meaning that the speaker wants to convey. It is not straightforward to answer how
each of these choices can influence syntactic decisions. But we will see that studies of
structural priming provide some insight into how syntactic decisions can be influenced
by each of these choices.
Finally, investigations into the nature of structural priming also show how it changes
with time. This property of structural priming provides crucial insight into the pro-
19
20 Chapter 2. Structural priming and language production
cesses responsible for its existence, the nature of learning syntactic choice and the
interaction of syntactic representations with other kinds of information during lan-
guage production. Therefore we will present a brief summary of the studies that show
how structural priming changes with the passage of time. Together, these properties
of structural priming and their role in syntactic decisions will motivate the need for
a mechanistic account that can provide the etiology of structural priming in language
production.
2.2 The Language Production System
Now let us look at the processes involved in language production. From the infor-
mation processing perspective, production can be seen as a transformation that converts
an input signal that encodes a mental state to an output signal that encodes speech.
Somewhere along this transformation, speakers need to choose the information they
want to convey, how to package this information and how to articulate it. Specifically,
when speakers package information they need to make decisions about the syntax of
their utterances. In this section, we will review what we know about the processes of
making syntactic decisions. These processes can be viewed in two different contexts.
The first context is that of the mental processes of the speaker – i.e. the set of processes
in the speaker’s brain that lead to a syntactic decision. The other context is that of a
conversation between two or more people – i.e. the set of linguistic exchanges that
lead to a syntactic decision. We will see that the study of syntactic priming is central
to the understanding of syntactic decisions in both these contexts.
§ 2.2.1 The organization of language production
We have just stated that when we produce a speech signal we need to perform a trans-
formation from a mental state to overt speech. This transformation consists of a num-
ber of functions that need to prepare different aspects of the speech signal. For example
the cognitive system must prepare the concepts to be expressed, the words that express
these concepts, the order in which these words are arranged, the function words that
make this order unambiguous, the suffixes and affixes attached to each word, the sound
of each word etc. However, just because all these functions need to be performed by
a speaker does not mean that each of these functions corresponds to an independent
process of the language production system. It could very well be that, for example, the
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same process that chooses the content words in an utterance also chooses the function
words. How can we be sure of the independent existence of these processes in the
cognitive system and how can we understand how information passes between these
processes?
One answer to this question comes from the study of spontaneously occurring
speech errors. People occasionally make an error while speaking, where they say
something that they did not intend to – e.g. minx in spoonlight in place of sphinx
in moonlight (Fromkin, 1971). The mistakes made during these speech errors are not
random but occur in particular patterns. These patterns have been carefully studied and
tell us that the construction of our utterances obey a strong set of constraints (Meringer
& Mayer, 1993; Fromkin, 1971; Garrett, 1975). Based, in part, on the study of such
speech errors, the processes of language production have been divided into three ma-
jor classes: conceptualization, formulation and articulation (Levelt, 1989). Different
models differ in some of the specific details of these processes, but there seems to be
a general agreement on the broad outline of these processes (Bock & Levelt, 1994;
Levelt, 1989; Garrett, 1975, 1988).
Conceptualization consists of the processes that determine what the speaker wants
to say. The result of this process is a preverbal message (Levelt, 1989) that is passed
on to the second class of processes for formulation. This second class, formulation,
consists of a set of processes that take the preverbal message and translate it into a
linguistic form. This translation consists of three mutually independent sub-processes
of functional processing, positional processing and phonological encoding (see Figure
2.2.1). Functional processing involves the selection of words and assignment of syn-
tactic roles to these words. However, it does not involve the process of ordering the
words themselves. This ordering of words is done at the level of positional processing.
Finally, after the selected words have been ordered, their sounds are retrieved during a
separate stage of processing known as phonological encoding. This finishes the pro-
cess of formulation and results in a phonetic plan for the utterance which is then passed
on to a class of processes responsible for articulation of this phonetic plan.
We noted above that the goal of this thesis is to look at the processes responsible
for making syntactic decisions. These are the processes that occur at the levels of func-
tional processing and positional processing. Together, they are known as the processes
of grammatical encoding (Levelt, 1989; Bock & Levelt, 1994). In this section we will
identify the details of what each of these processes needs to achieve in order to perform
grammatical encoding. We will discuss two kinds of evidence for the identification of

































Figure 2.2.1: An overview of the language production system. Adapted from Bock and
Levelt (1994) and Levelt (1989)
these processes. The first, as we noted above, is the evidence from speech errors. And
the second, which is central to the theme of this thesis, is the evidence from the study
of structural priming.
§ 2.2.1.1. A word about structural priming.— The phenomenon of structural
priming is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, like speech errors, structural priming
obeys certain constraints. The amount of structural priming varies based on the prop-
erties of the prime and the relationship between prime and target utterances. Thus
structural priming allows the experimenter to determine those properties that play a
role in determining the syntax of an utterance. Secondly, structural priming shows us
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that the processes of language production are intimately tied to the processes of mem-
orisation. It is memory that connects the target utterance to the prime. Since not every
aspect of the prime utterance influences the syntactic structure of the target, structural
priming helps us determine how the cognitive system extracts properties of utterances
for memorisation. Thus, by analyzing the properties of structural priming, we can gain
insight into the nature of the cognitive system underlying language production.
§ 2.2.2 Functional Processing
Functional processing comes immediately after conceptualization (see figure 2.2.1)
and therefore gets a preverbal message as an input. It is also separated from positional
processing, the stage that is explicitly responsible for ordering words. The goal of
functional processing is to take this preverbal message and generate a list of words,
each of which have been assigned its syntactic role. In order to do this, this stage
relies on the speaker’s lexicon. Therefore to understand the processes of functional
processing we need to understand of the structure of the lexicon.
§ 2.2.2.1. Lexical selection.— Bock and Levelt (1994) identified two sub-processes
involved at the stage of functional processing: lexical selection and function assign-
ment. During lexical selection speakers retrieve those lemmas from the lexicon that
allow them to convey the preverbal message. Lemmas are elements of the lexical net-
work that lie between lexical concepts and word forms (Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer,
1999) and contain grammatical information corresponding to each word. The meaning
of words is represented at a separate level in the lexicon as lexical concepts. Evidence
of this separation between the grammatical form and conceptual content of words in the
lexicon is obtained through semantic substitution errors. When speakers make seman-
tic substitution errors, they replace a word in an utterance with a semantically related
word, as in I received the trees, er — flowers you sent me. The crucial fact about se-
mantic substitutions is that they, nearly always, preserve the grammatical form class of
the word that was replaced. If semantic substitutions are made by speakers when they
make errors in retrieving the lexical concept, then this correct retrieval of the gram-
matical form class shows that speakers retrieve the grammatical form of utterances at a
separate stage of processing. This second stage of processing that is responsible for re-
trieving the grammatical information corresponding to words is lexical selection. Thus
semantic substitution errors show that lexical selection is part of grammatical encod-
ing and independent of the processes that are responsible for retrieving the conceptual
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content of a word.
That speakers access the semantic and grammatical properties of words separately
from the phonological and morphological properties is further evidenced by the tip-
of-the-tongue phenomenon. The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon is a state in which a
speaker cannot quite recall a familiar word but can recall words of similar form or
meaning (Brown & McNeill, 1966). If speakers in the tip-of-the-tongue state can be
shown to know certain grammatical property of the word, but be unaware of its phono-
logical form, then clearly the two kinds of information must be separately accessed.
This is exactly what was shown by Vigliocco, Antonini, and Garrett (1997) who found
that Italian speakers can be aware of the syntactic gender of words for which they
cannot yet generate a pronunciation code.
§ 2.2.2.2. Function Assignment.— Though lexical selection is able to give a list
of words along with their grammatical class information, this list of words cannot
yet be used to decide the order of the selected words. To do this, the speaker must
determine the grammatical function that each word should perform in an utterance1.
This task is performed by the process of function assignment. Bock and Levelt (1994)
point out that the process of function assignment needs to be separate from lexical
selection because the same words may serve different functions in different sentences
– The dog chased the cat versus The cat chased the dog. They also point out that this
process needs to be separate from positional processing because speakers can order
words in two or more different ways while keeping the grammatical function of each
word to be the same.
While we know that speakers need to assign syntactic functions independently of
lexical selection and positional processing, we do not completely understand the mech-
anism of this functional assignment. Bock and Levelt (1994) identify four kinds of
problems that must be addressed by a theory of functional assignment. They sug-
gest that such a theory must identify (a) the nature of grammatical functions that are
assigned, (b) the kinds of information that control the functional assignment, (c) the
nature of the elements that the functions are assigned to and (d) the organisation of
processes that carry out these operations. Each of these questions is the topic of much
1Following Bock and Levelt (1994), we use the term grammatical function to refer to the function of
each lemma in an utterance. Examples of these functions are syntactic elements such as subject, verb,
direct object and indirect object. But it is also possible to think of these syntactic elements as relations
between different lemmas in an utterance. For example, in the utterance Don Ciccio slapped on the
kitchen table a wild rabbit, Don Ciccio is ‘the subject of the verb’ slapped. In this sense, a subject is a
grammatical relation rather than a grammatical function. In our discussion, we will assume that the two
terms are equivalent and that the processes of functional assignment specify both kinds of relationships.
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debate in linguistics and psycholinguistics (see Bock and Levelt (1994) for more de-
tails). In this thesis we will be concerned with the questions (b) and (d).
Let us first consider the question about the kinds of information that control func-
tional assignment. At this stage of processing, the speaker has information available
about the semantic and grammatical properties of the lemmas and about the message
that needs to be expressed. This message contributes information about the semantic
roles of different lexical concepts in an utterance. One way in which this information
can be represented is as thematic roles such as AGENT, PATIENT, THEME, etc. Then, the
question that can be asked is how this information about thematic roles along with the
semantic and grammatical properties of the lemmas governs function assignment. A
related question is whether this information governs just the function assignment, or if
it directly governs the ordering of words in an utterance (discussed further below).
§ 2.2.2.3. Investigation of function assignment using structural priming.—
Bock and Loebell (1990) used the structural priming paradigm to explore the role of
conceptual information in function assignment and ordering of words. They gave sub-
jects primes and targets that matched either in both the thematic roles and the phrase
structure or just in the phrase structure. For example, the prime The wealthy widow
gave her Mercedes to the church matches the target The girl is handing the paintbrush
to the boy in both the phrase structure (noun phrase–verb–noun phrase–prepositional
phrase) and the thematic role assignment (both have dative structure). On the other
hand, this target would match another prime, such as The wealthy widow drover her
Mercedes to the church in the phrase structure, but not in thematic role assignment
(prime has locative structure). Bock and Loebell (1990) found that the additional over-
lap in thematic roles between prime and target had no enhanced effect on structural
priming. Based on this result, they concluded that message level information such
as thematic roles do not directly play a part in the ordering of utterances (i.e. the
choice of phrase structure rules). This however leaves the possibility that message
level information, such as thematic roles, do have an effect on functional assignment.
This possibility was explored by another study, which also used the syntactic priming
paradigm.
Bock, Loebell, and Morey (1992) varied the functional assignment of conceptual
information in the prime and observed how it affected the target. Instead of varying
the thematic roles like Bock and Loebell (1990), this study varied a primitive semantic
feature – animacy – of subject and object arguments of the primes. A sentence such
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as The dog followed the car has an animate subject and an inanimate object, while The
car followed the dog reverses the grammatical function of the animate and inanimate
entities. Bock et al. (1992) found an animacy priming – i.e. if subjects produced
a prime with an animate entity as the subject, then they also tended to produce an
animate entity as the subject in the target. Bock et al. (1992) also found that this
animacy priming was separate and independent of the thematic role assignment – i.e.
the amount of animacy priming received from a prime with an animate agent was equal
to the amount of priming received from a prime with an animate patient. This finding
led Bock et al. (1992) to argue that it is the primitive semantic features such as animacy
which controls functional assignment, rather than message level information such as
thematic roles.
But this observation still does not tell us whether these primitive semantic features
influence just the functional assignment or if they directly influence the ordering of
words in the utterance. To answer this question, Bock et al. (1992) observed that the
amount of animacy priming is separate and independent, not just of the thematic role
assignment but also of the phrase structure of the utterance. In other words, syntactic
priming and animacy priming were additive and did not interfere with each other. This
additivity of animacy and structural priming suggests that the influence of priming
upon the choice of syntactic structure is independent of the influence of priming upon
the choice of grammatical function (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). Thus one can con-
clude that primitive semantic features, such as animacy influence function assignment
and not the procedures that determine the phrase structure (i.e. ordering of words) of
an utterance.
Beside the question about the kinds of information that control function assign-
ment, the other important question was about the organisation of the processes that
carry out function assignment. Bock and Levelt (1994) point out that functional as-
signment seems to be controlled by the verb. They suggest that, during function as-
signment, the lemma for the verb contributes argument structures which can be used to
link the lemmas together. Studies on speech errors (Garrett, 1980) and attraction errors
(Bock & Cutting, 1992) both suggest the centrality of the verb in performing function
assignment. In chapter 5 we will discuss a schema-based representation for seman-
tics that naturally explains this centrality of verbs in the assignment of grammatical
functions.
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§ 2.2.2.4. Evidence for functional processing using speech errors.— More evi-
dence on the separation of functional and positional processing comes from the exis-
tence of exchange errors. During an exchange error a speaker switches two words in
an utterance – I received the flowers I sent you instead of I received the flowers you
sent me. Such an error shows that the speaker has mistakenly exchanged the syntac-
tic functions for two lemmas, assigning them to incorrect roles in the utterance. Such
exchange errors occur for both content words and function words. But importantly,
content words almost always exchange only with other content words while function
words exchange with function words (Harley, 2001) implying a separation between
the processes that operate on the two types of words. Based on such observations, Gar-
rett (1975) proposed that syntactic planning should be separated into functional and
positional processing, with content words being assigned grammatical roles during the
former and function words being chosen during the latter.
§ 2.2.3 Positional Processing
The procedures of grammatical encoding must not only associate each lemma with
a grammatical function, they must also impose a sequence on these lemmas. This
arrangement of lemmas in a sequence is done through positional processing, which
consists of two kinds of operations: constituent assembly and inflection (see Figure
2.2.1).
§ 2.2.3.1. Constituent Assembly.— Let us first look at the operation of constituent
assembly which is the actual process of ordering the lemmas into a sequence. For per-
forming this operation, the speakers have, at their behest, the knowledge of the gram-
matical class of each lemma, the semantic features of the lemmas (obtained from the
lexicon), the grammatical function of each lemma and the semantic properties of the
message (e.g. the thematic roles). With all this information available, speakers use
their procedural knowledge of the language to assemble the lemmas into a sequence.
Just like the question about the role of different kinds of information in function as-
signment, we can also ask the role of different kinds of information in constituent
assembly.
A related question is about the nature of the speaker’s procedural knowledge –
the knowledge of a list of procedures that allows the speaker to incrementally con-
struct the utterance from the list of lemmas and under the constraints imposed by the
speaker’s language. A crucial property of this procedural knowledge is that it needs
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to be lexically driven – i.e. the grammatical properties of the lemmas control the
structure of the utterance and not the other way around. Levelt (1989, pp. 236–246)
proposed a set of procedures based on a computational model developed by Kempen
and Hoenkamp (1987) that can perform such a lexically-driven grammatical encoding.
These set of procedures, called categorical procedures, incrementally construct hierar-
chical constituent structures based on the available lemmas and their grammatical cat-
egories. The critical question – a source of much debate in psycholinguistics – is that
of the dependence of these categorical procedures, on the speaker’s lexical knowledge.
Three possibilities exist: the procedural knowledge is (a) completely dependent, (b)
completely independent, or (c) somewhat dependent on the lexical knowledge. These
possibilities are pictorially depicted as Venn-diagrams in Figure 2.2.2.
Lex Syn
(a) Syn ⊂ Lex
Lex Syn
(b) Syn ∩ Lex = /0
Lex Syn
(c) Syn ∩ Lex 6= /0
Figure 2.2.2: The sets ‘Syn’ and ‘Lex’ stand for the speaker’s procedural and lexical
knowledge. The symbols ⊂ and ∩ refer to the subset and intersection operations and
/0 is the symbol for the empty set.
§ 2.2.3.2. Investigation of constituent assembly using structural priming.—
Several studies show the independence of a speakers procedural knowledge. We saw
above that Bock and Loebell (1990) showed the independence between procedural
knowledge (the knowledge responsible for word ordering) and thematic roles and Bock
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et al. (1992) showed the independence between procedural knowledge and primitive
semantic features. Pickering and Ferreira (2008) discuss further evidence that suggests
that something like phrase structure rules operate during sentence production and struc-
tural priming of these phrase structure rules is independent of variation in other aspects
of the grammatical structure of sentences.
These studies seem to indicate the view in Figure 2.2.2 (b) where the procedural
and lexical knowledge are completely independent. However, structural priming has
also shown evidence of an overlap. Pickering and Branigan (1998) was the first study to
look at the lexical influence on selection of syntactic structure. They used a structural
priming paradigm which varied the lexical overlap in prime and target utterances and
noted the effect on the syntactic form of the target. Like Bock (1986) and Bock and
Loebell (1990), they found a structural priming effect so that subjects were more likely
to use a syntactic structure for the target utterance, if the prime used the same structure.
Crucially, they also found that this structural priming increased if the prime and target
utterances used the same verb. This result, known as the lexical-boost effect, has been
replicated by several other studies since (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000; Corley
& Scheepers, 2002; Cleland & Pickering, 2006; Schoonbaert, Hartsuiker, & Pickering,
2007). The increase in structural priming suggests that procedural knowledge is, at
the very least, associated with lexical knowledge. Equivalently, one can argue that the
process of constituent assembly seems to draw on the process of lexical selection.
Thus the overlap in lexical and procedural knowledge seems to be closest to Figure
2.2.2 (c), such that procedural information is partially abstract and partially associated
with lexical entries. Pickering and Ferreira (2008) suggest that this partial overlap be-
tween lexical and syntactic information can be represented by two types of accounts:
(a) A two-locus account which assumes that separate cognitive systems lead to abstract
(lexically independent) priming and lexicalized (lexically boosted) priming, and (b) a
one-locus account which assumes a single mechanism can explain both abstract prim-
ing and the lexical boost. In the next chapter we will present, in detail, two accounts
that claim to explain structural priming: an error-based account which is a formal ac-
count showing how the lexically independent component of priming can arise during
language learning and a trailing activation account which is a conceptual account that
proposes a mechanism for lexically boosted priming.
So far we have considered priming studies that investigate influence of lexical and
semantic information on constituent assembly. The first set of studies demonstrated
that the process of constituent assembly is uninfluenced by thematic roles and primi-
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tive semantic features like animacy. The second set of studies showed that constituent
assembly is influenced by lexical information. Cleland and Pickering (2003) extended
these findings by observing that structural priming is enhanced by not only the exact
repetition of the lemma between prime and target trials (as observed by Pickering and
Branigan (1998)), but also by the repetition of a semantically related lemma. Thus
structural priming shows not only a lexical boost, but also a “semantic boost”. This
finding implies that the process of constituent assembly can be influenced by the se-
mantic features of the lemmas in the utterance and therefore, on the surface, seems to
contradict the conclusions of Bock et al. (1992), who found that primitive semantic
features do not affect choice of syntactic structure. However, Bock et al. (1992) were
interested solely in those semantic features that affect the mental prominence, or con-
ceptual accessibility of words. They found that this conceptual accessibility influences
choice of grammatical function but does not influence the choice of phrase structure.
The results of Cleland and Pickering (2003), on the other hand, used category co-
membership (dog-cat) to measure semantic relatedness and found that lemmas related
in this manner do show an influence on the choice of phrase structure. In addition,
Cleland and Pickering (2003) also found that phonological relatedness (cat-cot) does
not influence structural priming, suggesting that the process of constituent assembly is
unaffected by phonological feedback.
While the results of Cleland and Pickering (2003) do not contradict the findings of
Bock and Loebell (1990) and Bock et al. (1992), Pickering and Ferreira (2008) note
that two other priming studies challenge the belief that message structure does not in-
fluence the choice of syntactic structure. The first study done by Griffin and Weinstein-
Tull (2003) manipulated the message structure of primes. They found that manipulat-
ing the number of thematic roles in the prime had an effect on whether or not subjects
paraphrased a finite complement clause such as John believed that Mary was nice as
a noun phrase plus an infinitive clause John believed Mary to be nice. Griffin and
Weinstein-Tull (2003) concluded that, subtle differences in the message structure can
affect how speakers grammatically encode message elements. The second study was
conducted by Chang, Bock, and Goldberg (2003) and also varied the message struc-
ture of the prime, while keeping the phrase structure to be the same. For example, the
two primes The man sprayed the water on the wall and The man sprayed the wall with
water have the same phrase structure: noun phrase–verb–noun phrase–prepositional
phrase, but differ in their message structure. The first phrase adopts a theme-locative
structure, putting the theme (water) before the locative (wall), while the second adopts
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a locative-theme structure putting the locative before the theme. Chang et al. (2003)
found a difference in priming patterns for the two kinds of primes, with theme-locative
increasing in likelihood after a theme-locative prime and the locative-theme structure
increasing in likelihood after a locative-theme prime. Because there is no difference
in the phrase structure of the two types of primes, the difference in structural priming
must be due to the difference in the message structure. Thus, in contrast to Bock and
Loebell (1990), these results show that thematic roles can influence the mechanism of
constituent assembly, under the condition that both primes show a similar amount of
structural priming.
§ 2.2.3.3. Inflection.— The processes of inflection are responsible for encoding
grammatical features of lemmas such as tense, aspect and number and determining
how words are bound to other words in the utterance. Evidence for the independent
existence of this subsystem comes from speech errors. In an exchange error like She’s
already trunked two packs (Garrett, 1975), the content words trunk and pack get ex-
changed, but their bound-suffixes do not. This phenomenon, known as morpheme
stranding, is known to occur in spontaneous speech (Garrett, 1975) and shows that the
ordering of content words and the attachment of their suffixes (or, more generally, the
process of inflection) occur at different stages in language production. Besides speech
errors, there is also evidence from affix loss in Broca’s aphasia and affix addition to
neologisms in jargon aphasia that suggests an independent subsystem in the brain re-
sponsible for inflection (Harley, 2001).
§ 2.2.4 Production and dialogue
So far we have been viewing language production as an information processing system
that transforms a preverbal message into overt speech. But language production is
rarely done in isolation. During a dialogue, two such language production systems
interact and the processing of one system starts to depend on the other. Speakers
do not just want to produce an utterance, they want to produce an utterance for a
listener. This means that speakers must tailor their utterances so that they are relevant
to the conversation and understandable for the listener. Thus, the speaker’s production
system comes under an additional load trying to respond to the listener in a limited time
frame and keeping in mind the listener’s point of view. Garrod and Pickering (2004)
note that due to these factors and others (such as the use of fragmentary and elliptical
utterances in dialogue), dialogue should be much more difficult than the simple act
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of production, or monologue. However, they note, that this does not seem to be the
case. Speakers find dialogue just as easy, if not easier, than monologue. In light of
this observation, what can we say about the processes of language production during
dialogue?
One answer comes from the study of dialogue as a joint activity between inter-
locutors (Clark, 1996). According to this theory, interlocutors divide the burden of
holding a conversation amongst themselves. Instead of interlocutors behaving in the
same way as they would have during a monologue, they reduce their work by depend-
ing on their partner for generating part of the information required for holding the
conversation. Specifically, Clark (1996) proposed that interlocutors maintain a “com-
mon ground” which includes the shared information between them and their partners2.
This common ground could contain, for example, knowledge of the social and lin-
guistic community that they both form part of and new information that interlocutors
have exchanged during the conversation. By consulting the common ground, speakers
can then decrease their effort during a dialogue by only providing novel information
that adds to this common ground and by allowing their partner to consult the common
ground to generate the complete information structure. In this way, the language pro-
duction system of the speaker can defer part of its load to the listener, allowing them
to consult the common ground to fully understand the speaker. However, Garrod and
Pickering (2004) point out that actively maintaining this knowledge of the common
ground in addition to the speaker’s private knowledge would in itself create an addi-
tional burden for the speaker and therefore does not completely tell us how speakers
are able to participate in dialogues with such ease. In addition, there are other activi-
ties in a dialogue, such as listening to one’s partner at the same time as planning one’s
speech, that should make dialogues harder and cannot be explained by appealing to the
notion of common ground.
Some crucial insights into ‘why dialogue can be easy’ come from studies of rep-
etition in dialogue. Levelt and Kelter (1982) found that during a conversation, inter-
locutors tended to repeat material used by their partner. Speakers answered questions
such as (At) what time do you close with Five o’clock or At five o’clock depending on
whether the original question used At or not. This repetition could be due to repetition
of a function word, or due to structural priming (of prepositional or non-prepositional
structure). Garrod and Anderson (1987) found repetition at another level. They made
participants describe locations in a cooperative maze game. They observed that when a
2Specifically, information that interlocutors realise is shared between them.
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player used a description like I’m two along, four up for intimating their location on a
maze, their partner tended to use a similar ‘path-description’ scheme – I’m one along,
five up. On the other hand, when a participant used a coordinate scheme of describing
their location – I’m at B4 – their partner also tended to use the same scheme – I’m at
A5. A third kind of repetition was observed by Brennan and Clark (1996) who asked
subjects to describe pictures to each other and found that interlocutors tended to repeat
the referring expressions used by their partner.
One reason behind this repetition could be a strategic choice by the interlocutor
to repeat the words, syntax or description scheme of their interlocutor. But another
reason could be an automatic priming mechanism. Branigan et al. (2000) put this
second hypothesis to test by checking if interlocutors showed structural priming based
on the choice of syntactic structure made by their partner in a dialogue. They used a
confederate-scripting scheme where one speaker was a confederate of the experimenter
and produced scripted descriptions that systematically varied the syntactic structure.
Participants were required to take turns to describe pictures to each other. They found
that participants in this dialogue experiment tended to choose a syntactic structure if
they had just heard their partner (the confederate) use that syntactic structure. For
example, if a participant had just heard their partner describe a picture as The burglar
gave the priest a camera (double-object phrase), they tended to describe their picture
as The postman offered the policeman a banana rather than The postman offered a
banana to the policeman (prepositional-object phrase). In other words, participants in a
dialogue showed structural priming. Branigan et al. (2000) also found that participants
showed lexical boost – the amount of structural priming increased significantly when
the picture described by the confederate and the subsequent picture described by the
participant used the same verb. Other studies have subsequently replicated this effect
of structural priming in dialogue (see Pickering and Ferreira (2008) for a review).
These findings of repetition and priming in dialogue illuminate another reason
which might be responsible for why speakers find dialogue to be easy. Because in-
terlocutors show a tendency to repeat the linguistic structure they have just heard, they
can avoid constructing each of these linguistic structures from the ground-up and reuse
the linguistic structure constructed by their partner. Based on these observations, Pick-
ering and Garrod (2004) have proposed an interactive-alignment account of dialogue.
This account suggests that interlocutors maintain an “implicit common ground” in-
stead of separately maintaining their internal knowledge and a common ground for
the conversation. While common ground depends on both the shared information and
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on the knowledge that this information is shared, implicit common ground depends
simply of the shared information. Pickering and Garrod (2004) suggest that interlocu-
tors can generate this implicit common ground by aligning different levels of of their
linguistic representations with those of their interlocutor. This alignment of linguis-
tic representations can be achieved automatically through the mechanism of priming.
In this interactive-alignment account, interlocutors can use their own (aligned) repre-
sentations to produce their utterances, without explicitly maintaining the state of their
listener’s knowledge all the time. In this sense, the interactive-alignment account pro-
poses an implicit common ground generated through processes of priming.
Another property of structural priming plays a crucial role in the interactive-alignment
account. As noted above, Branigan et al. (2000) found a lexical boost in structural
priming during dialogue. The interactive-alignment account proposes that such a lex-
ical boost is one manifestation of a more general phenomenon whereby alignment at
one level spreads to alignment at another level. Just like lexical alignment can spread to
syntactic representations by boosting certain syntactic choices over others, Pickering
and Garrod (2004) argue that alignment at other levels can spread in a similar fashion.
This mechanism of spreading alignment ensures that alignment is not just a localised
phenomenon and that alignment of certain linguistic representations eventually leads
to alignment of mental states. In agreement with this hypothesis, Cleland and Picker-
ing (2003) have found that semantically related nouns between prime and target also
led to an increase in structural priming, showing that lexical boost is not an isolated
instance of alignment spreading from one linguistic level to the other.
Criticism of the interactive-alignment account comes from studies that demonstrate
that interlocutors can use strategic processes to tailor their utterances to their partners in
dialogue. Brennan and Clark (1996) asked subjects to participate in a card-description
task and showed that interlocutors aligned their lexical descriptions with that of their
parter – a phenomenon called lexical entrainment (Garrod & Anderson, 1987). Bren-
nan and Clark (1996) found that lexical entrainment was partner-specific – i.e. the
effect of lexical entrainment became weaker when the partner of the speaker in a con-
versation was changed. Based on these partner-specific effects in lexical entrainment
Brennan and Clark (1996) argued that interlocutors make implicit “conceptual pacts”
between themselves in a dialogue (agreeing to use a particular term for the descrip-
tion of a particular card, in this case). They added that parter-specificity in their ex-
periments showed that interlocutors explicitly referred to these conceptual pacts while
constructing their descriptions. On basis of these arguments, Brennan and Clark (1996)
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suggested that interlocutors rely on strategic, and not automatic, processes during lan-
guage production (but see Garrod and Pickering (in press) for an objection to their
experiment design). An interesting study in this context is that done by Horton and
Keysar (1996) who observed that speakers took their partner’s perspective into ac-
count when they were under no time pressure. But when the speakers were put under a
time-pressure, they tended towards more egocentric descriptions without considering
their partner’s perspective. In chapter 4 we will discuss a model that offers a solution
to these contrasting findings and is able to show a variable amount of priming based
upon the level of automaticity in the system.
While the processes of language production during dialogue remains an active topic
of debate, our discussion shows how priming, in general, and structural priming, in
particular, is pivotal to the investigation of these processes. Priming forms the crucial
causal link that connects comprehension to production, allowing production to reuse
information from comprehension and, in turn, allowing the speaker to use information
generated by their partner. In this way priming allows interlocutors to pursue dialogue
as a joint activity.
2.3 Temporal properties of structural priming
So far we have considered structural priming as an investigative tool. We can con-
trol this tool by systematically varying the prime and observing the change in the target.
The prime and target are separated in time and therefore priming is a mechanism that
allows information to be transferred through time. One can think of priming as an in-
formation channel that stretches through time. The experimenter systematically varies
information at one end of the channel (the prime) and observes the effect on the other
end (the target). Different linguistic properties of the prime are transferred differently
across the channel and therefore tell us about the nature of the channel itself. Take
lexical boost as an example. When the prime and target contain the same word, we
observe an increase in the flow of information along the channel. This increase in the
flow of information tells us that words carry part of structural information, predicting
a lexical influence on structural representations.
In this thesis, we would like to investigate the properties of structural priming it-
self. In the information-channel metaphor, we would like to investigate the mechanism
of information-flow across this channel. One way to understand the properties of the
channel is to increase or decrease its length and observe how it changes the flow of
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information. Because the channel exists across time (between prime and target), in-
creasing or decreasing its length is the same as varying the duration (or intervening
utterances) between the prime and target and observing how it affects structural prim-
ing. The information channel that we have been talking about so far is nothing but a
kind of memory. We want to investigate the mechanistic principles behind this mem-
ory and we are suggesting that one way to do this is to vary the time between encoding
and recall and see how it affects memory.
The temporal properties of structural priming are of interest for another reason.
There is an ongoing debate about the cognitive function of structural priming (Ferreira
& Bock, 2006; Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). We saw above that one function of prim-
ing could be to facilitate alignment in dialogue. This account claims priming leads
to aligned representation at a particular linguistic level and this alignment spreads to
other levels leading to aligned mental states between interlocutors (Pickering & Gar-
rod, 2004). A contrasting cognitive function of structural priming could be to perform
language learning. According to this account, comprehension leads to implicit learning
in the procedural knowledge and structural priming is a consequence of this implicit
learning. Therefore, this account proposes that the function of structural priming is
language acquisition. Chang et al. (2006) have developed an error-based model that
tries to acquire such procedural knowledge and is able to show structural priming. (We
discuss this model in greater detail in the next chapter.) Thus according to the align-
ment account, structural priming is the result of a memory trace that is required during
the conversation, while according to the implicit learning account structural priming
is the result of implicit learning that leads to language acquisition over a long period
of time. We will revisit this debate from time to time during this thesis and flesh out
the details and assumptions of each argument. For the present purposes, it is important
to note that the temporal properties of priming are at the heart of this debate. In this
section we review three temporal properties of priming and the experimental evidence
supporting or opposing each. We will review two of these experiments in some de-
tail because the models presented in this thesis are tested under the setup designed for
these experiments.
§ 2.3.0.1. Decay of structural priming.— There is some recent evidence which
shows that structural priming is long-lived. Bock and Griffin (2000) tested the du-
ration of structural priming by varying the number of unrelated filler utterances that
separated prime and target trials. In their first experiment subjects received 0, 1 or
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2 filler utterances between prime and target trials. Bock and Griffin (2000) found no
reduction in priming when the number of fillers increased. In their second experiment,
they extended this finding by increasing the number of fillers between prime and tar-
get. Subjects saw 0, 4 or 10 intransitive (filler) utterances between the prime and target
trial. They found no consistent decline in the amount of structural priming even with
10 filler trials between prime and target. Bock and Griffin (2000) argued that these
findings supported the explanation of structural priming in terms of long-term learning
rather than a transient memory activation mechanism. Bock, Dell, Chang, and Onishi
(2007) replicated these findings using only auditorily presented primes and argued for
the persistence of structural priming regardless of the modality in which the language
structure is experienced.
However, in contrast to these findings Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (1999)
found a steady reduction in priming when primes were separated by 0, 1 or 2 fillers.
Two aspects of this study differed from the experiments conducted by Bock and Griffin
(2000). Firstly, participants in this study wrote down, rather than spoke, the prime and
target sentences. Secondly, in the study conducted by Bock and Griffin (2000) primes
and targets used different verbs while in the study conducted by Branigan et al. (1999)
primes and targets used the same verbs. As we will see below, this overlap in the verb
between prime and target proves to be a crucial factor in how priming decays.
§ 2.3.0.2. Relative decay of structural priming and lexical boost.— In order to
understand the conflicting findings of Bock and Griffin (2000), who found structural
priming to be long-lived, and Branigan et al. (1999), who found a quick decay in
structural priming, Hartsuiker et al. (2008) conducted a set of experiment to see (a)
if structural priming and lexical boost decay at different rates and (b) if the decay in
structural priming depended on the modality (written or spoken) in which the experi-
ment was conducted. Each experiment was divided into two sessions – one for testing
written and the other for testing spoken conditions. One of the sessions of the experi-
ment was conducted using the confederate-scripting paradigm similar to the one used
by Branigan et al. (2000). This session tested the spoken modality and two subjects
(one of whom was a confederate of the experimenter) took turns to describe pictures
to each other. In order to test the results for the written modality, a second session was
conducted using computer-based chatting. The procedure of the experiment remained
the same – participants took turns to describe pictures to each other – except this time
the descriptions were typed into the chatting program and one of the participants (the
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confederate) was simply simulated using a computer script.
In both the sessions, Hartsuiker et al. (2008) varied the number of filler trials be-
tween the prime and target trials. Specifically, they inserted 0, 2 or 6 filler trials, called
Lag 0, Lag 2 or Lag 6 condition. The pictures used for the prime and target trials could
be described using either a prepositional-object dative (The teacher sells an apple to
the monk) or a double-object dative (The teacher sells the monk an apple), while the
pictures presented during the filler trials displayed actions that can be described using a
transitive sentence (The swimmer chases the police office). In addition, Hartsuiker et al.
(2008) also varied the lexical overlap between prime and target trials. Prime and target
trials could either show pictures with the same action giving the ‘Same Verb’ con-
dition, or they could show pictures with different actions giving the ‘Different Verb’
condition.
Figure 2.3.1: Results for a spoken and written session from Hartsuiker et al. (2008)
Hartsuiker et al. (2008) found, for both spoken and written conditions, structural
priming persisted across all three lags and there was no numerically consistent trend
in the change of structural priming. They also found that the ‘Same Verb’ condition
showed larger structural priming as compared to the ‘Different Verb’ condition at Lag
0 – i.e. participants showed a lexical boost. However, in contrast to structural prim-
ing, this lexical boost was short-lived, with no reliable difference between the ‘Same
Verb’ and ‘Different Verb’ conditions at Lag 2 and Lag 6. This result remained true
irrespective of whether the participants used spoken or written modality. Based on
these results, Hartsuiker et al. (2008) argued that the discrepancy in the longevity of
structural priming observed by Bock and Griffin (2000) and Branigan et al. (1999) was
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not due to the different modalities tested by the two experiments, but due to the fact
that Bock and Griffin (2000) tested only Different Verb conditions while Branigan et
al. (1999) tested only Same Verb conditions. A sample of these results for both spoken
and written modalities are shown in Figure 2.3.1.
§ 2.3.0.3. Relative accumulation of structural priming and lexical boost.—
The experimental evidence presented so far has measured the longevity of priming in
terms of the fillers between prime and target trials. Each of these fillers used a different
syntactic structure to that used during the prime trials. For example, the prime trials
in Hartsuiker et al. (2008) could be described using prepositional-object or double-
object datives, while the filler trials were described using a transitive sentence. Thus,
the structural representations evoked during the filler trials do not interfere with those
encoded during the prime trial. Thus these experiments can be seen as measuring a
non-interference based decay in memory. A similar point is that these experiments
measured the long-term effect of structural priming (and lexical boost) obtained from
a single prime trial and not one accumulated over a series of trials.
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) conducted experiments that also measure the long-
term effect of structural priming and lexical boost, but instead of measuring the long-
term learning obtained from a single trial, their experiment measured the effect of a
series of trials. Each participant in the experiment received a list of trials, each of
which consisted of an incomplete sentence. Participants were asked to complete these
sentences. This sentence-completion task is in contrast with the confederate-scripting
task used by Hartsuiker et al. (2008). Whereas the confederate-scripting task emulates
a real-world dialogue situation, this task emulates a monologue situation. However, the
results of priming have been shown for both monologue and dialogue and sentence-
completion is the same task that was used by Pickering and Branigan (1998) in their
demonstration of structural priming and lexical boost.
The experiment trials were divided into two phases, a Training phase and a Testing
phase3. During the training phase, participants received ten prime stems such as:
• Megan gave her mom. . . (double-object prime)
• Megan gave a kiss. . . (prepositional-object prime)
Thus each prime stem was either a prepositional-object (PO) phrase or a double-object
3The terms Training phase and Testing phase are our own. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) call these
phases the Bias phase and Priming phase, respectively. But their terminology is confusing as primes are
presented during both the phases.
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(DO) phrase. This sequence of prime stems was used by Kaschak and Borreggine
(2008) to cause long-term structural priming. Participants either received prime stems
that elicited an equal number of PO and DO completions (Equal condition) or elicited
completions of only one kind – either all PO or all DO (Unequal condition).
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) were interested in measuring how this long-term
memory created in the training phase would affect structural priming. In order to do
this, they gave participants a list of six prime-target pairs at the end of the training
phase. These sequence of six prime-target pairs were termed as the Testing phase.
Each prime and target trial again consisted of a sentence-completion task. All prime
stems elicited the same structure (either PO or DO), while the target stem could be
completed using either of the two structures. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) arranged
their materials in such a manner that the participants who were biased towards one
structure during the training phase received the opposite kind of prime during the test-
ing phase. Thus a participant could be either in the Equal or Unequal conditions during
the training phase and receive PO or DO primes during the testing condition. Here are
examples of each of the resulting four (2×2) conditions:
Equal-PO [DO–PO–DO–PO–DO–DO–PO–PO–PO–DO] [PO–target . . . PO–target]
Equal-DO [DO–PO–PO–DO–DO–PO–PO–DO–DO–PO] [DO–target . . . DO–target]
Unequal-PO [DO–DO–DO–DO–DO–DO–DO–DO–DO–DO] [PO–target . . . PO–target]
Unequal-DO [PO–PO–PO–PO–PO–PO–PO–PO–PO–PO] [DO–target . . . DO–target]
where each prime stem is shown by the type of structure it elicits. We have enclosed
the training and testing phrases within square brackets just for illustrating where the
boundary lies.
In addition, to measure the relative longevities of priming and lexical boost, Kaschak
and Borreggine (2008) divided their participant under two further condition – the
‘Same Verb’ and ‘Different Verb’ conditions. Participants under the Same Verb con-
dition were given verbs picked from the same set during training and testing phases,
while participant under the Different Verb condition received verbs from different sets
in the two phases. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) recorded the completions for the
target sentences and calculated the relative proportion of PO and DO completions un-
der each of these conditions. Their results are shown in figure 2.3.2.
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) found that subjects under the Unequal condition
showed lesser structural priming as compared to the Equal condition. Since the unequal
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Figure 2.3.2: Results for priming under Same and Different Verb conditions from
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). The x-axis shows different (long-term) priming condi-
tions and the y-axis shows the proportion of each type of completion.
condition was used to bias the subjects towards a structure that was opposite of the
one they received during the testing phase, Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) argued
that this was evidence for a long-term priming from the sequence of primes a subject
completed during the training phase. Furthermore, they also found that this difference
in priming was comparable for the Same Verb and Different Verb conditions. While
the relative frequencies of PO and DO constructions during the training phase affected
the magnitude of structural priming, Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) argued that this
pattern was relatively unaffected by whether the verbs in training and testing phases
were same or not, leading them to conclude that long-term structural priming is not
greatly affected by the patterns of experience with particular verbs.
It is worth reiterating that this ‘long-term’ priming measured by Kaschak and Bor-
reggine (2008) is quite different in nature from the long-term priming measured by
Hartsuiker et al. (2008), or indeed Branigan et al. (1999) and Bock and Griffin (2000).
While those experiments measured the decay in structural priming obtained from one
trial, this experiment measured priming obtained from a series of trials (in the training
phase). These two types of priming might internally rely on two different mechanisms
of memory. We will explore this question in greater detail during the design of formal
models for structural priming.
In any case, the different studies discussed in this section all agree that structural
priming seems to be a relatively long-term phenomenon and seems to last for the du-
ration of at least six to ten lags. Lexical boost, on the other hand, seems to decay rela-
tively quickly. These findings suggest that structural priming and lexical boost rely on
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somewhat different, even if overlapping, mechanisms of learning. In the information-
channel parlance discussed at the beginning of this section, structural priming and its
lexical enhancement seem to rely on different sub-channels of information transfer.
This observation forms a key insight that will help us develop a mechanistic account
for structural priming in the coming chapters.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have looked at structural priming both as an investigative tool
for studying language production and as a cognitive phenomenon, itself meriting inves-
tigation. As an investigative tool, structural priming provides insight into the processes
of language production, especially those related to grammatical encoding. It confirms
the separation of some levels previously predicted on the basis of speech errors and also
suggests further stratification of these levels. Structural priming in dialogue also shows
that processes of language production are intricately related to processes of language
comprehension, helping interlocutors to align their mental states with each other. As a
cognitive phenomenon, structural priming lies at the heart of the debate about the na-
ture of learning during linguistic processing. One possibility is that structural priming
is a consequence of language acquisition and another possibility is that it is a transient
memory trace useful during a discourse, which might or might not be used for long-
term language learning. One way to resolve this debate is to look at the duration of
structural priming and we have reviewed studies that show that structural priming per-
sists for up to a lag of 10 intervening utterances, while its lexical enhancement seems
to decay relatively quickly. But does this necessarily mean that structural priming is
used in language acquisition? This question cannot be answered without a knowledge
of the exact learning mechanisms that lead to structural priming and lexical boost. The
goal of this thesis is to give one such mechanistic account. We begin by reviewing two
existing accounts (one formal and one conceptual) in the next chapter and point out
their successes and their pitfalls.
3
Models of Structural Priming
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses theoretical accounts of structural priming. Such theoretical
accounts come in two flavours: computational models, which are specified using a for-
mal mathematical framework, and conceptual models, which systematically specify
the flow of information between different modules. Computational models have the
advantage of being precise and can therefore be tested through simulation while con-
ceptual models have the advantage of being more general and can have several possible
mathematical implementations.
We discuss one formal computational model – the error-correction model proposed
by Chang et al. (2006) – and an alternative conceptual model – the trailing-activation
account. We discuss the strengths of each model and, more importantly, identify the
gaps that need to be filled. Structural priming is, after all, a form of learning and so
we start with some general comments about how models learn from their environment
(section 3.2). We outline, through these comments, the broad distinctions between dif-
ferent learning paradigms. After these preliminary comments, we dive straight into
the description of the error-based model, providing a very short summary and con-
centrating mainly on identifying the limitations of this approach (section 3.3). We
point out these limitations not because we believe that an error-based approach to un-
derstanding priming is wrong, but that it is limited under certain circumstances. In
section 3.4, we develop a formal theory that quantifies how well error-based learning
explains structural priming under different circumstances. Finally, we briefly describe
a conceptual account for structural priming – the trailing-activation account – and its
precursor, the spreading-activation theory (section 3.5). As yet, this account has not
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been implemented as a formal computational model. Therefore, instead of pointing out
its limitations, we focus on mechanisms that need to be elaborated before this account
can be expanded into a precise mathematical model that can be tested.
3.2 Learning in computational models
Scientific investigation begins with the observation of a physical system. The sys-
tematic recording of observations provides a list of behaviours that form the raw data.
The goal of scientific enquiry is to understand the underlying reasons for the produc-
tion of this data. The investigation expresses these reasons as a theory or a model that
explains the data in terms of a set of processes operating over a group of representa-
tions. The next stage in research is to match the behaviour of the model with that of the
physical system. The behaviour of the model is governed by its input and a set of free
parameters. The investigation adjusts these free parameters so that the model closely
matches the observed behaviour of the physical system. This adjustment of the free
parameters as the model comes into contact with its environment is termed as learning
(Mendel & McLaren, 1970).
Another way to look at a model is as a transformation of an input stimulus to an
output or a response. The transformation describes the behaviour of the model and de-
pends on a set of free parameters. As the model comes in contact with its environment,
it generates a response but it also changes its parameters. The model not only trans-
forms the input, but also gets transformed by the input. Various learning algorithms
describe how computational models can both process information and perform learn-
ing at the same time. In this section we consider two learning paradigms that achieve
this goal. In the rest of the chapter we look at specific learning algorithms and models
developed to explain structural priming.
§ 3.2.1 Teachers and pupils
Let us consider a computational model that tries to approximate the stimulus-response
characteristics of a physical system. As the model comes into contact with the envi-
ronment, it would perform transformations on the input signals and generate an output.
This output might or might not match the output that the physical system would have
produced. If we want the model to learn from this episode of information processing, it
will be useful to give the model information about the correctness of the output signal.
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In other words, the model needs a teacher, that possesses knowledge of the physical
system and can ascertain the correctness of the response for each given input. The
learning paradigm that assumes the existence of such a teacher is called supervised
learning.
During supervised learning, the model is trained on a pairs of inputs and target
outputs. The training simulates the model with each input on the list and generates
an output. A teacher compares this output with the target and generates an error. The
model then uses this error to adjust its free parameters such that the error is reduced if
the model was simulated again.
Of course, if we want to use this learning paradigm we have to assume that a teacher
will be available that possesses enough knowledge about the environment and we can
use this teacher to predict the target output for every given input. But this assumption
might not always be true. Consider a system that models language comprehension.
The target output of such a system in not entirely clear. Depending upon what stage
of language comprehension we are modelling, the output might be a concept, a propo-
sition or a thought. Because these are abstract cognitive constructs, it is difficult to
know the target output of the model for any of these stages of comprehension. In the
absence of this knowledge, we cannot use supervised learning for modelling language
comprehension. As we shall see below, Chang et al. (2006) used a trick to overcome
this difficulty. Instead of using any of these abstract cognitive constructs as output,
their model used the input utterance itself as the output and a delayed version of the
utterance as the input.
The alternative to supervised learning is learning without a teacher. This learning
paradigm is, rather unimaginatively, called unsupervised learning. The goal of the
model remains the same: to approximate the behaviour of a physical system. Because
we do not have a teacher that can give us the target response for each input, we must
use a heuristic for adjusting the free parameters of the model. The system may have
an internally derived training signal based on the system’s ability to to predict its own
input, or it may be some more general measure of the quality of its internal repre-
sentation (Becker, 1995). One of the earliest and most popular unsupervised learning
algorithms is Hebbian learning, which postulates that the synaptic efficacy between
pre- and post-synaptic neurons should increase whenever they get co-activated. In-
stead of comparing the response of the system to a target output, this algorithm learns
patterns in the input stimuli.
Both supervised and unsupervised learning paradigms assume that the goal of the
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model is to approximate the input-output behaviour of a physical system. However,
learning might not be targeted at achieving a particular transformation from input to
output, but only at changing a system in a specific way. A finite-state transducer (FST)
is a good example of this form of learning. When an FST receives an input, this
input (possibly) changes the state of the FST. We can say that the FST has undergone
learning. But the FST does not try to approximate an input-output behaviour as a result
of this learning. The output depends not only on the input, but also on the state that the
FST was in, when it received the input. Declarative memory is another example. An
episode of stimulation might leave a trace in declarative memory but this trace need
not approximate any input-output transformation. Rather, the trace simply acts as a
record of the episode.
Well known learning algorithms such as error-correction learning and self-organised
learning try to optimize a global objective function. As training proceeds, the model
iteratively changes its parameters so that the sequence of changes converge to an op-
timal value of this objective function. Learning is governed by a global variable and
changes local values. We call this form of learning the top-down approach to learning.
In contrast, we saw the example of declarative memory where the synaptic adjustment
may or may not lead to a global objective function (Becker, 1995). This form of learn-
ing can be called bottom-up approach to learning. One of the reasons why Hebbian
learning is so popular is that it combines bottom-up synaptic learning with achieving a
top-down globally optimised objective function. Later in this chapter, we will present
the trailing-activation account of structural priming which falls into the bottom-up ap-
proach to learning. Although we will be using unsupervised learning algorithms to
implement the trailing-activation account, the reader should remember that our aim
will be to record traces of information rather than internalising an input-output trans-
formation.
3.3 Error-based learning model
It is uncontroversial that priming is a consequence of some kind of learning. The
question is which part of the cognitive system undergoes learning and what is the
mechanism of such learning. In Section 3.2.1 we saw that learning could be supervised
or unsupervised. In this section, we consider a previous model that uses supervised
learning and tries to explain priming as a consequence of such this mechanism.
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§ 3.3.1 A brief summary of Chang et al. (2006)
Chang et al. (2006) presented a language-comprehension and production model that
relies on error-correction to learn the sequential structure of utterances. When this
model is given an input utterance, it breaks down the utterance into a sequence of
words. As each word is processed by the system, it tries to predict the next word. In
order to make such a prediction, the system maintains an internal model of the structure
of sentences. If the prediction is incorrect, the system generates an error. This error is
backpropagated through the system so that the elements of internal model that led to
the incorrect prediction are penalised. Thus, for each utterance, the system makes a se-
quence of predictions and adjusts its internal model based on these predictions. Chang
et al. (2006) showed that a system based on these principles is able to successfully ex-
tract the abstract structure of utterances so that it can produce grammatical utterances
if it is given the meaning of these utterances as its input. Figure 3.3.1 shows the flow







Figure 3.3.1: [Supervised comprehension] To perform comprehension using
supervised-learning, Chang et al. (2006) used the lexical sequence both as the input
and as the target. The predictor forecasts the next word using the given sequence of
words. The teacher, then, compares this prediction with the input signal and generates
an error, which is used to adjust the rules of prediction.
Internally, the model presented in Chang et al. (2006) (hereafter CDB06) consists
of two parallel pathways for the flow of information. While the meaning pathway rep-
resents aspects of semantics that are critical to sequencing of utterances, the sequenc-
ing pathway consists of a sequential recurrent network (Elman, 1990) that encodes the
structure of sequences themselves (Figure 3.3.2).
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CDB06 implements the model using a connectionist framework. It represents words,
their features, syntax and semantics as patterns of activation over units in a network.
These units are connected to each other through weighted links and the system en-
codes its internal rules by adjusting weights on these links. The system learns most
of these weights through error-backpropagation, and some of them are set manually.
During comprehension and production, activation spreads in the network along these
weighted connections, through both meaning and sequencing pathways. Different pat-
terns of activation compete with each other for higher activation and the network makes



















Figure 3.3.2: [Dual path model] The Meaning system and Sequencing system are par-
allel pathways for the flow of information in CDB06. The sequencing system performs
categorisation using the ccompress and compress units and it performs sequencing us-
ing the sequential recurrent network implemented by hidden and context units. The
thick lines between what and where units represents connections that are manually set
at the beginning of the trial. Adapted from Chang et al. (2006).
At the heart of CDB06 is a sequential recurrent network (SRN). It is this element
that allows the model to predict a word based on its context. An SRN is a feedforward
network with the hidden layer connected to a recurrent layer. This recurrent layer
stores the context, or the previous values, of the hidden layer. Every time the network
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receives an input, the output of the hidden layer is governed not just by this input, but
also by the context stored in the recurrent layer. Elman (1990) showed that this setup
in an SRN gives it the capability of remembering sequences of patterns. Chang et al.
(2006) trained the network on a subset of the English language. They demonstrated
that, after training on this subset of language, the network was able to predict words
that were in grammatically correct positions 89% of the time and utterances that were
semantically correct 82% of the time.
The sequential recurrent network developed by Elman (1990) was extended in two
ways by Chang et al. (2006). First, they introduced a meaning pathway that runs
parallel to the SRN and connects to the hidden layer of the SRN. This meaning pathway
encoded the thematic roles of words and event-semantics of utterances. As a result of
these connections, the SRN started to predict sequences based not just on input words,
but also on the thematic and event-semantic properties of utterances. Next, Chang et al.
(2006) introduced a set of compression units that lie between the internal and external
representations of the SRN. These compression units reduced the dimensionality of
external representations. As a result of this dimensionality-reduction, the SRN based
its sequencing decisions on word classes rather than individual words. As the network
learnt to order utterances, it also learnt to abstract away from specific words to word-
classes, thus making the system less lexically specific with training. Together, the two
extensions made the network more suited for natural language production and ensured
that the network predicted word-categories based on the intended message.
§ 3.3.2 Testing CDB06
Chang et al. (2006) used their network to model two cognitive phenomena: Syntactic
acquisition (during development) and structural priming (during a conversation). Both
acquisition and priming are forms of learning. The central claim of Chang et al. (2006)
was that both these phenomena rely on the same algorithm of learning: backpropaga-
tion of error generated by comparing predicted and actual input. They claimed that the
cognitive system maintains an internal model of linguistic structure which it uses to
make predictions during training. When the cognitive system makes predictions that
do not match the external input, it adjusts its internal model. Over a long period of
time, this learning algorithm leads to an internal model that correctly predicts the ex-
ternal input. Crucially, Chang et al. (2006) also claimed that over a shorter period of
time, the same learning algorithm led to structural priming. Priming and acquisition
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are manifestations of the same higher cognitive principle: prediction-based learning.
To substantiate their claim, Chang et al. (2006) had to show that their model could
reproduce experimental findings on priming and acquisition. Therefore, they needed to
design simulations that replicated the procedure of experimental studies. Priming stud-
ies investigate how comprehension or production of utterances affect syntactic choices
during subsequent utterances. Thus these experiments consist of comprehension tri-
als, where subjects are required to understand an utterance that they see or hear, and
production trials where the subjects are required to produce an utterance for a given
picture or situation. Because Chang et al. (2006) wanted to replicate these experi-
ments on the model, they defined corresponding comprehension and production trials
for their model.
Definition of a production trial is simple. For subjects, production is the act of con-
verting an abstract message into a sequence of words. The trial adopted this definition
and initiated production by supplying the model with a message. It manually set the
activation of conceptual, thematic and event-semantic units in the meaning pathway.
It also set the strength of connections between these units. Given this message, the
model was expected to produce a sequence of words. Since this was a production trial,
the model received no external input and it did not perform any error correction.
Comprehension trials, however, are a bit more complicated to define. They always
involve an external input, which is the sequence of words that the model is required
to ‘understand’. But this understanding can either proceed in the absence of any con-
textual information – i.e. without a given message – or in the presence of the intended
message, in which case comprehension involves learning to match the utterance with
the message. The latter kind of comprehension trials are essential if the model wanted
to learn the connection strength between the meaning and sequential pathways. Chang
et al. (2006) called these trials situated events, while the trials in which the model
performed predictions in the absence of a message were called messageless events.
Chang et al. (2006) trained the model on a mixture of situated and messageless
trials and tested it for messageless events followed by production trials. During both
training and testing phases, the model learnt (through error-backpropagation) at the
end of (both kinds of) comprehension trials. The amount of priming was measured as
the difference between the percent of target structure produced after prime of the same
and competing structures.
The trained model replicated results from Bock and Griffin (2000), showing a main
effect of prime structure – i.e. the model was more likely to choose a syntactic structure
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if it had recently comprehended a prime with the same structure. As in Bock and
Griffin (2000), the amount of priming persisted over lags of up to ten intervening filler
trials. This result verified that error-based learning leads to both short-term and long-
term changes in the system.
Chang et al. (2006) also replicated several other experimental findings which
demonstrated that the model shows structural priming irrespective of thematic role
overlap between prime and target. Both locatives such as The wealthy widow drove an
old Mercedes to the church and prepositional datives such as The wealthy widow gave
an old Mercedes to the church primed a dative target to the same extent (Bock & Loe-
bell, 1990). Since the locatives and prepositional datives have the same structural form
and since the model showed same amount of priming for both structures, Chang et al.
(2006) argued that the model’s sequencing system generalised over the two different
thematic roles, making predictions based solely on each utterance’s surface structure.
Finally, Chang et al. (2006) used the same model to explain patterns of syntactic
acquisition. They tried to resolve the conflict between two contrasting observations
of language acquisition by proposing that the same internal principles could manifest
themselves as these contrasting observations. While the early-syntax theory (Fisher,
2002; Gleitman, 1990; Naigles, 2002) claims that children exhibit an ability to make
structural classifications at an early age, the late-syntax theory (Bates & Goodman,
2001; Lieven, Behrens, Speares, & Tomasello, 2003; MacWhinney, 1987; Tomasello,
2003) claims that children’s initial syntactic constructions are lexically specific and that
they arrive at abstract syntactic constructions only at a later age. Early-syntax theories
rely on evidence from preferential-looking data in children and late-syntax theories
rely on evidence from sentence production. Chang et al. (2006) attempted to resolve
this debate by showing that different estimates of syntactic competence in the model
can explain observations compatible with both early and late-syntax theories. One
estimate, the error-difference score, measured the amount of preferential looking while
another estimate, grammaticality, measured the correctness of produced utterances.
By analysing the value of these estimates at different stages of training, Chang et al.
(2006) demonstrated that the model agreed with the early-syntax theory when syntactic
competence is measured as the error-difference score, but with the late-syntax theory
when syntactic competence is measured as grammaticality.
The major success of CDB06 is to demonstrate that the same principle of error-
based learning can seamlessly explain the short-term phenomenon of structural prim-
ing and the long-term data regarding language acquisition.
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§ 3.3.3 Limitations and Critique
Chang et al. (2006) conjectured that the mechanics of both structural priming and
language acquisition rely on the engine of prediction-based learning. Their model
provides proof that prediction-based learning can indeed lead to both repetition of syn-
tactic structure and development of abstract syntactic knowledge. However, claim-
ing that prediction-based learning can drive priming and acquisition is different from
claiming that it does drive these phenomena. Their computational model demonstrates
the possibility, but it cannot prove that priming and acquisition are indeed driven by
prediction-based learning. In this section, we consider at some specific limitations
with the implementation of CDB06. In the next section (3.4) we will develop a theoret-
ical account that allows us to verify whether error-based learning underlies structural
priming.
§ 3.3.3.1. Lexical enhancement of structural priming.— As we discussed in
Chapter 2, Pickering and Branigan (1998) showed that when lexemes are repeated be-
tween prime and target, the amount of structural priming increases. This result, known
as the lexical-boost effect, shows that the lexical context of a syntactic decision plays
a role in the mechanics of structural priming. There is an ongoing debate about the
duration of this lexical boost (see section 2.3), but its existence does indicate a lexical
element to syntactic retrieval. If subjects show structural priming when they retrieve
syntactic representations, then this finding suggests that lexical context of the stored
representations influences this retrieval. Crudely, the syntax module needs to be con-
nected with the lexicon and flow of information along these connections plays a causal
role in the subject’s choice of structure.
Chang et al. (2006) tested their model for lexical boost by repeating the experi-
ment conducted by Pickering and Branigan (1998) on their model. The model showed
structural priming in the absence of any lexical overlap. However, they also found that
the amount of structural priming in their model does not increase with lexical overlap
– i.e. they did not find a lexical-boost effect.
The absence of lexical-boost in CDB06 is no coincidence. It is a consequence of
the fact that the model is designed to learn from predictions. The goal of learning in
CDB06 is to accurately predict the next word, given a series of words. Even with a
limited vocabulary, this is a very difficult task for the model because there are always
several words that are equally likely to occur at a particular position in the utterance.
To get around this difficulty, the SRN in CDB06 chose not to predict the exact word
3.3. Error-based learning model 53
itself, but instead it predicted the part-of-speech for the next word. This prediction
is a far more achievable goal. Of course, there could still be syntactic alternatives at
the end of each word, but the number of such alternatives is much more limited. To
achieve this part-of-speech prediction, Chang et al. (2006) surrounded the SRN by
the ccompress and compress layers (Figure 3.3.2). These compression units insulated
the SRN from individual words and instead allowed it to sequence word classes. This
insulation of the SRN means that the lexical context of a syntactic decision was lost
and the model showed no lexical-boost effect.
One could object that the SRN might have contact with the lexical context through
the meaning pathway. However, this pathway has limited connectivity with the se-
quencing system. Specifically, only the where and event-semantics units make contact
with the sequencing system. Since the lexemes themselves map only onto the con-
ceptual what units, the meaning pathway too does not allow any lexical influence on
structural decisions.
Chang et al. (2006) proposed that the reason why CDB06 did not replicate lexical
boost was that it modelled only an implicit memory of sentence structure and that
lexical boost is due to an explicit memory of the sentence. They suggest that this
implicit memory consists of abstract syntactic knowledge stored without any lexical
context. While this division of syntactic knowledge into explicit and implicit memory
might be true, their proposal raises the question: what is the relative contribution of
the two forms of memory on structural priming? The strength of CDB06 is to suggest
that short-term structural priming and long-term acquisition rely on the same learning
mechanism: error correction between predicted and actual input. The suggestion that
both implicit and explicit memory separately contribute towards structural priming
undermines the possibility that the same mechanism is responsible for both short-term
(priming) and long-term (acquisition) phenomena.
Also, CDB06 does not state the connection between explicit and implicit memo-
ries. Are they separate systems or does the explicit memory of the utterance play a
role in forming abstract structural representations? Eichenbaum (2003), for example,
hypothesised that semantic memories could be formed by learning the relationships
between episodic memories. If that were the case then it is possible that such (explicit)
episodic memory contributes to structural priming while (implicit) abstractions over
these episodic memories contribute to language acquisition. Such an account has a
much better explanation for the relative interaction of explicit and implicit memories,
and also explains how memory is consolidated and becomes more abstract. The trouble
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for CDB06 is that it has no account of how such explicit memories will gradually turn
into abstract syntactic knowledge. In fact, it argues that the abstract syntactic knowl-
edge is derived, on-line and immediately during comprehension. One could rightly
ask whether there is any advantage in updating the abstract syntactic knowledge on-
line and, more importantly, whether subjects actually do this.
§ 3.3.3.2. Production-to-production priming.— Prediction-based learning is a
form of supervised learning. The prediction of the model is compared with an ex-
pected target and an error is generated. The expected target is available from the ex-
ternal signal during comprehension. The error measures the mismatch between the
prediction and the external signal. The greater the mismatch, the more the system
needs to change. Therefore learning is proportional to the error. The backpropagation
algorithm proves that incrementally learning to minimize the mismatch between the
prediction and external input converges to minimise the error (Rumelhart, Smolensky,
McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). In other words, as the training progresses the system
starts making better predictions.
That an expected target is available to compare the output of the model is, of course,
an assumption. In the absence of an expected target, the prediction cannot be measured
for correctness and an error cannot be generated. Without generating an error, the
system cannot learn. And while an expected target is available during comprehension,
finding such a target is not straightforward during production. For such a target to
exist, the speaker would need to compare their prediction with the output signal – i.e.
the speaker would need to monitor their own speech and find a mismatch between their
prediction and the external speech. Specifically, for structural priming to exist, such
an error would need to be a syntactic mismatch between the external speech and their
predictions. We would see below that if such a mismatch between the predicted and
output syntax exists, then it would require us to make a some assumptions about the
language system that are difficult to defend.
Thus, an error-based learning account has no choice but to not perform any learning
during production. This is indeed the case for CDB06, which only tested a comprehension-
to-production priming. While testing CDB06, Chang et al. (2006) used a messageless
event as a prime trial and a production event as a target trial. A messageless event gave
a sequence of words (the utterance) as the input, but did not activate the units in the
meaning pathway. This sequence of words provided the expected target with which
the system could compare its predictions. Since the messageless event was a form of
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comprehension event, all the test cases measured comprehension-to-production prim-
ing. If, on the other hand, the model was given a production event as a prime, it will
undergo no learning and show no production-to-production priming. Thus if structural
priming is prediction-based, as Chang et al. (2006) argued it is, then subjects should
show no production-to-production priming.
Production-to-production priming, i.e. experiments in which both the prime and
the target consist of sentence production trials, is difficult to measure in the lab. Since
the experiments try to measure the amount of repetition between a prime and a target,
the experimenter wants to control what the subject hears or speaks during the prime
trial. It is during the target trial that the subject gets to choose the syntactic struc-
ture, which the experimenter can then compare with the given syntactic structure of
the prime. This means that even in experiments that, ostensibly, measure production-
to-production priming (e.g. Branigan et al. (2000)), the priming trial consists of im-
plicit comprehension which is then followed by production. Therefore, it is difficult
to determine whether the priming is actually obtained from the production event itself.
Indeed, Bock et al. (2007) found that the amount of priming during comprehension-to-
production events was similar to (production+comprehension)-to-production, showing
that production of prime did not actually lead to any increase in priming.
Even though production-to-production priming is difficult to measure in the lab,
we have evidence for it from corpus analysis. Gries (2005) analysed the International
Corpus of English (ICE-GB) for syntactic persistence and Szmrecsanyi (2006) did an
across-corpus study involving the British National Corpus (BNC), the Corpus of Spo-
ken American English (CSAE), the Corpus of Spoken Professional American English
(CSPAE) and the Frieburg Corpus of English Dialects (FRED). Both studies found that
the speaker’s own utterances were a significant determinant of syntactic persistence. In
other words, utterances in these corpora show a significant production-to-production
priming. Furthermore, both these studies obtained marginally significant results show-
ing that as compared to comprehension-to-production priming, production-to-production
priming is stronger.
Thus results from these corpus based studies showed clear evidence of production-
to-production structural priming and seem to be in conflict with the results from Bock
et al. (2007), which showed no advantage of production during structural priming.
How do we resolve these apparently contradictory findings? The conflict between
the two results arises when we assume that because priming during comprehension-
to-production and (production+comprehension)-to-production experiments is similar,
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production does not contribute towards priming. This assumption relies on a further
assumption that the relative contributions of comprehension and production towards
structural priming during a (production+comprehension) trial should add up linearly:
Priming(comp+ prod) = αPriming(comp)+βPriming(prod)
If this relationship holds, we can conclude that an equivalence in Priming(comp+
prod) and Priming(comp) implies that Priming(prod) is close to zero. But such an
assumption about linearity in human memory is unfounded. The relative contributions
of comprehension and production trials could add up nonlinearly:
Priming(comp+ prod) = S(Priming(comp),Priming(prod)).
where S(·) is a nonlinear function. If, for example, S(·) is a sigmoidal over the sum
of the two kinds of priming, then the overall amount of priming will saturate and the
equivalence between Priming(comp + prod) and Priming(comp) does not guarantee
that Priming(prod) is zero. Thus, the results from Bock et al. (2007) do not im-
ply that there should be no production-to-production priming and the study becomes
compatible with Gries (2005) and Szmrecsanyi (2006) who clearly found production-
to-production priming in corpora.
The existence of this production-to-production priming is problematic for a prediction-
based account. If this account wants to justify the existence of priming from produc-
tion trials, it must make the hypothesis that production itself involves comprehension.
There are two possible ways in which this is possible: (a) people listen to their own
speech and this means that a comprehension trial automatically follows every produc-
tion trial, or (b) comprehension and production trials share cognitive resources and
processes. However, it is not merely sufficient to say that production is accompanied
by comprehension; one also needs to state the nature of this overlap. Error-based learn-
ing takes place only when prediction and external target are mismatched. Because the
mismatch cannot occur during the production trial itself, it must occur during the (im-
plicit) comprehension trial. That is, there should be a mismatch in predictions between
the comprehension trial and the signal available from the production trial. Since the
comprehension trial happens as a result of listening to one’s own production (or over-
lap in comprehension and production processes), a mismatch in predictions implies
a mismatch in two consecutive predictions of the system. That is, a production trial
will only show priming when the system makes contrasting predictions during two
consecutive cycles.
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So if we assume that structural priming is prediction-based, we must make some
other assumptions to justify production-to-production priming. First, we need to as-
sume that production implicitly involves comprehension. Next, we have to assume
that priming occurs only when the prediction made during production does mismatch
with the prediction made by the implicit comprehension that immediately follows the
production.
Are these assumptions tenable? There is still a lot of work in progress that is trying
to look at the overlap between production and comprehension (Pickering & Garrod,
2007). However, the second assumption is difficult to defend. The (implicit) com-
prehension immediately follows the production and there can be no learning between
the two processes. In the absence of learning, the system makes the same predic-
tion during the two consecutive processes. The same predictions means no mismatch
and no mismatch means no learning. There can be only one possible cause for dif-
ferent predictions during consecutive cycles: Internal noise. Thus priming during
production-to-production trials should be proportional to internal noise. On the other
hand, priming in comprehension-to-production trials will be due to both the internal
noise and a mismatch between listener’s prediction and speaker’s prediction. Con-
sidering that the two interlocutors are not in absolute alignment, it is fair to assume
that their predictions will not always match (even in the absence of noise). Thus,
comprehension-to-production trials should show a larger mismatch error and a larger
priming than production-to-production trials. This conclusion contradicts both exper-
imental observations and (Bock et al., 2007) and results from corpus analysis (Gries,
2005; Szmrecsanyi, 2006). We can conclude that implicit comprehension cannot be
the reason behind production-to-production priming.
§ 3.3.3.3. Independence of structural and semantic pathways.— One key find-
ing of existing studies on structural priming is that it seems to exist independent of
semantic overlap between prime and target trials. Bock and Loebell (1990) have
shown that subjects produce an increased number of prepositional datives such as IBM
promised a bigger computer to the Sears store not only when they are primed using
another prepositional dative such as The wealthy widow gave an old Mercedes to the
church but also when they are primed using locatives such as The wealthy widow drove
an old Mercedes to the church. Crucially, locatives are as good as prepositional datives
for priming prepositional datives. Since locatives and prepositional datives differ in
their thematic roles, Bock and Loebell (1990) argued that structural priming is inde-
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pendent of thematic role overlap. They argued that this is an important finding because
it showed that structural representations are independent of syntactic representations
and are not identifiable with conceptual information, such as thematic roles.
Chang et al. (2006) replicated these results using their error-based model and ar-
gued that these results showed that the model successfully abstracts structural rep-
resentations. Indeed, the dual-path architecture of their model would suggest that it
should be able to separate sequential and semantic representations and that each of
these representations should be able to independently influence structural decisions.
However, a closer look at the system presents a problem. While CDB06 had largely
independent representations of sequential and meaning subsystems, it also included a
limited amount of connectivity between the two subsystems. In fact, the connections
from the cwhere and event-semantics units in the meaning subsystem to the hidden
units in the sequential subsystem (Figure 3.3.2) allowed the sequencing decisions to be
dependent on thematic roles and event-semantics respectively. These connections were
crucial during a production episode, where the system was only given the message and
had to make structural decisions based on the message. It is therefore surprising that
the model included these connections between meaning and sequencing subsystems
and yet showed that both locatives and prepositional dative show an equal amount
of priming in spite of different conceptual representations. How can we explain this
dichotomy between the model’s architecture and its behaviour?
One explanation is that the model successfully generalised structural representa-
tions and since locatives and prepositional datives have the same surface structure,
each construct provided the same amount of priming. This is the explanation that
Chang et al. (2006) forwarded in their paper. If this hypothesis is correct, it explains
why locatives are able to prime prepositional datives. However, it still does not ex-
plain why the conceptually identical prepositional dative does not prime more than the
conceptually dissimilar locatives.
The answer to this second question lies in the conceptual representation of CDB06.
Instead of using the traditional thematic roles of Agent, Patient, Theme, Goal, etc.,
CDB06 used more abstract roles X (agent, causer), Y (patient, theme) and Z (goal,
location, benefactor). These XYZ roles represented locatives and prepositional datives
identically. In the above example, The wealthy widow . . . , X = wealthy widow, Y =
old Mercedes and Z = church for both the locative and dative phrases. Thus it is no
surprise that CDB06 showed that prepositional dative and locative show similar amount
of priming since they had identical conceptual structure in the model.
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In fact, the conclusion that the model has generalised the surface structure so that
prepositional datives and locatives are represented identically is questionable. The
real reason why locatives showed priming at all is that adjuncts (. . . to the church) are
optional in locative phrases. Thus sometimes the system predicted an end-of-sentence
after the object and when it received the adjunct phrase (to the church), it underwent
learning. Had the adjunct phrase not been optional, the two prepositional dative and
locative would not have shown similar level of structural priming, even though they
had identical surface structure. Note that we are not objecting to the independence
of structural learning from conceptual information, but questioning whether the SRN,
with connections from the meaning system, is able to capture such an independence.
The above experiment does not distinguish a model that shows similar priming for
prepositional dative and locatives due to the optional adjunct phrase in locatives from
one that shows similar priming based on the identical surface form of the two. In order
to distinguish the two accounts, an experiment should compare the amount of priming
from two sentences with same surface form but different thematic roles and, crucially,
no optional parts. Such an experiment can possibly give identical priming from the
two sentences in subjects but unequal priming in the model.
The second experiment in Bock and Loebell (1990) provided a stronger test for the
independence of conceptual and structural representations in CDB06. This experiment
found that subjects produced an increased number of passives such as The construction
worker was hit by a bulldozer not only when they were primed using another passive,
but also when they were primed using an intransitive locative such as The construction
worker was digging by the bulldozer. Again, these results suggest that subjects repre-
sent structural information separate from conceptual information because the locatives
and passives have different conceptual structure.
In this case the XYZ roles for passives were actually different from those for loca-
tives. Therefore the model’s simulation of these results did actually test whether the
connections from the meaning subsystem played a role in choosing the structure of the
utterance. Simulations conducted by Chang et al. (2006) replicated the results from the
experiment and therefore suggested that the model successfully abstracted a structural
representation that was common to the two structures. Again, it is surprising that the
connections from the meaning subsystem played no part in priming.
One of the reasons is that again the XYZ representation ensured that the conceptual
encoding of locatives was quite similar to that of passives, but not the same. When
Chang et al. (2006) tested the model with more traditional thematic role representation,
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the effect of priming did, in fact, decrease. Since the simulations fit the data better with
the XYZ representations, the results in fact seem to argue that structural representation
is not independent of conceptual information; rather, utterances that were traditionally
thought to be represented quite differently are actually cognitively quite similar. In
other words, these results argue that prepositional locatives and prepositional datives,
or intransitive locatives and passives are actually semantically quite similar and it is
because of this semantic similarity that they show similar amount of priming. It must
be noted that this is a different point from the one Bock and Loebell (1990) were trying
to make.
However, one cannot deny that the XYZ roles do not represent intransitive loca-
tives and passives identically and yet the two utterances seem to show similar amount
of priming. Thus the sequencing subsystem in CDB06 seems to base its decisions far
more on the input from the word category (output of ccompress units) than from input
from the meaning subsystem. The reason for this is the way in which the model learns
through error-backpropagation after the priming trial. Error-backpropagation ensures
that only those units undergo learning that play a part in producing the output. As the
comprehension phase is messageless, the meaning units do not provide any contribu-
tion to the output and hence the links from meaning subsystem do not undergo any
learning after the priming trial. And since there is no learning on these links, they do
not play any role in priming – i.e. they bias the competing structures just as they would
have done in the absence of the prime.
But this assumption of comprehension trials not involving any input from the mean-
ing system is not correct. During a dialogue, subjects might have information about the
message from the discourse context and from common ground (such as a visual scene
shared amongst interlocutors). Moreover, there is no reason to expect that subjects
make predictions at the structural level but do not make predictions at the semantic
level. If predictive learning is performed at the structural level, as Chang et al. (2006)
suggested that it is, then its also possible that a similar predictive learning is made at
a semantic level. If this is true, then subjects will have (predictive) information about
the message when they process the utterance. This information will ensure that learn-
ing takes place on the connections from the meaning subsystem. In order to argue
that structural priming can exist independently of the conceptual information, CDB06
would have to change to a strict dual-path model by severing all links between the
meaning and sequencing system. This, however, raises the question how such a sys-
tem will lead to the grammatical production of a given message.
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§ 3.3.3.4. Lexical specificity and development of structural priming.— Chang
et al. (2006) noted that structural priming in an error-based account increases with
training. They used a variable called priming difference to measure the amount of
structural priming shown by the model. It was calculated by taking the percentage
of target structures produced after the target structure prime and subtracting the per-
centage of targets produced after the alternative-structure prime. A model with 4,000
epochs of training showed less than 1% priming difference, while a model with 40,000
epochs of training showed around 5% of priming difference.
The reason for the increase in structural priming was the decrease in lexical speci-
ficity. When the model was young, it learnt to sequence particular words. As it went
through training, it extracted categories from input words and learnt to sequence based
on these categories rather than individual words. Thus a young model would learn to
use the PO structure for give when it encounters the phrase The sailor gave the book
to the actor, but it would not generalise this use to the verb hand. On the other hand,
a relatively mature model would group give and hand together in the ccompress units
and therefore when it increases its probability of using one verb in a PO, it automat-
ically increases the probability of using the other verb in the same structure. Lexical
specificity decreased as a result of learning and as a consequence structural priming
became more robust.
But if this hypothesis is true, then children should show a larger amount of lexi-
cal specificity in structural priming as compared to adults. Such lexical specificity in
structural priming can be measured through lexical boost, or increase in the amount
of structural priming when the verb is repeated between prime and target. Contrary to
this hypothesis, Branigan, McLean, Thatcher, and Jones (2006) have found that adults
and children between the age of 3 and 4 years show an equal amount of lexical boost.
While there is evidence from developmental studies such as Tomasello (1992) that
children do show lexical specificity at an early age, this lexical specificity does not
appear in structural priming experiments. Together, these two results would suggest
that structural priming needs to be separated from the process of extracting abstract
syntactic structure from word forms. For if structural priming is not conflated with
structural acquisition then it is possible that priming shows similar patterns in children
and adults in spite of differing abilities of structural abstraction.
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3.4 Quantifying priming in error-based models
Chang et al. (2006) successfully demonstrate that a system designed to perform
language acquisition can also lead to structural priming. But why is this the case? At
one level the answer is quite simple. The same system that models the environment
performs structural decisions. As the system learns, it incrementally adjusts this inter-
nal model. And since this model makes structural decisions, adjustment to the model
leads to priming.
But is this the entire story? If an error-based account is responsible for priming,
then it should not only show priming, but also explain how priming varies for different
stimuli. In particular, how much priming would we obtain from stimuli of different fre-
quencies? If we can precisely quantify the amount of priming such a model should give
under different patterns of stimuli, we can compare these predictions with experimen-
tal observations. Although priming has been extensively studied, to our knowledge
no account exists that systematically predicts the amount of priming under different
patterns of stimuli. In the following discussion, we develop a theoretical account for
priming predicted by an error-based account and discuss the experimental data that can
test for these predictions. Some of this experimental data already exists, while other
needs to be collected in the future.
§ 3.4.1 A theory for error-based priming
Here is the problem: assuming that priming is a consequence of error-based learning,
how much priming should the system show for a given stimulus? Because an error-
based model is sensitive to the frequency of the stimulus – low frequency stimuli lead
to larger error – the answer to this question depends upon the frequency of the stimulus
during training. In this section, we will develop a formal relation between the amount
of priming shown by an error-based model and the frequency of different stimuli during
training. If this amount of priming is comparable with experimental observations, we
can conclude that priming could be due to error-based learning. On the other hand, if
priming is larger than predicted by this relation, then we need to look elsewhere for the
mechanisms responsible for this difference.
Consider an error-based system that has undergone some training and receives a
test trial. The amount of priming from such a test trial is what we want to quantify.
Obviously, the nature of the test trial will determine the amount of priming. But this is
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something we do not know, since we are interested in developing a general account for
every kind of trial. While we do not know this test trial, we will know the probability
of occurrence of different test cases. This probability is available during the design of
the experiment. Consider, for example, test cases in which the system has to choose
between prepositional datives (PO) and double object datives (DO) after being trained
on both POs and DOs. While we do not know whether a particular test case will be a PO
or DO utterance, we would know the probability of occurrence of POs and DOs in the
experiment. Thus we can develop our account of priming based on these probabilities
of different test cases, or stimuli. Let us start with the fundamental premise of error-
based learning:
Priming ∝ Error correction (E) during trial
where ∝ is the symbol for directly proportional. Therefore, in order to determine
priming, we must determine the error E during a trial. This error relies on the outcome
of the trial – i.e. on whether the prediction of the model matches the test case. As
we stated above, we will not know the outcome of each trial in advance, so instead of
considering the exact outcomes, we have to start considering their probability:
E = Probability of making error during trial (perr)×Learning rate
perr = Probability of classifying as PO when target is DO (perrPO )
+ Probability of classifying as DO when target is PO (perrDO )
perrPO = Joint probability (Classification = PO; Target = DO)
How can we evaluate this joint probability? Consider the incomplete utterance The
boxer showed . . . . When a prediction-based model is given this phrase, it could predict
that the rest of the utterance has an NP-PP structure or that it has a NP-NP structure. In
the former case, the model would have classified the utterance as a PO and in the latter
as a DO. The above analysis shows that priming depends upon the joint probability
of the classification made by the model and the probability of the (opposite) target.
In a real dialogue, the classification of a phrase by the listener (here, the model) is
not causally related to the classification by the speaker (here, the target) – they are
independent events. In CDB06 as well the two are independent because the model
assumes prime trials to be messageless events – i.e. it classifies the input in absence of
any semantic knowledge. From probability theory we know that the joint probability
of independent events is the product of the marginals. Thus, the joint probability of
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classifying the phrase as PO and the target being DO can be given by:
p(c = PO,t = DO) = p(c = PO) ·p(t = DO)
Here we come to the crucial question of determining the probability of classifying
a particular trial as a PO: p(c = PO). A neural network like CDB06 maps an input
and a context onto one of the output classes. We can assume that the context and the
input for both the PO and DO phrase is the same up until the choice point. Therefore,
the classification will completely depend upon the weights – i.e. the training of the
network. Again, we do not know how the network was trained for each simulation. But
since we are developing a general theory, we do not care about the specific simulation.
We would like to describe the classification probability in terms of the probabilities of
different trials during training.
Let ptrainPO be the probability of a PO trial during training and p
train
DO be the prob-
ability of a DO trial during training. Since we are only interested in the prediction
of PO relative to DO, we can ignore cases in which the network is trained on other
cases. In other words, ptrainPO +p
train
DO = 1. Since the network’s classification depends
completely on the training of the network, the probability of classification as a PO
will be some monotonic function, F , of the probability of getting a PO during train-
ing, F (ptrainPO ).1 We can interpret the value F (ptrainPO ) as the baseline bias towards
producing a PO. Thus, we can say:
p(c = PO,t = DO) = F (ptrainPO ) ·ptestDO (3.4.1)
Similarly,
p(c = DO,t = PO) = p(c = DO) ·p(t = PO)
= F (ptrainDO ) ·ptestPO (3.4.2)
Using equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we can write:
perr = F (ptrainPO ) ·ptestDO +F (ptrainDO ) ·ptestPO
= F (ptrainPO ) · (1−ptestPO )+F (ptrainDO ) ·ptestPO
= F (ptrainPO )−F (ptrainPO ) ·ptestPO +F (ptrainDO ) ·ptestPO
= F (ptrainPO )+ptestPO (F (ptrainDO )−F (ptrainPO )) (3.4.3)
1Note that we require the function to be monotonically increasing if the system is more likely to
choose higher frequency structures over lower frequency structures.
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where we have used the fact that ptestPO +p
test
DO = 1 – i.e. only two outcomes are possi-
ble during testing phase: either the utterance is a prepositional object dative, or it is a
double object dative.
Using Equation 3.4.3 we can express the error generated during a testing trial in
terms of the relative frequencies of stimuli during the testing trials (ptestPO ) and the rela-
tive frequencies of the two structures during training (ptrainPO and p
train
DO ). Figure 3.4.1
uses equation 3.4.3 to plot the probability of error during a test trial (perr) against the
frequency of POs during test trials (ptestPO ). Since the amount of priming is propor-
tional to the error E , this figure gives us a theoretical account of priming for different









Figure 3.4.1: This plot shows the amount of priming (proportional to perr) for different
frequencies of PO during an experiment, ptestPO . We can see that priming is inversely
proportional to ptestPO . This is because PO is the more frequent structure during training:
F (ptrainPO ) > F (ptrainDO )
Now let us evaluate how a trained error-based model would respond to different
frequencies of stimuli. In Figure 3.4.1, the frequency of stimuli varies along the x-axis.
Because each stimulus consists of one of two constructs, PO or DO, we can represent
patterns in the stimuli by using only one dimension. As the frequency of one construct
increases, that of the other decreases. In Figure 3.4.1, the probability of getting a PO
construct increases as one moves along the x-axis. At (0,0) all test stimuli consist of
DO phrases and the error is governed by F (ptrainPO ). On the other hand, at (1,0) all test
stimuli consist of PO phrases and the error is governed by F (ptrainDO ).
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§ 3.4.1.1. The inverse-preference effect.— Let us first consider test-stimuli in
which the lower frequency pattern is more likely than the higher frequency pattern.
In Figure 3.4.1, the training data has a larger frequency of PO structure than the DO
structure. This is reflected in the fact that F (ptrainPO ) > F (ptrainDO ). Now, if the lower
frequency structure is more likely than the higher frequency structure then ptestDO >
ptestPO . In other words, p
test
PO < 0.5. We can observe from the above figure that in
this case, perr will be larger than 0.5. Since error is directly related to the amount of
priming, we can conclude that in this case the amount of priming will be above the
average.
Similarly, when we test the model for the inverse pattern – higher frequency struc-
ture being more likely – the theory predicts that the amount of priming will be below
the average. These two results together are the hypothesized inverse-preference effect
(Ferreira & Bock, 2006; Chang et al., 2006; Ferreira, 2005) which predicts that the
effectiveness of priming is inverse of the frequency of the structures being primed;
highly frequent structures yield low priming whereas uncommon structures yield high
priming.
The error-based model certainly predicts an inverse-preference effect, but do we
actually observe such an inverse preference? More importantly, if we do observe this
effect, can we be certain that it is due to error-based learning? We can explain the
inverse-preference effect in at least two different ways: (a) it could indeed be due
to error-based learning, or (b) it could be a result of attentional mechanisms since
a low-frequency structure might require larger attention and lead to better encoding.
The observation of inverse-preference effect and its underlying causes are still under
investigation. If we do observe the inverse-preference effect we would like to ascertain
that it is due to error-based learning and not due to other (e.g. attentional) mechanisms.
For this, we need to look at the predictions that an error-based account will make for
such an effect.
One study that is repeatedly referenced (Ferreira & Bock, 2006; Chang et al., 2006)
in the context for inverse-preference effect is Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000). This
study measured the amount of structural priming in Dutch phrases ending in one of
two alternative structures – an auxiliary or a participle. Besides measuring the amount
of priming, Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) also measured the baseline levels of
structural choices at the beginning and end of the experiment. They found statistically
significant levels of structural priming – i.e. subjects were more likely to respond with
an auxiliary-final phrase when given an auxiliary-final prime and vice versa. They
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obtained another interesting result. They observed that the baseline level of priming
changed after the subjects had undergone the experiment, leading them to conclude
that priming accumulates over a sequence of trials rather than being a short-term effect.
Their results are reproduced in Table 3.1.
Condition Auxiliary-final Participle-final Other
Baseline 1 35% 56% 9%
Auxiliary-final 46% 39% 15%
Participle-final 35% 54% 11%
Baseline 2 44% 47% 9%
Table 3.1: Columns show the percent of auxiliary-final, participle-final and other re-
sponses under four different conditions. Each experiment consisted of 24 primes and 24
targets. The first six prime/target combinations constituted baseline 1, the next twelve
constituted experimental trials and the last six constituted baseline 2. Adapted from
Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000).
The crucial aspect of the results in Table 3.1 that is used as evidence for inverse-
preference effect is the comparison of the amount of priming under participle-final
and auxiliary-final conditions, relative to the baseline. Table 3.1 shows that the num-
ber of auxiliary-final responses increases from 35% under baseline condition to 46%
under auxiliary-final condition. However, the participle-final responses change from
56% under baseline condition to 54% under participle-final condition. Since the less
preferred (auxiliary-final) structure shows a larger increase in responses than the more-
preferred (participle-final) structure, this is seen as an evidence of inverse-preference
effect. Ferreira and Bock (2006), for example, interpret that these results show that the
less-preferred structure accumulates larger amount of priming than the more preferred
structure. 2
§ 3.4.1.2. How priming changes.— We would like to compare the results of Hart-
suiker and Westenberg (2000) with the predictions of an error-based account for the
given stimuli. But we can see that these results do not just talk about the amount of
priming, but also how this priming changes during the experiment. Equation 3.4.3, on
2It must be mentioned that Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) themselves do not interpret these
findings as amounting to an inverse-preference. Instead, they make the more conservative deduction
that priming is cumulative and long-lasting.
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the other hand, only predicts the priming shown by the model at the end of training.
Therefore, in order to compare the predictions of our theory to these results, we must
generalise our theory in two ways: first we must change the nomenclature so that we
can talk about auxiliary-final and participle-final structures and not just PO and DO;
secondly, we must extend the theory to see how the predictions would change after
each trial – i.e. we must build in dynamics in the prediction of error.
The first goal is quite simple and so we tackle the aspect of generalising the nomen-
clature first. Each of equations 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 are specific to PO and DO con-
structions. Instead, we adopt the more general names for alternative constructions: x
and y, giving:
p(c = x,t = y) = F (ptrainx ) ·ptesty (3.4.4)
p(c = y,t = x) = F (ptrainy ) ·ptestx (3.4.5)
perr = F (ptrainx )+ptestx (F (ptrainy )−F (ptrainx )) (3.4.6)
The second extension is less straightforward. We would like to determine how each
test trial changes the model. As is evident from both equation 3.4.6 and Figure 3.4.1,
perr depends on two parameters: F (ptrainx ) and F (ptrainy ). These parameters are
sufficient to describe the value of perr for different values of ptestx . As a result of error-
based learning, these two parameters will undergo change. Therefore, to understand
how error-based learning changes the system, we need to describe the dynamics of
these two parameters.
The system undergoes learning at the end of each trial. This learning will be pro-
portional to the learning rate, λ, and to the prediction-error. The parameter F (ptrainx )
describes the probability of classifying the construction as x based on the training. As
a result of the trial, this parameter will change. How it changes will depend on the
prediction-error during the previous trial. If the system predicted x but the target was
y, the probability of the system classifying an identical trial as x should be lower and
correspondingly F (ptrainx ) must decrease. On the other hand, if the system predicted
y but the target was x, then F (ptrainx ) should increase. While we do not know the
exact outcome of the trial, we do know the probabilities of the two errors, perrx and
perry (equations 3.4.4 and 3.4.5). The learning in the system should be proportional to
the difference in these two errors. Thus we can write:
F (p(2)x ) = F (p(1)x ) − λ (perrx −perry ) (3.4.7)
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where we have used the superscripts (1) and (2) to refer to the number of the iteration.
If we set F (p(1)x ) to the initial condition F (ptrainx ), then we can investigate the effect
of learning on the trained model by observing how this parameter changes. Using
Equation 3.4.4 and the fact that ptestx = 1−ptesty , we obtain:
F (p(2)x ) = F (p(1)x ) − λ [F (p(1)x ) ·ptesty −F (p
(1)
y ) ·ptestx ]
= F (p(1)x ) − λ [F (p(1)x ) · (1−ptestx )− (1−F (p
(1)
x )) ·ptestx ]
= F (p(1)x ) − λ [F (p(1)x )−ptestx ]
Using induction, we can generalise the result to the (n)th iteration:
F (p(n)x ) = F (p(n−1)x ) − λ [F (p(n−1)x )−ptestx ] (3.4.8)
Equation 3.4.8 gives a recursive way of finding the value of parameter F (px) at time-
step (n) in terms of its value at time-step (n−1). Thus it meets our objective of
finding a way to describe how the model changes its predictions as a consequence of
each trial. We argued above that the prediction of the model, perr depends only on two
parameters: F (px) and F (py). Equation 3.4.8 gives us a way of calculating both the
first and, mutatis-mutandis, second parameters at different stages of testing.
Before putting this extended theory to test, let us see how an error-based system is
predicted to evolve by this theory. Equation 3.4.8 describes the dynamics of an error-
based model and as with any dynamical system, we are interested in how the dynamics
will stabilise. In this case, a stable solution will tell us how the system’s predictions
(perr) will change as the system undergoes training. We can gain a better understand-
ing of the importance of stable solution by looking at its geometrical interpretation.
As training progresses, the slope and intercept of the graph in Figure 3.4.1 will keep
changing. A stable solution will tell us the shape that this graph approaches as the
experiment goes on.
The recursive Equation 3.4.8 reaches stability when F (p(n)x ) = F (p(n−1)x ) – i.e.
F (px) stops changing. This condition, in turn, implies that:
λ [F (p(n)x )−ptestx ] = 0
⇒ F (p(n)x ) = ptestx
In other words, the effect of error-based learning is to align the probability of clas-
sification of an input as x with the probability of the occurrence of the structure x in the
test data. If we take the example of the structural choices PO and DO, then the effect
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of error-based learning is to align the model’s prediction of PO with the probability of
occurrence of PO in the (test) environment. This result makes sense since the goal of
error-based learning is to internalise the statistical structure of the environment. Thus
we can understand equation 3.4.8 as the formalisation of how the model iteratively
aligns its internal representations with that of the environment.
Now, let us go back to the data from Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) and see how
well the predictions made by this theory fit their results. But first we must align the
variables in the theory with values from the data. The results in Table 3.1 give us the
baseline level of auxiliary-final and participle-final choices at the beginning and end of
the experiment. Each of these values gives the probability that the system will choose
the corresponding structure and therefore determines the parameters F (p(i)auxiliary)
and F (p(i)participle), for a generic iteration number (i). These two parameters allow





F (p(1)x ) = 0.56
F (p(1)y ) = 0.35







Figure 3.4.2: [Baselines] This figure plots perr for the two baseline conditions reported
in Table 3.1. The variable x stands for participle-final construction and y for auxiliary-
final construction. The response frequencies from the experimental trials are also
marked using the small circles.
Figure 3.4.2 plots perr for the two baseline level of classifications from Table 3.1.
We can observe from the figure that as baseline level of priming change the plot for
perr also changes. These plots are shown as the dotted line (labelled ‘baseline 1’)
3.4. Quantifying priming in error-based models 71
at the beginning of the experiment and as the solid line (labelled ‘baseline 2’) at the
end. Since perr tells us the amount of priming that the system will undergo, we can
observe from figure 3.4.2 that the system shows a larger difference in priming for the
two structures at the beginning of the experiment than at the end. Formally, |F (p(1)x )−
F (p(1)y )| > |F (p(n)x )−F (p(n)y )|, where we have used the variables ‘x’ for participle-
final structure and ‘y’ for auxiliary-final structure.
As the experiment progresses, the error-based model gradually adjusts its internal
representations. Before the experiment, the system believes that it is more likely to
encounter a participle-final structure as compared to an auxiliary-final structure and at
the end it believes that both structures are almost equally likely. This transition in the
model’s behaviour is shown by the thick blue line in Figure 3.4.2 ( ). The dotted
line of baseline 1 slowly evolves to the solid line of baseline 2 and the model gradually
changes its behaviour. In between the two lies the behaviour of the model during the
experiment (shown as the shaded region). If we want to compare our prediction with
the results from Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000), this is the region to look at.
Provided the learning rate is not too large (and we argue below that it does in-
deed need to be small) our theory predicts that the response of an error-based system
will lie somewhere inside the shaded region bounded by the plots of the two baselines.
Formally, F (p(1)x,y) > F (p(i)x,y) > F (p(n)x,y), where we have used (i) to stand for an exper-
imental trial that lies between the two baseline tests. For example, the probability that
the model will choose the participle structure at any given point during the experiment
should be between 0.56 (F (p(1)x ))and 0.47 (F (p(n)x )).
We can now compare this prediction of the model with the results obtained by Hart-
suiker and Westenberg (2000). From Table 3.1 we can see that while the participle-final
responses following a participle-final prime lie within this bound (0.54), the participle-
final responses following an auxiliary-final prime do not (0.39). The auxiliary-final
responses too seem to be a poor fit to the data: the probability of the responses should
lie between 0.35 and 0.44. While the responses following the participle-final structure
are just within the bound (0.35), the responses following an auxiliary-final structure
are not (0.46).
These results illustrate how our theoretical account can be used to check how well
error-based models fit the patterns of structural priming. We have taken Hartsuiker and
Westenberg (2000) as an example to show that if structural priming was the result of
error-based learning, then the amount of structural priming would need to be bound
within certain limits. Similar analyses can be performed for other studies such as
72 Chapter 3. Models of Structural Priming
Scheepers (2003) and Ferreira (2005) to check whether the inverse-preference effect
reported by such studies can be a consequence of error-based learning.
§ 3.4.1.3. Tug of war.— The limitation of the error-based model lies in its require-
ment for long-term generalization, which requires a small learning rate. If we examine
the results in Table 3.1 closely, we can see that priming has a large short-term effect.
The number of participle-final responses, for example, changes from 39% to 54% when
its followed by a matching prime. The error-based model cannot account for such a
large effect unless its learning rate (λ) is quite large. But such a large learning rate
will mean that, in the long-term, learning does not converge (Oja, 1982) which would
mean that the model would fail to internalise the statistics of the environment. Since
Chang et al. (2006) require their model to perform language acquisition, it is critical
that their model shows convergence in learning. In fact, the data from Hartsuiker and
Westenberg (2000) itself shows that the baseline converges towards the statistics of the
test cases – 50% for each structure. If the learning rate was large, then the baseline
would shift quite radically after each priming trial making it depend largely on the
most recent trial. But this does not seem to be the case. Baseline 2 seems to reflect the
overall statistics of test cases presented during the experiment.
If the learning rate was large, it would also be difficult to explain why the amount
of repetition after the participle-final prime (54%) is not larger than the initial baseline
level of participle-final responses (56%). Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) suggested
that the participle-final responses did not increase during the experiment because the
baseline level of these responses steadily decreased as the experiment progresses. If
we assume that the learning rate is large, the baseline levels will not show a steady
shift and the responses would largely depend on the prime and not on the baseline.
Thus, this assumption would make it very difficult to explain why the repetition after
participle-final primes remains so low.
Our argument here is not that the error-based model presented by Chang et al.
(2006) cannot show priming. Indeed, Chang et al. (2006) demonstrated that the model
is more likely to repeat a syntactic structure than to pick the alternate structure. Since
the model learnt based on error, this is not surprising. Our argument is that the amount
of priming shown by the model is not sufficient to explain both the short-term and
long-term effects of priming simultaneously. If the model shows priming comparable
to the experiment, its baseline will shift quickly and it will not show generalisation.
On the other hand, if the model shows generalisation it will show only a small amount
3.4. Quantifying priming in error-based models 73
of priming. Thus there is a trade-off between priming and generalisation.
Similarly, priming and inverse-preference also seem to show a trade-off. The error-
based model predicts larger priming if the input consists of lower-frequency structure.
This can be seen in Figure 3.4.3, which plots the prediction error when one structure is










Figure 3.4.3: [Inverse preference] Low frequency primes lead to larger error correction.
Mark on left shows low frequency, high priming. Mark on right shows high frequency,
low priming.
We can observe from the figure that the prediction error is much larger if the prob-
ability, ptestx is low. Since F (p
(train)
x ) > F (p(train)y ), we can also observe that x is
the more frequent structure during training. These two observations imply that if the
probability of the less frequent structure is large in the test trial, then the error-based
model will show larger prediction error and consequently larger priming.
While this observation is true for the first testing trial, the behaviour of the system
for subsequent trials depends on how the system changes as the result of the first trial.
According to Equation 3.4.8, the shape of the plot for the second iteration will depend
not only on the difference in training and test probabilities (F (p(n−1)x )−ptestx ), but
also on the learning rate, λ. If the learning rate is large, the system will show a large
adjustment, leading to a large amount of priming. But the adjustment would also mean
that the difference between F (p(2)x ) and F (p(2)y ) is diminished leading to a reduction in
the inverse-preference effect. Thus, if the system is to show inverse-preference effect
over a series of trials then the priming needs to be low and vice-versa.
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§ 3.4.1.4. What is inverse-preference?.— There is one other question that needs
to be addressed. So far we have assumed that the term inverse-preference refers to a
larger long-term priming for the less preferred structure. The results from Hartsuiker
and Westenberg (2000) are frequently cited (Ferreira & Bock, 2006; Chang et al., 2006;
Scheepers, 2003) as evidence for such an inverse-preference effect. Ferreira and Bock
(2006), for example, observed that in the results obtained by Hartsuiker and Westen-
berg (2000), the number of less preferred, auxiliary-final responses, seemed to increase
substantially relative to the initial baseline while the more-preferred, participle-final
responses, seemed to remain the same. They argued that this result suggested that
. . . in the course of the experiment, the less-preferred auxiliary-final order
accumulated more long-term priming than the more-preferred participle-
final order. (Ferreira & Bock, 2006)
drawing the conclusion that inverse-preference effects are long-lived. However, we
believe that this is an incorrect interpretation of the results shown by Hartsuiker and
Westenberg (2000). In their study, the long-term learning shown by each syntactic
structure can be measured by the change in the amount of shift in the baseline. The
data in Table 3.1 shows that the amount of shift in baseline for the participle-final
structure and auxiliary-final structure is the same (9%). Thus both structures seem to
accumulate the same amount of long-term priming. The reason for an apparent lack
of increase in priming for participle-final structure relative to baseline 1, is that the
baseline level for participle-final responses keeps decreasing during the course of the
experiment. In fact, Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) actually pointed out to this
reason in their discussion of experimental results:
Because the number of responses with the least preferred structure in-
creases in the course of the experiment, the number of responses with
the alternative structure decreases. Thus, the apparent lack of priming for
participle-final responses can be explained as the result of an overall di-
minishing preference for the participle-final structure in the course of the
experiment.
Thus, the “diminishing-preference” of the participle-final responses was not due to a
greater amount of learning for this less-preferred structure, but due to an internal shift
in the baseline.
In fact, if the study did show a larger long-term priming for the less-preferred struc-
ture, it would be a problem for the error-based model. The error-based theory predicts
an inverse-preference effect only when the probability of the lower-frequency structure
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is high during the experiment. If the probability of the two structures is the same – i.e.
ptestPO = 0.5 in figure 3.4.3 – then this theory predicts that the data should not show any
inverse preference effect. From equation 3.4.6, we can see through simple algebraic
manipulation that when ptestx = 0.5, the prediction error becomes a constant (0.5) and
does not depend any more on F (ptrainx ). The experiment design of Hartsuiker and
Westenberg (2000) assumed an equal probability for the auxiliary-final and participle-
final priming trials. As such, existence of a larger long-term learning for one structure
would be incompatible with the error-based theory.
But the inverse-preference effect does not necessarily need to be a long-term ef-
fect. Scheepers (2003), for example, observed that the short-term priming of a low-
frequency structure is larger compared to that of a high-frequency structure. When
they manipulated the baseline such that the two structures reversed in frequency, they
observed that the amount of short-term priming obtained for the two structures also
reversed. This pattern of priming is compatible with the error-based theory which pre-
dicts that the short-term adjustment to the model as a result of a low-frequency prime
will be larger as compared to a high-frequency prime, even though each structure will
accumulate the same amount of long-term priming. However, if the error-based theory
has to explain this short-term inverse-preference effect, then it must deal with the trade-
off between inverse-preference and structural priming that we demonstrated above –
i.e. it must provide a detailed account, similar to the one we present above, of how
error-based learning can lead to a large short-term structural priming and yet show an
inverse-preference effect.
§ 3.4.1.5. Accumulation of priming.— How does structural priming accumulate
over a sequence of trials? We saw that Ferreira and Bock (2006) expected (although
incorrectly) that less-preferred structure should accumulate more long-term priming
than more-preferred structure. Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) too summoned a
long-term storage mechanism as an explaination for the change in baseline levels of
syntactic choice. A mechanism for long-term accumulation of priming is crucial for
explaining how structural choice is influenced by not just the previous trial, but an
entire sequence of trials.
An error-based learning model has a natural way of accumulating information in
its internal representation of the stimuli. As learning progresses, the error-based model
iteratively updates this internal representation and combines new information with the
stored information. Thus each episode of priming adds to the previous and the model
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automatically makes decisions based on all the previous episodes that it has encoun-
tered.
Since change in the existing representation of the model depends on the size of
error, such an account makes very specific predictions about the effect of previous
trials on the current trial. Equation 3.4.8 gives us insight into how an error-based
model updates its internal representation in light of the stimuli. Each adjustment will
depend upon the mismatch between the internal representation p(n−1)x and the external
input ptestx . Information about this mismatch would then be stored by updating the
internal representation p(n)x . For a subsequent trial, the error would depend upon the
mismatch between this new internal representation and the new stimuli. Since the
internal representation itself depended on the error correction during the previous trial,
the new error would indirectly depend on the outcome of the previous trial. Thus
priming during each trial becomes causally liked to all the previous trials.
But does this error-correction based causal link between different trials explain the
pattern of priming obtained over consecutive trials? What would be the predictions of
the error-based model when two consecutive trials have the same syntactic structure?
Would the priming be the same as when the trials are different? Or would it be more
or less? Again, we turn to the theoretical account developed above for the answers.
In particular, we investigate the predictions for two cases: (i) the case where two con-
secutive trials have the same syntactic structure, and (ii) the case where the trials have
alternating structure.
Consider a prime trial of type ‘y’ followed by another of type ‘y’. For the sake of
example, we take the hypothetical values F (p(1)x ) = 0.7, F (p(1)y ) = 0.3 and λ = 0.1.
Thus, at the beginning of the first trial, there is a 70 % chance that the model would
predict a trial to have the structure ‘x’. Using Equation 3.4.8 we can calculate that at
the end of this trial,
F (p(2)y ) = 0.30− 0.1 (0.30−1)
= 0.37
where we have used F (ptesty ) = 1 since we know that the outcome of the trial is
selection of structure y (with probability 1). Thus the new value for F (py) is 0.37, a
change of 0.07. We use this change in the value of F (py) as a measurement of the
learning in the system and hence as a measurement of priming.
First let us consider the first case where the second trial is the same structure as the
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first. We can again use Equation 3.4.8 to calculate,
F (p(3)y ) = 0.37− 0.1 (0.37−1)
= 0.433
an increase of 0.063. Now consider the other case where the first trial has the structure
‘x’ and is then followed by a trial of type ‘y’. In this case the value of F (py) will
change after the first and second trials in the following way:
F (p(2)y ) = 0.30− 0.1 (0.30−0)
= 0.27
F (p(3)y ) = 0.27− 0.1 (0.27−1)
= 0.343
In this second case, the probability of classification as ‘y’ increases by 0.073, which is
greater than that in the first case (0.063). Clearly, this account predicts that the amount
of change to the internal representation is larger during the second trial when consecu-
tive trials have different syntactic structure. This result makes intuitive sense too. The
first trial changes the expectations of the error-based model. If the second trial has the
same syntax as the first, the model’s expectations are more in line with the stimuli and
the amount of learning is small. But if the second trial has the alternative syntax, the
model is surprised. This surprise leads to larger error correction and larger priming.
Thus an error-based model predicts that different structures during consecutive trials
will lead to a larger change in priming as compared to the same structure.
How do these predictions compare with data? Currently, there does not seem to be
any study that measures how priming changes during an experiment, though studies
exist that show the build up of priming as a result of sequence of trials. Hartsuiker
and Westenberg (2000), for example, reported that for the written condition the effect
of priming was much stronger when both the previous and current primes were of the
same type than when the primes were of a different type. When the primes were of the
same type, the difference in priming was around 15% for auxiliary-final responses and
around 17% for participle-final responses. In contrast, when the two primes were of a
different type the priming reduced to 6% and 5% respectively.
These results are the opposite of what is expected from the error-based model,
which predicts larger priming when the two primes are different. The above analy-
sis also shows that the priming difference between the two competing structures is
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lower when the consecutive primes are of the same type. We can measure the priming
difference as |F (p(3)x )−F (p(3)y )|. In the above example, this priming difference is
0.134 when the two primes are the same and 0.314 when the two primes are different.
Thus, irrespective of whether we measure priming as the change in F (px) or as the
priming difference, the error-based model predicts larger priming when the two primes
were different than when they were the same.3 Interestingly, the two trials, tested for
the repetition of prime by Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000), were separated by eight
items. Therefore, the effect of one priming trial on the other seems to be a long-term
effect and the error-based model cannot appeal to short-term priming effects to explain
this data.
§ 3.4.1.6. Amount of priming.— Another interesting prediction of the above the-
ory is regarding the quantity of priming for stimuli of differing relative frequency.
Equation 3.4.6 tells us that the average amount of error depends both on the frequency
of the test stimuli and the difference in baseline frequencies of the competing struc-
tures, (F (ptrainx )−F (ptrainy )). However, if the experiment consists of equal number
of both primes (ptestx = 0.5), the probability of a prediction error becomes 0.5, a con-
stant. Thus the average amount of priming over the experiment does not depend upon
the difference in the frequencies of the competing structures at all. The reason for
this is clear from Figure 3.4.4 which shows that each plot passes through the point
(0.5,0.5), irrespective of the difference in frequencies.
How does this prediction match up with experimental observation? Most psy-
cholinguistic experiments consist of an equal number of alternative kinds of primes.
Therefore, according to the error-based account, a variation in the frequency of com-
peting structures should be independent of the amount of priming. There has been
no experiment that varies the frequency of the structural alternatives and notes the ef-
fect on priming. However, it has been repeatedly observed that transitives consistently
show lesser priming compared to datives (Bock, 1986; Bock & Loebell, 1990; Bock &
Griffin, 2000). One of the differences between transitives and datives is the relative fre-
quencies of their alternative forms. While actives and passives have a large difference
in their frequencies, prepositional and double-object datives seem to be better balanced
3Although it must be mentioned that this change in priming difference changes behaviour based
on the frequency of the primes. When the two consecutive trials use the more-preferred prime, x, the
priming difference will increase as a result of consecutive trials using the same structure relative to trials
using different structure. Nevertheless, Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) reported that the increase
in priming for the same structure held for both the more-preferred participle-final and less-preferred
auxiliary-final structures.














Figure 3.4.4: [Average priming] Three different structural alternatives, x1−y1, x2−y2,
x3−y3 are plotted. These three structures have different relative frequencies and
therefore, different slopes. All three intersect at (0.5,0.5)
(Bock & Griffin, 2000). If this difference in relative frequencies is responsible for the
difference in priming between transitives and datives, then this observation runs con-
trary to the predictions of an error-based model. However, as Bock and Griffin (2000)
pointed out, the difference in priming between transitives and datives could be due to
a number of differences in the two structures, including the number of arguments that
they express and their likelihood of occurrence.
3.5 Trailing-activation account
We saw at the start of the chapter that learning in model can be supervised or
unsupervised. We have been looking at the error-based learning account of structural
priming until now. This account uses a supervised learning mechanism that uses the
linguistic signal as both the input and as the teacher. However, learning does not
necessarily need to rely on a teacher and it can be unsupervised. In this section we
look at a conceptual account of structural priming that relies on unsupervised learning.
This is the trailing-activation account.
Pickering and Branigan (1998) proposed the trailing-activation account to explain
structural priming and its lexical enhancement. Their account is an extension of the
spreading activation theory of lemma retrieval proposed by Roelofs (1992), which was
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later expanded in Levelt et al. (1999) and is based on spreading-activation theories
of phonological encoding (Dell, 1986), semantic processing (Collins & Loftus, 1975)
and memory retrieval (J. R. Anderson, 1983). The notion of spreading activation goes
further back, developed by Quillian (1962, 1967) to implement human semantic pro-
cessing in a computer. The difference in trailing-activation and spreading-activation
accounts is that of emphasis; while the spreading-activation accounts try to understand
the process of information retrieval, the trailing-activation account aims to investigate
the effect of time on stored information. Aside from this difference in emphasis both
accounts share the underlying theory of information representation and processing.
Therefore, to understand the trailing-activation account, it is crucial to understand its
precursor – the spreading-activation theory.
§ 3.5.1 The theory of spreading activation
Spreading activation forms the foundation of trailing activation and provides insight
into three fundamental concepts of trailing activation: nodes, activation and network
organisation. These concepts were formulated to understand the process of information
retrieval and to understand them we need to look at the context in which they were
developed.
Information retrieval in humans depends on relational properties of memories.
While von Neumann machines retrieve information at a pre-specified location instan-
taneously, humans retrieve information based on memory cues. These cues usually
contain incomplete information about a word, a concept, an episode, etc. To complete
the information present in the cue, memory needs to be searched. An exhaustive search
of memory would provide the correct information, but it would be time-consuming
and wasteful of cognitive resources. Fortunately, an exhaustive search is not required
as memory is not a random collection of knowledge, but an organised network of in-
formation. Words, concepts and episodes are linked to each other and to their features
through a well-defined set of relationships. The retrieval mechanism can use the con-
tents of the cue to move through this network, instead of randomly searching the entire
memory.
The idea of information retrieval by searching through a network of related con-
cepts is formalised in the spreading-activation theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975). This
theory represents each concept as a node which is linked to other concepts via its
properties. Together, the nodes and their relational links form a network of organised
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information – i.e. the system’s4 memory. Given such an organisation of information,
the process of search becomes more straightforward. The search begins with a set of
cues that index particular nodes in this network. The system can now move, in parallel,
along all the relational links until it finds information that meets some criteria. This
process of moving along the relational links of the network is the essence of spreading-
activation account.
There is no mystery in the use of the term spreading which suggests moving, in par-
allel, along the relational links in search of information. But we have not yet specified
who is doing the moving along these links. That is where the term activation comes in.
So far, the description of the spreading-activation theory assumes a homunculus that
traces the paths from one node to a related node in search of information.5 The concept
of activation helps the theory to get rid of this notion of homunculus and replace it with
a property of the system. This activation can be defined as a scalar variable associated
with each node and each link. The value of this variable indicates the suitability of the
node to the search goal.
Now that the abstract notion of a moving through the network has been replaced by
a formal variable, we can constrain how this variable changes as the search progresses.
Collins and Loftus (1975), for example, constrained that activation must decrease as
it spread out along a network path, that it needed to reach a certain threshold for the
search to be successful, that it should decrease with time and that the summation of
activation over the entire network could be controlled. These constraints allowed them
to perform certain predictions about semantic retrieval in memory which could then be
compared with experimental evidence. Different constraints about how the activation
variable changes with time and with input allow us to explain different experimental
findings. We dedicate a large part of the next chapter to investigating how structural
priming can be explained by the dynamical properties of this activation variable. A
major contribution of the spreading-activation theory is this formal idea of an activation
variable and is inherited by the trailing-activation account of structural priming.
Another key conceptual contribution of the spreading-activation theory is the idea
of network connectivity and organisation of information. Indeed it is this idea that
allowed us to move from an exhaustive search through the entire system to a re-
stricted (and more efficient) search amongst concepts related to the cue. Each con-
4Here we use the generic term ‘system’ to stand for either a computer trying to implement human
memory or a cognitive system.
5In fact, it assumes a group of homunculi, as information needs to be searched in parallel.
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nection in such a network provides a passage for the flow of information. A fully con-
nected network would mean an unrestricted flow of information and a homogeneously
connected network would mean that all links carry the same amount of information.
The spreading-activation theory treats the strength and nature of connectivity between
nodes as parameters of the system. Collins and Loftus (1975), for example, organised
the semantic network based upon semantic similarity. This organisation helped them
to explain the role of semantic associations during semantic search. We would see be-
low how both the lemma retrieval model, developed by Roelofs (1992), and the models
developed in the next chapter use this concept of network organisation to restrict the
flow of information.
Even though spreading-activation theory has been developed to explain (and imple-
ment) information-retrieval, it provides a general framework for studying the flow and
dynamics of information in the cognitive system. We will see below that the concepts
of nodes, activation and network organisation are fundamental for understanding how
trailing activation can explain structural priming.
§ 3.5.2 The Roelofs (1992) model of lemma retrieval
Roelofs (1992, 1993) and Levelt et al. (1999) applied the spreading-activation theory to
lexical and phonological retrieval during language production. We saw in the last chap-
ter that language production involves different stages of processing, each contributing
an information structure. A key process during production requires the cognitive sys-
tem to retrieve a word from the mental lexicon, given a particular concept. It is this
process that is modelled by Roelofs (1992) using the spreading-activation theory.
Since spreading activation is an abstract theory, Roelofs (1992) adapted this theory
to model language production by specifying the three fundamental concepts of spread-
ing activation: nodes, network connectivity and activation. Let us look at nodes and
networks first. These concepts are domain specific – i.e. different domains of mem-
ory have different primitives that can be represented by nodes and, of course, they are
connected in different ways. When the memory is searched for words, as in the case
considered by Roelofs (1992), the network needs to search a network that represents
associations of words. It turns out that words are involved in three mutually-exclusive
kinds of associations, each of which plays a role in lexical retrieval (Levelt et al., 1999).
First, the concept of each word is associated with other concepts: a dog is an animal, it
barks, it is closely related to the wolf species, etc. This information is represented at a
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conceptual stratum. Next, each concept corresponds to a lemma. Different languages
will usually represent the same concept as different lemmas. The concept dog, for ex-
ample, is represented in different languages by different words: in English it is ‘dog’,
in French ‘chien’ and in Dutch ‘hond’. Each language also associates the lemma with
its diacritic features. These diacritic features include features such as the number, tense
and aspect for verbs which need to be assigned values during sentence production. The
language-dependent manifestation of concepts, along with their diacritic features form
the lemma stratum. Finally, each word is associated with phonemes that allow a person
to express the word as an auditory signal. These associations form the word-form stra-
tum. Thus Roelofs (1992) and Levelt et al. (1999) have developed a tripartite network
for lexical memory (Figure 3.5.1) which they use to implement a spreading-activation
theory of lexical retrieval.
Figure 3.5.1: Fragment of the lexical network underlying lexical access. The network
gives an example of the word ‘escort’ in the lexicon. Copied from Levelt et al. (1999).
Given this representation of lexical memory, it only remains to define the rules of
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activation spreading to obtain a procedure for lexical retrieval. Roelofs (1992) define
activation as a positive real-valued quantity that spreads according to the following
equation:
a(m, t +∆t) = a(m, t) · (1−d)+ ∑
n∈N
w(n,m) ·a(n, t) (3.5.1)
where a(m, t) is the activation level of the node m at point in time t, d is the decay
rate (0 < d < 1), ∆t is the duration of a time step and w(n,m) is the weight on the
connection from node n to node m. This equation says that the activation of a particular
node at any given time is a fraction of its activation at the previous time step and the
(weighted) sum of activation coming in from all nodes connected to this node. Thus
there are two parts to the equation: decay and integration. As the search progresses,
activation moves along the network pathways due to integration, but also decays by a
certain factor, (1− d). Once this activation function has been defined, it is simple to
understand the process of lexical selection. Usually, the selection is some function of
the activation of the nodes. In the simplest case, the node with the largest activation
gets selected. In a more complicated case, selection is some function of the activation
of the entire network.
The theory takes the notion of nodes, networks and activation from the spreading-
activation theory and specifies how these concepts apply to language production. Net-
work connectivity is highly structured and restricted to separate out conceptual, lemma
and word-form strata. Nodes are non-decompositional representations of concepts,
lemmas, features and word-forms. Activation spreads in a mathematically well-defined
manner, specified by equation 3.5.1. Roelofs (1992) use this theory to replicate several
experimental findings related to lemma retrieval during language production, including
picture naming and picture-word interference task. Levelt et al. (1999) discuss how an
extension of this theory can also be used for performing word-form encoding.
§ 3.5.3 The trailing-activation extension
The spreading-activation theory proposed by Collins and Loftus (1975) for semantic
search was adapted by Roelofs (1992) for language production. It was originally de-
signed as a generic theory to search memory and when it is applied to production, the
theory explains production as a memory search for lemmas and word-forms. Searching
results in selection and selection results in production.
Going the other way around, one can say that production depends on the outcome of
the memory search. Thus production depends on all the variables that search depends
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on. And since search depends on activation, we can say that production depends on
activation and its parameters. These parameters are formally arranged in Equation
3.5.1, which shows that activation of a node will depend on the decay rate (d), the
connectivity of the network (w(n,m)), the activity of all other nodes and the previous
activity of the node itself. The decision to produce one word over another will depend
on the selection of the node and consequently on these parameters.
Now, the phenomenon of structural priming tells us that the production of a partic-
ular structure is related to the choices made about the comprehension or production of
the structure in the recent past. Thus production depends not only on the current in-
puts, but also on past episodes of structural selection. These past episodes themselves
must have involved procedures of memory search. Therefore, one can say that if pro-
duction depends on memory search then evidence from priming tells us that search
itself should depend on past episodes of searching. One way to make this happen is
to let each episode alter the parameters of Equation 3.5.1, letting the parameters form
the causal links between two episodes. In fact, since search proceeds by changing the
activation of nodes along a path, it already alters the key system parameter: activation.
If activation from one episode of searching can survive till the next episode, then the
two episodes will be causally coupled through this residual activation. That is the key
idea behind the trailing-activation account of structural priming.
We have started using the term ‘structural’ priming, but the Roelofs (1992) model
was developed for the selection of words. In order to deal with structural selection,
Pickering and Branigan (1998) make two observations that allow them to extend the
spreading-activation model. The first observation is that structural selection involves
choosing how words combine with other words in an utterance. An utterance using
prepositional dative construction (The banker gave the gold to the burglar) combines
a noun phrase (NP) with a prepositional phrase (PP) while an utterance using double
object dative construction (The banker gave the burglar the gold) combines a noun
phrase with another noun phrase. If we want to search the memory for structural
selection, then the memory can represent different choices as combinatorial nodes (NP-
PP or NP-NP). These combinatorial nodes belong to the syntactic level and therefore
should be added to the lemma stratum in Figure 3.5.1. The second observation made
by Pickering and Branigan (1998) was that repetition of verb leads to an increase in
priming. Thus, if priming is due to residual activation in the combinatorial nodes,
then this activation is causally related to the activation in the verb nodes. Therefore,
Pickering and Branigan (1998) hypothesise links between the combinatorial nodes and
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lemma nodes for verbs.
Thus the trailing-activation account extends the spreading-activation theory for
lemma retrieval by (a) introducing combinatorial nodes at the lemma stratum, (b) intro-
ducing links between the lemma nodes for verbs and the combinatorial nodes and (c)
hypothesising that priming is due to residual activation in the nodes from one episode
to the other. During production, the memory search will result not only in lemma se-
lection, but also in the selection of a combinatorial node. This latter selection will be
governed by residual activation (implementing priming) and input from verb lemmas
(implementing lexical boost).
§ 3.5.4 Limitations of the trailing-activation account
Spreading activation was developed as a generic framework for memory search. Roelofs
(1992) adapted it for searching the mental lexicon and simulated it for testing lemma
selection (Roelofs, 1992, 1993) and word-form encoding (Levelt et al., 1999). While
Pickering and Branigan (1998) specify how the spreading-activation theory needs to be
extended to account for structural priming, they make a number of assumptions about
the operation of their model that require justification or elaboration.
§ 3.5.4.1. Representations and processes.— The trailing-activation account is
rich in representations but lacking in processes. The representations include lemmas,
syntactic constructions and their relationships. Both the lemmas and the syntactic
constructions (combinatorial properties) are represented as nodes. The relationships
between between these nodes are represented as links. These nodes and links form a
network that is accessed during the episodes of language comprehension and produc-
tion. The only processes specified during either of these episodes is the activation of
nodes and links. Beyond this, the account is silent about processes such as how these
nodes get activated, how the model learns with repeated activation, how the activation
decays, do different traces of activation interfere, etc.
Specifically, the trailing-activation model assumes that both comprehension and
production lead to the activation of lemma nodes and the associated combinatorial
nodes. This assumption requires that comprehension and production share these repre-
sentations and that these representations contain traces of memory from each episode.
The model does not specify the constraints under which such lemma and combina-
torial nodes will be activated and how exactly a node is chosen from its cohort. The
spreading-activation theory specified that activation spreads along links and that lemma
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selection is made based on the activation (Roelofs, 1992). However, it is not clear
whether the same is applicable to the trailing-activation account. And if this is the case,
then what is the contribution of the residual activation in the selection of lemma nodes
and combinatorial nodes and what proportion of activation is spread out from each
node to the connected nodes? The original spreading-activation model also assumes
no inhibitory connections between nodes and implements the selection process as a
random event that is likely to select highly activated nodes. It is unclear whether selec-
tion of the combinatorial nodes in the trailing-activation account takes place through
the same process.
The trailing-activation account also assumes that lexical boost is a result of active
links between the lemma nodes and combinatorial nodes. Again, the account does
not specify how long the link remains active and whether it shows any effect of being
repeatedly activated. Pickering and Branigan (1998) assume that the selection of a
combinatorial node takes place based on the activation that it receives from the lemma
nodes. This mechanism allows them to explain the lexical boost effect. However, it is
unclear how other processes can participate in the selection of the combinatorial node,
in addition to the selected lemma. For example, if speakers adapt what they speak
according to their listeners (Brennan & Clark, 1996), then how does this information
play a role in the selection of the syntactic structure. In fact, the trailing-activation
account does not explain how this information can play a role in the selection of the
lemma node either.
Thus, the major limitations of the trailing-activation account lie in the fact that it
is a conceptual model and not a mechanistic one. In fact, some of our questions about
the error-based model, such as the relative amount of priming from comprehension
to production and from production to production, might be valid for a mechanistic
model of the trailing-activation account as well. In the absence of such an account,
it is difficult to know what the prediction of such a model will be. Therefore, the
trailing-activation account leaves a number of open questions, including:
1. How does activation survive from one episode to the other? Equation 3.5.1 spec-
ifies a decay rate (d) for activation. This is the rate at which activation decays
within an episode. In the simulations conducted by Levelt et al. (1999), this
parameter was set to 0.0240/msec. If activation decays at this rate, then the
residual activation will barely have any significance between two trials that are
more than 1 sec (1000 ms) apart. An alternative mechanism of decay needs to be
specified that can demonstrate how residual activation can account for how struc-
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tural priming survives when prime and target trials are separated with variable
number of filler trials (for example in Bock and Griffin (2000)).
2. What is the mechanism of learning as a result of an episode of comprehension
or production? Pickering and Branigan (1998) only specified that each episode
leaves a trace of residual activation. This activation could be as a result of an
error-based learning mechanism like the one specified by Chang et al. (2006), or
it could be the result of unsupervised learning.
3. What is the mechanism for structural selection? Roelofs (1992) specified a se-
lection mechanism based on the activation of nodes. However, this mechanism
is tailored for the experiments that they are studying: picture categorisation,
picture-word interference, etc. The structural priming experiments would re-
quire its own criterion for selection amongst combinatorial nodes.
4. How does priming accumulate over several trials? We saw that data from Hart-
suiker and Westenberg (2000) and Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) showed that
structural priming accumulates over a series of trials. How does activation allow
accumulation of priming?
5. How are nodes added to the spreading-activation network? This is a question
that can be asked of not just the trailing-activation account but also of its prede-
cessors. These accounts assume a long-term memory representation consisting
of a network of nodes. Long-term learning should be able to add nodes to the
network and modify strength of existing connections. How does this process
occur?
These questions indicate that the trailing-activation account specified by Pickering
and Branigan (1998) is only a conceptual framework for studying priming through
spreading-activation networks. However, only a fully implemented formal model can
make predictions that can be tested against experimental observations. The following
chapters will present such models and show that they provide a compelling alternative
to error-based models.
4
Dynamical systems approach to priming
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have motivated the need for a theoretical account that can
investigate the learning principles behind structural priming. We also saw that one such
account exists but fails to explain certain patterns of structural priming and especially
the phenomenon of lexical boost. In this chapter we will develop three computational
models based on a novel theoretical account of structural priming. These models ex-
plore the learning mechanisms behind structural priming and also explain the lexical
enhancement of this priming.
Our intention is to model the effect of linguistic processing on the cognitive sys-
tem. We would like to develop a mathematical description of how the cognitive system
learns as a result of linguistic processing. We would also like to investigate what hap-
pens to the cognitive system after it has undergone learning. In Chapter 2 we motivated
the study of the temporal properties of structural priming. If we are to understand how
structural priming changes with time, we must understand how the cognitive system
changes after it has undergone learning. We can formally study change in any physical
system through the theory of dynamical systems. This theory introduces the mathe-
matical apparatus required to track the evolution of a physical system through time.
By applying this theory to the relevant aspects of the cognitive system, we can track
the effect of an episode of linguistic processing on the cognitive system. Therefore,
we will begin this chapter by introducing the theory of dynamical systems and see how
this theory can be applied to the study of structural priming.
Once we have presented this theory, we will build a set of mathematical models that
exploit this theory and help us to understand the computational processes that could
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underlie structural priming. Specifically, we will present three models, each of which
focuses on a particular property of structural priming. The reader might wonder why
we present three models and not just one, all-inclusive model. The reason lies in the
nature of our investigation. The goal of this chapter (and the thesis) is to explore pos-
sible computational mechanisms that could underlie structural priming. In this thesis,
we choose a certain set of computational mechanisms that capture the properties of
structural priming. However, it is not necessary that these are the only computational
mechanisms that could underlie the behavioural phenomena. In future, other studies
could exploit a different set of computational mechanisms that can also capture these
phenomena. Our goal is to (a) demonstrate the utility of dynamical systems for inves-
tigating structural priming, and (b) to gain insight into cognitive processes that might
affect structural priming. Each of the three computational models presented in this
chapter helps us to gain insight into a cognitive process that could play a key role in
amount of structural priming.
While the three models explore different cognitive processes that could affect the
amount of structural priming, they also share some core computational mechanisms.
Each model assumes that lexical and syntactic information is represented by two sep-
arate dynamical systems which participate in both language comprehension and pro-
duction. During an episode of linguistic processing, these dynamical systems may
undergo a change in state. We will explore the nature of this change when we discuss
each model. As a result of this change in state, these dynamical systems store the in-
formation related to the episode. Furthermore, the behaviour of the dynamical systems
in subsequent episodes depends on their state. Therefore, a change in state leaves a
trace of linguistic processing which interferes with future episodes. We will see that
this trace of linguistic processing eventually leads to structural priming.
Beyond this common implementation of information storage during linguistic pro-
cessing, the three models diverge in their architecture and mechanisms. Before we
delve into the details of each computational model, here is a summary of the key ideas
of each model and the results of the simulations:
• MODEL ¬ explores the nature of connection between the dynamical systems
responsible for structural and lexical processing. Previous accounts of lexical
boost, such as the trailing-activation account (Pickering & Branigan, 1998) as-
sume that lexical boost is due to a flow of activity along the links between lexical
and combinatorial nodes. This model presents an alternative, by assuming no ex-
plicit connections between the two dynamical systems. Instead, it proposes that
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the two representations are connected due to a global property of the cognitive
system, such as its automaticity – i.e. how automatically linguistic constructs
are selected during production. By performing simulations on this model, we
show that such a representational scheme can capture both structural priming
and lexical boost.
• MODEL ­, just like Model ¬, assumes dynamical systems for structural and
lexical processing. However, unlike the first model, this model has explicit
links connecting lexical and combinatorial nodes. Simulations conducted on this
model show that this architecture can also capture the patterns of structural prim-
ing and lexical boost. In this model, we also explore the mechanisms through
which structural priming and lexical boost decay. By hypothesising that different
types of dynamical systems are responsible for priming and the lexical enhance-
ment of this priming, simulations on this model show how structural priming can
persist over a long period of time, while lexical boost decays quickly.
• MODEL ® extends the second one by building a learning mechanism that is able
to retain not just one prime episode, but a sequence of episodes – i.e. this model
builds in the mechanism of incremental learning. While the first and second
models are quite independent, with different architectures, the second and third
models are more intimately connected, with the third model subsuming the sec-
ond. Simulations conducted on this model show how both structural priming and
the lexical enhancement of this priming accumulate over a series of trials. These
simulations also reveal the nature of learning and decay in memory that can lead
to the patterns of structural priming and lexical boost observed in psychological
experiments. One interesting insight from these simulations is that the lexical
influence on combinatorial nodes could last over several trials, but might not be
detected by some existing psychological experiments used to measure this ef-
fect. Further simulations conducted on this model uncover the reason why such
a lexical influence could be hidden from experimental observation.
After presenting the theory of dynamical systems (and how it can be used to study
structural priming), we present each of these models in succession. The presentation
of each model is divided into three parts – the architecture, the formal description of
the model, and the simulations conducted on the model. At the end of the chapter,
we discuss what these simulations reveal about the cognitive processes that govern
structural priming.
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4.2 Theoretical Background
Priming is caused by the flow of information from one point in time to another. An
episode of linguistic processing at one point in time changes the system in a particular
way. After the episode is over, the system still continues to change. These changes,
in turn, influence how the system processes information during subsequent episodes.
Clearly, if one wants to understand how one episode of linguistic processing influences
a subsequent episode, one has to understand how the system changes between the two
episodes. These ideas of change and flow of information from one point in time to
another are formalised in the theory of dynamical systems.
In this section we develop the theoretical background required to study dynamical
systems. We review the relevant literature with a view of constructing a formal model
of syntactic choice and syntactic priming. Our treatment of dynamical systems will
focus around the properties of these systems that allow us to capture the behavioural
phenomena crucial to the study of structural priming. We also describe two elementary
units – a node and a network – that the formal models will build upon. In addition,
we review literature pertaining to the representation of associations in such networks
of nodes.
§ 4.2.1 Dynamical Systems
Following Hoppensteadt and Izhikevich (1997) we use the term dynamical systems to
refer to a system of differential equations of the form:
dX
dt
= F(X), X = (X1, . . . ,Xm)T ∈ Rm (4.2.1)
The above equation states that the rate of change of variables X = (X1, . . . ,Xm)T ∈ Rm
is some function F = (F1, . . . ,Fm)T on those variables. If we know a set of initial
conditions X0, this equation can determine the state of the system at any subsequent
point in time. This definition, therefore, formalises the idea of change in the system
and demands that we identify a set of variables over which this change is defined. It
also requires us to define the set of functions F that will determine the way in which
the system will change.
Equation 4.2.1 defines a very general system. It can be used to describe any phys-
ical system that undergoes change. The physical laws of the change are encoded in
the set of functions F and the properties that undergo change are encoded as variables
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X . Thus F stands for the laws of nature. For mechanics these might be the laws of
motion, for optics these might be the laws of electromagnetism. Our interest lies in
cognition and as we will see, F will encode the laws of cognitive change. Specifically,
we are interested in how syntactic structure is chosen and F will encode a mechanism
for making this choice.
Once a particular law of nature, F , has been chosen, equation 4.2.1 describes how
the properties of the system will change. The solution of this differential equation
describes a function Φt : Rm → Rm which traces the evolution of the variables over
time.
X(t) = Φt(X0) (4.2.2)
If we know the initial conditions of the system – i.e. if we know the values of various
properties of the system at some given point of time – Φt will tell us how the system
will evolve through time. Thus Φt helps us define a trajectory of the system. Figure
4.2.1 shows two different trajectories. The figure is drawn for a two dimensional sys-
tem with variables X1 and X2. Each variable is along an axis and the trajectory plots
the value of the two variables at different points in time. The two axis only track the
values of the two variables and not the value of time. We say that the variables are







Figure 4.2.1: [Trajectories] Two contrasting trajectories are plotted in the phase plane.
(a) shows a stable spiral, while (b) shows an unstable saddle.
The trajectories tell us about the stability of dynamical systems. The trajectory of a
stable solution converges to a single point while that of an unstable solution diverges.
Stability is crucial because, as we will see below, it corresponds to memories in a cog-
nitive system. When the system memorises an event, for example a syntactic choice, it
converges to a stable solution. Loss of stability leads to loss of the memory.
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Whether or not memories in the human brain really correspond to stable solutions
of dynamical systems is a question we will not be exploring in this chapter. This
question is part of a wider debate in cognitive science. However, dynamical systems
provide a way to model memory and its evolution. They help us formalise the notion of
change in memory and in this chapter we will illustrate how we can apply this approach
to investigating the effect of priming in language production.
§ 4.2.1.1. Bifurcations.— An episode of language processing changes the behaviour
of the system. The system acts one way before the episode and another way after.
Dynamical system capture such changes in the qualitative behaviour of the system
through bifurcation phenomena (Hoppensteadt & Izhikevich, 1997). Informally, a bi-
furcation can be seen as a point around which the system can evolve in (at least) two
different ways. Here, the change in the qualitative behaviour of the system is dis-
tinguished from a change in its quantitative behaviour. As an example, consider the
phenomenon of swaying of a trailer at the back of a vehicle moving along a straight
path with increasing speed (Seydel, 1999). In the absence of motion, the trailer will lie
in a stable state. As the vehicle starts moving, there will be a quantitative change in the
state of the trailer. However, beyond a certain velocity, the trailer will suddenly start
to sway. Thus there is a particular value of velocity beyond which the system shows a
qualitative change in its behaviour. This velocity is a bifurcation point for the system.
In the definition of a dynamical system stated in the previous section, the concept
of change has been formalised as the change in the values of a set of variables. These
variables can be divided into two categories: the internal variables of the system and a
set of system parameters. These system parameters are the open variables which can
have a range of values. We are interested in those values that can lead to the system
showing bifurcations. If a parameter has a value around which the system shows two
different dynamics, based on the value of the parameter, then we call such variables
bifurcation parameters. The value of the parameter at such a point is called the bi-
furcation value. In the trailer example, the velocity of the vehicle is the bifurcation
parameter and the velocity at which the trailer starts to sway is the bifurcation value.
Formally, a dynamical system dXdt = F(X ,ρ) (where we have separated the internal
variables of the system X from the bifurcation parameter ρ) is at a bifurcation point
ρ = ρb if any neighbourhood of ρb contains some ρ1 such that the qualitative behaviour
of the system is different for ρb and ρ1 (Hoppensteadt & Izhikevich, 1997).
The bifurcation characteristics of a dynamical system are interesting to us because
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they can alter the system’s equilibrium states. Around a bifurcation point the system
switches from one kind of equilibrium to another. Equilibria govern the qualitative
behaviour of the system and a change in the nature of a system’s equilibria is a change
in its qualitative behaviour. We can illustrate such a change in a system’s qualitative
behaviour by studying a particular form of bifurcation called the saddle-node bifurca-
tion.
Let us consider a dynamical system for a neuron whose activity depends on the
external input to the neuron and some feedback. We formalise the change in activity
in the neuron by encoding it as a dependent variable of the differential equation. We
also formalise the external input and the feedback by encoding them as independent




Here x ∈ R is the activity of the neuron, ρ ∈ R is the external input to the neuron, and
c∈R is the feedback parameter. The function S is a sigmoidal function which provides
a threshold mechanism. Since the change in the activity of the neuron depends on the
sum of external input and the feedback, this dynamical system is called the additive
model (Hoppensteadt & Izhikevich, 1997).
Such an additive model can show different states of equilibrium based on the value
of the parameter ρ. When ρ→−∞, the neuron’s activity x→ 0. On the other hand
when ρ→ +∞, the neuron’s activity approaches the equilibrium value one (x→ 1).
More interestingly, for intermediate values the system switches from this characteristic
of monostability to bistability – i.e. for these intermediate values of ρ the system has
two stable states. In fact, the system has three points of equilibrium; two of these
are stable (nodes) and one is unstable (saddle-point). Hence the name saddle-node
bifurcation. We see that the system shows a change in its qualitative behaviour for
particular values of ρ. This change in qualitative behaviour, in this case, is the change
from monostability to bistability. And since this change in behaviour depends on ρ,
this parameter is a bifurcation parameter of the additive model.
§ 4.2.1.2. Hysteresis.— Our goal is to study the persistence of priming through
dynamical systems. Therefore, we must first define what it means to be primed in
terms of such a system. Or at an even more basic level, what do we mean when we
talk of an episode of language processing? Each event of language processing leads
to flow of information through the cognitive system. This flow of information leads
to a change in the behaviour of the system. We saw above that a dynamical system
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shows a change in its qualitative behaviour when it passes through a bifurcation. Thus,
if we want to model the cognitive system as a dynamical system, we have to relate
the change in cognition to a change in the qualitative behaviour of the dynamical sys-
tem. In other words, episodes of language processing can be considered as events that
change the qualitative behaviour of the system. Thus, these events can be associated
with bifurcation parameters for the dynamical system. When the system encounters
an event, its qualitative behaviour changes. The dynamics of the system show how
the system is going to evolve and by studying the dynamics we can trace the causal
effect of an event through time. This allows us to study the longevity of an event and
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where S(x) = 11+e−x
Figure 4.2.2: [Bifurcations] Additive neuron dynamics could have one, two or three equi-
libria for various values of ρ (Hoppensteadt & Izhikevich, 1997). This figure shows dxdt
plotted against x for various values of the parameter ρ. The system is at an equilibrium
whenever dxdt = 0, i.e. whenever the curve crosses x axis. The equilibrium can be a
stable node (shown as a filled circle) or an unstable saddle (shown as a shaded circle).
Let us again consider the additive model from the previous section. Figure 4.2.2
shows the dynamics of the additive model for various values of x (the state of the
system) and ρ (the bifurcation parameter). Each sub-figure shows how the system
evolves for a range of ρ. In the additive model, this bifurcation parameter represents
the neuron’s external input. Therefore, each of the sub-figures shows the behaviour of
the neuron for a range of the external input. It can be seen from the figure that when the
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external input ρ is increased beyond a particular value ρ2 (figure 4.2.2(e)), the neuron
will approach the stable state x→ 1 (shown as ). On the other hand, when the external
input is decreased beyond ρ1 (figure 4.2.2(a)), then the system will approach x→ 0. In
between these two extremes, when the external input is larger than ρ1, but smaller than
ρ2, the system exhibits bistability – i.e. there are two stable states at x = 0 and x = 1.
In addition the system also develops an unstable saddle point (shown as ) in between
the two stable nodes. We would like to know which of these equilibriums does the
neuron approach when it receives such an intermediate input.
In such cases (ρ1 < ρ < ρ2) the system’s response depends on the previous state
of the system (figure 4.2.2(c)). If the system has most recently been pushed above
the bifurcation point ρ2, then the system will approach x→ 1. On the other hand,
if the system has most recently been pushed below the bifurcation point ρ1, then it
will approach x→ 0. Therefore, the system’s response depends not only on the value
of the input parameter, but also on the history of the system. This phenomenon is
known as hysteresis, and is illustrated in the Figure 4.2.3. While bifurcations provide
us with a mechanism for encoding the impact of an episode of language processing
on the dynamical system, hysteresis provides us with a mechanism for encoding how
one episode of linguistic processing affects the other. Priming in experimental subjects
demonstrates that the linguistic choices during an episode of language processing are
not made independently during each episode, but are dependent on episodes in the
recent past. Hysteresis provides a mechanism for formalising this dependency between
consecutive linguistic choices.
§ 4.2.1.3. Adaptation.— So far we have described bifurcations and hysteresis and
stated that these phenomena can be used as mechanisms for formalising linguistic pro-
cessing and the dependency between episodes of processing. We have still not de-
scribed a mechanism that can be used to formalise how the system changes between
episodes. That is, how does the system change when it is left on its own, without any
external input (or a constant external input). We know, for example, that human mem-
ory shows forgetting and neural firing shows fatigue. In this section, we describe a
mechanism that can help us formalise principles of forgetting and fatigue.
The state of a dynamical system depends on the position of its equilibria. As the
system evolves, it tries to approach its stable equilibria. An external input to the dy-
namical system pushes it towards a particular equilibrium. As we saw above, one
way of doing this is to push the system beyond a bifurcation point so that the system
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Figure 4.2.3: [Hysteresis] This figure shows the three equilibriums of an additive model
against different values of ρ. For a small as well as high values of ρ, only one equilibrium
exists. However, for intermediate values the system shows three equilibria – two stable
ones and one intervening unstable one. Under these conditions, the system shows
hysteresis and settles into the most recent equilibrium. If ρ is swept back and forth
across the range [ρ1,ρ2], the system will trace out the hysteresis loop shown by the
arrows. Adapted from H. R. Wilson (1999).
changes its point of stability. Therefore, events of external input are recorded in the
dynamical system through the position of its stability. This is the system’s memory.
Forgetting involves destruction of memory and therefore, corresponds to the de-
struction of the stable equilibria of the dynamical system. This destruction of a sys-
tem’s equilibria is a change in its qualitative behaviour and corresponds to a bifurcation
point. Therefore, in order to find a mechanism of forgetting, we need to identify a bi-
furcation parameter that leads to a loss of stability. Furthermore, this parameter should
change its value with the progress of time – i.e. we should be able to describe the
change in this parameter with another differential equation. H. R. Wilson (1999) have
discussed such a parameter for fatigue in neurons of the visual cortex. Following H. R.
Wilson (1999), we call this parameter the adaptation parameter, where the term ‘adap-
tation’ reflects the observation that when neurons are exposed to a sustained external
stimulus, their rate of firing decreases as they adapt to the external stimulus.
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where X = (X1,X2), A ∈ R and F and G are, as usual, vector functions that encode
the law for change of variables X and A respectively. This dynamical system is an
extension of the one presented at the beginning of the section (equation 4.2.1). We have
introduced the parameter A, which, in turn, changes according to its own differential
equation. H. R. Wilson (1999) shows that A can act as an adaptation parameter, such
that as the system evolves without an external input, A will change such that the system
will bifurcate and lose its state of stability. Since this state of stability is the system’s





























Figure 4.2.4: [Adaptation] Each of the figures shows two isoclines (dX1dt = 0 and
dX2
dt = 0)
for a particular value of the adaptation parameter A. The equilibria of the system are
given by the intersection of the two isoclines. The three figures are plotted for increasing
values of A. For a small value of the adaptation parameter, the system shows three
equilibria. As the parameter is increased, two of these equilibria coalesce, leading to a
saddle-node bifurcation. As A increases beyond this value, the system shows only one
stable equilibrium. Adapted from H. R. Wilson (1999).
This loss of the system’s stability can be illustrated by looking at the phase plane
of dynamical system for different values of the parameter A. Figure 4.2.4 shows this
evolution of the phase plane as the adaptation A increases. Each sub-figure plots the
isoclines for the system dXdt = F(X ,ρ,A). The points where the isoclines intersect
are the points of equilibrium. In figure 4.2.4(a), the isoclines intersect in three places -
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which corresponds to the three values of (X1,X2) for which the system is in equilibrium.
Two of these points are stable nodes and the third is a saddle point. As A increases,
we can see that the saddle point approaches the node till they collide leading to a
saddle-node bifurcation. Beyond this bifurcation (figure 4.2.4(c)) the system has only
one point of stability – at (X1 = 0, X2 = 0). If this system was stable at the non-zero
equilibrium node (Figure 4.2.4(a)) before adaptation set in, then this adaptation has led
to the loss of the information stored in that state.
§ 4.2.2 Networks and Nodes
So far we have described dynamical systems as a set of differential equations which
describe the change in a set of variables (equation 4.2.1). We have also split these
variables into bifurcation parameters and internal variables of the system. Finally, we
have seen an example that relates the internal variable to the activity of the neuron and
the bifurcation parameters to its external input and the feedback (Equation 4.2.3). We
would now like to extend this idea and consider larger systems which consist of not
just a single internal variable – such as the activity of a node – but a group of such
variables, each of which influences the other. Such interactions between a group of
variables are best studied using network theory which allows graphical representation
of the variables and their relationships as nodes and networks. In this section we will
first formally describe what we mean by such a node and then we will consider a
small network of two nodes that allows us to implement an interesting behavioural
phenomenon.
§ 4.2.2.1. Node.— Each node in the model can be seen as a mathematical trans-
formation T, that transforms its input to a scalar output: x j = T(x) (see Figure 4.2.5).
The input vector x is the stimulus and the scalar output x j is the response. In Section
4.2.1.0, we saw how the additive model of Equation 4.2.3 shows saddle-node bifur-
cation and hysteresis. This additive model sums its inputs and performs a nonlinear
transformation on the sum – the sigmoid transformation. We intend to implement each
of our nodes as an additive model and for this reason, we need to define this nonlinear
transformation. Specifically, we need a transformation that can perform thresholding
so that the node does not produce an output response until the it gets an input over a
specific limit.
Following H. R. Wilson (1999), we choose the Naka-Rushton function (Naka &
Rushton, 1966) to define the nonlinear transformation S(·). This function has the useful














Figure 4.2.5: [Node] Each node is an additive model that sums its inputs (shown as
Σ) and performs a nonlinear transformation (shown as S(·)). The node also performs
temporal integration of the input signal based on the dynamics. In this respect, the node
acts as an electrical RC circuit. The time constant of the impulse response function, τ j,
is given by τ j = R jC j, where R j is the resistance and C j is the capacitance. Adapted
from Haykin (1999).
characteristic of providing a good fit for the cortical neural response to stimuli. By
implementing this nonlinear transformation we keep the implementation of a node in
our network close to the physiological mechanisms that implement these processes.
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(4.2.5)
where x is the input to the function, M is the maximum activation, ~ is semi-saturation
constant (the point at which S(x) reaches half its value), and N determines the slope of
the function. Figure 4.2.6 plots the function for different values of N. We can see the
general sigmoid shape of this function in the figure.



















Figure 4.2.6: [Naka-Rushton function] M = 100 gives the peak response (y axis) and
~ = 50 gives value of the stimulus (along the x axis) for which response is half of peak
response. Adapted from H. R. Wilson (1999).
§ 4.2.2.2. Two competing nodes.— We mentioned in Section 4.2.1.1 that an addi-
tive model could show hysteresis. This means that if such a system were to implement
syntactic choice, then this choice would depend on both the current input, and on the
system’s past – a highly desirable characteristic since we are studying priming. How-
ever, to complete the story, we need a mechanism that not only shows hysteresis, but
also implements choice between competing structures. Though the single node in an
additive model can show hysteresis, in order to implement competition, we need to
look at a network that consists of more than one node.
Consider the following dynamical system in which two nodes are connected to







Let us look at the dynamics of this system. Each node is an additive model. How-
ever, unlike the additive model that we previously considered, here the two nodes have
mutually inhibitory connections. Hence the activation of one node forms the (negative)
feedback to the other. We want to study how this dynamical system evolves, whether
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it reaches equilibrium and what are the points of its equilibrium. This information is
given by the system’s isoclines. Each isocline traces the curve along which a node is
at equilibrium. Figure 4.2.7 shows the isoclines for each of the two nodes. We can
see that the isoclines intersect in three different places. Two of these fall along the x
axis and y axis respectively. It can be shown (H. R. Wilson, 1999) that each of these
equilibriums is stable. The third equilibrium, marked (κ,κ) in the phase plane, is an
unstable saddle point. As in section 4.2.1.0, we have a dynamical system with two
nodes and a saddle point. At each of the stable equilibrium points, one of the nodes
has a positive activation, while the other one has been suppressed and has no activation.
The inhibitory connections mean that there is competition between the nodes. One of
the nodes wins the competition and completely suppresses the other. Therefore such

















Figure 4.2.7: [Isoclines] Each isocline shows the equilibrium values for the correspond-
ing node. Therefore, the intersection of the two isoclines shows the points of equilibrium
for the whole system. This system has two stable nodes (black dots) and one unstable
saddle (white dot).
The qualitative behaviour of the dynamical system can be predicted from its bifur-
cation parameter. The bifurcation parameter for the additive model of Equation 4.2.3
was the external input ρ. For the WTA system with inhibitory connections, this pa-
rameter is the difference of the two external inputs ρ1−ρ2. If this parameter is below
a certain value (say, θ1), then the first node will win the competition. If the parameter
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is above a certain value (say, θ2 > θ1), then the second node will win the competition.
For θ1 < ρ1−ρ2 < θ2 the system could be in either of the two stable equilibriums. In
this case the equilibrium will depend on the system’s past. Thus this WTA network
will show hysteresis.
The simple dynamical system with mutually inhibitory links shows two essen-
tial properties we were looking for: it implements competition and shows hysteresis.
Therefore this system can be used to implement choice in our model. When we de-
scribe the network architecture of our models, we will see that nodes in each layer are
connected via mutually inhibitory links. Thus each layer can be seen as a dynamical
subsystem that shows competition and hysteresis.
§ 4.2.3 Binding
Syntactic choice during sentence production is influenced by two factors:
1. Syntactic choices made in the recent past (structural priming effect).
2. Lexical context of the syntactic choice (lexical boost effect).
Dynamical systems allow us to understand how information changes over time and,
consequently account for the structural priming effect. But in order to account for the
lexical boost effect, we must specify how lexical and syntactic information is associ-
ated. In Section 2.2.3 (page 27) we noted the ongoing debate about the dependence
between speakers’ lexical and syntactic knowledge. In this section, we will consider
how the influence of one form of information on the other can be represented.
Information represented in one part of the system can influence information in an-
other part through two mechanisms. The first mechanism is that of simple association,
frequently shown in connectionist models as a link between the two representations. In
this mechanism, the two representations are directly connected to each other. Activa-
tion of one representation directly influences the activation of the other representation.
An alternative mechanism is where the two representations are not directly connected
to each other, but through another intermediate representation. In this mechanism, ac-
tivation of one representation can influence the activation of the other, but only if the
intermediate representation is also activated. Thus the flow of information from one
representation to the other becomes conditional on the state of a third representation
which connects the two.
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We need to choose between these two mechanism of information flow and this
choice depends on the properties of the relationship that we want to encode. During
language production, linguistic constructs are temporarily related with each other in a
highly structured manner. These relationships are temporary as they exist only for a
short period of time – e.g. phonetic relationships exist for the duration of a word while
syntactic relationships exist for the duration of a sentence. Also, each construct is not
arbitrarily related to every other construct, rather this relationship is highly structured.
For example, if the relationships between syntax and words were arbitrary, then it
would be impossible to distinguish the sentence John gave the book to Mary from
Mary gave the book to John. Not only are the words John, Mary, give and book
associated with each other, but they are associated in a specific structure. We can
conclude that the relationships between linguistic representations need to exists only
between relevant subsets of linguistic constructs and they need to exist temporarily.
While the mechanism of directly associating representations is simple to imple-
ment, it suffers from the disadvantage that the influence between the two representa-
tions is simply governed by the frequency of their co-occurrence. The linguistic rela-
tionships generated by such an associative mechanism are neither temporary – since
they accumulate the long-term frequencies of co-occurrence – nor structured – since
they are based on statistical and not structured relationships.
The other mechanism of information flow – through an intermediate representation
– overcomes these limitations by having this intermediate representation serve as a
gate between the two representations. If this common representation is active, then
one representation (say word-form) influences the other (syntactic choice). Otherwise,
the two representations stay independent. This intermediate representation can exist
for a short period of time and allows us to implement the temporary nature of the
relationship. We will see below that this mechanism is advantageous to us because
it allows us to study the time course of lexical influence on syntactic choice. It also
allows us to represent the fact that not all constructs that co-occur in a sentence will
be related to each other. Only those relationships that have an active intermediate
representations will be related.
However, in order to implement this mechanism, we need to specify what this
intermediate representation could be. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to the re-
lationship between the word-form of a verb and the syntactic construction that the
verb appears in. The intermediate representation needs to store this relationship in a
temporary manner. While we will not be concerned with the structured nature of the
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relationship (e.g. the verb acts as the predicate and the subject and objects of the sen-
tence act as the arguments to this predicate), we would like to use a representational
mechanism that can be generalised to capture this structured nature of the relationship
as well. In the next chapter, we will use this generalisation and expand our representa-
tional scheme to include structural relationships between different parts of a sentence.
The problem of explicitly storing structured relationships between representations
is well studied and is known as the binding problem (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Hum-
mel & Biederman, 1992). The binding problem is not restricted to representation of
language, but extends to other modalities. For example, the binding problem needs
to be solved in our visual system if it represents an object as the conjunction of its
features. The early visual cortex seems to be good at detecting different features of ob-
jects, such as orientation, colour and location. This means that if the cognitive system
wants to represent an object as a whole, then this information about the orientation,
colour, location, etc. needs to be integrated somewhere. Thus we need a mechanism
for representing the conjunction of these features.
There are two ways to represent such conjunction of features: (a) through static
binding, and (b) dynamic binding. Static binding uses an explicit symbol, or a node, to
represent the conjunction. Thus the conjunction of a colour and an orientation is rep-
resented by a node. If there are three possible colours and four possible orientations,
then this requires twelve nodes (3×4). This representation has the obvious disadvan-
tage of spatial complexity – i.e. as the number of symbols increase, the nodes required
to represent the conjunctions will increase exponentially. The advantage, however, is
the simplicity of representation as it only requires a representational unit to encode an
association.
Static binding suffers from spatial complexity because all the conjunctions are ex-
plicitly represented at the outset. Some of these conjunctions will never be used dur-
ing the processing of the system. This limitation can be overcome if the system can
temporarily bind representations. This kind of conjunction is called dynamic bind-
ing. Usually, the system uses a particular variable to represent the conjunction of
properties. A popular variable for dynamic binding is temporal synchrony (von der
Malsburg, 1981). Binding through temporal synchrony assumes that units that code
for each representations fire at a particular frequency. Two patterns of activation can
then be bound together by synchronizing the firing frequency of units participating in
the two patterns. Gray and Singer (1989) have given physiological evidence for the
existence of such synchronous firing of neurons. Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993) have
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developed a model that can be used for natural language reasoning and uses temporal
synchrony for representing structured relationships in sentences.
In our current study, we are not seeking a complete model of language production.
Instead, we want to design a formal model that serves as a proof-of-concept for our
premises about priming and lexical boost. Therefore, we adopt the simpler representa-
tion of static binding over the more computationally complex dynamic binding. This
will make our design more simple and our analysis more lucid. However, the results do
not depend on the nature of the binding and the same arguments can be made, mutatis
mutandis, for a dynamic binding solution as well.
4.3 Model One
As stated in the Introduction to this chapter, we will consider three models for struc-
tural priming in this chapter, each based on the theory of dynamical systems. While
the second and third model provide a more accurate implementation (and extension) of
the trailing-activation account, the first model presents an intriguing digression. This
model investigates the range of information that speakers use while making structural
decisions. The trailing-activation account assumes that lexical information influences
structural decisions through a set of associative links, but this model explores an alter-
native possibility for such a flow of such information. Models ­ and ® will return to
the trailing-activation idea and show how associative links can also account for lexical
influence on structural decisions. We present this model first because it is the simplest
and helps us introduce some basic dynamical systems that will be used in the following
models.
The act of speaking involves making decisions at various levels of processing. Lev-
elt (1989) divides production into three stages: (i) Conceptualisation, during which
speakers decide what they want to say, (ii) Formulation, during which speakers choose
the linguistic construction and finally (iii) Articulation. Each stage involves a group of
processes that make decisions amongst a set of competing alternatives. The speaker
can employ a range of considerations while making each of these decisions. At one ex-
treme, each decision can be made strategically by considering a broad range of social
and inferential premises. Examples of such strategic processes are given by Brennan
and Clark (1996) and Brennan and Metzing (2004), who propose that interlocutors in a
dialogue explicitly model their audience and carefully “design” their utterances based
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on this audience. At the other extreme, each linguistic decision can be made by a set of
fast, automatic processes, without explicitly considering this broad range of premises.
An example of this automatic process is structural priming where interlocutors show a
tendency to repeat the construction that they have just heard.
Garrod and Pickering (2007) discuss how the stages of language production show
a mixture of automatic and non-automatic processes. Following Bargh (1994), they
divide automaticity into four components – awareness, intentionality, efficiency and
controllability. Garrod and Pickering (2007) argue how each stage of language pro-
duction can fulfill a varying number of these criteria and therefore shows a graded
amount of automaticity. In particular, they discuss how the process of grammatical
encoding shows features of both being non-automatic (it is partly open to awareness
and competes for central resources) and being automatic (it shows structural priming).
Finally, Garrod and Pickering (2007) also discuss evidence suggesting that interlocu-
tors in a dialogue show a variable amount of alignment which suggests that the degree
of automaticity in each stage is not fixed, but variable. They suggest that speakers can
overcome automatic processes of alignment through effortful processing if they have a
strong interest in not aligning with their interlocutor.
A complete model of structural selection needs to show how subjects can employ
these automatic and strategic considerations while making structural decisions. This
is a non-trivial problem. The model needs to implement a structural decision process
in such a way that it shows priming. Secondly, the model needs to show how this
priming would increase under lexical repetition. Finally, the model needs to show how
priming and lexical boost are affected by the change in the degree of automaticity. In
this section, we develop a model that makes structural decisions and allows us to vary
the overall degree of automaticity in the system. Before describing the architecture of
the model, we review the architecture of an existing model and see how we can change
it using the theory of dynamical systems.
§ 4.3.0.1. A flashback of trailing activation.— We discussed in Section 3.5 how
Pickering and Branigan (1998) extend the lemma retrieval model proposed by Roelofs
(1992, 1993) into a conceptual model of structural priming. Pickering and Branigan
(1998) found, through a series of experiments, that structural priming was influenced
by the repetition of the verb between prime and target trials (the lexical-boost effect).
They argued that this result showed that syntactic decisions are influenced by their
lexical context. The original spreading-activation model described by Roelofs (1992)
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contained only the syntactic category information with each lemma. Therefore, this
network was insufficient for explaining the lexical-boost effect, prompting Pickering
and Branigan (1998) to propose a revision of this model.
In this revised conceptual model, the lemma nodes are connected to a constellation
of grammatical nodes which represent grammatical properties such as the tense, as-
pect, number, etc. and the combinatorial properties of the node. These combinatorial
properties correspond to the procedural knowledge (i.e. knowledge of phrase structure
rules) associated to a lemma (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). In this chapter, we are only
concerned with the lexical influence on the word order of utterances. Therefore, we
will ignore all other links of the lemma nodes except its link with the combinatorial
nodes. This isolated set of relationships between two lemma nodes, Give and Send and
two combinatorial nodes, NP-PP and NP-NP, is pictorially shown in Figure 4.3.1.
NP-PP NP-NP
Give Send
Figure 4.3.1: [Trailing-activation ac-
count] Each lemma is associated with a
combinatorial node, which governs how
the lemma combines with other words in
the utterance. Active nodes and links are
highlighted.
The extension of the model proposed by
Pickering and Branigan (1998) emphasises
that syntactic information is not stored inde-
pendently, but in its lexical context. This lex-
ical context is associated with syntactic infor-
mation through a link. Pickering and Brani-
gan (1998) propose that the lexical context of
syntactic structure is encoded by making this
link ‘active’. An active link allows the flow of
activity from one node to the other and there-
fore, in subsequent trials, syntactic structures
receive a boost from lexical nodes connected
using an active link. In Figure 4.3.1 we pic-
torially represent the active link between Send
and NP-PP through a thick edge connecting the
two nodes.
This revised model, being a conceptual rather than a computational account, leaves
many aspects unspecified including the nature of associations between the lexical and
combinatorial nodes, the dynamics of the nodes themselves, the mechanism of syn-
tactic choice and the nature of learning with each episode of language production or
comprehension. In this section, we will try to investigate the specification of each of
these aspects and arrive at an architecture that can explain temporal aspects of syntactic
priming and its lexical enhancement.
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§ 4.3.1 Architecture
We design our model based on the conceptual model proposed by Pickering and Brani-
gan (1998) (Figure 4.3.1). As the first step, we change this model to include a module
that controls the overall degree of automaticity in the system. Then, we assume that
this degree of automaticity influences both structural and lexical decisions. While it is
true that lexical and syntactic decisions show different degrees of automaticity (Gar-
rod & Pickering, 2007), we assume that these decisions can also be controlled by an
overall level of automaticity in the system. This overall level of automaticity can, for
example, reflect the amount of control that an interlocutor wants to exert over align-
ment. When a speaker is interested in not aligning with their interlocutor, the system
can encode this state by having a low level of automaticity. To reflect the assumption
that an overall level of automaticity influences both structural and lexical decisions, we
connect this module to lexical and structural layers. Thus, our new system introduces
an implicit causal link between lexical and structural layers – through the overall level
of automaticity in the system.
Previously, it has always been assumed that lexical boost is caused by an explicit
causal connection between lexical and syntactic layers (Pickering & Branigan, 1998;
Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). This causal connection has often been represented as
associative links between the two layers (Figure 4.3.1). However, we have seen that
one can hypothesise an alternative causal connection between lexical and structural
layers – through a module that controls the degree of automaticity in the system. In
our first model, we test this hypothesis by removing the overt associative links between
lexical and structural layers and investigating if the system still shows lexical boost. We
call the cognitive process that controls the overall level of automaticity in the system
as the system’s level of arousal. A high value of arousal is related to a low degree
of automaticity and vice-versa. In this sense, arousal can be closely compared to the
awareness component of automatic processing. The more automatic a process is, the
less likely is the speaker to be aware of that process.
Figure 4.3.2 shows a pictorial description of our first model. This figure shows
that the model consists of three parts: a lexical layer, a syntactic layer and the Arousal
module. In Pickering and Branigan (1998), two nodes in the same layer are not linked
to each other. However, in the current model, nodes in the same layer are connected
via inhibitory connections. As we will see below, such inhibitory connections lead
to competition between nodes and can implement the process of choice between the
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NP-PP NP-NP Syntax Layer




Figure 4.3.2: [Model ¬] Each layer shows a representational cohort. The nodes within
a layer are connected through inhibitory links. The input of each node (Ki) is connected
to a module that maintains the overall level of arousal in the system.
nodes. The third component of the model is an Arousal module. The output of this
arousal module is linked to the external input received by the lexical and combinatorial
nodes.
§ 4.3.2 Formal Description and Dynamics
In this section we present the precise formal details of the model shown in Figure 4.3.2.
We discuss the mathematical details of the connectivity of the model, the dynamics of
each node and a systematic method of determining the parameters of the model.
§ 4.3.2.1. Dynamics.— Our first model consists of two independent winner-take-
all layers. Each node within a layer is connected with an inhibitory link to all other
nodes in the layer. For our example, we consider only two nodes in each of the layers.
The dynamic equation for the rate of change of activation of each node in Layer1 and







(−Ei +S(Ki− c ∑
j 6=i
E j)) (4.3.1)
where Ei is the activation of the node, Ki is the external input, c is the feedback pa-
rameter, and τ is the time-constant for rate of change of activation of each node (H. R.
Wilson, 1999). Therefore, (Ki− c∑
j
E j) is the net input to each node – the difference
between external input and sum of inputs from inhibitory connections. Note that the
general form of the equation is the same as the equation for the additive model. The
external input ρ has been replaced by Ki. The feedback is negative and depends on the
sum of activation of all other nodes1.
Let us consider the behaviour of this system during a prime trial. The network is
symmetric – the strength of the (inhibitory) connections from each node to the other
are identical (ci = c ∀i). Therefore, if the initial conditions are the same for both the
nodes, then the winner is decided by external input. Each external input, Ki, tries to
pull the activation of the node towards its own value and each node tries to suppress all
other nodes. Since the system always starts from the rest state (Ei = 0) at the beginning
of a prime trial, the winning node at the end of this trial is completely dependent on
the external input. The network makes a choice and the winning node is picked by
external input.
As discussed above, once the network makes such a choice, it sticks with it – i.e.
shows hysteresis. The bifurcation parameter indicates whether the network will show
hysteresis or be biased towards one of the nodes. As discussed above, this bifurcation
parameter is the difference in external inputs K1−K2. Depending on the value of
the parameter, one of the nodes will achieve maximum activation – we call this node
being in the ON state. The other node will have activation close to zero – we call this
node being in the OFF state. If during the priming trial, one of the nodes was turned
ON and the other OFF, then the network will have inertia towards keeping each node
in its existing state. In order to overcome this inertia, a greater difference of inputs
(∆K = |K1−K2|) is required.
Therefore, during the target trial, the network is driven by two contrasting forces.
The first is hysteresis – which provides the network inertia – and the second is external
input – which pushes the network towards the node with larger external input. These
forces might pull the network towards the same node, or they might be in opposition,
with greater external input for the node that has lost the competition.
1Model ¬ has only two nodes, so the summation sign, in this case, is redundant.
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§ 4.3.2.2. Determining external stimuli.— Since we are studying priming, we
are interested in how the system behaves once it has been primed. As we will see
below (section 4.3.3), it is fairly straightforward to determine amount of external input
during the priming trial. This is because a priming trial is completely governed by
the external input. However, during testing, this choice of external input is not so
straightforward. At first glance, one might think that the system can be tested by
simply providing an equal external input for both the nodes. But doing so would
mean that the system is completely determined by its internal state. As we will see,
this implies that we will have 100% priming. Subjects do not show 100% structural
priming, because each production trial receives a novel set of semantic constraints
under which to choose a structure. Thus, making a structural choice finds a balance
between relying on the system’s memory and fulfilling a set of higher level (semantic
or attentional) constraints. This variation in higher level constraints can be modelled
in our system with a variation in the external inputs. Specifically, it can be modelled
through a variation in the value of the difference in external inputs ∆K.
So we can reformulate the problem of determining external inputs to the problem
of determining a value for ∆Ktest , the difference in external inputs for a typical target
trial. Because we want each trial to be independent, we want to assign this ∆Ktest
randomly, with a certain probability distribution function, p(∆Ktest). What should this
pdf look like? Our first constraint comes from the knowledge that we do not want this
external input to be biased towards any of the two combinatorial nodes. This gives us
the condition:
P(∆Ktest > 0) = 0.5 (4.3.2)
where P(a > b) is the probability that a will be greater than b. This equation helps us
constrain the shape and the mean for the probability distribution: the mean ∆Ktest , µ,
should be zero and the distribution should be symmetrical about this mean. Several
distributions satisfy this criterion. For instance, the Gaussian distribution, N (µ,σ),
with µ = 0, the uniform distribution with µ = 0, the bimodal distributions symmetrical
about the y axis all have P(X > 0) = 0.5 (figure 4.3.3).
Our second constraint comes from the absolute value of the difference between the
external inputs, |∆Ktest |. This difference in external inputs governs whether external
input will be able to overcome hysteresis. If ∆Ktest is below a certain value, say −θ1
(the bifurcation point), then the first node will win the competition, irrespective of the
system’s past. Similarly, if ∆Ktest > θ2, the system crosses the other bifurcation point
and again there is only one stable state: the second node comes ON and suppresses








Figure 4.3.3: [Probability distributions] Gaussian, uniform and bimodal distributions,
symmetrical about the y axis.
the first node. For a symmetrical system, |θ1| = |θ2|, and we can replace them by a
single constant, θ. So, when |∆Ktest |> θ, the external input is the only parameter that
determines the system’s equilibrium – there is no priming. For intermediate values,
|∆Ktest | < θ, the system has two stable states and the choice of the state depends on
the system’s past. Here, hysteresis dominates external input; the system shows 100%
priming.
In a realistic model neither hysteresis, nor external input, will completely dominate
the other. This means that the value of |∆Ktest | should be less than θ with a certain
probability, say π (0 < π < 1). Equivalently, we can say that the external input will
dominate hysteresis with a probability, 1−π.
P(|∆Ktest |< θ) = π, 0 < π < 1 (4.3.3)
Again, this constraint can be fulfilled by several distributions for p(|∆Ktest |). We
choose the Gaussian distribution, N (µ,σ), because it provides us two parameters that
will allow us to control the position and the shape of the distribution. Also, the central
limit theorem means that the distribution makes fewest assumptions about the distri-












The shape of the Gaussian distribution is shown in figure 4.3.3. The distribution
is symmetrical about its mean, µ, which governs the location of the distribution. The
spread of the distribution around its mean is governed by its second parameter – vari-
ance, σ2. The smaller the value of σ2, the more concentrated is the distribution about
its mean. Larger values of σ2 will result in larger probability of obtaining values away
from the mean. Thus, if p(|∆Ktest |) = N (µ,σ), then the most likely value of |∆Ktest |
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Figure 4.3.4: [Hysteresis vs External input] The value of |∆Ktest | determines whether
hysteresis or external input will dominate. If |∆Ktest | is picked from a Gaussian distri-
bution, then probability of hysteresis dominating external input is shown as the shaded
region under the curve.
Now, we can restate our problem of determining the external stimulus as determin-
ing the parameters µ and σ for a Gaussian distribution, given a dynamical system with
the boundary θ and a mean probability of hysteresis, π. From equation 4.3.3 and our
assumption of p(|∆Ktest |) = N (µ,σ), we can deduceZ
θ
0
N (µ,σ) = π (4.3.5)
This equation gives us the constraints using which we can determine the mean and the
variance of p(|∆Ktest |) in terms of the probability that the model will show hysteresis,
π. These constraints are pictorially represented in the Figure 4.3.4. The shaded area
under the curve is the probability that |∆Ktest | is less than θ. By moving µ, we will
be moving the distribution along the x axis, while the boundary between the forces
of hysteresis and external input remains fixed at |∆Ktest | = θ. If we align µ with θ,
then each force will dominate the other exactly 50% of the time. Furthermore, we
can use well known facts about the Gaussian distribution, such as the probability of a
variable assuming a value within standard deviation σ of the mean is 0.68 2, to calculate
appropriate values of µ and σ. In the next section, when we describe the simulation
results, we will see how we can manipulate the value of µ and σ as a proportion of π to




−σ N (µ,σ)dx = 0.68
R +∞
−∞ N (µ,σ)dx
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§ 4.3.3 Simulation & Results
§ 4.3.3.1. Terminology.— So far we have been using the term episode to indicate
the flow of information in a cognitive system and the term trial in the same way as
it is used in psychological experiments. But in order to describe the simulations, we
must refine these definitions and also add a third term, phase, to our repertoire. Since
we will need to use these terms for specific and disjoint purposes, we provide a brief
description of them and their relationship to each other.
• TRIAL. A trial is a single execution of the dynamical system. It commences
when the stimuli is input to the system and continues till the system settles down
into an equilibrium. The exact time for the system to settle into an equilibrium
is determined relative to the time-constant (τ) of the relevant dynamical system.
A trial can be either a comprehension trial, or a production trial. The difference
is how the input is supplied to the system. A comprehension trial implies that
lexical and syntactic choices are not made by the dynamical system (which is
the hearer), but by an external speaker. Hence, during a comprehension trial,
lexical and syntactic choices are fixed. The mechanism for fixing these choices
will be discussed below. In our simulations, a comprehension trial usually serves
a prime and a production trial could serve either as the target, or as a filler.
• EPISODE. A comprehension trial followed by a production trial is termed as
an episode. The production trial is optional, so that an episode could consist
merely of a comprehension trial. The reason for production trial being optional
is that we might need to prime the system with a sequence of comprehension
trials before simulating a production trial.
• PHASE. When we study the long-term effects of priming, we need to see how a
sequence of episodes affect syntactic choice. Such a sequence of episodes con-
sists of a phase. There are two kinds of phases: training phase, where the system
receives a sequence of primes, and testing phase which consists of a sequence
of target episodes. Note that a testing phase consists of episodes themselves and
not trials directly. This is because we will be using the experimental design of
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) where testing phase consists of a sequence of
prime-target pairs. We will discuss their design in greater detail in Section 4.5.3.

















Figure 4.3.5: [Terminological hierarchy] For illustration purposes, each parent node is
shown as having only two children nodes. In practice, each parent node will have
multiple children. A phase, for example, might consist of ten episodes.
§ 4.3.3.2. Experiment Design.— Let us look at the experimental setup for simu-
lating Model ¬. This model had two goals: (a) to test whether we can get priming and
lexical boost without explicit connections between lexical and combinatorial nodes and
(b) to test the influence of arousal on priming and lexical boost. Crucially, we do not
intend to test the longevity of priming and lexical boost for this model. Therefore, the
simulation consists of the prime trial immediately followed by target trial. Figure 4.3.6
shows the experimental setup for model ¬. The key thing to note is that the state of
the system at the start of the target trial is the same as the state of the system at the end
of a prime trial.
Next we need to set the values for the external inputs during priming trials. The
priming trial begins with a ‘clean slate’ system and receives an unbiased external in-
put. This trial simulates comprehension. At the beginning of the priming trial the
network was set to the rest state, i.e., both the nodes in the WTA layer were turned to
the OFF state. In Equation 4.3.1 this corresponds to the initial conditions Ei = 0,∀i.
The external inputs during the priming trial are picked randomly from the Gaussian
distribution N (µ,σ). During the priming trials, we would like each of the nodes to be
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equally likely to win the competition. As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, we can express
this constraint in terms of the balance between hysteresis and external input being at
par – i.e. π = 0.5. Looking back at Figure 4.3.4, it is clear that we can achieve this
if the Gaussian distribution is symmetrical about the boundary between hysteresis and
external input. In other words, we need to align the mean with the bifurcation value for
|∆K|: i.e. µ = θ. Because the Gaussian distribution is symmetric about the mean, the
value of the standard deviation, σ, becomes irrelevant in this case. The external inputs
were chosen independently for the lexical and combinatorial nodes and the system is
simulated till it reaches equilibrium. As the system starts from the rest state during a
priming trial, the equilibrium is completely determined by the external inputs.
Now let us look at the target trial. This trial simulates production. We start the
target trial by specifying the initial conditions of the system. At the beginning of
the target trial, the initial state of each node was set to the final state for the priming
trial. Production starts from where comprehension stopped. This means that there is no
intervening decay in memory between priming and target and the production dynamics
become dependent on comprehension phase, allowing the network to show hysteresis.
Next we specify the external input during the target trial. It is the balance between
the hysteresis and external input that decides the extent of automatic priming. When
we discussed the architecture for Model ¬, we saw that there is a trade-off between au-
tomatic and non-automatic (strategic) processes during language production. Syntactic
decisions are influenced by the automatic process of priming, but the input from social,
pragmatic and inferential premises might constrain this influence of priming. The tar-
get trial needs to accommodate these constraints. The architecture of Model ¬ showed
these constraints by making causal link between external input and the Arousal mod-
ule. Now we need to specify how exactly the input from the Arousal module influences
the choice of external input during target trial, |∆Ktest |.
The sign of the external input is chosen from a uniform distribution such that
P(∆Ktest > 0) = 0.5 (Equation 4.3.2), so that there is no bias towards any construc-
tion. The absolute value of the external input, |∆Ktest |, was again chosen randomly
from the Gaussian distribution N (µ,σ). But the mean, µ, and the standard deviation,
σ, become a function of π as well as the amount of arousal in the system, A . This
means that the difference between the external input for the two nodes is related to the
amount of arousal in the system. If the amount of arousal is high, then the difference
is larger, making external input dominate over the system’s inertia or hysteresis.
Relating external input to arousal makes sense. During production, the external
4.3. Model One 119
Priming Trial
Target Trial





Figure 4.3.6: [Experiment Design] A flow diagram showing the sequence in which differ-
ent layers are simulated during testing for Model ¬. During the priming trial, both layers
are simulated in parallel. During the target trial, the lexical layer is simulated before the
syntax layer. The arousal is adjusted by comparing the lexemes selected during prime
and target. Finally, based on the arousal the inputs to syntax layer are adjusted and the
layer is simulated.
input comes from higher level processes. These higher level processes could com-
pletely determine syntactic choices (non-automatic processing), or these choices could
be left to the syntax module itself (automatic processing). The variable that influences
whether the choices will be made within the syntax module, or outside, is arousal.
Take, for example, the syntactic choice between a prepositional object and direct object
dative. Under some cognitive load, a speaker might choose one over the other based on
which was used most recently. But remove this cognitive load and the speaker might
favour one of the constructions for contextual or social reasons. This is the trade-
off between automatic and strategic processing. The model implements this trade-off
through the contrasting forces of hysteresis versus external input. Hysteresis captures
the notion of inertia and external input is related to arousal, which, in turn, is related to
strategic processing.
Arousal can also be related to lexical repetition. The amount of arousal is a global
property of the system. It affects both syntactic and lexical choices. Now, because we
are modelling the sentence completion task during the target trial, the lexical choice
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has already been made by the experimenter. Subjects can use the verb given in the sen-
tence completion trial to decide the degree of automaticity of their utterance. Or more
specifically, they can choose the syntax of their utterance based (either automatically
or strategically) on whether the verb given to them during the target trial is the same or
different to the prime trial. We can encode these properties of the experimental setup
by associating the arousal in the system with the repetition of verb between prime and
target.
We assume that the repetition of verb between prime and target trials, leads to a
lower level of arousal in the system. We can justify this assumption by considering
the definition of arousal in our model. We defined arousal as being inversely related
to the degree of automaticity. In terms of the components of automaticity proposed
by Bargh (1994), our definition of arousal comes closest to awareness and efficiency.
Our assumption is tantamount to assuming that the repetition of the verb leads to low
focal attention and therefore triggers efficient processes. This low focal attention also
leads to a low level of awareness. In contrast, a novel verb, we assume, contains
new information which grabs the focal attention leading to awareness and inefficient
processing. While much experimental work needs to be done to confirm (or reject)
these assumptions, they allow us to study a possible connection between repetition and
the amount of automaticity in the system. We will discuss the consequences of these
assumptions in section 4.6.1.
To sum up, the external input for a target trial is picked based on the arousal in
the system. Formally, [µ,σ] = f (π,A), where A is the global arousal in the system.
The mean and standard deviation of the pdf become a function of π and the amount of
arousal, A . This arousal is, in turn, related to lexical repetition. Thus the target trial
proceeds in two stages (figure 4.3.6). The first stage simulates the lexical layer by pick-
ing external input from N (0, f (π)). The second stage simulates the syntax layer by
picking external input from N ( f (π,A)), where A ∝ 1lexical repetition . If the lexical layer
uses the same verb between first and second stage, the amount of arousal in the system
decreases, which, in turn, shifts µ and σ for p(|∆Ktest |). In the current experiment, we
assume that µ decreases by a constant kb in case we have lexical repetition. In other
words, the expectation of difference in external inputs for the two nodes decreases by a
constant, kb, whenever the verb is repeated between prime and target. In Figure 4.3.4,
this corresponds to moving the Gaussian distribution towards the left by the constant
kb.
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§ 4.3.3.3. Measuring Priming.— While collecting data from simulating the model,
we want to check whether the system shows priming and we want to measure the
amount of priming. Therefore, we need a statistic that quantifies the amount of prim-
ing shown during a particular simulation. Unlike a psychological experiment, where
we specify the outcome of each priming trial in advance, the current simulation de-
termined the outcome of priming trials stochastically (as specified above). In order
to measure priming, we needed to compare these stochastic choices during prime and
target trials and quantify the results.
Now, we know that priming depends on repetition – an increase in priming would
lead to an increase in repetition of a syntactic choice. But this relation is not symmet-
rical. A large amount of repetition does not necessarily entail large amount of priming.
There might be, for example, a bias towards one of the syntactic choices, which would
lead to more than a 50% repetition, without priming. We saw in section 4.3.2 that the
external stimuli depends on a stochastic variable, ∆K. There, we assumed that the vari-
able is picked from a pdf with mean zero. Moving the mean in any direction can allow
us to test the model in cases where there is a syntactic bias towards one combinatorial
node. The obvious way to measure priming is to see if a syntactic choice is repeated
between a prime trial and a target trial. However, this would mean that the model will
show repetition of the preferred structure in absence of priming.
We can circumvent this problem by simulating the system under two different con-
ditions: (i) Priming condition: when the initial state of the target trial was influenced
by the final state of the prime trial, and (ii) No-priming condition: when the initial
state of the target trial was reset to the rest state. In other words, we internally switch
off priming and measure the amount of repetition. Then we compare this with the
amount of repetition in case the priming was switched on. A statistic was derived by





Np = Number of subjects that show repetition in priming condition.
Nnp = Number of subjects that show repetition in no-priming condition.
NSub = Total number of subjects.
In the simulations conducted on this model, each subject undergoes one trial.
Therefore this statistic measures priming by trial, rather than by subject.
3Each subject is different from the other since the external stimuli, ∆K, is picked independently for
each subject, as discussed in section 4.3.2.
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To quantify the lexical boost, just like we quantified priming, another statistical
measure was developed. This is done by checking if there is greater amount of priming






Primingrep = Amount of priming (in percent) for subjects who received a repeated verb.
Nrepp = Number of subjects (receiving repeated verb) that show repetition in priming
condition.
Nrepnp = Number of subjects (receiving repeated verb) that show repetition in no-
priming condition.
NBoostSub = Total number of subjects receiving repeated verb.
Lexical boost can then be calculated as Primingrep−Priming. This statistic mea-
sures the difference between priming when the verb was repeated and the overall level
of priming. If priming is enhanced due to lexical repetition then Primingrep−Priming
should give a positive value. Note that this statistic is slightly different from how lexi-
cal boost is normally shown in psychological experiments, where the amount of prim-
ing is compared between the ‘Same-Verb’ and ‘Different-Verb’ conditions. In these
results we are not trying to make a quantitative comparison of lexical boost shown
by the model and experimental subjects. Rather, we are only interested in accessing
whether or not the model shows a lexical boost. The above statistic is sufficient for this
purpose.
§ 4.3.3.4. Results.— The simulation was run independently for 50 different sub-
jects. Each subject receives a priming trial followed by a target trial according to the
experimental design shown in Figure 4.3.6. The results of the simulation are shown
in figure 4.3.7. Along the y axis, the figure shows amount of activation of a node at
the end of a trial, i.e. when the system has reached equilibrium. Circles represent the
activation of a PO node, while diamonds represent the activation of a DO node. Along
the x axis, the figure shows the subjects.
We can observe from the figure that the activations of the two nodes are polar
opposites. For a particular subject, if the PO node achieves maximum activation, the
DO node is completely switched OFF and shows zero activation. We can find the
amount of repetition by comparing the results from the priming and the target trials.
If a node that wins the competition during the priming trial also wins the competition
during the target phase, then we have repetition. We plug in these results into Equation
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4.3.6 to obtain Priming = 20%. These results were caluculated for µ = θ, i.e. the mean
of the Gaussian distribution was situated at the point of bifurcation. Since hysteresis
dominates half of the times, it is not surprising that the model shows priming.4




































Figure 4.3.7: [Results] The results for simulating Model ¬ for fifty subjects. The x axis
shows the subjects and y axis shows the activation of the PO and DO node at the end
of each trial.
We also checked whether the model showed an increase or decrease in priming
with change in external stimulus. To do this, we varied µ and σ. This is equivalent to
changing the shape of the Gaussian in Figure 4.3.4 and moving it along the axis. When
we increased µ to (θ + 5), and kept σ to a very low value of (θ/50), Priming became
0%. External input becomes the governing force, removing the effect of hysteresis
completely. On the other hand, when we moved µ in the other direction to (θ− 5),
Priming became 44%. Thus the model behaved as we had expected – showing priming
based on the balance between external input and hysteresis.
Next, we tested the network for lexical boost by setting kb to a positive value. Until
now, the global arousal in the system did not affect the value of external stimuli. But
when we set kb to a positive value, the difference in external input decreases when the
4If anything, it is surprising that the model shows a priming of 20% and not 50%. This is due the fact
that our statistic compares the repetition under the priming and no-priming conditions. Since there is
repetition during the no-priming condition as well, the overall amount of priming shown by this statistic
is diminished.
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system shows low arousal (Section 4.3.3.1). In other words, when the verb is repeated
between prime and target trials, the new expected value of difference between external
inputs is reduced by kb: |∆Knewtest |= |∆Koldtest |− kb.
We reset the value of µ = (θ+5) and σ = θ/50, a setting of parameters that previ-
ously gave us no priming. We also set kb = 6, so that it can just overcome the external
input. When the model was tested with these parameters, Priming indeed increased
to 12%. Whats more, the value of the statistic Primingrep – i.e. the priming for those
subjects which received repeated verbs between prime and target trials – became 23%.
Thus subjects who received the repeated verb show a large amount of priming taking
the overall level of priming up from 0% to 12%.
This pattern of results remained true for various values of the parameters µ, σ and
kb. The model showed both priming and lexical boost, contingent on values of these
parameters. By varying the parameters, we can confirm that the reason that the model
shows priming is indeed the the balance between hysteresis and external input and it
shows lexical boost due to the input from the arousal module. Thus these simulations
serve as a proof of concept for our predictions of the reasons behind structural priming
and lexical boost. Of course, the value of these results rests on a set of assumptions
about the role of hysteresis and arousal in linguistic processing. We discuss these
assumptions and other the consequences of our results in section 4.6.1.
4.4 Model Two
Model ¬ challenges the idea of overt associative links between lexical and com-
binatorial nodes. It replaces these overt associative links with a module governing the
degree of automaticity in the system. We saw in the simulations that such a model can
lead to lexical boost. Therefore model ¬ provides a proof of concept for a complex
relationship between lexical and syntactic representations. In this section, we revert to
the simpler possibility that information flows between lexical and syntactic represen-
tations through a set of associative links. These links are simple to implement and help
us explore the longevity of the association between lexical and syntactic information.
A complete model would consider the interplay between flow of information due to
the degree of automaticity in the system and due to associative connections between
lexical and syntactic representations. However, evaluating such a model would require
experimental data to be collected on the effect of automaticity on syntactic decisions,
which is lacking at the moment. Therefore, we will not endeavour to construct such
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a model. Instead, we pursue the idea of direct associative links between lexical and
syntactic representations and explore whether such links can lead to structural priming
and lexical boost.
Specifically, we consider the possibility that the links between lexical and combi-
natorial nodes are present, but do not undergo long-term learning. That is, these links
simply function as a flow of activation from one representation to the other. This flow
of activation might be gated (i.e. the links become active under certain circumstances
and broken under others), but they does not learn the statistical association between
lexical and combinatorial information.5 Our next model explores whether we can get
priming and lexical boost when the links between lexical and syntactic information do
not show this long-term statistical learning.
This model challenges the notion that the causal link between lexical and syntactic
information is necessarily formed through long-term learning, or that these links record
statistical information over a series of episodes. Chang et al. (2006) predict that the
same learning mechanisms that are involved in long-term language acquisition could
also lead to priming effects. Their model learns the statistics of stimuli over a series
of episodes and incrementally accommodates each stimulus into the model. Model
­ tries to put forward a contrasting hypothesis: Short-lived memory traces can also
reproduce experimental findings related to short-term priming and lexical boost. We
discuss the consequences more fully after presenting the results.
§ 4.4.1 Architecture
Figure 4.4.1 shows the network architecture of our next model. The nature of connec-
tions between nodes in the same layer is the same as in model ¬ – inhibitory connec-
tions allowing for competition. However, instead of having no links between nodes in
the two layers, this model assumes that any pair of nodes in the two layers are con-
nected through a module of short-term memory (STM). This module remembers the
association between a lexical and syntactic information for a short period of time. It
contains nodes that can remember the conjunction of lexical and syntactic properties
of a sentence. The reader would recall (from Section 4.2.3) that remembering such
conjunctions involves forming the binding between the two properties. Since we pre-
allocate the nodes that are used for storing each conjunction, our model implements
5In the strictest sense, this opening and closing of gate might be (and is) governed by the input and
therefore counts as a kind of learning too. But here we are reserving the term learning for learning the
statistical patterns (e.g. correlation) between lexical and combinatorial information.
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static binding. The short-term memory layer is nothing but a collection of binding
nodes. The number of binding nodes is equal the total number of combinations of
lexical and syntactic nodes.
NP-PP NP-NP Syntax Layer





Figure 4.4.1: [Model ­] Syntax and lexical layers consist of mutually inhibitory nodes.
STM consists of a set of binding nodes (shown as gray ellipses) with each binding node
containing two mutually excitatory nodes. A binding node is activated when nodes
connected to it in both the lexical and syntax layer are activated.
As shown in the figure, each binding node connects to two nodes – one in each
layer. Node 1 for example is responsible for retaining the binding between a PO and
Give. If both of these nodes are activated during a priming trial, then binding node 1
gets activated, thereby memorising the association. The memory is short-term and is
wiped out completely at the end of each trial.
Our goal in this study is to investigate the lexical influence on syntactic choice.
We are not interested, for our present purposes, in the role of syntactic information on
lexical choice. For this reason, the connections between the STM and the two layers are
asymmetrical. Activation flows only one way – from the lexical layer to the syntactic
layer. We call these connections control connections and the exact detail of the flow
of information on these connections is discussed when we describe the simulation (see
Section 4.4.3).
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§ 4.4.2 Formal Description and Dynamics
Model ­ is an extension of Model ¬ and its formal description can also be seen as an
extension of the formal description of the previous model. It still contains the com-
petitive networks of mutually inhibitory nodes. However, in addition, it also contains
some additional dynamical systems. In this section, first we describe the dynamical
subsystems and then we outline how these subsystems can implement a key goal of the
second model – decay in memory. Once we have described these systems formally, we
will be ready to test them. The method of determining the external stimuli remains the
same as the previous model and will not be described again.
§ 4.4.2.1. Dynamics.— Model ­ extends Model ¬ in two ways: it introduces a
short-term memory module between Layer1 and Layer2 and it introduces decay in
memory through adaptation. In this section we formalise the notion of short-term
memory and in the next we formalise decay in this memory. The dynamics for winner-
take-all competition within a layer is inherited in this model from Model ¬.
As we saw in Section 4.2.3, the short-term memory module consists of a num-
ber of binding nodes that retain the association between nodes in Layer1 and Layer2.
One way to encode the association of two nodes is by simply setting an attached flag
whenever two nodes are activated together. However, such a mechanism will not be
consistent with our overall paradigm of using dynamical systems. Additionally, there
is no straightforward way to implement forgetting using such a mechanism. In con-
trast, the additive model that we discussed above can show both short term memory
and decay. Therefore, we implement the binding nodes using such an additive model.
Figure 4.4.2: [Binding node] A binding
node is a dynamical system consisting
of two mutually excitatory nodes.
Specifically, each binding node is imple-
mented as a network of two mutually exci-
tatory nodes (figure 4.4.2). It has previously
been shown (e.g. H. R. Wilson (1999)) that
such a pair of mutually excitatory binding
nodes can, just like the WTA pair, show hys-
teresis. Once activated beyond a particular
point (i.e., driven to the ON state), both nodes
will need to be sufficiently inhibited by exter-
nal input before they are turned OFF. The dy-
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(−Ei +S(Kstm + cE j)) (4.4.1)
where Ei and E j are activations of the two mutually excitatory nodes comprising a
binding node, τstm is the time constant for the rate of change of this activation, Kstm
is the external input, and S(x) is again the Naka-Rushton function. In contrast to the
winner-take all dynamics of Equation 4.3.1 (page 112), each node in this system gets
positive feedback from the other node. Also note the missing summation function since
we assume that this network consists of exactly two nodes, while the WTA network
consisted of two or more nodes.
Comparing equations 4.4.1 and 4.2.3 (page 95), we can see that each excitatory
node is an additive model, with each node getting positive feedback from the other.
So it would come as no surprise that this network has three states of equilibrium,
two nodes and one saddle point – just like the WTA network. However, unlike the
WTA network, the stable equilibriums occur at (0,0) and (ν,ν) – where ν is a positive
constant (see Figure 4.4.3). The exact value of ν is currently not of interest to us, but the
interesting observation is that both nodes have the same amount of activation in either
of the stable states. Both nodes either switch ON (ν,ν), or OFF (0,0). Therefore, the
state of the network (i.e. the binding node) is stored mutually in the two nodes. If both
the nodes are in the ON state, then a conjunction is present, otherwise it is absent.
§ 4.4.2.2. Adaptation.— We picked the above dynamical system to represent bind-
ing nodes not just because it could encode conjunctions, but also because this system
can show forgetting. The conjunctions are implemented using the stable nodes and for-
getting is implemented through loss of this stability. In between the two stable nodes,
(0,0) and (ν,ν), lies an unstable saddle (κ,κ). We have seen this pattern before. It oc-
curred when we were looking at mutually inhibitory nodes (figure 4.2.7) and saw that
the isoclines for such nodes intersected in three places. There as well, an unstable sad-
dle was sandwiched between two stable nodes. Before that, we saw the same pattern
in Figure 4.2.4 (page 99), when we had a first look at adaptation. There we looked at
the isoclines for an additive model. They intersected in three places, provided an adap-
tation parameter was below a certain value. As the adaptation parameter increased, the
unstable saddle coalesced with the stable node leading to a loss in memory. In this
section, we are interested in (a) specifying how the adaptation parameter might change
with time, (b) identifying a system variable that can act as the adaptation parameter and


















Figure 4.4.3: [STM Isoclines] Isoclines for mutually excitatory nodes show that, at equi-
librium, either both nodes will turn ON (ν,ν), or both nodes will turn OFF (0,0). The
intermediate equilibrium (κ,κ) is an unstable saddle point (H. R. Wilson, 1999).
(c) understanding how the change in this parameter could lead to forgetting in STM
and WTA nodes.
Let us first consider a winner-take-all network. The memory of such a network
lies in remembering which of the two nodes received greater external input during the
priming trial. The system is capable of remembering such an event because each event
corresponds to a stable equilibrium and each stable equilibrium is the polar opposite
of the other stable equilibrium. One can, therefore, think of decay as a mechanism that
makes the system move away from this polar nature, either by causing the stable equi-
libriums to disappear, or by bringing them close to each other (thereby diffusing the
polarity). Therefore, the adaptation parameter will need to be changed incrementally
and with each incremental adjustment, the system should move away from these stable




As we discussed in Section 4.2.1.2, this additive model has two bifurcation param-
eters: the external input, ρ and the feedback, c. We have already seen how the external
input might push such a model over a bifurcation point leading to a change in its qual-
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itative behaviour. This same qualitative change can be achieved using the feedback
parameter, c. We cannot use the external input, ρ, to account for adaptation, since the
value of this variable is governed by the input stimuli. However, there is a possibility
that we can use the feedback parameter c to perform the role of adaptation.
Here we run into a problem. If c is to serve as an adaptation parameter, then we will
need to make incremental changes to it. Feedback to each node comes from the input
connection from the other node. In the WTA network these connections are inhibitory
and in the STM network they are excitatory. However, the strength of connections
between nodes in a layer needs to be symmetrical and fixed because we do not want
to build any Hebbian-like long-term learning into Model ­. But this means we cannot
adjust the strength of these connections to take care of adaptation.
The solution to this problem comes from the study of cortical gain control cir-
cuits. H. R. Wilson and Humanski (1992) show that if a cortical circuit has divisive
feedback6, then changing the feedback is equivalent to changing the semi-saturation
constant, ~, of the neuron’s response. The reader would recall that the semi-saturation
constant is the value of input stimuli for which the Naka-Rushton response function
reaches half its peak-value (equation 4.2.5). For our purpose, ~ gives us a parameter
that we can relate to a neuron’s feedback. Crucially, H. R. Wilson (1999) show that
this variable can act as the adaptation parameter in Equation 4.2.4. As the parame-
ter changes with time, the stable nodes in figures 4.4.3 and 4.2.7 will approach the
unstable saddle, eventually leading to a bifurcation and a loss in the system’s memory.
Model ­ consists of two kinds of connections – mutually inhibitory (WTA), and
mutually excitatory (STM). Each of these dynamical systems (given by 4.3.1 and 4.4.1)
is extended to adopt the changing parameter ~. For the STM network, this is done by
replacing ~1 with (~1 +A1) and ~2 with (~2 +A2), and adding the equations for change
of A1 and A2. Here A1 and A2 are the amount of adaptations to ~1 and ~2 respectively.














where τa is the time constant for adaptation and α is the saturation constant for Ai –
i.e., it governs the maximum values of Ai, as a fraction of Ei.
6In a cortical circuit, divisive feedback means that the input signal is divided by a portion of the
neuron’s response. Unlike subtractive feedback, divisive feedback depends nonlinearly on a neuron’s
response.
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For the WTA network, we make a slight modification. Instead of having different
rates of adaptation of E1 and E2, we have the same rate of adaptation, based on the sum


















We can justify using the same rate of adaptation for both nodes in a WTA net-
work from both a computational perspective and a behavioural perspective. From the
computational perspective, having separate adaptation rates for E1 and E2 leads the
network to an asymptotically stable limit cycle. This means that E1 and E2 start show-
ing oscillations. As adaptation proceeds, the activation of one of the ON node starts
to decrease and that of the OFF node starts to increase. This continues till the previ-
ously OFF node has maximum activation (becomes ON) and the ON node has zero
activation (turns OFF). This is not phenomenologically desirable as it would mean that
we get “reverse-priming” in case the testing phase begins at a time when E1 and E2
have reversed their activation during an oscillation. There is no such evidence of an
oscillating amount of priming (see, for example, Pickering and Ferreira (2008)). Also,
from a behavioural perspective, it makes sense to have the same adaptation rate in both
the nodes as the nodes are completely symmetrical. This adaptation rate is a function
of the total activation in the network (E1 + E2), rather than activation of a particular
node. However, it must be said that the adaptation rate in this case becomes a non-local
behaviour – i.e. its value does not depend simply on the local variables of the node,
but on the global state of the system.
§ 4.4.3 Simulation & Results
§ 4.4.3.1. Experiment Design.— Just like Model ¬, the simulation consists of a
sequence of two trials: the priming trial followed by the target trial. And just like
Model ¬, the external inputs K1 and K2 are selected stochastically. During the priming
trial, the initial state of all nodes is set to the rest state (Ei = 0,∀i). ∆Kprime is chosen
in an identical manner to Model ¬ from the pdf N (µ = θ,σ) and equilibrium state is
calculated by simulating the dynamical equations of both layers. Once the network has
settled, the bindings are stored in the STM (see figure 4.4.4). This is done by simulating
the dynamical equations of the mutually excitatory networks and a constant external
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input. This external input is positive (and above threshold) if both nodes connected to
the binding node are active (ON), and zero otherwise.
The target trial simulates production. We are interested in syntactic choice and
therefore, this target trial can be seen as simulating the sentence completion task in
which the subject is already given the verb, but can choose one of two possible gram-
matical structures to complete the sentence. The lexical layer is simulated first and
receives a large external input (µ θ), ensuring that the lexical decision is made solely
using external stimulus. After the nodes in the lexical layer have achieved equilibrium,
the syntax layer is simulated. The layer receives a random external input (∆Ktest) that is
not biased towards any node. The amount of priming is varied by varying p(|∆Ktest |),
as described in Section 4.3.2.
Priming Trial Target TrialAdaptation




Figure 4.4.4: [Experiment Design] Flow diagram for simulating Model ­. Unlike the
simulation for Model ¬, the priming and target trials are separated by an adaptation
period. The short-term memory is updated after the priming trial and forms an input to
the syntax node during target trial. ∧ represents the process of finding conjunction. It
is used to both bind the representations during a priming trial and unbind them during
a target trial.
Unlike Model ¬, this model has explicit connections between the lexical layer
and the syntactic layer, via the short-term memory. Each node in the syntactic layer
receives input from STM based on the following expression:{
Kstm i f Estm×Elex > 0
0 otherwise
(4.4.4)
where Kstm is a constant amount of input that a node in syntactic layer gets from the
STM, provided the condition on the right-hand-side is met. Estm and Elex are the ac-
tivations of the binding node and the lexical node connected to it, respectively. The
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condition Estm×Elex > 0 ensures that a syntactic node receives input from only those
binding nodes that are themselves active and are connected to active lexical nodes. For
example, to calculate the input from STM to the PO node, the model tested whether
EGive×Estm1 > 0, or, EShow×Estm2 > 0. Thus this condition ensures that a PO node
gets input from the STM layer only if a connected binding node was activated during
the priming trial (hence, Estm1 > 0 or Estm2 > 0), and, the lexical node linked to this
binding node is active during the target trial. We see that during the target trial, there
is a causal flow of activation from lexical to syntax layer via the binding nodes.
It should be noted that the dotted connections between the nodes in Figure 4.4.1
(page 126) – i.e., the connections between the STM and the two layers – are not ex-
citatory or inhibitory connections like the ones within each layer. Instead, the flow
of activation along these connections is dependent on a logical condition (expression
4.4.4). It is for this reason that we call these connections control connections.
There is another way in which simulating this model is different from the previous
one. The target trial immediately follows the priming trial in Model ¬. Here, the two
are separated by a period of adaptation. While explaining the simulation of the target
trial above, we did not state the initial conditions for the nodes in the WTA layers.
These initial conditions are a key difference in the previous simulation and this one. In
Model ¬ the initial state of the dynamical system during the target trial was just the
final state of the priming trial. In the current model, once the priming trial is over, the
system keeps running under adaptation conditions (equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) before
the target trial.
During the adaptation period, the nodes in STM network received no external input
while the nodes in WTA layers received a constant external input. This difference in
external input for the two types of nodes is required by the nature of their connectivity.
Since the connections within a binding node in STM are mutually excitatory, the net-
work is able to retain its activation in the absence of any external input. However, the
connections in the WTA network are mutually inhibitory. In the absence of an external
input, these nodes rapidly pull down each other’s activity. The nodes soon approach
the rest state, losing their memory. Looking back at equation 4.4.3, this behaviour
would mean that the activations start decaying according to the time constant τ, rather
than τa, which was meant to be the adaptation time-constant.
We can prevent this rapid decay in WTA memory by maintaining an external input
during the adaptation period. However, maintaining the same external input as the
stimuli is not behaviourally desirable as (a) it is biologically implausible, and (b) it
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would not let the system adapt, defeating the purpose of adaptation period. Instead, we
can maintain a neutral external input, which does not favour any particular node (i.e.
∆K = 0). Such an input allows the system to adapt according to the adaptation time-
constant, τa, and does not interfere with the network’s memory. The absolute value of
each external input during adaptation, Kadapt , is set to the mean of the two inputs K1
and K2 received during the priming trial.
Adaptation carries on for a pre-determined amount of time (and not till the system
has reached equilibrium). At the end of this period, the initial state for the target trial
is chosen as the final state of the system during adaptation. Activation of both WTA
nodes and STM nodes changes during adaptation period. This means the model will
show variable behaviour depending on the duration of adaptation.
§ 4.4.3.2. Results.— Before we look at the results of the simulation, let us review
the hypotheses of this model. The simulation tested the model for three kinds of be-
haviour:
(i) Whether or not the model shows priming.
(ii) Whether or not the model shows lexical enhancement of this priming.
(iii) How do priming and lexical boost vary with change in duration of adaptation?
Our prediction is that the model should show both priming and lexical boost. This
model, just like the last one, shows WTA dynamics. These dynamics exhibit hysteresis
which lead to priming in Model ¬. Therefore, we predict that the model should show
priming. Furthermore, the combinatorial nodes in the current model receive an input
from the lexical layer (via the STM module). Repeated lexemes between prime and
target trials should lead to extra input for the combinatorial node that appeared during
the priming trial. Thus, we expect to see a lexical enhancement of structural priming.
We also expect that the amount of priming and lexical boost will decay with in-
crease in adaptation time. This can be seen by looking back at equations 4.4.2 and
4.4.3. As the adaptation period progresses, the adaptation variable Ai increases, lead-
ing to a decrease in the activation for the nodes. This, in turn, drags the stable system
towards the saddle point. The longer the adaptation period, the closer the system will
get to the unstable saddle and the more likely it is to lose its memory.
Figure 4.4.5, shows results from a typical simulation run on 50 independent sub-
jects. Like the results of model ¬, this figure plots the output of both the priming and
target trials for the syntax layer. Model ¬ contained only the lexical and syntax layers,
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Figure 4.4.5: Results for simulating Model ­ on 50 subjects. The x axis shows subjects
and y axis shows activation. The two panels on the left show activation for PO (circle)
and DO (diamond) nodes. The panel on the right shows the state of one (out of the four)
binding nodes, for all 50 subjects. If a binding node is active (i.e. activation is more than
50), then it passes the activation from the associated lexical node to the syntax node.
but this model also contains a connecting layer of binding nodes. Therefore Figure
4.4.5 also shows the activity in the binding nodes alongside. Also like the previous
model, these results are contingent on the values of the parameters µ and σ which de-
termine the external input, drawn from p(|∆Ktest |) = N (µ,σ). For the results shown in
figure 4.4.5, we had set µ = (θ + 0.5) and σ = (θ/20). This means that the system is
marginally in favour of the external input as the mean of the Gaussian distribution in
figure 4.3.4 (page 115) is marginally to the right of the bifurcation point θ. In addition,
we set the adaptation time between prime and target trials to be 0ms – i.e. there was
no adaptation. For these values of the parameters, we obtained Priming = 20% and
Primingrep = 18.5%. Thus, the system seems to show priming but since Priming and
Primingrep are almost the same, it shows no lexical boost.
The reason for the lack of lexical boost is that the syntactic layer in the system re-
ceived no input from the binding nodes – i.e. we had set Kstm = 0. Next, we wanted to
see how the system behaves when we changed the value of this constant – i.e. activated
the connection between binding nodes and syntactic layer. We also wanted to see the
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Table 4.1: Results for Model ­. The first two columns show values for different parameters.
We keep µ and σ fixed and vary Kstm and the adaptation time.
Kstm Adapt time Priming Primingrep Lex boost
Kstm = 0 0ms 20% 18.5% 8
Kstm = 2 0ms 39% 51.2% 4
Kstm = 2 1000ms 32% 38.2% 4
Kstm = 2 2000ms 34% 43.5% 4
Kstm = 2 3000ms 18% 20% 8
Kstm = 2 4000ms 13% 12.5% 8
Kstm = 2 8000ms 11% 12% 8
behaviour of the system when the adaptation time was steadily increased. In particular,
we wanted to observe how priming and lexical boost change as the lag between prim-
ing and target trials is increased. Testing the adaptation time requires setting another
parameter of the model – the adaptation time constant τa (equations 4.4.3 and 4.4.2 on
page 130). We assumed the value of 4000ms for this adaptation time constant. This
value is chosen so that it is much larger than τ and τstm, the time constant for change
in activation in syntax and STM layers. Crucially, this adaptation time constant is the
same for both the syntax layer and the STM layer – i.e. we assumed that similar kinds
of decay mechanisms operate in the representational layers and the binding nodes. The
reason for making this assumption is that we wanted to explore whether the same de-
cay mechanisms in the two memory systems can lead to different properties of decay
in structural priming and lexical boost. The results from simulating Model ­ with a
range of values for adaptation time are shown in Table 4.1.
From Table 4.1, we can observe that the model is capable of showing both priming
and lexical boost. This lexical enhancement of priming is contingent on input from the
STM module. In the absence of this input – Kstm = 0 – the model shows no lexical
boost. We also observe that the amount of priming reduces steadily as the adaptation
period increases. Over a long period of time (Adapt time = 8000ms) the priming shows
saturation, decreasing to around 11%. The lexical enhancement of this priming also
decreases steadily with increase in adaptation time. But in contrast to priming this
lexical boost decreases suddenly to zero between 3000ms and 4000ms. Thus, these
results not only confirm that Model ­ is capable of showing structural priming and
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lexical boost, they also show that the same internal decay rate in memory (τa), can
lead to different behavioural decay properties. We discuss the reasons and significance
of these results in Section 4.6.2.
4.5 Model Three
In the first two models, we experimented with the nature of connections between
lexical and combinatorial nodes. The first model had no explicit links between the
two representations and the second model had links that stay active over only a short
period of time. In Model ®, we make it possible for the links to remember associations
between lexical and combinatorial nodes over a sequence of episodes. That is, we
provide the network with long-term memory. Specifically, we build in incremental
Hebbian learning. Unlike the network in Model ­, this network is able to extract
statistical patterns of association between the two representations. However, unlike the
network presented in Chang et al. (2006), Model ® uses unsupervised learning. That
is, there is no model for the correct response that the simulation tries to internalise.
This, in turn, means that learning is not error-based. The consequences of this scheme
are discussed in Section 4.6.
§ 4.5.1 Architecture
Figure 4.5.1 shows a schematic diagram of model ®. This schematic representation is
the same as that for model ­, except for the arrows attached to the input of the nodes.7
These arrows depict the external inputs that the nodes receive. During comprehen-
sion, this input is assumed to be from feed-forward connections coming from either
lower levels of processing or afferent connections from the sensory system. During
production, this input could come from other cognitive systems, such as meaning and
attention. In addition to this, nodes in layer 1 and 2 also receive a fixed input from
binding nodes in the short term memory.
The reason why external inputs are explicitly represented in figure 4.5.1 and not
in Figure 4.4.1 is that these external inputs are used to store long-term memory in
model ®. Every time a node gets activated, its external input is incremented. This is
7The number of words in the lexical layer has been increased to four in place of two in the previous
model. We made this change because this model will be used to test the stimuli from Kaschak and
Borreggine (2008) which requires at least four verbs. However, this is not a major change and Model ®
can easily be changed to use two verbs like the previous models without any loss of generality.
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Figure 4.5.1: [Model ®] All nodes in a layer are connected with inhibitory links and each
node also has control connections to binding nodes in the STM layer. (For representa-
tional convenience we show inhibitory links only between neighbouring nodes, but each
layer is, in fact, fully connected. The formal description below will give a more accurate
view of network connectivity.) The input sensitivity of each node (shown as incoming
arrow with weight) varies with each episode.
true for both nodes in the representational layers and the binding nodes in the short-
term memory module. There are various other ways in which long-term memory can
be implemented in the model. We will discuss in the next section why we choose to
implement long-term learning through incrementally adjusting the input to nodes.
§ 4.5.2 Formal Description and Dynamics
Model ® inherits its dynamics from Model ­ – two WTA layers connected with an
STM module consisting of binding nodes. Both WTA and STM show adaptation with
time, as discussed for model ­. The key addition to this model is that of long-term
cumulative learning. In this section we present a formal description of how such a
cumulative learning can be encoded and how to select the parameters associated with
this learning.
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§ 4.5.2.1. Incremental learning.— Model ® extends Model ­ by performing
long-term learning. While in Model ­ we were content to use the current state of
the system as the memory for its recent past, in this model we explicitly record infor-
mation of each passing episode. Two kinds of information are recorded:
(i) The association between lexical and combinatorial information. This informa-
tion is encoded in the binding nodes.
(ii) The combinatorial and lexical choice made during the target trial. This informa-
tion is encoded in the winner of the comptetion in each WTA layer.
Incremental learning can be seen as an extension of the trailing activation account
(Pickering & Branigan, 1998), which claims that priming is due to traces of residual
activation in the language processing system. Incremental learning proposes that these
traces can accumulate over time, so that more frequent constructs are more likely to
be chosen over low frequency constructs, given the same amount of attention. Thus, a
system that shows incremental learning is sensitive not just to the most recent episode,
but also to the long-term history of the inputs presented to the system.
Since this incremental learning is simply an accumulation of trailing activation, it
is in contrast with goal-directed learning mechanisms. The learning algorithm for our
system does not try to model the environment – it simply records traces of activation.8
This is an important distinction – while a learning algorithm that tries to model the en-
vironment is concerned with the goal of the learning first and cognitive implementation
second, a learning algorithm that records traces of activation places the emphasis on
cognitive implementation. The difference is a matter of perspective. A goal-directed
learning algorithm looks at the cognitive system from the outside, inwards, and tries
to find an implementation that models the environment. A learning mechanism that
records the activation looks from the inside, outwards, and finds a property of the en-
vironment that is encoded through forming such a record.
A cognitive system could record a series of episodes in two possible ways: it could
record each of these episodes separately as an exemplar (e.g., Goldinger, 1998), or it
could collapse information spread across multiple episodes into a single variable and
use each episode to update the variable. The first algorithm uses an episodic memory
to retain episodes, while the second one uses a prototype-based semantic memory. In
this chapter we implement long-term learning as a prototype-based memory. Each
8Inevitably, this accumulation of traces of activation models the frequency of stimuli in the environ-
ment – however, this can be seen as a by-product of the learning algorithm, rather than its goal.
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episode is used to incrementally update a variable that records the system’s response
to the input. Specifically, we use a Hebbian-like unsupervised learning algorithm. The
system has no explicit teacher and the training data consists of a set of inputs without
any corresponding target values. The learning algorithm makes fixed increments to its
semantic memory based on each episode.
There are a number of variables in the model that can record the effect of each
episode:
• PEAK ACTIVATION OF EACH NODE. The peak activation of each node is gov-





f or x≥ 0
0 f or x < 0
One way to record the effect of each episode is to increase the value of this peak
activation incrementally when the node gets activated. This way a node that
has been activated more frequently will have higher activation as compared to a
node that gets activated less frequently. This would also mean that for the same
amount of external input, the node that gets activated more frequently will show
a larger response to the input and as a result dominate the other node.
Although this mechanism allows us to model the effects of repeated activation
of a node, it raises questions about the neural plausibility of the model. Neurons
show a lot of random activity that (until now) cannot be associated with any
behaviour. This random neural activity, or neuronal noise, interferes with the
value of the peak activation of a node. If, for example, a node in our system
is implemented through a population of neurons, then the peak activation of this
population will not be a constant. Rather, it will show a large variation because of
neuronal noise. This variation in peak activation will mean that small increments
to this activation after each episode cannot be seen as an evidence for learning.
Therefore, using peak activation is not desirable for encoding learning in our
system.
• STRENGTH OF EXCITATORY OR INHIBITORY CONNECTIONS. So far we have
assumed for both STM and WTA networks that the connections between any
two nodes are symmetric. But this need not be the case. If we make one of
the connections stronger than the other, it alters the equilibrium states of the
network. This can be seen in figure 4.5.2, where the inhibitory connection from
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the first node to the second is stronger than the inhibitory connection from the

















Figure 4.5.2: [Asymmetric connections] Isoclines for WTA network with asymmet-
ric connections. The network is stable at either (0,80) or (50,0). This means that
the ON activation of E2 is larger than E1. In addition, the domain of attraction of
E2 (not shown) will be larger than that of E1.
This change in equilibrium state of the network is accompanied by a change in
the domain of attraction of each equilibrium state. A domain of attraction for
an equilibrium state can informally be defined as the set of all intial condition
for which the trajectory approaches the equilibrium. In our case, when one of
the connections becomes stronger than the other, then the node which receives
the stronger inhibitory connection develops a smaller domain of attraction. This
means that if equal size of external inputs are provided to the two nodes, then
the node with the larger domain of attraction will dominate. This allows us to
build an incremental learning mechanism that changes the connection strengths
between the two nodes, making the node that has been activated more frequently
have the larger domain of attraction.
The potential problem with this solution is that unless the strengths of connec-
tions are changed in a particular way, the system tends to develop equilibriums
that do not completely turn one node OFF and the other ON. For example, in
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figure 4.5.2, the peak activation as well as the external inputs of the two nodes
had to be asymmetrical so that the isoclines intersect along the x and y axes.
Therefore, this solution, even though plausible, is complex to implement.
• SENSITIVITY TO EXTERNAL INPUT. We have seen above how each node in
a dynamical system is pulled by two forces: hysteresis and external input. The
equilibrium of a dynamical system in which both nodes receive the same amount
of external input will be governed by hysteresis. However, if the external input
is biased towards one of the nodes, then the equilibrium will be governed by
both hysteresis and external input. If the difference in external input is large,
then this input can overcome the effect of hysteresis and the equilibrium will
be completely determined by the external input. Therefore, one can think of a
linear scale that shows the kind of forces that influence the equilibrium of the a
dynamical system (figure 4.5.3).
|∆K||∆K|= 0 |∆K|= π
fhyst fext
Figure 4.5.3: [Forces] Hysteresis and External input can be thought of as forces
acting on the dynamical system.
The little circle below the line in figure 4.5.3 can be seen as the external input
in the case of a particular trial. This external input is pulled towards the points
|∆K|= 0 and |∆K|= π by the two forces of hysteresis and external input. Now,
consider a situation in which the external input available to each node is not
fixed, but scaled by a factor, say ωi for each node. A key point is that, in this
case, the distance between the two points |∆K|= 0 and |∆K|= π is not absolute,
but dependent on these scaling factors. In case of a two-node network, if the two
scaling factors are close to each other (ω1 ≈ ω2) the distance between the two
points will be larger than the case in which there is a large difference between
ω1 and ω2. Therefore, a small difference in external input could lead to the node
with larger input winning the competition, provided there is a large difference
between the two scaling factors. These scaling factors, ωi, can be seen as weights
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attached to inputs, or as sensitivities of a network’s inputs to external stimuli.
These input sensitivities can serve as the long-term record of the system’s pro-
cessing. Whenever a node gets activated (wins the competition, for WTA net-
work), its sensitivity to the input can be increased by a small amount λ. This
way, a node that gets activated greater number of times will be more sensitive
to the input and consequently more likely to win the competition given the same
external stimuli.
Each of the variables presented above provides a mechanism for encoding long-
term learning. We choose the last one – ‘Sensitivity to external input’ – because it is the
easiest to implement and most biologically plausible. Adjusting the input sensitivity
is Hebbian learning in its most primitive form: when an input frequently contributes
to firing of a particular neuron, then synapses from the input to the neuron should be
strengthened.
The other two mechanisms have their limitations. Implementing long-term learn-
ing as adjustment to the strength of excitatory and inhibitory links suffers from com-
putational complexity. As the network adjusts the strength of links between nodes the
domain of attraction for each equilibrium, as well as the position of the equilibrium,
will change. We need to make sure that the learning mechanism leads to stable solu-
tions and it guarantees that repeated presentation of stimuli will lead to convergence of
connection strengths to finite values. In the next chapter we will see that we can study
such domains of attraction by defining a certain function called the Lyapunov func-
tion for the dynamical system. However, we avoid this theoretical complexity at the
moment and use the simple mechanism of adjusting input sensitivity to investigate the
effects of long-term learning on the behaviour of our system. We also avoid using the
mechanism of adjusting the peak activation of a node as we saw that such a mechanism
will show a sensitivity to noise and will be difficult to justify biologically.
Now, let us look at how we can implement learning using this mechanism in Model
®. In order to do this, first we need to formalise what we mean by input sensitivity and
how we can adjust this sensitivity. Let us assume that the variable for recording this
input sensitivity for each node is ωti. The subscript i stands for the number of the node
and the subscript t stands for time. We want the input sensitivity to accumulate over
time. We want its current value to depend on its past values. We also want the input
sensitivity to change if the node is activated. Therefore, the learning rule for change in
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ωi with each episode can be stated as:
ω
t
i = δ ω
t−1
i +λ (4.5.1)
where δ is a parameter that governs the effect of previous episodes on the current input
sensitivity and λ is the amount of adjustment to input sensitivity as a result of the
current episode.
The next thing we need to specify is how a node’s input is affected by its input
sensitivity. Let the external input to a node at time t be Ktext and let the input that
reaches the node be Ktint . We stated above that the input sensitivity can change the
|∆K| from an absolute value to a relative one. In other words, ωi scales the external
input: Ktint = ω
t
i ×Ktext . Alternatively, we can maintain this input sensitivity as an






Thus the input received by a node is the sum of the external input and an internal long-
term learning variable. By examining figure 4.5.3, we can see that the larger the value
of this internal variable, the more the input will be pushed towards |∆K| = π and the
more likely it will be that the external input will dominate hysteresis. Thus ωti does
indeed serve as the input sensitivity of a node.
Two unknown factors remain before we have completely defined the learning rule:
δ, which is the effect of previous episodes on input sensitivity and λ, the effect of the
current episode on input sensitivity. These factors can be, respectively, seen as the
decay rate and the learning rate in long-term memory. First, let us look at the decay
rate, δ.
§ 4.5.2.2. Choosing the rate of decay δ.— Any capacity-limited memory needs
to undergo gradual forgetting in order to avoid losing all stored information or else
losing the ability to form new memories (Sandberg, Lansner, Petersson, & Ekeberg,
2000). We have already seen one such mechanism of forgetting – adaptation in the
activation of nodes – which leads to forgetting in the short-term memory. In long-term
memory, we implement forgetting by building it explicitly in the learning rule 4.5.1.
With each episode, the sensitivity of a node to input stimuli is adjusted based on the
node’s response to the stimuli. Thus the input sensitivity carries a record of a sequence
of responses of the node and serves as long-term memory. This record, in turn, plays a
role in calculating the new value of the input sensitivity. The learning rule is recursive
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and with each step (episode), the previous input sensitivity is scaled by a factor δ9,
0 6 δ 6 1.
What can be a suitable value for δ? If δ = 0, then the input sensitivity changes
with each episode. In this case, the system’s memory is restricted to its immediately
preceding episode. Therefore, the system can be represented as a finite state machine.
At the other extreme, if δ = 1, then the system shows no decay in memory. Each
episode is accumulated in the memory and the system shows no recency effect – an
episode in the distant past is as important as a recent one. Neither extreme is suitable
for encoding structural repetition.
Szmrecsanyi (2006) showed that, in dialogue corpora, structural persistence does
indeed decrease as the textual distance between prime and target increases. Further-
more, he compared the amount of decrease under two cases: immediately after the
choice and a long time after the choice. He found a rapid decay in persistence immedi-
ately after a syntactic choice and a more gradual decay as time went on. Based on this
evidence, he argued that the decline in persistence is best described by a logarithmic
forgetting function. Other studies (e.g., Gries, 2005) have obtained similar results.
This behaviour of a rapid decay in memory immediately after an event and a slower
decay as time goes on is not unique to structural priming and has a long tradition in
the study of human memory. Researchers have proposed various mathematical func-
tions that can describe how we forget memory traces. Wickelgren (1970) described
the performance of subjects in a recognition experiment using an exponential curve.
Rubin (1982) and J. R. Anderson and Schooler (1991) have described forgetting using
a power function.
The recurrence of such functions in memory and other aspects of psychology
prompted J. R. Anderson (1990) to put forward a theory of how such curves emerge
as a result of interaction between a goal-oriented system and the natural environment.
J. R. Anderson (1990) compared memory recall to nonhuman information retrieval
systems such as the library borrowing system and computerised file systems. Informa-
tion retrieval in these nonhuman systems can be predicted by using the history of these
systems – i.e. the statistics of how these systems have been accessed in the past. In
a similar manner, J. R. Anderson (1990) argued that recall in human memory can be
predicted by using the history of how the memory system has been accessed in the past
(and, of course, the recall cues). This statistical history of memory retrieval is what
9This factor, which is a constant, is a simplification that encompasses the rate of change in long-term
memory. This change could, in turn, depend on a number of factors and the constant δ, in that case,
could be replaced by a function δ,(δ ∈ R→ R).
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J. R. Anderson (1990) called the memory’s environment. He shows that the structure of
this environment can be formally related to the probability of recall from memory. Cru-
cially, if one assumes that the environment has a certain structure, then without making
any additional assumptions about memory mechanisms, J. R. Anderson (1990) showed
that memory decays via a power function. Thus, his analysis showed that decay curves
such as the power function can arise out of the memory’s statistical history of usage.
Both the exponential function and the power function possess the property of rapid
decay immediately after encoding and a more gradual decay as time goes on. The
two functions however differ in how quickly memory decays with exponential decay
being faster than decay under a power function. Rubin (1982), J. R. Anderson (1990)
and J. R. Anderson and Schooler (1991) have argued for power function to be used to
describe recall and recognition in memory. However Szmrecsanyi (2006) and Gries
(2005) have shown an exponential decay in structural priming with time. We will es-
chew from the debate between these two functions and because we are studying struc-
tural priming, we will adopt the exponential function to describe decay in our system.
However, the mechanistic framework presented in this chapter does not depend upon
the nature of the function and if a future experimental study shows compelling case for
structural priming to follow the power function, we can revise our model to implement
such a function.
In Equation 4.5.1, the input sensitivity ω becomes a fraction of itself after each
episode. Therefore this function implements an exponential curve and we can control





where τδ is a parameter that governs the speed at which the exponential changes. This
equation satisfies our criterion of having a value of δ between the two extremes: 0 <
δ < 1.
§ 4.5.2.3. Rate of learning λ.— Now that we have decided how to represent the
amount of decay with each episode, let us turn our attention to the amount of learning,
or increment in input sensitivity, λ. The key question regarding the amount of learn-
ing is whether it should be fixed for each episode, or dependent on properties of the
episode.
From a behavioural perspective, we do not learn equally from all episodes. This
might have to do with the amount (or kind) of information present in the episode. Sur-
prising episodes have more information content and require greater amount of learning.
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If the system’s goal is to model the input stimuli, then it will have variable amount of
learning for each episode.
On the other hand, from the system’s perspective, each flow of information through
the system leaves a memory trace in the system that corresponds to a fixed amount of
learning. One could argue that variable amount of learning is actually a consequence
of processes such as rehearsal, which take place only at the command of a higher-level
module that performs a meta-analysis of the input information. So if the system’s goal
is to model memory in a subsystem then it should show a fixed amount of learning.
Thus the choice of whether learning should be fixed or variable depends on two
contrasting perspectives of learning – each with its set of arguments. We need to base
our choice of learning algorithm on how relevant are each of these opposing arguments
to the study of structural priming. Let us consider each of these arguments in a bit more
detail.
Consider, for example, a generative model that tries to reproduce a pattern of data
points. This model might have some internal representation of the data, let us say a
mixture of two Gaussians. The learning algorithm will adjust the parameters of the
model – its mean, variance and mixing proportions – to form a best fit to the data.
While some data points such as the ones close to the estimated mean of a Gaussian,
will lead to a small amount of learning, an outlier will lead to larger adjustment to the
estimated parameters. Therefore, this generative model will show a variable amount
of learning.
Another example is an error-based learning model, such as Chang et al. (2006),
which calculates the error by comparing the output of the model with a known target
and makes adjustments based on the difference between the output and the target.
Episodes in which the output (or prediction) of the model is close to the target, lead to
a small adjustment or error-correction. While episodes in which the prediction is very
different from the target lead to a larger error-correction. Thus the amount of learning
in the model is, again, variable.
These two examples can be contrasted with the kind of model we are trying to
develop in this chapter. In our model, long-term learning is a cumulative record of
trailing activation from a sequence of episodes. The dynamical system treats each
episode in the same way – with competition between nodes and the winning node
achieving maximum activation. The system’s input sensitivity needs to simply record
the memory of the episode and unlike the two examples above, it is not concerned with
finding an internal representation of the statistics of the environment.
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There is no denying the fact that subjects might actually perform a variable amount
of learning in different episodes. We noted above, for example, that surprising episodes
contain greater amount of information and therefore might need larger amount of learn-
ing. But this variable rate of learning might actually be moderated by a different cog-
nitive system, like the attentional system. Carlson and Dulany (1985), for example,
show that subjects learn attended stimuli better than unattended or background stimuli.
In this study we do not intend to develop a holistic model of human cognition. In
particular, Model ® does not look at the effect of such attentional processes – instead, it
teases apart a memory module and looks at the duration of priming and lexical boost in
such a memory module. For this reason, we assume a fixed amount of learning, λ, with
each episode. Every time a node wins the competition, its input sensitivity increases
by a constant |Λ|. On the other hand, every time the node loses the competition the
sensitivity decreases by the same amount |Λ|:
λ =
{
+|Λ| i f ON
−|Λ| i f OFF
(4.5.4)
In this algorithm, we choose to both increase and decrease the input sensitivity of the
learning parameter because it prevents saturation. The value of |Λ| is a free parameter
that governs how quickly or slowly a system learns with each episode.
Our choice of a fixed learning rate allows us to highlight another feature of the
current model that distinguishes it from some other models. One way to distinguish our
model from an account like Chang et al. (2006) is to say that the current model is based
on unsupervised learning while their model is based on supervised learning. While this
distinction is true, we would like to argue that the difference between our models is not
limited to the usage of supervised versus unsupervised learning algorithm. We have
used unsupervised learning to encode traces of memory that are created in the system
as a result of information flow. However, unsupervised learning can also be used by
generative and recognition models to reproduce input stimuli. These models try to
look for a set of causes underlying input data. The Gaussian mixture model that we
discussed above, for example, can learn through an unsupervised algorithm, but its
goal is to reproduce the input data. Looking for such a set of underlying causes is a
goal of language acquisition. However, our goal is not to model language acquisition.
Instead, we are modelling linguistic memory. The key difference is that we do not
assume that this memory is used to look for a set of causes in the input stimuli. Rather,
it is a by-product of the flow of information through the system. Thus, not only is the
learning algorithm in our model unsupervised – i.e. learns without a teacher – but it
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is also ‘indifferent’ – i.e. it does not try to find underlying causes in input stimuli. In
other words, the function of learning in our system is not to acquire, but to remember.
§ 4.5.3 Simulation & Results
§ 4.5.3.1. Experiment Design.— The simulations on Model ® tested the long-
term persistence of structural priming and the lexical enhancement of this priming.
The phrase ‘long-term’ is used in this context to specifically refer to testing conditions
where prime and target were separated by interfering episodes. The term ‘interfering’
distinguishes these set of simulations from those conducted on Model ­. There, the
prime and target trials were separated by an adaptation period. That adaptation period
led to a decay in memory. However, the constructs that were activated during the
priming trial were not re-activated or reset between the prime and target trials. We
use the term non-interference to refer to this condition. This non-interfering period of
decay was simulated through the loss of activation in the WTA and STM nodes. It is
possible that the system receives filler trials during this adaptation period, but these
trials do not invoke the same constructs (combinatorial nodes) as those in the prime
and target and hence do not interfere with their activations.
In contrast, during the simulations in this section, the activity of a construct might
be pushed towards ON or OFF states between a prime and target trial. In other words,
these simulations test the affect of a sequence of priming trial on a target trial. Each
priming trial simulates comprehension and therefore the winning nodes in each WTA
layer are completely determined by external stimuli. A pictorial representation of pos-
sible simulation is shown in Figure 4.5.4. This simulation consists of two priming
episodes followed by an adaptation period, which is then followed by a target trial. At
the end of the target trial, the simulation adjusts the input sensitivity of all the nodes.
The reader would recall that the input sensitivity stores the long-term memory of the
system. The syntactic choice made during the target trial is governed by both the input
from STM module and the sensitivity of the combinatorial nodes to input stimuli.
In order to make direct comparisons with behavioural data, we tested the model
under same experimental conditions as Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). Each of their
experiments is divided into two phases: a training phase, and a testing phase10 (Fig-
ure 4.5.5). Subjects are trained for a particular grammatical construction during the
10The testing phase does not imply that the model has stopped learning – it performs learning during
both phases, but is tested on target sentences only during testing phase.
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Figure 4.5.4: [Experiment Design] Model ® tests priming over a sequence of episodes.
This diagram illustrates a sequence of two priming trials followed by a target trial. In
practice, a longer sequence was used for testing (see figure 4.5.5).
training phase by being coerced to produce it. These are shown as the ‘prime’ trials in
Figure 4.5.5. After 10 such priming trials, subjects receive 6 prime-target pairs during
the testing phase. Simulating each prime-target pair is exactly same as the simulation
for Model ­ (Figure 4.4.4). The only difference is that the external input to combi-
natorial nodes during the target trial is moderated by the input sensitivity of the node.
This input sensitivity has been adjusted as a result of the sequence of priming trials
during the training phase. As a result of this adjustment, we expect priming to be in-
fluenced by both short-term dynamics and long-term learning. The results can then be
compared with the behavioural data observed by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008).
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) found a cumulative effect of priming – i.e. the
training phase influences the amount of priming during testing phase. However, they
found that this long-term influence is not mediated by the choice of verbs. Based on
this result, they have argued that structural priming is long-lasting while the lexical
influence on structural choice is short-lived (see Section 2.3 for details). Our model
allows us to test this hypothesis. We saw in the previous section (Equation 4.5.3 on
page 146), that we can control the rate of learning and forgetting for each of the WTA
layers and for the binding nodes. We also know that binding nodes provide a causal
link from the lexical layer to the syntax layer. By varying the rate of long-term for-
getting in binding nodes, we can vary the duration of lexical influence on syntactic
choice. Similarly we can vary the duration of long-term priming by varying the rate
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Figure 4.5.5: Experimental design for testing long-term priming and lexical influence.
of forgetting in WTA layer. In this section, we test our model when the rate of forget-
ting is similar for structural memory and the binding nodes. Assuming a similar rate
of decay in the two kinds of representations is in contrast to the conclusion made by
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). If our model, based on a different set of assumptions
(i.e. same rate of decay in syntactic layer and binding nodes), gives the same results as
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008), then it would challenge this conclusion.
§ 4.5.3.2. Input file.— Before we proceed with the testing, we need to configure
our model to receive the input stimuli required by the experimental design. Models
¬ and ­ picked the input stimuli randomly for each priming trial. Our goal was
to establish whether the combinatorial choices are repeated between a single prime
and target. However, in this section, we are interested in investigating whether the
combinatorial choices are primed by a sequence of trials and whether this priming is
verb-specific – i.e. if we change the set of verbs between training and testing phases,
does the amount of priming remain the same? To test these issues, the input stimulus
needs to be rigidly defined for each priming trial.
An input file was constructed that specifies the choices for each priming trial. At the
beginning of each trial, the simulation reads this input file and calculates the external
input for each node based on the entry in the file. Unlike the previous simulations,
this means that the model cannot choose a lexical node at random. It is not sufficient
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to have an equal probability of lexical selection for all the nodes. Rather, the external
input must specify which node is selected. This chosen node gets a larger input than
all others (µ θ), thereby selecting the node.
This input file also allows us to run our entire simulation as a batch process. Ex-
ternal input is specified for all sixteen episodes, for each of the eighty subjects. To
provide a particular pattern of primes during the training phase, only this input file
needs to be changed. The model calculates the appropriate inputs for each node after
reading this file. Part of a sample input file is shown in appendix B.
§ 4.5.3.3. Measuring Priming.— So far, measuring priming has been simple. We
count the number of repetitions between priming and target trials and compare these
repetitions under priming and non-priming conditions (section 4.3.3.2). But now we
want to calculate the amount of cumulative priming from a sequence of primes to a
target. Therefore, we need a new measure.
Over a sequence of primes, what is important is the statistical pattern of the primes.
Do all the priming trials favour one structure over the other? If not, is one structure
more frequent than the other? These statistical properties of primes are likely to get en-
coded in our memory. If priming relies on incremental learning, it will accumulate the
statistical properties of linguistic processing. If on the other hand, it is non-incremental
then these long-term statistical properties will not be recorded. Priming might be non-
incremental due to various possibilities. One of these possibilities is that it might be
short-term. Figure 4.5.6 illustrates this idea. It shows three functions, with x axis show-
ing time and y axis showing output of the function. The function on the left decays
slowly and receives a boost whenever it receives an input (shown as an arrow along the
x axis). It accumulates each input as the output of the function. The one in the middle
decays very fast. As a result, its not able to accumulate the inputs. Therefore, it is not
incremental. The function on the right is also not incremental, even though it is slowly
decaying. This function is reset to a fixed value whenever it receives an input.
If priming is long-term and relies on principles of incremental learning then it will
encode some statistical properties of the pattern of primes. Of course, priming might
be non-incremental or only short-term. But we have a lot of evidence against these
possibilities (Bock & Griffin, 2000; Chang et al., 2006). One way to measure the
long-term effect of priming is to pick a statistical property of the primes (such as the
ratio of POs to DOs) and see if this property affects priming. This is the method
used in Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) and since we are replicating their experiment,










Figure 4.5.6: [Types of learning] Function f (t) records events related to the system.
These events (shown as arrows along the x axis) can be activation of node, or arrival
of an input, etc. In our model, the function f (t) can be seen as input sensitivity. (a)
shows a desirable incremental function that accumulates a record of events; (b) shows
a function that does not accumulate a record because it forgets very quickly and (c)
shows another function that does not accumulate the record because each event resets
its value to a constant.
we will follow this measurement. Of course, it does not follow that if the statistical
property does not affect priming, then priming is non-incremental. We will discuss this
possibility in section 4.6.
To quantify the pattern of priming, Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) compared the
amount of priming for two patterns of priming during the training phase. The first
pattern, called Equal condition, consisted of an equal number of primes of each gram-
matical construction. Since we are looking at alternative dative constructions, this
condition presented subjects with the same number of PO and DO constructions. The
second pattern, called Unequal condition, consisted of all primes having the same
grammatical construction. That is, all ten prime trials during training phase used the
same dative structure.
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) put forward the following hypothesis. If priming
accumulates over several trials, then the Unequal condition will bias the subjects to-
wards a particular construction. This bias should interfere with the priming between
a prime-target pair during the testing phase. On the other hand, the Equal condition
will not bias the subjects towards any particular construction. Hence it should not in-
terfere with priming between a prime-target pair. Thus, a difference between priming
under Equal and Unequal conditions should indicate a long-term effect of priming.
Furthermore, the value of this difference can be used as a measurement of the amount
of priming from training to testing phase.
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Lastly, we need a method for measuring lexical enhancement of structural priming
over a set of trials. Again, this measurement was simple in the short-term where we
could compare priming in cases there was lexical repetition (Primingrep) to priming in
general (Priming). However, over a series of trials, some trials might be using the same
verb while others might be using a different verb. Therefore, we cannot use the same
measure for lexical boost. Instead, Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) measure whether
the priming is verb-specific or not. That is, they measure the difference in priming
between Equal and Unequal conditions when the same set of verbs are used in training
and testing conditions. This difference is then compared to the corresponding differ-
ence when a different set of verbs are used in the two phases. These conditions have
been called the Same Verb condition and the Different Verb condition, respectively.
If the pattern of priming is different for Same and Different Verb conditions, then
priming is clearly verb-specific – i.e. there is long-term lexical influence on structural
priming. Otherwise, Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) conclude that lexical influence is
constrained to prime-target trials and does not have a cumulative effect.
§ 4.5.3.4. Results.— The model runs this simulation for eighty different subjects.
Each subject receives a set of sixteen episodes, as shown in the experiment design
above. The priming trial starts from the rest state and the target trial starts from the
final state of the prime trial. The equilibrium state during the priming episode is com-
pletely determined by the external input. This is very much like the simulations on
model ¬ and ­, with one difference. When we ran the priming trials for the previ-
ous two models, we randomly determined which syntax (and lexical) node wins the
competition. We did not care which node won the competition; we only cared about
whether the same node won the competition between prime and target trials. During
the current simulation, we intend to replicate the experiment design for Kaschak and
Borreggine (2008). In this design, the priming trial is a comprehension trial where the
lexical and syntactic decisions are not made by the subject. Instead these decisions are
already provided in an input file, as we saw above. Therefore, the external stimulus for
the priming trial comes from an input file.
The target trials proceed in the same manner as in the previous models. The exter-
nal stimulus is randomly obtained from the probability distribution p(|∆Ktest |) which
is modelled as a Gaussian with mean µ and standard deviation σ. We saw in section
4.3.2.1 (page 113) how the parameters of this distribution can be determined using
the balance between hysteresis and external input (π) and the bifurcation parameter of
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the dynamical system (θ). In order to test this model, we developed a graphical user
interface that automates the calculation of µ and σ based on the specification of an
overall level of hysteresis by the experimenter. This GUI (shown in appendix A) also
allows the experimenter to specify other parameters of the model such as the adapta-
tion time between prime and target trials in an episode and the long-term learning rate,
Λ, between episodes (Equation 4.5.4).
Our first simulation tested whether the model shows structural priming for the
experimental setup used by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). We were interested in
checking whether the model showed short-term priming – i.e. priming from a compre-
hension to a production trial within an episode. Therefore, we decreased the long-term
learning parameter, Λ, to zero. We also assumed an intermediate value of π = 0.4 – i.e.
there is a 40% chance that hysteresis will dominate external input. Lastly, we set the
adaptation time to be 1000ms. The reader would recall from the results of the previ-
ous model (table 4.1) that at this value of adaptation time, the model still showed both
structural priming and lexical boost. The results of the simulation are shown in figure
4.5.7.
















(a) Results from simulating model ® (b) Results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008)
Figure 4.5.7: A comparison of results from simulating model ­ and the experimental study
conducted by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) (Same Verb condition). Each graph shows the
proportion of PO and DO completions in the production trial for the four priming conditions.
Results for the simulation generated with the long-term learning turned off.
These results are presented in the same structure as the results given by Kaschak
and Borreggine (2008). There can be two types of priming conditions in the training
phase: Equal and Unequal, and two types of primes during the testing phase: PO or
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DO. This leads to four (2×2) types of prime conditions, which are shown along the x
axis. The y axis is the dependent variable and measures the proportion of PO and DO
sentence completions, in response to each priming condition. From this figure we can
see that the DO prime led to a larger proportion of DO completions, as compared to
PO completions. Similarly the PO prime led to a larger proportion of PO completions.
Thus each syntactic structure led to an enhancement for the subsequent selection of
that structure – i.e. the model showed structural priming. It can also be observed from
the figure that the model showed similar amount of structural priming for the Equal and
Unequal conditions. Because the Equal and Unequal conditions manipulated the se-
quence of primes during the training phase, these results imply that the model showed
no effect of the training phase on structural priming – i.e. it showed no long-term
priming. Indeed, we were not expecting the model to show such a long-term priming
because we had set the long-term learning parameter Λ to zero.
In our next simulation, we wanted to test whether the model showed long-term
priming and also whether it showed a long-term persistence of lexical boost. As we
discussed above, we cannot measure lexical boost directly over a series of trials. In-
stead, following Kaschak and Borreggine (2008), we measure the verb-specificity of
structural priming. For doing this, we needed to test the model under the Same Verb
condition and the Different Verb condition. We put half of the subjects into each con-
dition – i.e. forty subjects were trained and tested under the Same Verb condition and
forty under the Different Verb condition.
Crucially, we set the learning rate Λ to a positive constant 0.8 (the parameter is
normalised between 0 and 1). This means that the model should now start accumulat-
ing the effects of each priming trial during the training phase. Activating the long-term
learning also requires the specification of a second parameter, the rate of forgetting δ
(Equation 4.5.1 on page 4.5.1). We set δ to a positive constant as well by setting the
time constant for change in δ to 0.3 – i.e. τδ = 0.3 (Equation 4.5.3). Other parameters
such as the adaptation time, µ and σ remained same as the previous simulation. By
setting the parameters in this manner, we made the model capable of showing both a
short-term structural priming and a long-term accumulation of priming as a change to
the input sensitivity of nodes. Lastly, the model assumes a similar rate of decay in the
syntactic layer and the binding nodes – setting the time constant for decay in input sen-
sitivity of binding nodes to be 0.3 and the time constant for adaptation to be 4000ms
for both the WTA and STM networks. Figure 4.5.8 shows the results of simulating the
model under Same and Different verb conditions.
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(a) Results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008)
















(b) Simulation results for Same Verb
















(c) Simulation results for Different Verb
Figure 4.5.8: Simulation results for Experiment 1 from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). The
y-axis estimates the amount of priming by measuring the proportion of PO and DO completions.
We can contrast these results to the results of our previous simulation (Figure
4.5.7). First, let us look at the priming shown under the Equal condition. Under this
condition, just like the previous results, the model showed a larger proportion of PO
completions after a PO prime and DO completions after a DO prime. However, the
priming shown under the Unequal condition is in contrast to the previous results. For
both the Same and Different verb conditions, the proportion of PO completions af-
ter a PO prime and DO completions after a DO prime are diminished in the Unequal
condition. Since the Equal and Unequal conditions manipulated the sequence of trials
during the training phase, any difference in these conditions must be due to the long-
term learning incurred during that phase. This reduction in structural priming is the
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same result that was found by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) and therefore the model
replicated their findings. Furthermore, both the Same and Different verb conditions
showed a similar reduction in priming for the Unequal condition. Again, this is a re-
sult that was obtained by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008), and one which they used to
justify the lack of influence of lexical factors on long-term structural priming. These
results are surprising because the computational model assumed the same rate of decay
for syntactic nodes and their lexical enhancement – an assumption that is in contrast to
the conclusion made by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) that lexical enhancement of
priming decays quickly while syntactic abstractions persists in long-term memory.
While the previous simulation tried to detect lexical enhancement of structural
priming by comparing priming for different frequency verbs (Equal versus Unequal
condition), it is certainly possible that lexical influence does not show up in this statis-
tic. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) used another method to detect the long-term lex-
ical enhancement of priming. This alternative method compares the amount of prim-
ing for verbs that are equally associated with both the syntactic constructions during
training phase to the priming for verbs that are associated with only one construction.
These two conditions have been named Balanced condition and Skewed condition, re-
spectively. The hypothesis is that if lexical enhancement is long-lasting, then verbs that
are biased towards one construction (Skewed condition) should interfere in the prim-
ing during testing phase, decreasing this priming; in contrast, unbiased verbs should
show no interference. Thus, this experiment involves measuring the amount of priming
under the two conditions and comparing the results.
In order to conduct this experiment, another input data set was constructed where
half of the subjects were put into the Balanced condition and the other half into the
Skewed condition. Again a set of eighty subjects were simulated with the same param-
eters as above. The results of the simulations are shown in figure 4.5.9.
It can be observed from this figure that the model showed similar amount of struc-
tural priming under the Balanced and Skewed training conditions. In other words, the
amount of priming does not diminish under the Skewed condition, as compared to the
Balanced condition – which is the same result that was found by Kaschak and Bor-
reggine (2008) in their second experiment. Thus, the model replicated their results
– a finding that is again counterintuitive since this computational model works under
different assumptions from the model of linguistic memory that they are trying to sup-
port. We explore the reasons behind these results and the consequences for the study
of linguistic processing in section 4.6.3.
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(a) Results from simulating model ® (b) Results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008)
Figure 4.5.9: Simulation and experimental results for Experiment 2 from Kaschak and Borreg-
gine (2008). This experiment compares priming under balanced and skewed conditions.
4.6 Discussion
Psycholinguistic experimentation and computational modelling share the goal of
understanding the psychology of language, or in our case, the psychology of structural
priming. However, these two different methods make different assumptions and look
for the answers in contrasting places. Psycholinguistic experiments look at behavioural
correlates of structural priming. These experiments usually relate it to other aspects of
environmental stimuli. Experiments exist which show that structural priming exists in
the absence of overlap at lexical, thematic role or sentence prosody level (Bock, 1989;
Bock & Loebell, 1990). Others show that it is influenced by its lexical context (Pick-
ering & Branigan, 1998), that it exists for both monologue and in dialogue (Branigan
et al., 2000) and that it exists across modalities (Hartsuiker et al., 2008).
But human memory is cognitively embedded. Therefore priming, which is a form
of memory, is related not only to other environmental stimuli, but also to other cogni-
tive processes. Computational accounts of structural priming try to model this relation.
The model presented in Chang et al. (2006), for example, relates structural priming to
learning and prediction. We presented three models in the last section. These models
relate structural priming to the cognitive concepts of arousal, competition, fatigue and
input sensitivity in the cognitive system. Admittedly, the implementation of these con-
cepts is fairly simplistic. However, these models are a first attempt at understanding
how structural priming might be influenced by physical and computational properties
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of the system that implements language processing.
In order to develop a computational representation of a cognitive process, each
model makes a set of assumptions. These assumptions are manifested in either the ar-
chitecture of the system, or in the value of its parameters. Based on these assumptions,
the simulations allow us to make a series of inferences. In this section, we discuss the
assumptions underlying three cognitive properties: arousal, fatigue and incremental
learning. We discuss the validity of these assumptions, possible alternatives and the
set of inferences that these assumptions allow us to make.
§ 4.6.1 Arousal
In order to explain the observation that subjects show a variable degree of structural
priming under different conditions, we formulated the concept of arousal. This arousal,
we proposed, is a global property of the system that controls the amount of priming
shown by the system. In this sense, we argued, arousal captures the trade-off be-
tween automatic and strategic processes involved in linguistic processing. As arousal
increases, the system becomes less automatic and strategic constraints dominate lin-
guistic decisions. When arousal decreases, the system becomes more automatic and
the process of priming dominates linguistic decisions. Thus, we argue that priming is
variable because automaticity is variable and since automaticity is related to the state
of a system’s arousal, we can argue that the real reason for the variation of priming
is the variation of this state of arousal of the system. This reasoning, however, only
shifts the burden of the explanation from automaticity to arousal; it raises the question
why arousal should be variable. Our answer to this question requires a look into the
decision making process of a computational system.
Any computational system makes a decision under a set of constraints. This set en-
compasses a number of (local) considerations or premises, but does not include other,
more general (non-local) premises. Decisions are made in a closed world and can al-
ways be revised to include more general and distally related constraints. The more
constraints that are considered, the more general the decision will be. However, the
decision-making process will be more time-consuming and effortful. Therefore, the
computational system has to strike a balance between these local and non-local con-
straints.
Assuming that the cognitive system is a computational system, it faces the same
conundrum. Making, say, a structural decision could involve considerations of seman-
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tics, pragmatics, fluency, audience-design, etc. Ideally, the cognitive system should
consider each of these constraints before making the decision. However, making each
structural decision under all these constraints will introduce unnecessary load on the
cognitive system.
The solution to the conundrum involves our definition of the term ‘arousal’. The
amount of arousal in the system can be seen as the size of the set of constraints under
which a decision is made. If the arousal is low, the set of constraints is small and the
decision is local. If the arousal is high, non-local constraints are considered in making
the decision. Thus arousal provides a mechanism that allows the system to select
whether the decision will be local or non-local. And in this sense, the term arousal is
closely related to the cognitive processes of detecting a set of constraints and orienting
towards these constraints. As Posner and Petersen (1990) point out, these activities are
two of the three major functions of the attention system in the brain. Therefore arousal
is closely related to the concept of attention.
Model ¬, therefore, makes the connection between attention and language process-
ing explicit. It connects the dynamical systems making syntactic and lexical choices to
a module maintaining the level of attention. In agreement with this argument, Horton
and Keysar (1996) found that interlocutors took the point of view of of their listeners
into account only when sufficient cognitive resources were available. When partici-
pants had to produce utterances rapidly, they frequently included information in their
utterances that was not present in a shared context with their interlocutors. Thus the
cognitive system, much like our computational system, adjusts the range of constraints
that it uses to make linguistic decisions based on the cognitive resources that are avail-
able to the system.
Crucially, this system does not use any associative links between the lexical and
syntactic layers. The results from simulating this model, though predictable from the
theory, show that lexical boost can arise out of an alternative mechanism than such as-
sociative links. This alternative mechanism predicts that linguistic decisions are made
under two contrasting forces:
• Winner-take-all dynamics which lead to hysteresis – i.e., the linguistic choice
made by the system depends on the history of the system. This is the automatic
process, taking only local constraints (of the syntactic layer) into consideration
and hence involving a low level of arousal.
• An external input to the two nodes. Since the nodes compete with each other,
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in the absence of hysteresis, the winner is decided by the external input ∆Ktest .
This is the strategic process, taking non-local constraints into account. These
constraints could come, for example, from considerations of audience-design
and manifest themselves as increase in |∆Ktest |.
A key assumption of the model is to relate the external input to the arousal in the
system. A high level of arousal leads to larger difference in external input, making it
the dominant force in decision-making. A lower level of arousal will lead to a small
external input, making hysteresis the dominant force in decision making. As arousal
is inversely related to automaticity and hysteresis to priming, we can infer that a high
amount of automaticity will lead to high priming and a low amount of automaticity
will lead to low priming.
The second major assumption, which allows the model to simulate lexical boost,
is that the level of arousal is a global property of the system. Instead of assuming that
each layer has its own level of arousal, the model assumes that both the layers will show
the same amount of arousal. Specifically, if the lexical layer is showing a low level of
arousal, then so will the syntactic layer. Since arousal is inversely related to repetition,
through a backward-reasoning, we can conclude that repetition in the lexical layer will
mean a low level of arousal and consequently a small difference in external input to the
combinatorial nodes. And a small external input implies that hysteresis becomes the
dominating force leading to a larger amount of priming. In short, repetition in lexical
layer is associated with increased priming in syntactic layer. This is the lexical boost
effect (Pickering & Branigan, 1998).
Support for the hypothesis that repetition is accompanied by low level of arousal
comes from observation of neural response to repetition. It has been observed (Miller
& Desimone, 1994) that repetition leads to a decrease in neural response to the stimuli.
This phenomenon is known as “repetition suppression”. Henson, Shallice, and Dolan
(2000) also observed the contrasting effect – an increase in neural response to unfa-
miliar data. One way to explain repetition suppression is that fewer neurons respond
to a repeated stimuli (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006) – i.e. representations for
this stimulus become sharper and more sparse. In the context of decision-making, this
would mean an increase in focus or decrease in generalisation. In other words, the set
of constraints governing the decision would become smaller in size, being restricted
to the essential local constraints. So, in short, repetition is accompanied by localised
decision-making, which was our definition of a decrease in arousal.













Figure 4.6.1: [Causal flow]
structural priming varies under different conditions. In previous studies, the variation
in structural priming has been explained either in terms of the association between lex-
ical and syntactic structures (Pickering & Branigan, 1998) or as a change in the degree
of the automaticity of the system (Garrod & Pickering, 2007). Model ¬ suggests the
alternative that structural priming can vary due to the range of constraints considered
by the cognitive decision-making system. If the decision system considers only lo-
cal constraints, then priming will be high. On the other hand, if the decision system
considers a larger set of constraints, then the priming will reduce. According to this
account, lexical repetition changes the amount of priming because the repetition of a
word changes the amount of arousal in the system, which in turn changes the criteria
under which the decision system makes the syntactic choice.
It is worth emphasising that Model ¬ does not have a causal flow of information
between a lexical and syntactic layer. We have used backward reasoning to ‘guess’
that repetition in the lexical layer is a consequence of low arousal, which also leads
to repetition in the syntactic layer. This model puts forward the idea that lexical boost
arises as an epiphenomenon of a reduced level of external activation to modules of
linguistic selection. The causal flow of information is from the global level of arousal
to lexical and syntactic selection and not from lexical selection to syntactic selection
(Figure 4.6.1).
Model ¬ is a theoretical account. Its truth can only be ascertained by checking the
predictions of the model against experimental evidence. If the models assumptions are
correct, then it makes two predictions which can be used to design future experiments:
1. PRIMING PREDICTION The model predicts that a low level of arousal will lead to
greater priming. We have assumed that lexical repetition causes priming because
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it leads to a state of low arousal. By this reasoning, other conditions that similarly
lead to low arousal should also cause larger priming – i.e. lexical boost is only
one is a set of different conditions that can lead to increased priming.
2. BOOST PREDICTION The partial correlation between structural (S) and lexical
(L) repetition, given the level of arousal (A) in the system, ρLS·A , should be
zero. That is, if we partial out the effect of arousal in the system, then lexical
repetition should be uncorrelated to structural repetition. Again, we would need
to manipulate the amount of arousal and record the amount of structural, lexical
priming and their correlation.
§ 4.6.2 Adaptation
A central goal of the current study is to investigate the temporal properties of structural
priming. In particular, we want to understand the mechanisms underlying decay in
priming and in lexical enhancement of this priming. Model ­ investigated one possible
mechanism for such decay: fatigue. The idea comes from behaviour of neurons, which
show an adaptation in its firing rate when exposed to a stimuli over a period. Instead of
firing rates, our model remembers the stimuli in a stable state of a dynamical system.
But just like neural adaptation, this system shows fatigue in maintaining its stability.
That is, after some time, the stable state decays and the system loses its memory.
Thus, if linguistic decision-making is implemented in such a system, then the temporal
characteristics of this decision-making will be influenced by fatigue.
Model ­ implements a process of adaptation through a decrease in activation of
each node. We saw in the section 4.4.3, that such a system shows decrease in amount
of priming as the period of adaptation increases (table 4.1 on page 136). Crucially,
while the rate of priming decreases exponentially, the lexical influence on this priming
decreases suddenly to zero after a certain period. This difference in the temporal prop-
erties of structural priming and lexical boost springs from the systems that implement
these two kinds of memory.
Structural priming is implemented through hysteresis in a winner-take-all network.
Each node in this network has inhibitory connections to all other nodes in the network.
As the system approaches equilibrium, one node dominates all the others and wins the
competition. This is the stable state of the network. But as the network progresses
through the adaptation period, the winning node starts to show fatigue. Its level of
activation starts to go down. At the same time, the activity of all the other nodes that it
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had previously suppressed starts to increase. The network starts losing its memory.






















Figure 4.6.2: Adaptation in the winner-take-all dynamical system.
In Figure 4.6.2, we show the activity of the nodes in a WTA network consisting of
two nodes. Time is plotted along the x axis and the activation is plotted against the
y axis. It can be seen that as the adaptation period progresses, the activity of the two
nodes approach each other. Since the memory of a WTA network lies in the differ-
ence in the activation of the two nodes, the network starts to lose its memory, which
is apparent in the results in Table 4.1. A key observation is that (a) the activity of the
two nodes approaches each other gradually and (b) the difference in activation asymp-
totically approaches a constant. As a result, structural priming in Model ­ shows a
gradual decrease, with saturation.
Lexical enhancement of structural priming comes through the input from the STM
module. This module contains binding nodes retaining the conjunction between lex-
ical and syntactic nodes. Each binding node is implemented as a mutually excitatory
network. This network has two stable states – either both nodes are fully active (ON)
for completely inactive (OFF). The binding node records a conjunction by turning both
nodes to an ON state. Thus, the memory of the network resides in the stability of this
ON state. As the adaptation period progresses, the activity of the nodes decreases and
the stable equilibrium approaches an unstable saddle (see section 4.4.2 for details).
The network shows a steady decrease in its memory while the stable equilibrium is ap-
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proaching the saddle. At the bifurcation point, when the saddle meets the stable node,
the system shows a complete loss of memory.






















Figure 4.6.3: Adaptation in the mutualy excitatory binding nodes.
Figure 4.6.3 plots the activation of a typical binding node as the adaptation pe-
riod progresses. Since both the nodes have the same activation, the figure plots the
activation of one of the nodes against time. We can see the node seems to show an
almost linear decay in activation up to a certain point in time (around 4000ms in the
model). Beyond this time, the node shows a sudden decrease to zero activation – i.e. a
catastrophic decay in its memory. In contrast to the WTA network, the STM network
does not seem to show saturation. Also, for the same time constants, the STM memory
seems to be short-lived, by comparison. This difference in the two kinds of memory
is manifested in the results of model ­ where lexical boost seems to suddenly decay
to zero around 4000ms. It is no coincidence that the loss of stability in STM happens
at the same time as the decay in lexical boost. The model’s architecture constrains the
lexical influence on structural decisions to act via the short-term memory and its decay
inevitably leads to a decay in any lexical enhancement of structural priming.
Model ­ gives a mechanistic explanation for the difference in temporal properties
of structural priming and lexical enhancement of this priming. We can compare these
results with the findings of Hartsuiker et al. (2008) who found that structural prim-
ing persists over large lags (up to six filler items), while lexical enhancement of this
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priming decays quickly (see Chapter 2 for details of experiment). The results from
simulating Model ­ (table 4.1) mirror this effect. In their experiment, Hartsuiker et
al. (2008) change the lag between prime and target trial by inserting filler trials. In our
simulation, instead, we vary the length of adaptation period. Since the filler trials do
not interfere with the syntactic or lexical constructs used in the priming trials, varying
adaptation time achieves the same goal as varying the number of fillers.
Model ­’s explanation of the difference in structural priming and lexical boost re-
lies on a crucial assumption in the architecture of the model: priming and lexical boost
rely on different kinds of dynamical systems. Structural decisions are implemented
through a WTA network where each node competes with all others. The lexical con-
text of these structural decisions are maintained in a STM network, where nodes do
not compete, but help each other stay active. One system relies on mutual inhibition
while the other relies on mutual excitation.
This assumption makes sense. Activating a structural node is equivalent to making
a decision about the structure of sentence. Only one structure can be used, so a choice
needs to be made. For this reason, the decision-making network is competitive and uses
mutual inhibition. Remembering the lexical context of a node, on the other hand, is not
a decision-making process – it is a associative process. The binding node retains this
association and nodes are mutually excitatory so that they can retain their activation in
the absence of an external stimuli.
The validity of the model’s assumptions can be checked against its predictions.
Model ­ asserts that syntactic decision-making and its lexical enhancement rely on
two different cognitive systems. If this is true, then it should be possible to find a
double dissociation between syntactic decision-making and influence of lexical con-
text on these decisions. The short-term memory module is a domain-general cognitive
system. It can be used to retain associations between linguistic constructs, but also
associations within other modalities, such as vision (which has to solve the binding
problem in object recognition) or cross-modality associations such as associating vi-
sual cues to co-occurring auditory signals. On the other hand, the decision-making
module is domain-specific to linguistic processing. If the two types of networks have
mutually exclusive existence in the brain, then it should be possible that one system
gets impaired while the other is still functioning. Therefore, it should be possible that
an individual has short-term memory impairment, but shows structural priming and
equally, an individual who has an impairment with syntactic processing should show a
larger lexical boost than control subjects.
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One more assumption lies at the heart of the difference between adaptation in WTA
and STM networks. This assumption concerns the parameter α, the saturation constant
for the adaptation variable in equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. When the adaptation period
begins, both the WTA network and the STM network have a bistable solution. As
the adaptation period progresses, the STM network crosses a bifurcation point and
shows a qualitative change in its behaviour, becoming a monostable system. On the
other hand, the WTA network never crosses the bifurcation point, remaining a bistable
system. It is because of this difference in the trajectories of the dynamical systems
that one shows a catastrophic decay in memory while the other shows an exponential
decay with saturation. But this difference in behaviour is not guaranteed in all cases –
it depends on the value of the parameter α.
Let us look at the function of the parameter α in greater detail. We saw in Section
4.4.2 that α governs the equilibrium value of the adaptation variable, Ai, expressed as
a fraction of the activation of the nodes. That is, as the system approaches equilibrium,
Ai→ αEi (or, Ai→ α∑
j
E j for Equation 4.4.3). The larger the value of α, the greater
will be the value of the adaptation variable Ai. Since the variable Ai occurs in the
denominator of the Naka-Rushton function (~ is adjusted to ~+Ai during adaptation),
an increase in α, in turn, leads to a larger decrease in the activation Ei of a stable node.
Thus α really governs how much the system will move from its stable equilibrium.
What is interesting from our perspective is that for certain values of α, the STM
system will move enough from the stable equilibrium to be pushed over a bifurcation
point while the WTA system will still be in a bistable state. This can be understood
by looking at the change in phase plane of the two systems as the system goes through
the adaptation period. Figure 4.6.4 plots the isoclines dEidt = 0 for the two systems.
For α = 0.9, we can see that the STM system moves from bistability to monostability
around 4000ms11 while the WTA system seems to remain in the bistable state even
when Ai saturates (figure 4.6.4(a)). When we change this value of α to 1.3, both the
STM and WTA systems move from monostability to bistability even though the STM
system does seem to approach its bifurcation point more quickly (Figure 4.6.4(b)).
Whether or not the WTA system crosses bifurcation seems to be contingent on the
value of α. The results shown in Table 4.1 are obtained for α = 0.9.
The theoretical constraint on α comes from the constraint on Ai, the adaptation
variable. In equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, Ai changes the value of ~, the semi-saturation











































(b) Isoclines for α = 1.3; Ai has reached saturation.
Figure 4.6.4: The same value of α could lead to different qualitative behaviours for STM
and WTA system. When α = 0.9, the STM system is monostable while WTA system is
bistable (points of stability are shown as black dots).
constant. Recall that ~ is the value of input stimuli at which the response (of the node)
reaches half of its maximum value (Figure 4.2.6). As the value of ~ increases, the
S-shaped curve moves toward the right. The larger the value of Ai, the farther the S-
shaped curve moves to the right. But there is a limit. This limit comes from the range
of input stimlus. If the semi-saturation constant, ~, is larger than the input stimulus
then the curve loses its S shape, no matter what the value of the exponent N. This
is not functionally acceptable since the node never achieves its peak activation value.
Therefore, we can limit the maximum value of Ai to the maximum input stimulus. The
excitatory and inhibitory connections in STM and WTA networks mean that this input
stimulus is, in turn, related to the output activation, Ei. So, as a conservative constraint,
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we limit the maximum value of Ai to the output activation Ei (or to ∑
j
E j for the WTA
system). Since, at equlibrium, Ai = αEi, we obtain the constraint α < 1.
As Figure 4.6.4 illustrates, under the constraint α < 1 we can indeed obtain a dif-
ference in the qualitative behaviour of STM and WTA networks at saturation. Thus, we
can observe that the difference we see in the temporal behaviour of priming and lexical
boost might be due to the difference in the way these two phenomena are implemented
in the system. On the one hand priming relies on WTA networks that show bistabil-
ity at saturation. In contrast, lexical boost is implemented through the STM networks
which degrade to monostability at saturation. These two behaviours are obtained for
the same adaptation variable α.
§ 4.6.3 Incremental learning (and forgetting)
In the previous section, we saw how fatigue in the cognitive system might have con-
trasting effects on priming and lexical boost. In this section we look at another cog-
nitive phenomenon: incremental learning, which is required when the system records
information over a series of trials. The choice of the learning rule and the rate at which
the system learns changes the behaviour of the system.
Model ® builds in incremental learning and is able to record structural decisions
over a sequence of trials. We saw that it is able to replicate experimental results on
priming and lexical enhancement of this priming over a short period of time (e.g.,
Pickering & Branigan, 1998) and over a sequence of episodes (e.g., Kaschak & Bor-
reggine, 2008). We chose the learning rule to make fixed adjustments to the system at
the end of each episode. We also chose the rate of learning (and forgetting) in struc-
tural layer to be the same as that in the STM module. Thus the model had same rate of
decay in the processes of syntactic decision and the channels through which lexemes
influence this syntactic decision.
The results of simulating Model ® for a sequence of priming episodes (figures 4.5.8
and 4.5.9) presented a paradox. The model was simulated on an input data similar to
the experiments in Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). The results from these experi-
ments showed no lexical enhancement of priming over a sequence of episodes. Our
simulations replicated these results, but internally the model did not have a faster rate
of decay in the lexical channel. This was surprising since the experimental design in
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) was supposed to detect any lexical influence on struc-
tural decisions. Because the simulations replicate these results, it suggests that lexical
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influence shows a faster rate of decay than structural memory. According to the inter-
nal values of the decay parameters, we know that this is not the case. We would like to
understand how the internal parameters for the rate of decay manifest in the behaviour
of the model. Therefore, in this section we vary these rates and observe how this vari-
ation influences the behaviour of the model. We find that for certain values of these
parameters, the null results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) do not necessarily
imply a lack of long-term lexical influence on structural decisions.
§ 4.6.3.1. Learning rate in WTA layers, λ.— The learning rate in WTA layers
governs the amount of adjustment that is made to the input following each episode.
Small learning rates help to make the system generalise when its trying to discover
hidden variables in its environment. But small learning rates also mean that the impact
of each individual episode is small. Large learning rates, on the other hand, mean that
the system learns quickly, but also that the system becomes over-sensitive to recent
episodes, thereby showing poor generalisation.
But the goal of the current study is different. We are considering adult speakers
who have already acquired a working knowledge of language. Generalisation takes
a back seat, as learning here is geared towards maintaining an active knowledge of
dependencies within a sentence or within a discourse. A small learning rate would
mean that the episode has not been recorded properly and that the increase in sensitivity
of the node is small. This small increase in sensitivity might not be good enough to
overcome the noise in the system. Hence the learning rate in our system is a direct
reflection of how well an episode is recorded. Episodes with large learning rate will
persist, while those with small rate will be forgotten quickly. Thus, we can control
lexical and structural persistence in our system by varying the learning rate of each
layer.
To check how this parameter affects structural repetition in the two experiments
above, we repeated the above experiments under different values of learning rate, λ.
These results are shown in figure 4.6.5, which plots the amount of priming12 against
the (normalised13) value of λ. In order to isolate the effect of λ, other variables were
either set to zero, or to a default value. Learning in binding nodes, for example, was set
to zero. This means that the binding nodes do not have any long-term learning. Adap-
tation time (i.e. the time between presenting a prime and a target) is set to 1000ms.
12The overall amount of priming is calculated as the average of the deviation from random responses
(no priming) for the PO and DO prime conditions (Equation 4.3.6).
13Values of all variables are normalised between 0 and 1.
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(a) Experiment 1: Priming under Same Verb and
Different Verb conditions























(b) Experiment 2: Priming under Balanced and
Skewed conditions
Figure 4.6.5: Simulation results for Experiment 1 and 2 showing amount of priming versus
increase in learning rate.
Let us first consider the Equal case, where the subject sees equal number of POs and
DOs during training phase. In this case, varying λ does not affect structural priming
under either Same Verb or Different Verb conditions (Figure 4.6.5(a)). Everything else
being null (or default), the system shows 100% priming. This is only to be expected
since any amount of learning (increased sensitivity) will affect both nodes equally
under the equal-condition. That is, although we have structural priming in this case, it
affects both nodes equally and does not bias the system to any construction.
Now let us consider the Unequal case. This case is more interesting. We no-
tice that as learning rate, λ, increases, the amount of structural priming reduces quite
significantly (the ‘blue/triangle’ and ‘black/diamond’ curves). Though it might seem
unintuitive at first, this is exactly what is expected. The Unequal case in the experiment
is set up so that the trials during testing phase use the opposite grammatical construc-
tion to the one used in the training phase. Hence as learning increases and leads to a
bias towards the construction used in the training phase, it also leads to a bias against
the construction used in the testing phase. This, in turn, leads to the observed reduc-
tion in priming. We can conclude that learning rate in the syntax layer, λ, affects only
the ‘Unequal case’ during experiment 1 and is positively correlated to the amount of
long-term structural repetition of the primed construction.
Lastly, we observe that λ does not have any effect on the amount of structural
priming in the Balanced / Skewed experiment (figure 4.6.5(b)), and in the absence
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of any lexical influence both cases show a high level (close to 100%)14 of structural
priming. Again, considering that both the Balanced and Skewed conditions are special
cases of the Equal-case from the previous experiment, this is not a surprise. It does
however confirm the belief that whatever difference we notice between the long-term
priming of Balanced and Skewed conditions is down to lexical influence.
§ 4.6.3.2. Rate of forgetting in binding nodes, δbind .— Binding nodes link lexical
nodes to syntactic nodes and therefore they form the medium through which lexemes
can influence syntactic choice. They extend the idea of weighted connections between
lemma nodes and combinatorial nodes in Pickering and Branigan (1998). The co-
activation of lexical and syntactic nodes, during priming episodes, activates the con-
necting binding node. Once activated, this node shows hysteresis and remains in the
active state for a particular length of time. If the target episode falls within this length
of time (i.e. there are not too many filler items) then it acts as an active link between
the lexical and syntactic node. An active link simply means that if the same lexical
node is activated in the target episode (say, by an incomplete utterance: John gave...)
the binding node boosts the input of the syntactic node activated in the priming trial.
If, on the other hand, the link is not active, then the syntactic node receives no such
boost. Through this mechanism lexemes influence syntactic choice.
But how long does this influence last? In our computational model this depends on
how long the binding node remains active. Although the model resets the activation of
each binding node at the beginning of a trial, it records the result of each episode in the
internal memory of the node. Just like the variable Kint for lexical and syntax layers,












The value of Eint acts as an internal input to the node. Just like Kint maintains a
record of the input sensitivity of a WTA node, Eint maintains a record of the input
sensitivity of a binding node. Thus Eint acts as a memory of all the previous episodes
where learning took place. This memory means that activation of binding nodes de-
pends not only on the immediately previous episode, but also on ones in the distant
past. Just how far in the distant past depends on the rate at which Eint is learnt (λbind),
and the rate at which it decays (δbind).
14This overall amount of priming can be decreased by varying other parameters, e.g. increasing the
adaptation time, or decreasing the amount of hysteresis. That, however, does not impact the result that
the difference between Balanced and Skewed conditions is independent of λ.
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Therefore, we can re-frame our question about the duration of lexical influence to
a set of questions about the activation of binding nodes:
1. How does a binding node become active? That is, how does Eint learn? This
relates the concept of choosing a learning mechanism.
2. How long does an active node remain active? That is, how does Eint decay? This
is the concept of the longevity of activation.
3. How does the activation of binding nodes influence structural repetition?
The last question is the one we ultimately intend to answer: assuming we have long-
term lexical-syntactic associations, how would they impact the structural repetition we
observe on simulating the experiments of Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). But first
we will have to specify the mechanism of learning and forgetting to see how those
associations are created (activated) and destroyed.
Let us look at the learning mechanism first. There are two ways in which learning
can take place in binding nodes. The first way is to learn (make a small change to
Eint) whenever the binding node gets activated. This is similar to the mechanism that
we have for learning in the lexical and syntactic nodes – the winner is rewarded by an
increase in internal memory. The other way is to learn only when both the connected
lexical and syntactic nodes are activated. That is, Eint learns the association between
the lexical and syntactic nodes. These two different kinds of learning give two different








(b) Learning on input
Figure 4.6.6: Learning on activation depends upon the activation of the binding node itself,
while learning on input depends on the co-activation of both WTA nodes.
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§ 4.6.3.3. Learning on activation.— With learning on activation, the model in-
creases Eint each time the binding node gets activated at the end of priming episode.
λbind =
{
|Λ| i f ON
0 i f OFF
(4.6.2)
Let us try to address each of the three questions raised above, under these conditions:
• ACTIVATION. A binding node can become activated if (a) both the input nodes
are active at the end of priming episode, or (b) Eint is large enough to activate
the binding node on its own.
• LONGEVITY. The longevity depends on both the rate of learning (λbind) and the
rate of forgetting (δbind) (Equation 4.6.1). However, under the current mecha-
nism of learning, once the node has been activated it will become self-sustaining.
At the end of each episode, the sensitivity of an active node increases by a fixed
amount (|Λ|) since its in an active state. Although this sensitivity would also
show finite amount of forgetting (governed by δbind), this decay is not sufficient
to turn the node OFF. It is not sufficient because the values of δbind and Λ are
picked in such a way that the system shows cumulative learning. If δbind is too
large, then the learning would completely decay at the end of each episode (fig-
ure 4.5.6(b)). Thus, if Eint is large enough, it will drive the binding node into
an active state, even in the absence of external input. And since the node is
activated, it will undergo learning, leading to a further increase in Eint . This
means that once Eint has been driven above a threshold, then it will become self-
sustaining and the binding node will always be active. In behavioural terms,
this can be equated to developing a permanent15 association between the lexical
node and the syntactic node: every time the lexical node is activated, it would
facilitate the associated syntactic node.
• INFLUENCE. Under this learning mechanism, lexemes would influence syntactic
choice in one of three different ways: (i) if the decay rate (of Eint) is really
fast then the longevity of binding nodes will be restricted to within an episode,
and there will be no influence of previous episodes; (ii) If the decay rate is at
an intermediate level then Eint might be driven above threshold; under input
15Of course, here we are considering this permanence in the context of a discourse. The human
memory system is complex and there might be a host of other processes responsible for wiping the slate
clean over longer periods of time.
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scenarios where this can happen, we will get long-term influence of lexical nodes
on syntactic choice; (iii) Finally, if decay rate is really slow, then Eint will quickly
become self-sustaining and we will start getting lexical influence on syntactic
choice for any association that has been activated even a few times during the
training.
We are now in a position to see how variation in forgetting rate (for binding nodes)
affects the results of the two experiments conducted by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008).
We simulated the model for different rates of forgetting and made a counterintuitive
finding: a system might show bias for a particular lexical association even if it is trained
equally for two different associations. Specifically, the simulations find that in the ex-
perimental design used by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) (figure 4.5.5), a verb might
be equally associated with the two dative structures, and yet show a bias towards one
of them. If this is the case, then the difference between equal and unequal cases (and
balanced and skewed cases) no longer remains a measure of the amount of long-term
priming. The premise used in the experimental design was that the Unequal case biases
the verb towards a particular construction, while the Equal case has no long-term bias.
By comparing the amounts of priming under the two cases, the experiment tried to
reveal the long-term lexical enhancement of priming. When no difference was found,
it was argued that lexical enhancement of priming is short-lived. But if the process of
syntactic choice shows lexical bias even in Equal conditions, then one can no longer
use the difference between the Equal and Unequal cases as a measure of long-term lex-
ical enhancement of priming. Indeed, the results show that there might be long-term
lexical enhancement of priming and yet no difference between the equal and unequal
conditions. Let us have a closer look at these results.
The results for the two experiments are shown in figure 4.6.7. The figure plots the
amount of structural priming versus an increase in the rate of forgetting. We choose an





The x axis shows the order of the exponential decay in the long-term learning rule
for binding nodes – τδ – and the y axis shows the amount of structural priming for
each of the four cases. As τδ increases, δbind decreases. And as δbind decreases, the
input sensitivity, Eint , becomes more driven by current input. Finally, the greater the
contribution of the current input, the faster the system forgets the contribution from
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past episodes. So, in summary, values on the right (large τδ) represent very fast rates
of forgetting while values on the left represent slow forgetting.16
(a) Variation of priming with rate of forget-
ting in binding nodes – Same and Diff Verb
conditions
(b) Variation of priming with rate of for-
getting in binding nodes – Balanced and
Skewed conditions
Figure 4.6.7: Simulation results for Experiment 1 and 2 showing amount of priming versus
increase in rate of forgetting.
Let us first look at the results for the Same Verb versus Different Verb experiment
(Figure 4.6.7(a)). We observe that the rate of forgetting in binding nodes has no impact
on the Different Verb conditions. This is not surprising. Under this condition, the verbs
used during testing are disjoint from the verbs used during training. Consequently, the
two phases have independent sets of binding nodes. And since binding nodes are the
medium through which lexemes influence syntactic choice, there is no influence of
lexical persistence on syntactic choice.
But what we are really interested in, is how the Same Verb conditions compare
with the Different verb conditions and what happens on varying the rate of forgetting.
This comparison can be made by looking at the Unequal-Same (red/square) and Equal-
Same (blue/triangle) curves in Figure 4.6.7(a) and comparing them with the Different
curves mentioned above. The first observation is that both the equal and unequal cases
(under the Same Verb condition) show a decrease in the amount of structural repetition
as a result of lexical influence. This decrease in repetition is evident from the values
on the left in Figure 4.6.7(a). These values correspond to a slow rate of forgetting in
the binding nodes – which, in turn, corresponds to longer lexical influence. Compared
to the different case, structural repetition is down from 100% to around 60% for these
16It must be mentioned here that the value of persistence in structural memory itself was set to zero –
so this is the impact on structural repetition caused independently by lexical influence.
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values. These results show that when verbs are repeated and the links between lexemes
and verbs forget slowly, then lexemes influence syntactic choice over a long term. As
we mentioned above, the surprise lies in the fact that the amount of priming decreases
in the Equal case. This was the case in which an equal number of PO and DO primes
were provided in the training phase. So intuitively, there should be no bias towards any
syntactic construction and hence no reduction in priming even if the lexical influence
decays very slowly.
But one could argue that even if Equal cases show a reduction in priming, the
amount of reduction might be less than the Unequal case. This would make it possible
to distinguish the Equal and Unequal cases based on the difference in priming under
the two cases. Therefore it is important to compare the quantity of this reduction in
priming under the two cases. For a fast rate of decay (values on the right of figure
4.6.7(a)), both Equal and Unequal cases show very little and similar amount of de-
crease. For intermediate values, it seems that the Equal and Unequal cases, do indeed
differ in the amount of reduction in priming, with Unequal cases showing a greater
amount of reduction. However, the surprise lies at the left of the figure – cases where
the decay is slow and forgetting is minimal. Under these circumstances, both Equal
and Unequal cases show similar amount of decrease. Not only are the two cases similar
for short-term lexical influence, but they are also similar for much longer lexical influ-
ence. Thus the similarity or difference in priming for equal and unequal cases gives us
no indication of whether lexical influence is a short-term or a long-term phenomenon.
Let us also look at the results for the Balanced versus Skewed conditions (Figure
4.6.7(b)). These cases compare not only the overall bias towards alternative syntactic
constructions, but also the specific bias of each verb towards each construction. Un-
der balanced condition each verb is biased equally towards the two datives and under
skewed conditions a verb is biased only towards one dative structure. We are interested
in the difference in structural priming between the two conditions. Kaschak and Bor-
reggine (2008) hypothesise that if lexical enhancement of priming accumulates over a
series of episodes, then skewed conditions should carry the effect of the bias during
training into testing, thereby reducing the amount of priming. On the other hand, the
balanced condition should not develop any bias during training and therefore show no
impact of long-term learning. Therefore, by comparing the two conditions, it should be
possible to establish whether lexical enhancement of priming persists over a long pe-
riod of time. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) found no such difference. This led them
to conclude that structural priming is independent of lexical influence in the long-term.
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The simulation repeated the experiment for variable rates of forgetting in the bind-
ing nodes. The difference in priming for the two conditions is plotted as the black/circle
curve in figure 4.6.7(b). Firstly it can be observed that this difference is close to zero
for very rapid decay in binding nodes. This result is on the expected lines, and in agree-
ment with Kaschak and Borreggine (2008): if lexical influence on structural choice de-
cays very rapidly, then the balanced and skewed conditions will be similar. However,
observe what happens as we decrease the rate of decay (i.e. move left). The difference
follows a (inverted) U-shaped curve, reaching a maximum when Eint decays around
exp−0.5. If we keep decreasing the decay rate further, the difference between bal-
anced and skewed conditions becomes close to zero – just like it was for a rapid rate
of decay. Of course, the two scenarios are not identical. The difference is low for
fast rate of forgetting because both conditions show close to 100% structural priming.
And it is low for a slow rate of forgetting because both conditions have similar reduc-
tion in priming – down to 50%. But the essential result remains that Balanced and
Skewed conditions show similar structural priming, not only when lexical influence
decays rapidly, but also when it decays very slowly.
According to these results, if we observe that balanced and skewed cases show sim-
ilar levels of structural repetition, then we could conclude, either (a) lexical influence is
very short-lived, or (b) lexical influence is really long-lasting. Thus, simply observing
that Balanced and Skewed cases show similar priming does not allow us to make any
inference about the duration of lexical influence.
Just like the surprise in the Equal-Unequal experiment was really the fact that prim-
ing decreases under the Equal condition, the real surprise here is that priming decreases
under the Balanced condition. Even though each verb is trained on stimuli that is un-
biased towards any syntactic construction, it seems to develop a bias towards certain
constructions. This bias leads to interference during the testing phase and decreases
the amount of priming. It seems that, under this learning rule, presenting an unbi-
ased stimulus, does not guarantee that the system will develop unbiased associations
between lexical and syntactic constructs.
Let us try and understand why the system develops a bias towards one syntactic
construct even when it receives both constructs equal number of times. Recall that
the learning mechanism used to get this result is ‘learning on activation’. Under this
mechanism, binding nodes could have two different kinds of longevities: (a) dependent
on rate of forgetting, if their internal memory, Eint , is below a threshold value, or (b)
permanently active, if Eint is pushed above the threshold value. First let us look at
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what happens when the rate of forgetting is very rapid. In this case, the binding nodes
remain active only within an episode – i.e. between a priming trial and a target trial.
This means there is no long term influence of lexical nodes on structural selection.
Hence we get no reduction in priming (the values on the right of Figure 4.6.7(b)).
When we reduce the rate of forgetting to an intermediate value, some binding nodes
might have their Eint value driven above the threshold. This is especially true in the
Skewed case, where a verb is associated with only one kind of grammatical construc-
tion. The binding node representing this association will be repeatedly activated dur-
ing the training phase. This will send the internal memory for that node, Eint , above
the threshold and make the link between the verb and the grammatical construction
permanent. On the other hand, the Balanced case associates a verb with both the con-
structions, thereby distributing the trials among the two different binding nodes. This
means that the internal memory for binding nodes in this case is not pushed above
the threshold and the link is not made permanent. As a result of this the Skewed case
shows a greater reduction in priming for an intermediate rate of forgetting in binding
nodes.
Finally, for very low rate of forgetting, even a couple of trials are enough to send
Eint above threshold. This means that binding nodes activated during training phase
in either Balanced or Skewed cases could have Eint above threshold. Crucially, in the
Balanced training phase it is no longer sufficient that an association is activated the
same number of times as the other. The exact sequence in which an association is ac-
tivated becomes important. The sequence PO— PO—DO might send the PO link into
active state, but that would not be the case if the subject receives PO—DO—PO. Thus
the system might develop a bias towards one association even though both association
were presented an equal number of times.
These biased association help us find an answer to the problem with which we be-
gan the section. At the start of the section, we noted that it is paradoxical that our
model replicates thee results of Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). Their experiments
were designed to detect the long-term influence of lexical information on syntactic de-
cisions. We assumed in our model that the rate of decay is same in the syntactic layer
and the binding nodes. This assumption meant that the lexical influence on syntactic
decisions was long-lived. In spite of this long-term influence, our model replicated the
results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008), which they use to argue for the lack of
such a long-term lexical influence. The solution to this paradox lies in an assumption
implicit to the design of the experiments. This is the assumption that the Equal con-
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Eint
Number of episodes with
both inputs active
Figure 4.6.8: The value of Eint for a binding node is a linear function of the number of priming
trials where input nodes are simultaneously activated.
dition, which presents the two dative structures an equal number of times during the
training phase, leads to an unbiased association between the verb and the two dative
structures.
Our analysis shows that even in the Equal condition the system might develop a
bias towards one association. These biased associations for a slow rate of forgetting
mean that comparing results under equal versus unequal stimuli and balanced versus
skewed stimuli does not necessarily rule out a long-term lexical enhancement of prim-
ing. Therefore, a system could internally show long-term lexical enhancement, yet
show no difference between Same Verb and Different Verb conditions, or Balanced
and Skewed conditions. Of course, the underlying assumption of our model is the
learning rule: fixed increment in the input sensitivity whenever an association is acti-
vated.
§ 4.6.3.4. Learning on input.— It is time to consider the alternative assumption:
learning might not depend simply on the activation of a node at the end of an episode
– it might depend on the co-activation of the two nodes connected to the binding node
(Figure 4.6.6(b)). Therefore, this is a purely associative learning – lexical and syn-
tactic nodes that are activated together more frequently have greater Eint . Thus the
amount of increase in Eint is a linear function of co-activation. In comparison, Eint
increased nonlinearly under the previous mechanism: learning could happen because
of co-activation, or it could happen because Eint had passed a threshold. No such
threshold value for Eint is applicable under this mechanism.
We also noticed that under the previous mechanism, the longevity of an activated
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node could either depend completely on the rate of forgetting, or exhibit permanent
activation – in which case it became independent of the rate of forgetting. In the
current mechanism, on the other hand, since the learning is a linear function of co-
activation, the longevity is directly dependent on rate of forgetting. And since we use
an exponential function for forgetting, the dependence between the order of forgetting
and longevity is exponential. That is, the order of decay in Eint is exponentially related
to the duration for which a link remains activated.
Now that we know what to expect from this learning mechanism, let us see the
results of the above experiments under these conditions (figure 4.6.9).
The results for the Same Verb versus Different Verb study (figure 4.6.9(a)) are
similar to the results obtained by learning on activation. The Different Verb conditions
are independent of variation in rate of forgetting while the Same Verb conditions show
reduction in priming for slow decay. Just like figure 4.6.7(a), both Equal and Unequal
cases show a reduction in priming – making effect size (primingequal− primingunequal)
similar for slow and fast decay. The difference between the last mechanism and this
lies in how structural priming increases with increase in rate of forgetting. While the
rate of increase was roughly linear under learning on activation, here it seems to be
asymptotic.
























(a) Experiment 1: Priming under Same Verb and
Different Verb conditions























(b) Experiment 2: Priming under Balanced and
Skewed conditions
Figure 4.6.9: Simulation results for Experiment 1 and 2 showing amount of priming versus
increase in rate of forgetting. This simulation uses the second learning mechanism: learning on
input.
The results for Balanced versus Skewed conditions (figure 4.6.9(b)) differ signifi-
cantly under this learning mechanism from the last. We notice that the U-shaped curve
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has given way to a roughly exponential decay. This means that if this mechanism of
learning is cognitively realised then the Balanced versus Skewed conditions will differ
significantly if there is long-term lexical influence. This difference will decay expo-
nentially as the duration of lexical influence becomes shorter. This is the result we
expected from our discussion on linear mapping between co-activation and learning.
Though it is expected, it is still an important result as it shows precisely how lexical
representations influence syntactic choice. It also raises the need to conduct further
psychological studies to examine which of these learning mechanism is more plausi-
ble.
§ 4.6.3.5. Time based forgetting.— We saw above how different learning mecha-
nisms can give different dynamics for lexical influence on syntactic choice. While we
have varied the learning mechanism – i.e. conditions for learning – we have kept the
learning rule the same. This learning rule is that of a fixed incremental adjustment to
input connections at the end of each episode. In the case of binding nodes, we only
make a fixed positive adjustment to the activated node(s). And in the case of WTA
nodes we make positive adjustment to winning node, but negative adjustment to the
losing nodes. This negative adjustment means that activation of a competing node, at
the end of an episode, interferes with the long-term memory of the losing node. There-
fore, the decay in memory is not strictly exponential and is influenced by the sequence
of the input episodes. This is an interference-based account of decay in memory17
To check whether our results change if we change our learning rule to have strictly
a time-based decay, we ran the two experiments using only positive adjustment to the
winning node. That is, no (negative) adjustment is made to a node if it loses the target
trial. The results for this are shown in Figure 4.6.10.
We observe that, in essence, the results remain similar to those obtained from
interference-based learning rule (figure 4.6.5). Priming remains independent of vari-
ation in learning rate, λ, for the Equal cases. It decreases with increase in learning
rate for Unequal cases. This again confirms that long-term learning in syntax layer
is one of the factors responsible for lower priming in Unequal cases. Crucially, the
reduction in priming for Same and Different verb conditions is similar. This means
that long-term learning in syntax layer is not responsible for any difference between
the two conditions.
All this is similar to the results from interference-based decay. What is different in
17Strictly speaking, this rule combines interference-based decay with time-decay since Kint decays
both due to negative adjustments and due to an exponential decay at the end of each episode.
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(a) Experiment 1: Priming under Same Verb and
Different Verb conditions























(b) Experiment 2: Priming under Balanced and
Skewed conditions
Figure 4.6.10: Simulation results for Experiment 1 and 2 showing amount of priming versus
increase in learning rate. Simulation conducted with non-interference learning rule.
this case is that the decrease in priming, for Unequal cases, sets in later than it did for
interference-based decay. At low rates of learning, the Equal and Unequal cases show
similar amount of priming.
§ 4.6.3.6. Prediction based learning.— A characteristic feature of the learning
rule, used so far, is making fixed adjustments after each episode. This choice was
made because of our hypothesis: structural repetition in a discourse could be a result
of trailing activation, and not a goal-directed learning (section 4.5.2). Now let us see
what happens when we change our learning rule in another way: learning more when
the input is surprising.
When a system shows variable amount of learning, depending on the input, it builds
an internal model of its stimuli. The model makes a prediction and the system com-
pares this prediction with external stimuli. If the prediction is incorrect, the system
adjusts the model. This adjustment is proportional to the difference between the pre-
diction and the external stimuli. The greater this difference, the more ‘surprised’ the
model is and the larger the amount of learning it has to undergo. As discussed in
Chapter 3, this is the learning mechanism that lies at the heart of the model presented
in (Chang et al., 2006).
Two different kinds of experimental support is given for a goal-directed learning
approach. The first one is the longevity of syntactic priming and the relatively short
duration of lexical boost (Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008; Hartsuiker et al., 2008). The
simulations in this chapter show that a trailing activation account (where the locus of
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processes responsible for priming is internal) can replicate this experimental evidence.
The other set of experiments used to support a goal-directed learning point to evidence
from experiments studying priming in structures with variable frequencies (Hartsuiker,
Kolk, & Huiskamp, 1999; Hartsuiker & Westenberg, 2000). These experiments find
that low-frequency target structures benefit more from priming as compared to high-
frequency target structures.
As we pointed in Section 2.3 (page 35), the claim for different amounts of priming
for structures of different frequencies is controversial. However, for the sake of argu-
ment we decided to test our model with a different learning rule – one that is prediction-
based and learns more for surprising information. While we adjust the learning rule,
the architecture of the model remains the same – lexical and syntactic information
is represented independently in WTA layers and connected through a set of binding
nodes. Thus changing the learning rule allows us to challenge the assumption that the
results of our simulation rely on a fixed learning mechanism.
Now, let us see how we can implement a prediction-based learning in our model.
The computational model developed by Chang et al. (2006) makes predictions through
the inbuilt sequential recurrent network. Our model does not have such an inbuilt
mechanism. If we want it to perform predictive learning, our model would have to use
an approximation to perform these predictions. A good heuristic for this is learning
according to the surprise value of input information. There is previous evidence (Hale,
2006) that the surprise value of input information is a good estimation of the cognitive
load during language comprehension. It relies on the intuition that our cognitive system
is better at registering surprising information than it is at registering banal information.
Our next task was to identify a variable in the system that estimates the surprise
value of a structural construct. For this, we used the frequency with which the construct
appears in the training phase. We change the learning rule to make large adjustments
when it comes across a construct of low frequency, and small adjustments when it
comes across high-frequency structures. The new learning rule becomes,
ω
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One can compare this learning rule with the previous learning rule (Equation 4.5.4).
The crucial difference is that the amount of learning, λ, depends on the current sensi-
tivity of the node, ωti. If a node has a high sensitivity, then the amount of learning is
186 Chapter 4. Dynamical systems approach to priming
low. On the other hand, a node with low sensitivity (i.e. large surprise value) will have
larger adjustment, λ.
The assumption here is that more frequent constructs are going to be more likely
during the testing phase. If a construct appears more frequently during the training
phase, the sensitivity of the construct will be large and therefore it will show a small
amount of adjustment during the testing phase. Consistent with this approach, the
frequency-based results mentioned above (Hartsuiker et al., 1999; Hartsuiker & West-
enberg, 2000) do indeed compare the relative frequencies of targets appearing during a
pre-experimental baseline with frequency of targets appearing during the experimental
phase. Also, this heuristic for measuring surprise is not too different from the error-
based learning in the model proposed by Chang et al. (2006) which also internalises
the frequency structure of the environment during training.
We plugged in this learning rule into our system and simulated it for the exper-
imental design for Model ­. Again we vary the learning rate, λ, and simulate the
computational model for the two experiments from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008).
The results are shown in Figure 4.6.11.

























(a) Experiment 1: Priming under Same Verb and
Different Verb conditions























(b) Experiment 2: Priming under Balanced and
Skewed conditions
Figure 4.6.11: Simulation results for Experiment 1 and 2 showing amount of priming versus
increase in learning rate. Simulation conducted with prediction-based learning rule.
Let us look at the results for the Balanced versus Skewed conditions first (Figure
4.6.11(b)). These results are exactly same as those for the fixed learning rule: nei-
ther Balanced nor Skewed condition depends on increase in rate of learning in syntax
layer. The results for Same and Different verb conditions are more interesting. Just
like for the fixed learning rule, the Equal cases for both conditions show no depen-
4.7. Conclusion 187
dence on learning rate. The Unequal cases however seem to decrease in a rather non-
monotonic manner with increase in learning rate. Also the difference begins to emerge
later (around λ = 0.5) than under fixed learning rule (figure 4.6.5(a)).
But besides these minor differences, the results for Same versus Different con-
ditions are similar under prediction based learning. The Unequal cases show lesser
priming than Equal cases for large learning rate; both Unequal-Same and Unequal-
Different show similar amounts of reduction in priming; and the general trend is for
a decrease in priming as learning rate increases. These results suggest that the archi-
tecture for the current model can just as easily be used for prediction-based learning,
at least, as far as the experiments of Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) are concerned.
The results do not arbitrate between a goal-based learning account and a fixed amount
of learning, but they do suggest that either could lead to the temporal properties of
syntactic priming and lexical enhancement of this priming.
4.7 Conclusion
We started this chapter with the knowledge that people repeat syntactic structure
while speaking. We also knew that this repetition can be enhanced by repeating the
verb. Finally, we knew that syntactic repetition and the lexical enhancement of this
repetition show different temporal properties. What we did not know was whether the
trailing activation model can account for these different temporal properties.
In this chapter we have developed a computational model that shows that a trailing
activation account can indeed show these variable rates of decay in syntactic repetition
and its lexical enhancement. In the process, we have embellished the trailing-activation
account itself. At a computational level, we have seen how we can formalise the notion
of trailing activation through the mechanism of hysteresis in a dynamical system. We
have also seen that such a system needs to perform incremental learning if it has to
accumulate information over a sequence of episodes. Researchers frequently make the
distinction between trailing activation and implicit learning. In this chapter, we have
bridged this gap by developing a system that that shows incremental (implicit) learn-
ing and yet is compatible with the principles of trailing activation. Instead, we have
redrawn the boundaries for learning mechanisms between a goal-directed, supervised,
variable amount of learning on the one hand and a cognitively inspired, unsupervised,
fixed amount of learning on the other. We have seen that experimental findings that
were believed to be compatible with only the former form of learning are also compat-
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ible with the latter.
What consequences does this have for the study of language production? To begin
with, the fact that priming and its temporal properties can be explained through a trail-
ing activation account shows that repetition might not be a consequence solely of the
processes of language acquisition, a claim that has been made by Chang et al. (2006).
Let us develop this argument a bit further.
Interlocutors might have two reasons for learning during a dialogue. The first rea-
son is to develop their knowledge of how the language works. This account assumes
that the language expertise lies in the linguistic community that the interlocutors inter-
acts with. Interlocutors are embedded in this linguistic community and try to build an
internal model of language. Each time they hear a phrase, interlocutors try to adjust
their internal model to make it compatible with the phrase. This adjustment is one
reason why they repeat syntactic structure of recently heard utterances.
The other reason for learning is to develop a discourse model. The linguistic signal
is sequential and is spread through time – across phonemes, words, phrases, sentences
and even conversations. Interlocutors want to integrate this information that is spread
in time and the only solution is to rely on memory – i.e. to learn. Each phoneme,
word, phrase and such leaves a memory trace when it is processed by the linguistic
system. Each time interlocutors want to produce a sentence, they do not construct it
from the scratch, but rely on previous memory traces. Not only does this integration of
memory traces save system resources (through reuse), but it is made necessary because
linguistic signals are spread over time. The last part of the puzzle is that this integration
comes with interference. When interlocutors face linguistic choices (such as POs or
DOs; Actives or Passives), the memory traces bias these choices in certain directions.
Reusing a DO that an interlocutor has recently heard saves resources, but it also ensures
integration with the speaker’s discourse model. Reusing a memory trace ensures that
the speaker and listener are aligned (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
But memory is a complex system. It serves not just language but other aspects
of cognition too – vision, motor skills, emotions and others. It is also implemented
through a biological system – populations of neurons and their connections. As a
consequence, the nature of cognitive implementation affects memory which, in turn,
affects repetition in language. In this chapter, we saw how repetition might decrease
with time as a consequence of fatigue or adaptation in populations of neurons. We also
saw that while structural representations might be implemented through one type of a
dynamical system (WTA), the lexical influence on structural decisions might be medi-
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ated through a different kind of a system (STM). The two different types of systems
show different kinds of memories (or fatigue) and therefore might explain the exper-
imental observation that structural repetition persists longer than lexical enhancement
of this repetition.
Memory is complex in another way. When sequence of episodes of language pro-
cessing accumulate over a period of time, certain sequences might be more important
than others. We noticed this in our analysis of incremental learning. Our system devel-
oped a bias towards certain choices even though it was presented both those choices an
equal number of times. The reason is that the learning mechanism that integrates the
information is nonlinear: PO—PO—DO—DO 6= PO—DO—PO—DO. The sequence in
which information is presented might be important. Kaschak and Borreggine (2008)
present subjects with verbs that are associated with PO and DO structures equal num-
ber of times and expect that subjects form equal associations with both structures. The
simulations performed with ‘learning on activation’ rule challenge this assumption.
Even if every episode has equal amount of attention drawn to it, some sequence of
episodes leave a larger trace on memory than others. If integration in memory was lin-
ear then all episodes will be equal, but if it is nonlinear some episodes might be more
equal than others.
Lastly, this chapter explores a novel method for studying priming – dynamical sys-
tems. It shows that linguistic choices can be modelled as dynamics of a system near
bifurcation. A formal system allows us to investigate the assumptions underlying dif-
ferent hypotheses. It exposes a limited set of parameters that allow us to tune the
system so that it gives results consistent with behavioural data. The values of these pa-




A novel framework for comprehension and
production
5.1 Motivation
Until now we have considered theoretical models that replicate experimental find-
ings about syntactic priming and lexical boost. However, we have not considered the
plausibility of these models. Our goal was to search for computational mechanisms
that can explain how syntactic priming changes with time and with lexical overlap.
Having established these computational mechanisms, we now turn to developing a
system that is more complete. Such a system not only needs to provide an account of
structural choice, but also needs to specify when this choice is made during compre-
hension and production and how these processes can be plausibly represented.
The model that we developed in the last chapter has several limitations that make it
cognitively implausible, representationally underspecified or procedurally incomplete:
• LOCALIZED REPRESENTATIONS. The model in the last chapter represents lex-
ical and syntactic constructs as nodes, rather than patterns of activation over a
network. Such a localized representation has several limitations such as catas-
trophic degradation with noise, hard capacity limit and a lack of generalisation
(Plate, 1997)1. Importantly, localized distributions do not allow coarse coding
and therefore do not allow us to study interference between different linguistic
constructs. For example, we cannot use the existing model to study how syn-
tactic priming changes with conceptual overlap. Thus, we need to replace the
localized representation of the existing model with a distributed representation
1However, see Thorpe (1995) for some rebuttals to critiques of localized representations.
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at each layer.
• LEARNING ALGORITHM. Two different kinds of learning mechanisms operate
in the existing model: (i) hysteresis in WTA and STM networks which is re-
sponsible for priming when the target immediately follows the prime, and (ii)
incremental adjustment to input sensitivity of nodes, which is responsible for
cumulative effect of priming over several prime trials. In this chapter, we would
like to explore whether we can find a single learning mechanism that can seam-
lessly explain both immediate and cumulative effects of priming. In the interest
of plausibility, we would also like this learning mechanism to be previously stud-
ied for physiological memory networks.
• SEMANTIC INFLUENCE. The model in the previous chapter does not include
any conceptual representations. It only studies structural choice under lexical
influence. This is a shortcoming of the model since semantic representations
drive syntactic choice during production and are extracted using syntactic rela-
tions during comprehension (Levelt, 1989; Levelt et al., 1999). In this chapter,
we would like to correct this limitation and extend the system to include con-
ceptual representations and explore how these representations might influence
syntactic choice.
• EXPLICIT PROCESSES OF COMPREHENSION AND PRODUCTION. In the last
chapter, we simulated comprehension by providing a large external stimulus to
the nodes and production by allowing the nodes to settle into a stable state on
their own. While this implementation allowed us to concentrate on the mech-
anism of syntactic choice, it leaves open questions as to how the syntactic and
lexical nodes receive this large input during comprehension and what is the se-
quence in which lexical, syntactic and semantic decisions are made by the sys-
tem. In this chapter we intend to make the system more complete – i.e. we would
like to specify the sequence of processes and the flow of activation during com-
prehension and production. We would especially like to see how the two might
overlap and whether one process can prime the other. These are important ques-
tions in the study of dialogue where this overlap between comprehension and
production processes could be a mechanism of achieving alignment between in-
terlocutors (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
Before we proceed, it must be mentioned that when we talk about a complete sys-
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tem we do not mean a system that can understand and generate natural language from
scratch. Such an enterprise would not only be overly ambitious, but also largely ir-
relevant to the processes of syntactic priming. Instead, our goal is a more modest
one of extending the model presented in the last chapter so that we can investigate
how syntactic representations might be generated from a sequence of words during
comprehension and to see how concepts are arranged into one sequence or the other
during production. We will limit ourselves to studying the dative structure and would
like to specify how the system understands or produces such a structure and what role
memory plays in each of these processes.
5.2 Theoretical extensions
Addressing the first three limitations, noted above, requires three extensions to our
theoretical repertoire, and the last limitation requires a change in architecture of our
model. In this section we present theoretical concepts required to extend our model
and in the next, we present a new architecture.
§ 5.2.1 Binding for distributed representations
A chief obstacle in moving from localized to distributed representations is binding
these distributed representations together. Localized coding has a one-to-one mapping
between a concept and its representation. Each concept is represented by a node and
each node represents one concept. This makes the task of binding concepts together
quite simple. In the previous chapter, for example, we saw that binding nodes record
the association between lexical and syntactic nodes. Models ¬, ­ and ® implement
static binding which means that the association between a lexical and a syntactic con-
struct is explicitly encoded by a node. In Model ® (figure 4.5.1 on page 138), for
example, each lexical node is connected to both the combinatorial nodes through two
binding nodes. Since there are four lexical nodes and two combinatorial nodes, we
have a total of eight binding nodes, each binding node representing a lexical-syntactic
association uniquely specified by the attached lexical and syntactic nodes.
A distributed code, on the other hand, represents a concept as a pattern of activation
over a group of nodes. Each concept can be represented by several nodes and each node
can play a part in representing several concepts. Because there is no longer any one-to-
one correspondence between a concept and a node, binding two concepts now becomes
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a non-trivial problem. It is no longer clear which nodes to include in a binding, whether
overlapping representations will lead to noise during unbinding, etc.
Fortunately, this problem is not unique to the representation required for our model
and has been well studied in another context – that of representing relational structure
in connectionist networks (Plate, 1997). In order to represent a sentence such as Mary
spied on John yesterday, a connectionist network needs to represent not only each of
the concepts Mary, spied on, John and yesterday, but also bind them together as part
of one sentence. Furthermore, the connectionist network needs to perform this binding
in such a way that this sentence is not confused with John spied on Mary yesterday.
Thus, the connectionist network needs to represent not just the constituent concepts,
but also their relational structure. If each of the concepts is represented as a distributed
pattern of activation, then the network needs to perform binding over these distributed
representations and disambiguate this binding from other possible bindings over these
concepts.
Three major schemes have been proposed to perform binding for distributed rep-
resentations. Pollack (1990) has developed a Recursive Auto Associative Memory
(RAAM) for representing the compositional structure of sentences. Plate (1995, 1997)
proposed Holographic Reduced Representations (HRRs) which bind two representa-
tions by performing circular convolution (defined below) over these representations.
Lastly, Smolensky (1990) proposed that binding between patterns over two vectors
can be calculated by finding the tensor product between these vectors.
When we consider the network architecture in the next section, we will see that
there are two kinds of bindings that we would like to represent – one within a represen-
tational layer and another between two layers. Both HRRs and tensor product binding
schemes are suitable for each of these bindings. We briefly present both these schemes
below and discuss reasons for choosing the tensor product as the preferred method of
encoding bindings in our system. The third scheme – RAAM – is a more complex
scheme used to learn reduced representation for tree structures (Pollack, 1990). Our
interest, for the current purposes, is not to represent such a tree structure, but a simple
binding between roles and fillers. Therefore, in the interest of simplicity, we do not
pursue this binding mechanism any further.
§ 5.2.1.1. Holographic Reduced Representations.— Holographic Reduced Rep-
resentations were developed by Plate (1995) to represent the compositional, tree-like
structure of language using distributed representations over a connectionist network.
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Plate (1995) discusses how it is difficult for matrix memories, such as auto-associative
memories (e.g. Hopfield networks) and hetro-associative memories (e.g. feedforward
networks), to represent the recursive associations between constituents of sentences.
As a solution to this problem, they propose a representation scheme based on holo-
graphic memory (Willshaw, 1981), instead of matrix memory.
The idea behind holographic reduced representations stems from the mathematical
operation of circular convolution. The convolution, or more specifically aperiodic







We can store the association between two vectors x and h using their convolution y,
which serves as the memory of the association. At a later point, we can retrieve the
vector associated with the vector x, given the convolution memory y, by performing
deconvolution, which is an algorithm that can reverse the effects of convolution. Thus,
convolution can be used to store the binding between patterns of activation over two
vectors.
However using convolution to perform binding for compositional structure has two
problems. Firstly, deconvolution of two vectors is not a straightforward process and
leads to noise in the retrieved memory. Secondly, if each of x and h are of length N,
then their convolution y is of length 2N − 1. This means that if we want to use the pro-
cess of convolution recursively, such that we want to bind the output of a convolution
to another vector, then the dimensionality of the vector keeps expanding.
Plate (1995) propose that this problem of expanding dimensionality can be avoided
if we use circular convolution as the binding operation, instead of aperiodic convolu-







where the subscript N on x and h denotes that the indexes are modulo-N – i.e. they
wrap around when the index is larger than N. Crucially, the circular convolution of
two vectors of length N is another vector of the same length N, thereby avoiding the
problem of expanding dimensionality.
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The second crucial insight provided by Plate (1995) is that the circular cross-
correlation operation, ?, is an approximate inverse of the circular convolution oper-
ation, which means that instead of relying on the difficult algorithm of deconvolu-




where the circular cross-correlation of two vectors y and x is an operation that is quite
similiar to the circular convolution. Just like convolution, the correlation operation
takes two input signals and finds an output signal. Howerver, unlike the convolution
operation, the correlation operation tries to detect a known signal x in a noisy input y.
Formally, the circular cross-correlation between two vectors y and x, each of length N,
is defined as:





yN(k) xN(k + i)
where the subscript N on y and x again denotes that the indexes are modulo-N. Because
this convolution-correlation scheme works on vectors of the same length (N), a number
of vectors can be hierarchically combined together to give a single vector. This vector
is the compressed, or reduced representation of the binding between each of these
vectors and hence the name Holographic Reduced Representations.
The last piece of the puzzle comes from the illustration that different convolutions
can be superimposed upon one another through summation. Superposition allows sev-
eral vectors to be stored in the same memory. While superposition inevitably leads
to interference, Plate (1995) argued that HRRs can be complemented with an auto-
associative memory (such as a Hopfield network), which can perform the “clean-up”
of retrieved memories and improve recall.
An example (taken from Plate (1997)) illustrates the use of HRRs for storing and
retrieval of compositional structure. Consider the proposition Spot bit Jane, which
caused Jane to run away from Spot. This proposition (say Pcause) can be divided into
two constituent propositions: Spot bit Jane (say Pbite) and Jane ran away from Spot
(say P f lee). Each of the propositions can be represented as a circular convolution of
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different concepts and their roles in the proposition:
Pbite = < bite + biteagt ~ spot + biteob j ~ jane >
P f lee = < flee + fleeagt ~ jane + flee f rom ~ spot >
where we use circular convolution to bind the concepts spot and jane to the roles
of biteagt , biteob j, fleeagt and flee f rom. In addition, each binding in a proposition is
superimposed with other bindings in that proposition through summation. Finally, the
two propositions can be (recursively) bound to their respective roles in the higher level
proposition, Pcause:
Pcause = < cause + Pbite + Pcause
+ causeantc ~Pbite + causecnsq ~P f lee >
Thus the single vector Pcause functions the memory for the entire proposition, “Spot bit
Jane, which caused Jane to run away from Spot,” including all its constituent concepts
and their roles in the proposition.
Plate (1995) also showed that such a vector can be used at a later point of time, to
obtain any of the sub-parts, through the process of circular cross-correlation. If, for
example, one wishes to find who did the biting, one can do so by evaluating (Pcause ?
causeantc)?biteagt , i.e. one first finds the antecedent of Pcause, which should give Pbite
and then the agent in Pbite, which should give spot.
This example illustrates that HRRs provide a binding mechanism for distributed
representations that can be used for storing the compositional structure of linguistic
expressions. Given two vectors, the binding can be calculated immediately, as this
mechanism does not entail any learning. Most importantly, this mechanism provides
a straightforward unbinding mechanism through circular cross-correlation, which can
be used to perform retrieval of one constituent, given the other constituent and the
binding.
§ 5.2.1.2. Tensor product binding.— We have seen that one mechanism of bind-
ing distributed representations is the mathematical operation of circular convolution.
An alternative binding mechanism is provided by an alternative mathematical opera-
tion – the tensor product. The tensor product between an n-dimensional vector a and
an m-dimensional vector b, is the nm dimensional vector a⊗b, whose elements are all
possible products aib j of an element of a and an element of b.
Smolensky (1990) showed that tensor products can be used to represent symbolic
structure in connectionist networks. For doing this, a symbolic structure should be
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expressed as a conjunction of roles and fillers – i.e. each symbolic structure is factored
out, or decomposed, into a set of roles and fillers. Smolensky (1990) proposed that
such role-filler decompositions can be used to represent different kinds of symbolic
structures. For example, strings can be seen as an array of characters. Each element
of the array contains a role and a filler. In the case of a string, the role is just the
position of the character in the string and the filler is the character itself. Similarly, a
proposition can be seen as a set of predicates, each of which is a conjunction of roles
and fillers (as we saw in the “Spot bit Jane” example above).
After decomposing a symbolic structure into a conjunction of fillers and roles,
the next step is to find a connectionist representation of such a conjunction. In the
scheme presented by Smolensky (1990), a connectionist network represents a con-









where ∧ is the symbol for conjunction, pi is the ith proposition and ψ is a function
that maps a symbol (such as pi) onto its connectionist representation. So the above
rule implies that the connectionist representation of a conjunction of propositions is
the sum of the connectionist representations for each of the individual propositions.
Thus a symbolic structure, which is a conjunction of a set of roles and fillers, can be
represented in a connectionist network as a sum of the connectionist representations of
each role and its filler.
The last step is to find a connectionist representation of each of the roles and fillers.
This is where the operation of tensor product comes in. Each role and its filler can be
represented as a pattern of activity over a set of nodes. This pattern of activity over a
set of nodes can then be encoded as a vector – which is nothing but a tensor of rank
one (as we will discuss below). If f is a vector representing the filler f (i.e. f = ψ( f ))
and r is the vector representing the role r (i.e. r = ψ(r)), then the role-filler association
(or binding) can be represented by the tensor product of the two vectors, f/r = f⊗ r,
where f/r represents the association between the vectors f and r.
Putting it all together, we can say that a symbolic structure which can be decom-
posed into a conjunction of role-filler bindings can be represented in a connectionist
framework through a sum of tensor products between roles and their corresponding
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The left side of the equation states the problem – finding a connectionist representation
for a conjunction of role-filler combinations. The right side of the equation delivers the
solution – the sum of tensor products of roles and their corresponding filler vectors.
This scheme of representing symbolic structure in connectionist framework can be
more clearly illustrated through a diagram. Figure 5.2.1 shows a vector biteagt , which
encodes a particular role, along the x-axis and a vector spot, which is the filler for
the role, along the y-axis. The tensor product is simply the outer product of the two
vectors, calculated by multiplying each of the elements of the two vectors together.




Figure 5.2.1: [Tensor product] The tensor product of biteagt and spot is calculated
by finding the outer product of each of the elements of the two vectors. Each vector is
shown along an axis in the 2-dimensional space and their tensor product is shown in the
middle. The activity of each node is characterised by its brightness, with darker nodes
showing high activity and brighter nodes show a low value of activation. (Adapted from
Smolensky (1990))
While the above analysis demonstrates that it is possible to represent symbolic
structure in a connectionist framework, it does not tell us whether this coding scheme
is going to be efficient. Once we store a set of role-filler associations in a connectionist
network through tensor product binding, would we be able to retrieve the filler corre-
sponding to a role at a later point of time? How do different vectors stored in such
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a memory interfere with each other and can we use this memory to store bindings of
more than two vectors? In order to answer these questions, Smolensky (1990) pre-
sented a detailed account of the properties of tensor product bindings that make this
scheme suitable for storing symbolic structures. We present a brief outline of a couple
of properties relevant to our implementation; the interested reader is directed towards
Smolensky (1990) and Smolensky (1987) for a more detailed discussion.
• UNBINDING. Unbinding is the procedure of retrieving one element of an as-
sociation, given the other element and the binding (or memory) that associates
the two elements. We saw above that the circular cross-correlation operation, ?,
provides an approximate unbinding mechanism for HRRs. Similarly, if we want
to use the tensor product as a memory, then we need to establish an unbinding
mechanism to perform retrieval from the memory. Smolensky (1990) proved
that, provided the vectors representing roles in a structure are linearly indepen-
dent2, each of the fillers fi bound to a role ri can be unbound from the tensor
product representation, with complete accuracy, using an unbinding vector ui.
While this unbinding operation is theoretically possible, to do so one must first
find the unbinding vector corresponding to each role. The inner product of this
unbinding vector with the tensor product binding gives the required filler:(
∑
j
f j⊗ r j
)
·ui = fi
More importantly, Smolensky (1990) also showed that when such an unbind-
ing vector ui is not available, one can use the role vector ri itself to perform
the unbinding. For obvious reasons, this unbinding procedure is called the self
addressing unbinding procedure. The procedure of calculating the unbinding is
similar to the one presented for the vector ui above: one needs to find the inner
product of the role vector with the tensor product representation. In this case the
roles do not even need to be linearly independent. However, there is a downside:
noise due to interference. Smolensky (1990) showed that the closer two role
vectors are, the more likely there will be interference from one to the other. But
if the vectors are orthogonal, then this noise disappears. Specifically, unbinding
2A set of vectors r1,r2, . . . ,rn are linearly independent if they cannot be expressed in the form
a1r1 +a2r2 + . . .+anrn = 0, where a1,a2, . . . ,an are non-zero constants.
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role ri from a sum of role-filler bindings f j⊗ r j, gives the result:(
∑
j
f j⊗ r j
)




where θi j is the angle between vectors ri and r j. If the vectors ri and r j are
orthogonal then the second term becomes zero, leading to zero noise.
• TENSORS AND VECTORS. Tensors are generalisations of vectors and tensor
products are generalisations of the outer product of vectors. The generalisation
comes when one moves from one-dimensional indexing to multi-dimensional
indexing. The word tensor signifies an array of numbers that can be indexed.
The number of indices required to pick an element of a tensor is called its rank.
A vector is a tensor of rank one (i.e. one index is required to pick an element in
a vector) and a tensor product of two vectors gives a matrix, which is a tensor
of rank two. We can continue along this path and find a tensor product of three
vectors a⊗b⊗ c, which will give us a tensor of rank three. This generalisation
is useful as it removes the restriction of being able to bind only two vectors
at a time. For example, if we have to bind lexical, syntactic and phonological
representations together we can code each of the representations into a vector
and find a tensor product of the three vectors.
§ 5.2.1.3. Choosing a binding mechanism.— Both tensor products and HRRs are
capable of binding distributed representations of symbolic structure. HRRs are partic-
ularly attractive because of their scalability: the binding of two vectors of length n can
be stored in another vector of the same length n. If we have to perform the binding
operations repetitively over symbolic structure, for example when the symbolic struc-
ture is hierarchical, the scalability of HRRs means that we do not face the problem
of expanding dimensionality. On the other hand, tensor product binding retains com-
plete information about the components of the binding, allowing us to retrieve each
component from the binding with complete accuracy. Tensor products can represent
hierarchical structures, but the size of the patterns increases exponentially with the
depth of the hierarchy (Plate, 1997). In fact, HRRs and tensor-product binding differ
not only in their binding operation, but also in their emphasis. While the HRR scheme
aims to find a “reduced description” (see Hinton (1990)) to represent compositional
structure, tensor-product binding aims to find a general connectionist representation
for symbolic structure that allows storage of multiple symbolic structures in parallel
and also provides a principled way of analysing interference between these structures.
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When we describe the extended model below, we will see that the symbolic struc-
ture that we wish to represent does not pose a significant problem with expanding
dimensionality. On the other hand, we do want to reduce the amount of interference
between different bindings for our experiments. This makes the tensor-product repre-
sentation suitable for our task.
In contrast, Holographic Reduced Representations have a serious limitation when
it comes to noiseless retrieval of a component from a binding. We saw above that
HRRs provide the capability to store multiple vectors by summing the individual asso-
ciations. This summation means that patterns overlap each other in certain regions of
the vector, leading to a distortion of the signal during retrieval. We saw that retrieval
can be performed by circular cross-correlation operation, ?, but this operation leads to
an approximate rather than exact unbinding. This approximation means that the result
of unbinding contains some noise. Plate (1995) showed that this noise can be mini-
mized under the constraint that each of the patterns are independently and identically
distributed with zero mean and variance 1/n, where n is the length of the vector. For
example, if each element of each vector is randomly generated from a Gaussian dis-
tribution N (0,1/n), then it can be shown (see Plate (1995)) that the noise will tend
towards zero as the length of the vector increases.
However, this constraint makes the implementation of HRR binding complicated
within our framework. We will see below that the vectors that need to be associated are
generated by lexical, syntactic and semantic memories which generate sparse vectors
with some nodes having high activation and most nodes having low or zero activation.
These vectors do not obey the above constraint and therefore lead to interference be-
tween memories and a noisy retrieval. Plate (1995) did forecast this problem and sug-
gested that it can be solved by mapping the vector generated by one’s (memory) sys-
tem onto a random vector (obeying the above constraints) through a hetro-associative
memory. However, performing this additional mapping is not straightforward as it
would require us to first train this hetro-associative network and then plugging in this
trained network into our system. In addition, the presence of the additional step of a
hetro-associative network will slow down the processing and, to our knowledge, lacks
physiological justification.
These problems can be avoided by using the tensor-product binding mechanism.
Though this mechanism does have the problem of expanding dimensionality, in our
case it is not a severe restriction since we do not intend to develop a system with
complex hierarchical symbolic structures.
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§ 5.2.2 Extending the learning algorithm
In Section 5.2.1 we chose a mechanism for encoding associations of distributed repre-
sentations. In this section we establish a learning mechanism for such representations.
Model ® in the previous chapter had two independent learning mechanisms –
short-term learning through hysteresis and a long-term learning through incremental
adjustment to input sensitivity. But these learning mechanisms have a few pitfalls.
Firstly, we have two contrasting learning mechanisms for explaining short term effects
of priming and cumulative effects of priming. Although, Model ® shows that both
these mechanisms can work in conjunction to explain experimental findings, it would
be preferable to have one uniform learning mechanism that is able to explain both
short term and cumulative priming. Such a unified mechanism of learning would make
it possible to directly compare the relative persistence of different kinds of memory
and see if priming over different intervals can be explained as a consequence of these
relative rates of persistence.
Secondly, we do not know how the long term learning mechanism presented in
the last chapter converges over different regimes of learning. The reader would recall
that when a node in Model ® wins the competition, its input sensitivity increases by
a fixed value. This means if a particular node keeps winning the competition, then its
input sensitivity would keep growing. As the input sensitivity grows, the node would
become even more likely to win the competition, leading to a self-perpetuating cycle
of growth in input sensitivity. Physiologically this phenomenon is implausible. This
raises the problem of ensuring convergence. In fact, unsupervised learning algorithms
such as Hebbian learning face a similar problem and solutions to the problem (e.g.,
see Oja, 1982) involve establishing an explicit or implicit bound for the learning rule.
In this section we would like to replace the learning rule with one that has more well
established properties of convergence.
Lastly, we do not know how the learning mechanism scales when we use more
than two symbolic structures. In Model ®, we used only two symbolic structures –
represented by a PO and a DO node and a symmetrical set of inputs between the nodes.
As the network size increases – i.e. we have more than two nodes – and the connection
between the nodes becomes asymmetric, we do not know whether the network will
converge to a stable activation pattern. Even though we will still be sticking to just two
symbolic structures in the syntax layer, we will introduce a larger number of symbolic
structures at the other layers and we would like our learning algorithm to have well
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known convergence properties for representing more than two structures.
To sum up, we would like to replace the existing learning algorithm with an un-
supervised learning algorithm for distributed representations that is suitable for mem-
orising both short term and cumulative episodes, has well known properties of con-
vergence and scalability and is consistent with our framework of dynamical systems.
Auto-associative memory models, such as the Hopfield model, have well documented
learning algorithms that meet these constraints (Hertz, Krogh, & Palmer, 1991). H. R.
Wilson (1999) presented a dynamical system that extends such an auto-associative
memory and uses a Hebbian algorithm to perform learning. We adapt this system to
implement a learning algorithm that meets the above criteria and can be used in our
system for encoding lexical, syntactic and semantic representations.
§ 5.2.2.1. A network of excitatory and inhibitory nodes.— The dynamical sys-
tems considered up to now have consisted of two nodes that are connected to each
other through symmetric connections. We saw that such a system is capable of show-
ing saddle-node bifurcations and these saddle-node bifurcations allow the network to
behave in two different ways depending on the history of the system. Now, we gen-
eralise the idea to a set of N nodes, where N can be any number larger than one. Let
us assume that these nodes are connected to each other through symmetric, excitatory
connections. In addition, the network contains a global inhibitory mechanism that in-
hibits all the nodes based on the overall level of excitation in the network. We can


























where Ei is the activation of node i, G is the level of inhibition, τ is the time-constant
for change in activation (or inhibition), S is the Naka-Rushton function (first seen on
page 101) and wi j is the connection strength (or synaptic weight) between node i and
node j. The level of inhibition, G, can be seen as the level of activation of an inhibitory
node. The crucial distinction between this node and all other nodes is that input from
this node to any other node is inhibitory while the input from any other is always
excitatory. If G is seen as an inhibitory node, then g can be seen as the value for the
input synaptic weights of this node.
The above dynamical system extends the two-node system presented in the previ-
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ous chapter in three ways:
1. Since the network can consist of more than two nodes, we can represent symbolic
structure in the network using distributed representations. In the previous mod-
els, each node stood for a symbolic structure (a PO or a DO). This isomorphism
between symbols and nodes does not need to hold in this multi-node network.
We can now represent a particular symbolic structure as a pattern of activity
distributed over a subset of nodes, which is the essence of distributed represen-
tations (Hinton, McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Thus the dynamical system
presented in Equation 5.2.2 allows us to move from localized to distributed rep-
resentations.
2. In the previous models all connections were of the same type – either excita-
tory or inhibitory. The WTA system (on page 112) had inhibitory connections
from each node to the other, while the STM system (on page 128) had excitatory
connections. The system in equation 5.2.2 has both kinds of connections. The
restriction lies in the type of node: the E node sends out only excitatory connec-
tions to all other nodes and the G node sends out inhibitory connections to all
other nodes.
3. Models ¬, ­ and ® held the strength of connections between nodes as constant.
Equation 5.2.2 replaces these fixed connection strengths with variable synaptic
weights, wi j. This variation in connection strengths between nodes holds the key
to learning. Instead of varying the sensitivity of a node to input, we vary these
synaptic strengths. When a particular pattern of activation is presented to the
network, the strength of connections between all activated nodes increases by
a small amount. This is simple Hebbian learning. H. R. Wilson (1999) imple-
mented the following modification of the Hebbian learning rule:
wi j = k ·H (Ei−0.5M) ·H (E j−0.5M) (5.2.3)
where k is the fixed value of the connection that has undergone learning, M is




1 f or x > 0
0 f or x≤ 0
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Therefore, the dynamical system presented in Equation 5.2.2 allows us to repre-
sent symbolic structure as a pattern of activity distributed over a subset of nodes. This
pattern of activity can then be consolidated in memory using a modification of un-
supervised Hebbian learning implemented by equation 5.2.3. Thus this network of
inhibitory and excitatory nodes goes some way towards finding our desired learning
mechanism.
What we require next is a way to find whether the learning algorithm converges.
In other words, we can ask whether the learning algorithm in equation 5.2.3 leads to
a stable solution for the dynamical system 5.2.2. We saw that the stability of the two-
node system presented in the previous chapters can be established by comparing it to
the additive-neuron model which has three points of equilibrium – two stable nodes
and one saddle point. In a similar manner, we would like to establish whether the
dynamical system in Equation 5.2.2 has stable nodes or saddle points. The existence
of stable nodes will tell us that the network converges towards this node and the pattern
of activity at the stable node will be the memory retrieved by the dynamical system.
In addition to this, we also need to know the range of initial conditions that will move
the network along a trajectory towards an asymptotically stable state. In other words,
we want to know which initial patterns will cause the dynamical system to retrieve a
particular memory. This range of initial conditions that converge to a stable equilibrium
are called the domain of attraction of this stable solution.
The problem of determining the stable solutions of a dynamical system and the
range of initial conditions that lead to these solutions was first investigated by Alexandr
Lyapunov3, who sought to establish the nature of trajectories for a dynamical system,
without actually having to find the trajectories. The Lyapunov theory requires one to
determine a state function, called the Lyapunov function, for the system. This func-
tion can be seen as a generalised energy function that plots the energy of the system
in state space. As the system evolves, energy gets dissipated and the system moves
in a direction to minimise this energy. Correspondingly, the Lyapunov function estab-
lishes a region around an equilibrium point such that all trajectories entering this region
asymptotically converge towards the equilibrium (where the equilibrium corresponds
to the point of minimum energy in the energy parlance). If one succeeds in finding a
Lyapunov function around an equilibrium, it guarantees that the equilibrium point is
stable. Thus, the procedure of finding the Lyapunov function helps one to establish
whether an equilibrium is stable and also helps one find a range of initial conditions
3Russian mathematician, 1857–1918
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(the stable node’s domain of attraction) that will move the system along a trajectory
towards this stable solution4.
H. R. Wilson (1999) showed that it is possible to find a Lyapunov function for the
dynamical system given by Equation 5.2.2 which learns via the unsupervised learning
mechanism given in Equation 5.2.3. The existence of this Lyapunov function confirms
that this dynamical system converges to a stable solution in such a way that a fraction
of nodes are activated above threshold and the rest of the nodes have zero or very
low activity. This is good news as it means that the system does not get into a self-
perpetuating cycle where some active nodes end up activating all nodes above threshold
and thus giving a meaningless result to memory retrieval.
H. R. Wilson (1999) explained that it is a balance between excitatory and inhibitory
nodes that helps the network to achieve a stable solution with only a fraction of nodes
firing. This analysis also helps us to uncover a limitation of this dynamical system.
Since stability rests on the crucial balance between excitation and inhibition, this sys-
tem has the limitation that the fraction of active nodes in a pattern are fixed – i.e. the
number of active nodes in each pattern stored in memory needs to be the same. If the
number of active nodes is (much) larger than this fraction, then excitation will dom-
inate and, conversely, if only a small fraction of nodes are active, then the inhibition
will dominate, driving all nodes to the rest state. In each case, the result of the retrieval
will be a false memory. However, this is not a serious limitation as we will be con-
sidering a small number of patterns to be stored. Each of these patterns is generated
systematically through the same procedure, ensuring that all patterns for a particular
memory have the same number of active nodes.
Thus the dynamical system given by Equation 5.2.2 that learns via a Hebbian learn-
ing rule provides us with a memory mechanism for distributed representations that has
well established analytical properties. When we discuss the computational details of
the model below, we will modify the learning algorithm slightly so that it can be used
for learning both short term and cumulative episodes of priming.
§ 5.2.3 Semantic extension
At the beginning of this chapter we set out to extend previous models so that the system
is more plausible and more complete. So far we have considered theoretical extensions
that will enable us to implement distributed representations and an analysable mech-
4Strictly speaking, it is possible to find multiple Lyapunov functions for a stable equilibrium. Thus
the Lyapunov function establishes a sub-region of the complete domain of attraction.
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anism for learning distributed patterns of activity. Both these extensions improve the
plausibility of the system. In this section, we pursue the second goal and seek the
theoretical apparatus required for extending the system so that it encodes processes
of comprehension and production. By extending the system in this manner, we can
then study how comprehension and production overlap and how learning during com-
prehension can lead to syntactic priming during production. Let us look in a bit more
detail at what we mean by extending the system to include processes of comprehension
and production.
First let us review how we have modelled comprehension and production until now.
Comprehension was modelled by providing a large external input to one of the combi-
natorial nodes. Providing this large external input is equivalent of forcing the network
to choose this node. When we simulate comprehension we try to model the cognitive
processes of the listener. Since the linguistic choices are made by someone else (the
speaker), our implementation simply forces the speaker to choose the grammatical cat-
egory that has been used by the speaker. In contrast, during production, we want to
simulate the speaker, who makes the linguistic choice. We implement this by allowing
the model to choose a combinatorial node based on its internal state and the dynamics.
We provide an equal amount of external input to both combinatorial nodes, making the
decisions dependent on the system’s hysteresis.
Now, we intend to extend these processes and make it similar to how information
is processed by the cognitive system during comprehension and production. Instead
of stating that comprehension requires providing a large external input for one of the
nodes, we would like to treat the system as a black box and provide it only with an
input signal. The system should simulate the lexical and syntactic layers based on this
input and transform the input into some kind of a canonical representation. We will
consider a mental representation to be canonical if different utterances with the same
meaning map onto this mental representation. During production, we would like to get
the reverse transformation: the system is given this canonical representation and should
turn it into an output signal. We will assume that all representations up to the semantic
level are canonical, focussing the burden of choice between different utterances at the
syntactic level. In other words, when the system faces a choice between two utterances
(during production) we will assume that this choice is completely made at the syntactic
level because the utterances are identical (canonical) at the semantic (or higher) level.
Ideally, the input signal for the comprehension and the output signal for production
would be an acoustic signal. At the other end, the canonical representation should be





Figure 5.2.2: [Black box] Comprehension transforms linguistic signal (L) into a canon-
ical representation (CR ). The transformation involves flow of information through lex-
ical and syntactic representations. Production involves the opposite mapping – from a
canonical representation to a linguistic signal.
something like an intentional state. However, this might be a very ambitious project
bridging philosophy of mind to speech technology and crossing, in between, the land-
scape of computational linguistics and psychology.
We would like to limit ourselves to a more modest goal – one that is relevant to
the study of syntactic priming. In this section we consider the nature of the canonical
representation and in the next we would look at the input representation. We will see
that the input representation is restricted to a text tagged with the syntactic function of
each word. But we will not get too far ahead of ourselves just now and first concentrate
on finding a reasonable definition for the canonical representation. This canonical
representation will form the output of a comprehension trial. Because we intend to
extend our framework to study the effect of semantic structure on syntactic priming,
we restrict the canonical representation to be the semantic structure of an utterance.
What is the nature of such a canonical (semantic) representation? Let us illustrate
the constraints on such a representation with the help of an example. Consider the
utterance John gave Mary the book. At the syntactic level, we can say that John is the
subject of the sentence with two objects, Mary and book, and the verb gave. When we
move to the semantic level, the subject John needs to be associated with the concept
JOHN5, just as gave, Mary and book need to be associated with the concepts GIVE,
MARY and BOOK. Furthermore, at the syntactic level, John, gave, Mary and book are
bound together by their syntactic roles in the utterance. Similarly, at the semantic level,
the concepts JOHN, GIVE, MARY and BOOK need to be bound to each other in such
a way that the semantics of this binding is associated with the meaning of the whole
utterance. If we represent the semantics of the entire utterance with the predicate-
5We will consistently use UPPERCASE (sans-serif) letters to signify a conceptual element, Italics
(roman) to refer to word forms or syntactic functions and BOLD (monospace) to refer to predicates.
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argument structure GIVE(JOHN,MARY,BOOK), then this predicate-argument structure
needs to be associated with the entire utterance John gave Mary the book. Lastly, this
semantic representation needs to be canonical – i.e. different (valid) rearrangements of
the words should lead to the same semantics. The prepositional dative John gave the
book to Mary and the double object dative above should both map to the same semantic
representation.
This example shows multiple levels of associations between syntactic and semantic
representations. At one level, the word forms are associated with lexical concepts
(e.g.John and JOHN) and at another level the entire semantic structure is associated
with the syntactic structure (e.g.GIVE(JOHN,MARY,BOOK) and John gave Mary the
book). We also see that the verb plays a special role as it picks out the predicate which
provides a list of arguments. These arguments are matched to the concepts picked by
the subject and object of the utterance. These different associations between syntactic
and semantic structures are schematically shown in figure 5.2.3.
GIVE( JOHN , MARY ,BOOK )
John gave Mary the book
Figure 5.2.3: [Dative mapping] This figure shows the mapping between the syntactic
elements of the construction John gave Mary the book and the semantic components
of the predicate-argument structure GIVE (JOHN, MARY, BOOK).
We can now specify a semantic representation based on these constraints. The
semantic layer needs to perform two different kinds of functions. Firstly, it needs to
represent the individual lexical concepts and secondly, it needs to represent the binding
between different concepts. These two functions can be used to divide the semantic
representation into two types of components: lexical concepts and schemata. Each
word in an utterance picks out a lexical concept in the semantic layer. This lexical
concept represents the semantic knowledge related to the word form. In addition,
each verb picks a schema which evokes a body of knowledge used for understand-
ing the relationships between the lexical concepts. The idea of schemata has been
used in connectionist networks for organising conceptual knowledge (see, for example
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(Rumelhart et al., 1986)) and is closely related to the idea of frames used in cognitive
linguistics (Fillmore, 1985). The schema or frame, picked by the verb, exposes a set of
roles which are matched with corresponding lexical concepts picked by the utterance.
Together, the frame along with the matched lexical concepts represents the semantics
of the entire syntactic construction. Figure 5.2.4 shows an example of a frame picked
by the verb risk. It also shows how the sentence You’ve risked your health for a few
cheap thrills provides lexical concepts that serve as arguments to the RISK frame and
link to its roles.
You’ve risked your health for a few cheap thrills
chance harm victim valued obj actor gain beneficiary RISK
Figure 5.2.4: [Risk frame] The analysis of the arguments (roles) of the RISK frame and
how different concepts in the utterance You’ve risked your health for a few cheap thrills
attach to these roles. Note that the frame contains a larger body of knowledge and an
utterance activates only part of this knowledge. (Based on the analysis of RISK frame
given in Fillmore and Atkins (1992))
§ 5.2.3.1. Concepts, Schemata and construction grammar.— This representa-
tional scheme is evocative of a popular grammatical theory. In our scheme, the syntac-
tic layer consists of word forms and utterances; the semantic layer consists of lexical
concepts and frames. The part-whole relationships between words and utterances at
the syntax layer are reflected in the relationships between concepts and frames in the
semantic layer. The parts of a syntactic structure (i.e. the utterance) map to the parts of
the semantic structure (i.e. the frame). At the same time, the whole syntactic structure
also maps onto the whole semantic structure. Croft and Cruse (2004) pointed out that
such pairing of word form and meaning is a key property of construction grammars
such as Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987) and Construction Grammar6 (Fillmore
& Kay, 1993). Because of this similarity in our goals of semantic representation and
construction grammars, we would like to investigate what this formalism can tell us
6There is a bit of confusing terminology here, with Construction Grammar (capital C and G), pro-
posed by Fillmore and Kay (1993), being one type of construction grammar.
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about the relationships between syntactic and semantic structure and whether a de-
scription consisting of the conceptual content of words and their role in a schema
provides a canonical representation for utterances.
Construction grammars treat any syntactic configuration as a construction. The
parts of the syntactic configuration might be entirely variable, like in our double object
dative John gave Mary the book, or they may be fixed, like the utterance What’s this cat
doing in here?, where the parts What’s and doing are fixed (Kay & Fillmore, 1999).
Sentences such as What is this scratch doing on the table? and What am I doing
reading this paper? are illustrations of other instances of this construction. Kay and
Fillmore (1999) argued that all constructions of the form What’s X doing Y share some
semantic features and that the entire semantics of such an utterance cannot be construed
from the semantics of its parts. Thus representation of the semantics of such utterances
presents a problem. This problem is solved by construction grammar which takes a
construction as an atomic unit that cuts across phonological, syntactic and semantic
levels and associates each construction with its own semantic interpretation. Thus
construction grammars do not just map word forms with lexical concepts, they also
map entire syntactic configuration onto a semantic structure.
Croft and Cruse (2004) illustrated this mapping between different elements of the
syntactic and semantic structures using the example of an intransitive utterance such
as Heather sings. The construction grammar representation of this utterance is shown
in Figure 5.2.5. The word forms Heather and sings are (vertically) linked to the
corresponding lexical concepts HEATHER and SING. In addition, the whole intran-
sitive construction Heather sings is also linked to the whole semantic structure SING
(HEATHER). The figure also shows the (horizontal) relationship between the syntac-
tic elements Heather and sings – i.e. the subject-predicate relationship. In the same
way, HEATHER and SING are related to each other through the predicate-argument
relationship.
Similarly, our scheme for semantic representation can be seen as mapping both the
individual word forms such as John and entire syntactic structure such as the double-
object dative, onto their semantic counterparts – lexical concepts and schemata. Thus
the schema, with its relevant roles related to other semantic components, constitutes
the semantic structure that corresponds to the entire construction.
Construction grammar also helps us understand the different kinds of relationships
between syntactic elements and semantic components. Just like HEATHER and SING
were connected through a predicate-argument relationship in the above example, our














Figure 5.2.5: [Heather sings] A construction grammar representation of the intransitive
sentence Heather sings. Horizontal dotted lines show relations (syntactic and seman-
tic) while vertical dotted lines show links. The vertical bold line shows the link between
the entire syntactic structure – the intransitive construction – and the entire seman-
tic structure – the predicate-argument construction. (Adapted from Croft and Cruse
(2004)).
example connects GIVE and JOHN through a similar predicate-argument relationship.
In a double object dative, the verb GIVE forms the predicate, because it is relational
– i.e. it presupposes another concept (Croft & Cruse, 2004). On the other hand the
subject (JOHN) does not presuppose another concept and therefore forms a filler. The
frame contributes a list of roles and the fillers link to these roles. In this manner the
different semantic components in an utterance connect to each other forming a cohesive
whole.
This comparison with construction grammar also highlights an assumption of our
representational scheme. We have assumed that verbs always contribute the frame
containing the roles while subjects and objects contribute the fillers that attach to these
roles. This special status of the verb in performing the functional assignment during
language production is not unique to our account and has some empirical justification.
Bock and Cutting (1992) showed that people make fewer agreement errors if utterances
are hierarchically organised, guided by requirements of verbs. Based on this data,
Bock and Levelt (1994) argued that verbs supply the argument structure that controls
the function assignment within a clause.
While this special status of verbs is simple to understand for datives (or transitives),
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which we intend to use for our simulations, construction grammar helps us see how
this scheme can be extended for more complex sentences. Croft and Cruse (2004)
pointed out that in an utterance such as You should read this article, the verb READ
is simultaneously a predicate and an argument. Our simple scheme does not have
the capability of representing such sentences, but can easily be extended using the
theory of Cognitive Grammar which allows a frame to become a filler in another frame
(Langacker, 1987).
There is another kind of relationship that is highlighted by construction grammar.
This is the relationship between different syntactic elements and the entire syntactic
construction. In the prepositional dative John gave the book to Mary, the words John,
book and Mary are nouns, but they bear different relationships to prepositional dative
construction. John serves the function of the subject, while book and Mary are the
first and second objects of the construction. Croft and Cruse (2004) pointed out that
this is the part-whole, or meronomic, relationship between each element and the whole
construction and contrasts with the syntactic relation between one element of the con-
struction – say, the subject – and another element – say, the verb. In our model, we
will stress the part-whole relationship and we will assume that this knowledge resides
within the grammar (a part that we do not implement).
Lastly, this frame-based semantic structure satisfies the requirement for being canon-
ical. The semantic structure for a prepositional dative consists of a frame with its roles
linked to the lexical concepts for the subject and objects of the utterance. Suppose that
these roles are P, Q and R and the lexical concepts are john, mary and book. Then the
semantic representation consists of the frame, VERB(P→ john, Q→ mary, R→ book).
This representation will be canonical if the double-object dative has the same semantic
representation. Indeed, the semantic representation does not contain any elements that
will be different for the two structures. The syntactic relationships within the word
forms should ensure that the roles P, Q and R are mapped to the same lexical concepts,
making the semantic representations for the PO and DO dative identical.
We have proposed a scheme of representing the semantic structure of an utterance
through mapping the syntactic elements into two kinds of semantic components. The
word forms are mapped onto lexical concepts, which can be implemented as patterns
of activity in the semantic space; the entire syntactic construction is mapped onto a
semantic structure which consists of a frame and contains roles that are, in turn, linked
to the lexical concepts. We have seen that this scheme allows us to obtain a canonical
representation which can be used as the output of a comprehension episode, or as the
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input of a production episode. We have also seen that this scheme is loosely related to
the formalisms of construction grammar, which allow us to ground this scheme into a
well established framework and provide the capability of expanding this scheme into
a more general representation for different types of linguistic utterances.
5.3 Computational Implementation
Equipped with the theoretical extensions presented in the last section, we are now
ready to extend our model from the previous chapter into a framework for studying
structural priming during comprehension and production. In this section, we will
present the architecture of the extended model, discuss its formal implementation, in-
troduce the processes required for implementing comprehension and production and
see how these processes can lead to structural priming.
§ 5.3.1 Network architecture
Before we lay out the architecture of the extended model, we will motivate the repre-
sentations of this model by looking at the kind of information processing it needs to
do. In Section 5.2.3, we stated that our computational system provides an interface
between a linguistic signal and a canonical representation. The linguistic signal lies in
the external environment; it is either produced by the computational system or needs
to be comprehended by it. The canonical representation lies inside the cognitive sys-
tem; it is either the product of comprehension or the origin of production. Both the
linguistic signal and the canonical representation are forms of information and as this
information flows through the computational system, it undergoes a transformation.
This transformation requires a number of intermediate steps, as information changes
from one representation to the other.
Consider the familiar example of comprehending the double object dative John
gave Mary the book. The input signal is the linguistic signal consisting of a sequence
of words. The system needs to look up each word in its memory and match it to a
lexical concept. Thus the system would search its memory for the word form John,
retrieving the corresponding concept JOHN, then Mary and so forth. While retrieving
these concepts, the system must somehow simultaneously also record what it retrieved
– i.e. as a result of the retrieval, the system must itself undergo a change. Changing
itself is important for the system because we are studying priming and we want to see
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how processing one utterance affects subsequent processing. The system must also
retrieve the grammatical structure for the utterance. We shall assume that the system
is given the syntactic function of each word. So the system must use this information
to retrieve, from its memory, the fact that the given sentence is a double object dative.
Again, as the system retrieves this information, it should undergo further learning so
that this episode of comprehension influences future episodes. Once the system has re-
trieved both the conceptual information and the structural information corresponding
to the input sentence, it must use this information to generate the required canonical
representation. We saw that this canonical representation consists of a schema along
with the bindings between the roles inherent in the schema and the concepts retrieved
by the system. Thus the system must retrieve a schema (corresponding to the relational
concept, GIVE) from the memory. This schema will present a list of arguments which
will form the roles that need to be attached to the concepts that were previously re-
trieved. The system should then use the grammatical structure that it retrieved earlier
to see how the roles should attach to the concepts and perform this binding. The bind-
ing of the schema and the lexical concepts forms the canonical representation that was
desired.
This example shows that the system needs to access three different kinds of memo-
ries: (i) a memory for lexical concepts, (ii) a memory for the structure of the utterance
and (iii) a memory for the schema for the entire construction. The memory for lexical
concepts and schemata is retrieved based on the input word forms and the memory for
structure is retrieved based on the input parts-of-speech. While we consider an exam-
ple of language comprehension, the same memory types can be used to perform the
reverse mapping from a canonical representation to a sequence of words during pro-
duction. Thus a chief architectural change from Model ® (presented on page 138) is
the inclusion of three kinds of representation layers – one for each of the above kinds
of memory – in place of the lexical and syntactic layers in Model ®.
Figure 5.3.1 shows the network architecture of the extended model. The three kinds
of memory are represented as three different representational layers. Each layer is
connected to both the other layers through a set of associative links. These associative
links are similar to the links between the lexical layer and syntactic layer in Model
® and serve as the short term memory of an utterance. The three representational
layers themselves retain long term syntactic, conceptual and schema memories. This
model does not implement the memory for the word forms themselves. Instead it
collapses the representation for word forms and lexical concepts, assuming each word









L = wi⊗ si
Figure 5.3.1: [Extended model] The system consists of three long term memory (LTM)
modules that represent syntax, lexical concepts and schema, through a distributed rep-
resentation scheme. Each pair of long term memories is associated with tensor-product
based short term memory modules. During each episode of comprehension or produc-
tion, the system performs a transformation between a linguistic signal L and a canonical
representation CR .
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form corresponds to one lexical concept. A similar simplifying assumption is made by
other models of language processing, such as Roelofs (1992, 1993).
It is instructive to understand this extended model from the perspective of informa-
tion processing during comprehension– i.e. how information gets transformed when it
passes from the environmental domain to the cognitive domain modelled by the net-
work. The linguistic signal, which we take to be a sequence of (syntactic-function
marked) words, is analysed into three different modules as it passes through the sys-
tem. Each of these modules matches a particular property of the signal with an in-
ternal long term memory of such properties. The syntax layer, for example, tries to
match the syntax of the linguistic signal with a long term memory of such a syntax.
Thus the model suggests that the process of understanding a linguistic signal involves
an analysing (or transforming) the linguistic signal into these three kinds of informa-
tion. Once this analysis has been achieved, the analysed information is then combined
through the associative links. The integration of the different forms of information
is the model’s memory of a linguistic episode. The memory of the surface form of
the episode is retained in the association between the syntactic and lexical layers (or
here, the lexical concepts layer). The memory of the content (or the semantics) of the
episode is retained in the association between the conceptual and schema layers. This
memory is nothing but the canonical representation of the linguistic signal. Thus, from
an information processing perspective, we can say that the role of the three modules of
long term memory is the analysis of information just as the role of the three associative
modules of short term memory is its integration.
The question now arises of how is a sequence of words analysed into these three
kinds of representations, or rather, who does this analysis. How can a sequence of
words be converted into a pattern of activity over syntactic, conceptual and schema
memories? There has to be a cognitive procedure that can convert such a signal into
each of these cognitive representations and vice-versa. This cognitive procedure will
have to learn how to perform this mapping and therefore it forms a developmental
account of learning language. Chang et al. (2006), for example, provided such a
developmental account that maps a sequence of words into an internal representation
for the syntax. This study does not intend to build such a developmental account and
instead assumes that this procedural knowledge is available in a given module. As
we did in the previous models, we concentrate on an adult subject who has already
acquired this procedural knowledge and is able to perform this mapping.
We make the distinction between a procedural learning that is required to map the
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linguistic signal into each of these representations and episodic learning that remem-
bers each of these representations once they have been invoked. While the procedural
knowledge is acquired over a period of time through the repeated presentation of data,
episodic knowledge is acquired as a result of a single presentation. Our extended
model performs such episodic learning and we are interested in investigating whether
this form of learning can explain patterns of structural priming.
§ 5.3.2 Formal Description
This section presents a formal description of the model’s properties. We describe how
the model represents the external input, how it represents internal information and how
it learns this information. We begin by describing the dynamics of the model, which
are closely related to the model’s learning. Then we discuss how the model forms
its internal representations and we describe some specific representations. Lastly, we
discuss how the model represents the input. Since we are studying both comprehension
and production, we deal with two kinds of inputs – the input during comprehension (i.e.
the linguistic signal) and the input during production (i.e. the canonical representation).
It is needless to say that this automatically ensures that we also represent the output.
The model consists of two kinds of memory modules – the long term memory
modules, which store the syntactic, conceptual and schema representations, and the
short term memory modules, which store the associations between these modules. We
call the former long term memory because this form of memory stores the long term
knowledge of syntactic constructions, lexical semantics and relational properties of
utterances. In contrast, the short term memory stores the transitory knowledge of how
each of these representations is associated in a particular episode of comprehension or
production. These two kinds of memories are implemented by different dynamical and
learning principles and we discuss each one in succession.
§ 5.3.2.1. Dynamics and Learning of LTM.— Each of the long term memory
modules is implemented using the network of excitatory and inhibitory nodes pre-
sented in Section 5.2.2.0. The dynamics of this system are given by the Equation
5.2.2 and the system learns the weights between nodes wi j via an unsupervised learn-
ing mechanism. We propose a learning algorithm that extends the Hebbian learning
mechanism presented in Equation 5.2.3:
wi j = k ·H (Ei−0.5M) ·H (E j−0.5M)
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This learning algorithm sets the weights between two active units to a constant
value k. H. R. Wilson (1999) used this mechanism to perform a single-shot (episodic)
learning of an input pattern. But since we are studying structural priming, we want this
learning algorithm to explain not just single-shot learning, but also how the memory of
linguistic representations changes during a discourse. We would like to explain (a) how
an episode of priming consolidates a pre-existing memory, and (b) how memory shows
a bias towards representations that have been activated more recently. To explain these
two phenomena, we change the Hebbian learning algorithm of Equation 5.2.3 in three
different ways:
• CUMULATIVE LEARNING. Experiments such as Kaschak and Borreggine (2008)
and Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) show that priming accumulates over a se-
ries of priming trials. These results cannot be explained by equation 5.2.3 (page
205) because this equation changes the weights after a single trial to a constant
value, k. Subsequent presentation of the same pattern will have no effect as the
equation would still keep the value of the weights constant at k. Instead, we
would like priming to accumulate over a series of trials. As we saw in the last
chapter, where we adjusted the input sensitivity, this cumulative effect can be
achieved through incremental learning – i.e. each episode increases the weights
by a small amount λ:
wT+1i j = w
T
i j +λ ·H (Ei−0.5M) ·H (E j−0.5M)
where wTi j is the connection weight between nodes i and j after trial T . This
equation says that if two nodes are activated during a trial, then their connection
weight will undergo a small increment λ, otherwise it will remain the same.
• BOUNDED WEIGHTS. The modification made for cumulative learning presents
the problem of unbounded growth of weights. When a pattern is repetitively pre-
sented, the connection strengths between active nodes will grow after each trial
in an unbounded manner. This unbounded growth of weights is a problem from
two perspectives. Firstly, it is physiologically implausible as synaptic weights
vary only within a limited range of values (Senn & Fusi, 2005). Secondly, un-
bounded weights in our excitatory and inhibitory network (equation 5.2.2) will
disturb the balance between excitation and inhibition causing excitation to dom-
inate. This dominant excitation would mean that activation would spread to the
entire network and the network will no longer display the stable equilibriums
5.3. Computational Implementation 221
required to encode memories. Therefore, in order to prevent this unbounded
growth of weights, we change the learning algorithm so that it stops to increase
weights above a particular bound:
wT+1i j = min(w
T
i j +λ ·H (Ei−0.5M) ·H (E j−0.5M), Wmax) (5.3.1)
where min(·) is a function such that min(x,y) is equal to the minimum of x and
y. This learning algorithm ensures that the connection weights do not increase
above an upper bound Wmax.
• RECENCY AND DECAY. Our last modification to the learning mechanism is to
accommodate the fact that as compared to more remote episodes of language
processing, recent episodes have a larger impact. This larger impact can be more
precisely characterised in terms of the size of each pattern’s domain of attraction.
If one pattern is presented more recently than the other, then the domain of at-
traction of the more recent pattern should be larger. A larger domain of attraction
ensures that the memory pertaining to the attractor will be retrieved for a larger
number of initial conditions. The domain of attraction of a particular memory
can be increased, in a convergent manner (Hertz et al., 1991), by increasing the
connection weights through Hebbian learning. But the bounded Hebbian learn-
ing algorithm in equation 5.3.1 means that most memories will quickly reach
the upper bound leaving no discrimination between recent and remote episodes.
Therefore, we need an explicit mechanism that changes the weights so that re-
mote memories have smaller weights as compared to recently activated memo-
ries. In other words, we would need to build in an explicit mechanism of decay
in memory. Because of the same arguments for the decay mechanism in the
previous chapter, we consider an exponential decay in memory:
wt+∆ti j = w
t
i j + exp
−∆t/τltm (5.3.2)
where wt+∆ti j is the weight at time t + ∆t and τltm is the time-constant for decay
in long term memory. Note that we use t to refer to time, whereas we used T
(uppercase) to refer to the trial in Equation 5.3.1. While learning occurs at the
end of every trial (T ), we assume decay occurs as a function of time (t). The
reason is that we would like to control the amount of decay as a function of the
number of fillers between prime and target and we will manipulate this distance
between prime and target by changing the duration of fillers.
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We also note that explicitly encoding decay is only one of the possible methods
of accounting for recency. Sikstrom (1999, 2002) showed that a learning rule
where weights are bounded and, crucially, the amount of learning depends on
the weight itself will lead to exponential decay. We chose not to use this learning
algorithm because we would like to dissociate learning regimes (priming trials)
from forgetting regimes (filler trials). Our algorithm achieves this dissociation
by the learning mechanism in equation 5.3.1 after priming trials and the decay
mechanism in Equation 5.3.2 during filler trials.
§ 5.3.2.2. Dynamics and Learning of STM.— Each pair of long term memory
modules are connected via a layer of short term memory. We will soon see that each
long term memory module represents information as a pattern of activity distributed
over the nodes. Thus each short term memory module needs to bind a pair of dis-
tributed representations. We saw above (Section 5.2.1.1) that such pair of distributed
representations can be bound using the tensor product.
Though the three short term memory modules represent three different associa-
tions, they are implemented using the same scheme. Consider two kinds of memories
Si and Xi. For the sake of illustration, let us say that Si is a syntactic memory and
Xi is the memory of a schema. Now using the representational notation used above
(originally in Smolensky (1990)), we can represent the connectionist representation
(ψ) of these two memories as Si and Xi, where Si = ψ(Si) and Xi = ψ(Xi). The short
term memory associating the syntax and schema representations can be found using
the tensor product of the two connectionist representations:
ψ(Si/Xi) = Si⊗Xi
The right hand side of this equation gives us a pattern (a tensor) of activations that can
be stored in the short term memory. This brings us to the question of how the short term
memory stores a given pattern of activation. More specifically, we would like to find
out how the short term memory combines the activity patterns that it has previously
stored with a new pattern. This is the problem of superimposing different bindings
in a memory. We saw that both the Holographic Reduced Representations and the
tensor-product binding superimpose activity patterns using mathematical summation.
Smolensky (1990) showed (and we reviewed in section 5.2.1.1) that summation leads
to memories that can be unbound using the inner product. We adopt this mechanism
of superposition of patterns to store a new pattern in a given short term memory. Thus,
for a set of n different syntax and schema patterns, we can calculate the short term













which says that the connectionist representation for the superposition of n associations
Si and Xi can be found using the sum of the tensor products of the connectionist repre-
sentation for each association.
Lastly, just like in the long term memory case, we would like to establish how
this short term memory changes with time. Our concept of short term memory as
the activation-based association between two representations is the same as the bind-
ing layer of Model ­ and ® is the previous chapter. We saw that the binding nodes in
Model ­ and ® remained active for a short period of time and then decayed catastroph-
ically. We used this behaviour to explain the difference in the longevities of structural
priming and lexical boost.
While implementing the decay characteristics of the short term memories in the
extended model, we keep in mind this difference in longevities of the two kinds of
memories. We can actually use the same computational implementation of the short
term memory as used in Model ­ and ® – i.e. mutually excitatory nodes (Figure 4.4.2
on page 127). However, in order to avoid computational complexity, we implement





where ai is the activation of the i-th node and τstm is the rate of decay of the activation.
We will set the value of τstm to be much smaller than τltm above, making the rate of
decay in short term memory much faster than that of long term memory. This fast
decay effectively mimics the short term catastrophic decay in binding nodes that we
saw in model ®.
§ 5.3.2.3. Representations.— Now that we have formally described the computa-
tional level of the model, let us shift our attentional to the representational level and see
how the model represents different kinds of symbolic structures. The model deals with
the following symbolic structures: the linguistic input (L) which consists of the word
forms (wi) and the syntactic categories or elements (si) associated with these word
forms; the whole syntactic constructions (S) which bear the part-whole relationship to
its syntactic elements; the schema (X) invoked by a predicate and the roles (argi) that
form the arguments of the schema; the concepts (ci); and the canonical representation
CR formed by associating roles with concepts.
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Our goal is to specify a mapping ψ that takes each of these symbolic structures
to a pattern that can be represented in a connectionist network. Following Smolensky
(1990) we assume that this pattern is a vector of activity states of the connectionist
network. Therefore ψ is a mapping from a symbol space to a vector space. We will also
assume that the mapping ψ is such that the vector obtained is sparse and normalised.
The sparseness of the vector ensures that the overlap between different patterns is
minimised and the normalisation ensures that different signals have the same power.
First let us look at the syntax layer which needs to represent the syntactic con-
struction S. This syntactic construction is composed of a list of syntactic elements
si. We can represent each syntactic element as a vector si, so that si = ψ(si). Once
we have the connectionist representation for the syntactic elements, we can build the
entire syntactic construction using these elements and a knowledge of what relation ri
each syntactic element bears to the whole syntactic construction. This step of assem-
bling a syntactic construction from a list of syntactic elements and their (part-whole)
relationship to the construction is equivalent to the step of ‘constituent assembly’ in
traditional models of language production (Chapter 2, page 22). The only part-whole
relationship we implement in our model is the position of different syntactic elements
in the syntactic construction. For example, in the DO dative construction the indirect
object of the verb comes immediately after the verb and this knowledge resides in the
grammar, from where it is retrieved and encoded into the relation ri. A more elabo-
rate model can replace this method of associating syntactic elements directly to their
positions by an incremental grammar that determines a hierarchical constituent struc-
ture and orders syntactic elements in different positions based on this structure. In our
model, we built a syntactic construction by associating each syntactic element with its
position and superimposing these associations. This operation of associating vectors
is a familiar one and can be performed by the tensor-product binding:
S = ∑si⊗ ri
where ri = ψ(ri) and S = ψ(S) are the vectors representing the (positional) relation
and the syntactic construction respectively.
The representational scheme of the syntax layer are quite similar to that of the
schema layer. Where the syntax layer has syntactic elements, the schema layer has
roles in the schema. Each role argi can be represented by the vector argi, by perform-
ing the mapping argi = ψ(argi). Just like we assumed that different syntactic elements
had a part-whole relationship with the syntactic construction, we also assume that the
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different roles in a schema have a part-whole relationship in the schema. This part-
whole relationship is encoded by posi, the position of the role in the schema. Again,
our notion of this part-whole relationship is very simplistic and a grammatical formal-
ism like Cognitive Grammar can be used to expand on this relationship. However,
given this simplistic notion of the relation of a role to the whole schema, we can state
the connectionist representation of the whole schema as:
X = ∑argi⊗posi
where posi = ψ(posi) and X = ψ(X).
Finally, the linguistic signal is an association between the list of words and syntac-
tic elements, while the canonical representation is an association between the roles of
a schema and concepts:
L = ∑wi⊗ si
CR = ∑argi⊗ ci
where wi = ψ(wi) and ci = ψ(ci) are the connectionist representations for a word and
a concept respectively.
These representations provide the information structures that can be processed by
the algorithms on our extended model. The representational scheme also clarifies
where the system relies on a procedural knowledge that we assume to be available
to the system at the outset. This is the knowledge encoded in the mapping ψ which
maps a symbolic structure to a vector of activity states. The system also assumes
the availability of grammatical knowledge encoded by the two structures, ri and posi
which encode the part-whole relationships for syntactic and schema constructions. As
the system processes information during comprehension and production, it will manip-
ulate the different information structures that we discussed above, but the procedural
as well as the grammatical knowledge will stay the same.
§ 5.3.3 Comprehension and Production
Let us now look at how the network performs the procedures of comprehension and
production. Both procedures can be seen as a flow of information through the different
memory modules. After describing the step-by-step flow of information, we discuss
the overlap between the two procedures and give and example to illustrate this over-
lap. In each direction of information processing, we will see that information is first
analysed – i.e. broken down – and then integrated – i.e. combined.
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§ 5.3.3.1. Comprehension.— The system comprehends by simulating each of the
three memory modules in response to an input sequence of words and generates a
canonical representation for this sequence as a result. We can describe comprehen-
sion as a transformation from a set of words and their syntactic functions (L) to the
canonical representation (CR ) through the following sequence of steps:
Step 1 Determine the concepts. Each input signal consists of a list of words. These
words will give a word form vector, obtained by applying the mapping ψ. We
also assume that each word form corresponds to a concept. Therefore, each word
in the input signal provides a direct mapping onto a conceptual pattern.
Step 2 Determine the syntactic elements. The input signal gives a list of syntactic
functions corresponding to each word. Again using the mapping ψ, obtain a

















Figure 5.3.2: [Comprehension] The edges label the order in which information
flows during comprehension. The forward pass is shown using bold lines while
the backward pass is shown using the dashed line.
Step 3 Determine the schema. The word associated with the syntactic function verb
will provide the key to determine this vector.
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Step 4 Assemble syntactic elements into a syntactic construction. Calculate the syn-
tactic pattern of the entire syntactic construction by binding the patterns for all
the syntactic elements.
Step 5 Simulate the syntactic, conceptual and schema memories and learn the input
patterns. Steps one to four provide the patterns required as cues for each mem-
ory module. Using these cues retrieve a memory. The process of retrieval will
automatically lead to learning.
Step 6 Bind syntax and schema. Calculate the binding between syntactic and schema
patterns and store this binding in the STM module associating the two layers.
Step 7 Determine a concept for each role. Determine the roles of the schema and
use the binding between the schema and syntactic construction to determine the
syntactic function associated with each role. Then, use these syntactic functions
to determine the word forms associated with each role. Lastly, use these word
forms to determine the lexical concepts associated with the roles.
Step 8 Bind roles and concepts. Calculate the binding between the lexical concepts
and roles and store this binding in the STM module associating the conceptual
and schema layers.
We can think of comprehension as proceeding in two passes: a forward pass in-
volving steps one to six and a backward pass involving steps seven and eight. During
the forward pass input signal is broken down into three kinds of representations (syn-
tactic, conceptual and schematic) and each of these representations is stored in the
respective memory module. Also, during this pass, the syntactic pattern is associated
with the conceptual and schema patterns and stored in the short term memory links.
Once this has been done, the backward pass begins. The schema representation is
broken down to obtain the roles and the system moves backwards through the layers,
using the schema to obtain the syntactic construction, using the syntactic construction
to obtain the syntactic elements, using the syntactic elements to obtain the associated
word forms and using the word forms to finally obtain the lexical concepts. These
lexical concepts can then be bound to the roles to obtain the canonical representation
and end the process of comprehension. Figure 5.3.2 shows this forward and backward
flow of information. It also shows that, in general, the process of comprehension can
be seen as moving from a syntactic configuration to a canonical representation.
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Let us describe each of these processes more precisely and formally. The input to
the system consists of the binding between a list of word forms wi and their associated




where L is the (linguistic) input. The system then uses the syntactic elements to to ob-
tain the representation of the entire syntactic construction. This step requires the sys-
tem to know the relation of each syntactic element to the whole syntactic construction.
We saw in Section 5.2.3 that this meronomic knowledge resides inside the grammar,
which we assume is available to us through a lookup table. The grammar contributes
a list of relations ri which the system binds to each of the syntactic elements to obtain




where S is the representation of the whole syntactic construction. The system also
uses each of the word forms to obtain the concepts ci. Finally, the system uses the verb
to obtain the schema X. Again, we use a lookup table to perform this mapping. But
ideally this process will be implemented by a feedforward network that can remember
the association between the word form of a verb and the pattern of a schema.
The structures S, X and ci are stored, through Hebbian learning (Equation 5.3.1),
in the long term syntactic, schema and conceptual memories respectively. The system
also calculates the binding
B = S⊗X
and stores it in the short term memory linking syntactic and schema layers. This fin-
ishes the forward pass.
During the backward pass, the system first needs to obtain the roles in the schema
X. We saw above that we represent the schema as the binding of different roles argi
and their positions posi. Thus we can obtain each role from the schema X through the
process of unbinding:
argi = X⊗pos−1i
where the unbinding operation is shown using the notation of the tensor product be-
tween a memory and the inverse of the given vector. As we saw in section 5.2.1.1 (page
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201), this unbinding operation can be implemented through the inner product between
the memory and the input. Next, we need to find the lexical concept that should be





w′i = L⊗ s′−1i
(5.3.4)
where S′, s′i and w′i denotes the syntactic construction, syntactic elements and word
forms respectively, retrieved through unbinding. These word forms can then be used
to obtain the corresponding lexical concept c′i, for each role argi. The system binds
each role with the retrieved concept giving us the required canonical representation
and thus bringing the comprehension process to an end:
CR = argi⊗ c′i
§ 5.3.3.2. Production.— Production is the reverse mapping, from a canonical rep-
resentation to a set of words and their syntactic functions – i.e. we are given a binding
between roles and concepts and we want to obtain a set of words tagged with their syn-
tactic function. To make things simpler, we assume that the system is given a schema
and a list of concepts, which saves the step for unbinding the roles and concepts. The
system follows the following steps during production:
Step 1 Simulate the schema and conceptual memories and learn these patterns.
Step 2 Retrieve the short term memory that links syntactic and schema layers.
Step 3 Unbind a syntactic construction. Determine a cue for retrieving syntactic mem-
ory by unbinding a syntactic pattern from the short term memory and the schema
pattern.
Step 4 Recall syntax. Use the cue to retrieve a syntactic construction from the long
term syntactic memory.
Step 5 Bind syntax and schema. Calculate the binding between the retrieved syntac-
tic construction and the given schema pattern. Update the short term memory
linking syntactic and schema modules with this binding.
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Step 6 Determine syntactic elements that can express the roles. Again, using the
schema patterns and the (updated) binding between schema and syntactic pat-
tern, determine the syntactic construction. Unbind different syntactic elements
from the syntactic construction and use this to construct a list of syntactic func-
tions.
Step 7 Determine words. Use the input list of lexical concepts to determine a list of
word forms.
Step 8 Pair the list of syntactic functions (from step 6) and word forms (from step 7)
















Figure 5.3.3: [Production] This figure shows the flow of information from a canonical
representation to a linguistic signal. Pass one is shown using bold lines and the Pass
two is shown using dashed lines.
Just like the comprehension procedure, production operates in two passes. How-
ever, unlike comprehension, both these passes are in the forward direction (from canon-
ical representation to linguistic signal) and so we call them pass one and pass two. Pass
one includes steps one to five and just like the forward pass of comprehension involves
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simulating the three kinds of memory and obtaining a syntactic construction that cor-
responds to the given canonical representation. Pass two includes steps six, seven and
eight. This pass, not unlike the backward pass during comprehension, uses the patterns
across different memory modules to bind word forms to syntactic elements.
Using the same notation as the one presented during the discussion of comprehen-
sion, we can see production as the process of retrieving a list of words wi and a related
set of syntactic elements si. This process starts with determining a list of word forms
wi for the given list of concepts ci. Next the system determines a syntactic construction
S, linked to the given schema via the unbinding operation
S = B⊗X−1
This syntactic construction is used as a cue for syntactic memory. The result of the re-
trieval is stored in the pattern S′ and used to calculate a new binding between syntactic
and schema layers, B′. The reason for updating the binding in the short term memory
is that the result of the retrieval from syntactic memory might not be the one that is
predicted by the tensor binding. Our framework assumes that the syntactic memory
is retrieved based on a number of different factors and that the input from the asso-
ciation between syntax and schema memories is only one of them. We can simulate
these different factors by assuming that retrieval from the syntactic memory is noisy
and we explicitly introduce random noise in the cue for syntactic retrieval. Since the
syntactic construction retrieved might not match the results of the unbinding, it be-
comes necessary to update the binding between schema and (a possibly new) syntactic
construction. Later, when the system tries to determine the syntactic elements for the
given list of roles, this updated binding will be used. This completes pass one.
The second pass uses the result of the memory simulations made during pass one
to calculate the sequence of information structures required to obtain the matched list
of words and syntactic elements:
S′′ = B′⊗X−1
si = S′′⊗ r−1i
L = si⊗wi
(5.3.5)
where ri is the list of relations in the syntactic construction obtained from the grammar
and L is the (linguistic) output this time around. Figure 5.3.3 shows the flow of infor-
mation during production, labelled with the different information structures generated
along the path.
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§ 5.3.3.3. Overlap between Comprehension and Production.— Having formally
characterised the processes of comprehension and production, we can now look at how
comprehension and production overlap. We would like to see what micro-processes
and representations are common between the two procedures and how flow of infor-
mation during comprehension can lead to priming during production.
Our first observation is that both comprehension and production are characterised
by the flow of information in the same memory modules. Rather than characterise
comprehension and production as mutually exclusive procedures that rely on the men-
tal lexicon, we describe both these processes as a set of transformations between three
kinds of representations – syntactic, conceptual and schematic. This means that learn-
ing in any of these memories during one of these procedures will affect the correspond-
ing memory retrieval during the other. Specifically, step five during comprehension re-
quires the syntactic memory to learn an input syntactic construction. Thus an episode
of comprehension will change the configuration (the weight matrix) of the syntactic
memory module. During a subsequent episode of production, at step four, the system
retrieves a syntactic memory corresponding to a cue. This retrieval depends on the
internal configuration of syntactic memory and therefore starts to depend on the syn-
tax of the construction during the comprehension episode, making comprehension and
production entangled.
Besides this overlap in the memory modules, the micro-processes of comprehen-
sion and production also overlap. One can see this by comparing equations 5.3.4
and 5.3.5, which describe the backward pass of comprehension and pass two of pro-
duction, respectively. The first two steps in each of these equations are identical:
S = B⊗X−1; si = S⊗r−1i . These steps describe the process of transforming a schema
pattern into a set of syntactic elements. The production process performs these trans-
formations because it needs to express a set of concepts in a syntactic configuration.
These steps give the system the syntactic elements to associate with each concept. The
comprehension process performs these transformation because it needs to find a match
between the roles of the schema and the concepts expressed in the input utterance.
These steps give the system the syntactic configuration of the roles in the utterance,
using which the roles can be mapped to the correct concepts in the utterance.
Let us consider an example to illustrate this overlap in the micro-processes of
comprehension and production. Let us say the speaker wants to express the schema
of GIVING such that JOHN is the GIVER, MARY is the RECEIVER and BOOK is the
OBJECT GIVEN. This is an episode of production and Equation 5.3.5 requires the sys-
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tem to determine the syntactic construction corresponding to the schema of GIVING.
Let us say that because of the way the memory is ‘wired up’, the result of the un-
binding is a double object dative. The second step in the equation is to determine the
syntactic elements corresponding to the double object dative. The unbinding procedure
will show that these are <Subject><Verb><Object 1><Object 2>. The system can
now use these syntactic elements to map the GIVER to the <Subject>, the RECEIVER
to <Object 1> and the OBJECT GIVEN to <Object 2>.7
Similarly consider a comprehension episode where the system has to comprehend
the input John <Subject> gave <Verb> Mary <Object 1> the book <Object 2 >.
Equation 5.3.4 suggests that the system can determine the concepts that should bind
to the roles in the GIVING schema by first determining the syntactic construction to
which this schema is bound. This unbinding should give the double object dative as the
schema has just been bound to this syntactic construction during the forward pass. The
second step is to determine the syntactic elements in the double object dative through
the unbinding procedure. These syntactic elements are <Subject><Verb><Object
1><Object 2>. The system can now retrieve the word forms (and eventually the
lexical concepts) linked to each of these syntactic elements and use these to bind to the
roles of the GIVING schema.
We see that both comprehension and production rely on the same processes of first
unbinding the syntactic construction from a schema and then unbinding the constituent
syntactic elements from a syntactic construction. Both processes start with the schema
GIVING and retrieve the list of syntactic elements <Subject><Verb><Object 1><Ob-
ject 2>. This means that the backward pass of comprehension can be viewed as the
production process of retrieving syntactic elements to express the given schema. The
model suggests that comprehension implicitly involves production. More precisely,
the information flow during comprehension and production overlaps.
5.4 Simulation and Results
We are now ready to test the behaviour of our extended model. So far in this
chapter, we have proposed a scheme for information processing during language com-
prehension and production. This scheme describes each of these procedures as a set
7Had the memory suggested that the system use a prepositional dative instead, the second step
would have given the syntactic elements <Subject><Verb><Object 2><pp><Object 1>, mapping
the RECEIVER to <Object 2> and OBJECT GIVEN to <Object 1>, reversing the order of MARY and
BOOK.
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of transformations converting information structures back and forth between syntactic,
conceptual and schema modules. In this section, we would like to test whether this
scheme of information representation can explain the patterns of structural priming.
We divide this section into three subsections, each of which tests a particular property
of structural priming. First we test whether the system shows any structural priming
and lexical enhancement of this priming. Then we test whether structural priming ac-
cumulates over a set of trials. In the end, we test how long structural priming and its
lexical enhancement persist. Each of these examinations is matched with an exper-
imental study and we present a comparison of the results of the experiment and the
simulation.
§ 5.4.1 Priming and lexical boost
As our first goal, we examine whether the model shows any structural priming and
lexical boost. We simulate the model under the experimental set-up of Pickering and
Branigan (1998) who found that subjects show structural priming from comprehen-
sion to production during a sentence completion task. They also found that structural
priming is stronger when the verb is repeated between prime and target.
§ 5.4.1.1. Experiment Design.— Unlike a psychological experiment, where hu-
man subjects walk into the experiment room, equipped with their knowledge of lan-
guage and memory of linguistic episodes, a simulation is conducted on a model whose
epistemic characteristics are strictly controlled by the modeller. In order to make a
direct comparison between the results of the experiment and the simulation, the model
must make its relevant knowledge comparable to that of the human subject, before
the testing begins. For this reason, the simulation on the model is conducted in two
phases. The first phase consists purely of comprehension trials and presents the model
with each syntactic construction, schema and concept in the stimuli. These trials give
the model a long term memory of each of these items. In the absence of such long
term memories, we cannot measure structural priming because the linguistic selection
made by the model might be based on the lack of a linguistic alternatives rather than
an assumed choice between alternatives. For example, we cannot test a (hypotheti-
cal) subject for structural priming between a PO and DO if the subject has never come
across a PO before. While psychological experiments assume such linguistic com-
petence by, for example, choosing only native speakers of a particular language, the
model avoids this possibility by presenting each possible linguistic structure during the
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first phase of the simulation. We call this phase the acquisition phase.
The second phase of the experiment is the testing phase and presents the model
with a sequence of comprehension and production trials. The results of this phase can
be directly compared against the experimental findings and therefore, the design of this
phase of the simulation must match the design of the experiment. Mirroring Pickering
and Branigan (1998), each testing phase contained a list of 32 items each consisting
of a comprehension trial followed by a production trial. Each comprehension trial
provided the model with a linguistic signal (L) – i.e. a sequence of pairs of words
and their syntactic function – which could be in either a PO or a DO construction.
The production trial provided the model a canonical representation – i.e. a schema
(consisting of a list of roles) and a matching list of concepts – which could again be
expressed as either a PO or the DO. Each production trial could follow either a PO
prime (comprehension trial) or a DO prime.
In addition, the schema used during the production trial could either be the same
as the verb used during the comprehension trial, or be different. Thus there were four
different priming conditions: PO-Same, PO-Different, DO-Same and DO-Different.
The testing phase chose eight items under each of the four conditions to give the list
of 32 items. The order of the priming conditions was randomized and the verbs were
also randomly chosen from a list of six verbs8. The input to the model came from an
experiment file, which presented a sequence of comprehension and production trials
that the model simulated. Figure 5.4.1 shows a fragment of such an experiment file
used during a testing phase.
The model was simulated for thirty different subjects. Each subject differed from
the other in the acquisition phase which randomised the order in which different stimuli
were provided and inserted a random delay at the end of the acquisition phase. This
random delay means that different subjects had a variable memory for each of the
linguistic constructs. Each subject also received a different list of trials during the
testing phase. Each list was randomly constructed under the constraints mentioned
above.
The model wrote the output of each trial to two output files. Each comprehension
trial resulted in a list of matched concepts and roles (i.e. CR ) which was written to a
comprehension file and each production trial gave a matched list of words and syntactic
functions (i.e. L) which was written to a production file. Figure 5.4.2 shows a segment
from a production file for a particular subject.
8give, send, hand, show, make and sell




c<: mary <nn1do> sent <verbdo>
matt <nn2do> book <nn3do>
f-: 50




Figure 5.4.1: [Experiment file] Fragment of a file used to test the model. The first
character of each line indicates the type of trial (comprehension, production or filler).
Thus, the solid box shows a linguistic signal (L) while the dashed box shows a canonical
representation (CR ). Filler trials show the duration of the filler, comprehension trials
show a list of word forms and their associated syntactic function and production trials
show a list of concepts and the schema. The tags <nn1do> refers to the subject,
<nn2do> refers to the first object and <nn3do> refers to the second object for the DO
trial.
The simulations also fixed the free parameters of the model to realistic values.
These free parameters included the variables for controlling the rate of learning and
forgetting. The parameters for learning in long term memory were the learning rate λ
(Equation 5.3.1) and the upper bound of the connection weights Wmax. These variables
control how memory accumulates over a series of trials. On one extreme, if the rate
of learning is the same as the upper bound on weights, then the model learns quickly
but since the connections achieve their maximum weight after a single trial, there is no
cumulative effect of learning. In the other extreme, if λ is much smaller than Wmax, then
the model learns very slowly and the cumulative effect stretches back into the remote
past. Thus, what is important is not the absolute value for each of these variables, but
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JOHN <nn1> SELL <ver> MARY <nn2> DRSS <nn3>
MATT <nn1> HAND <ver> JOHN <nn3> SEAT <nn2>
MARY <nn1> GIVE <ver> MATT <nn3> BOOK <nn2>
MATT <nn1> SHOW <ver> JOHN <nn2> SEAT <nn3>
JOHN <nn1> SELL <ver> MARY <nn3> DRSS <nn2>
Figure 5.4.2: [Production file] Fragment from a production file generated by the model.
Each line shows a string of words along with their syntactic function. The last line is a
PO utterance John sold the dress to Mary while the second last line is a DO utterance
Matt showed John the seat.
how one is related to the other. We chose Wmax = 4λ so that (in the absence of decay)
learning accumulated for four successive trials before saturation.
The parameters related to forgetting are the rate of decay in long term memory τltm
(Equation 5.3.2) and the rate of decay in short term memory τstm (Equation 5.3.3). In
the current set of simulations, we assumed the hypothesis that the lexical enhancement
of structural priming is a short-lived phenomenon (Hartsuiker et al., 2008) while struc-
tural priming itself persists for a much longer time (Bock & Griffin, 2000). Thus we
fixed τstm << τltm. Since the simulation tested for lexical enhancement from the prime
to the target, the duration of filler between prime and target was set to 0.5τstm and the
duration of filler between two consecutive items was set to τstm. These values were
chosen so that there was influence from the short term memory on the selection of a
target after a prime, but this influence decreased between two consecutive items.
§ 5.4.1.2. Results and Analysis.— The results were accumulated in an identical
manner to Pickering and Branigan (1998). For each subject, we counted the number
of PO productions following a PO prime, the number of PO production following a
DO prime, the number of DO productions following a DO prime and the number of DO
production following a PO prime. Next, we calculated the proportion of PO and DO
responses following the PO prime condition and similarly for the DO prime condition.
As noted by Pickering and Branigan (1998), this gives us the conditional probability of
each kind of response following each kind of prime. We also divided the results based
on whether the verb was repeated between the prime and target (Same-verb condition)
or prime and target used different verbs (Different-verb condition).
The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 5.4.3. The dependent variable










































































Figure 5.4.3: [Results] The dependent variable is the proportion of times a particular
syntactic construction was produced for both types of primes. (a) Shows the results
from the original study (experiment 1) conducted by Pickering and Branigan (1998). (b)
Shows overall proportions of PO and DO responses for each kind of prime. (c) Shows
the Same-verb condition – i.e. the comprehension and production trials used the same
verb. (d) Shows Different-verb condition.
is the proportion of a particular syntactic construction following each kind of prime.
The results are divided into the Same-verb and Different-verb conditions and each plot
shows the proportion of PO and DO productions following a PO or DO prime.
§ 5.4.1.3. Discussion.— The results in Figure 5.4.3 show that the model is more
likely to produce a PO after hearing a PO prime (79% of times) as compared to a DO
prime (20% of times) – i.e. it shows structural priming. Furthermore, it also shows a
larger amount of priming under the Same-verb condition as compared to the Different-
verb condition. For example, the difference between the PO and DO targets after
hearing a PO prime increases from 37% in the Different-verb condition to 74% in
the Same-verb condition. Thus, the model also replicates the results of lexical boost
shown by Pickering and Branigan (1998).
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In Section 5.3.3 we looked at a scheme for comprehension and production that
shows an overlap in the micro-processes and representations of the two procedures.
The results of the current simulation show that this scheme for linguistic processing
is sufficient to explain the results of structural priming and lexical boost. In particu-
lar these results show that an episodic unsupervised learning mechanism can lead to
structural priming. It also suggests that lexical boost could be due to the (short term)
association between the syntax and schema structures of a construction.
§ 5.4.2 Cumulative structural priming
Having established that our framework for linguistic processing is capable of show-
ing structural priming, we would like to investigate whether the given mechanism of
learning can account for the cumulative properties of structural priming. Kaschak and
Borreggine (2008) and Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) both showed a “long term”
effect of priming where priming accumulates over a series of priming trials. To pre-
serve continuity with our analysis of model ®, we tested the extended model for the
stimuli developed by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) and examined the effect of a
sequence of priming trials on selection of a syntactic construction.
§ 5.4.2.1. Experiment Design.— The above experiment design for testing struc-
tural priming and lexical boost (Section 5.4.1.0) is augmented to include three phases
in place of two. The first phase, where the model learns the long term memories for all
possible stimuli (acquisition phase) remains the same. The testing phase is split into
two: a training phase, which corresponds to the bias phase in Kaschak and Borreggine
(2008) and a testing phase, which corresponds to the priming phase in their experi-
ments. The definition of the training and testing phases are same as those employed
for testing model ® in the previous chapter (Figure 4.5.5 on page 151).
The experiments designed by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) varied the kind of
cumulative priming a subject received during a sequence of comprehension trials (the
training phase) and examined the effects this training had on the short term priming (i.e.
when target immediately follows prime) during a subsequent testing phase. Replicating
their design, the model received a list of 10 consecutive comprehension trials (primes),
each of which is either a PO construction or a DO construction. This list could contain
either an equal number of PO and DO trials, called the Equal condition or an unequal
number of PO and DO trials, called the Unequal condition. When the model received
an unequal number of POs and DOs, all constructions were of the same type – i.e. only
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POs or only DOs. This list of comprehension trials used verbs that were all drawn
from one of two sets. The first set contained the verbs give and sell and the second set
contained the verbs send and hand.
After presentation of the 10 comprehension trials, the model began its testing phase
during which it was presented a list of 6 pairs of comprehension and production trials.
All the comprehension trials in a list were either all POs or all DOs. All the verbs for
each list were selected from one of the two sets mentioned above and each production
trial used the same verb as the comprehension trial.
Thus each production trial made its syntactic decision based on the following con-
ditions: (i) Equal/Unequal primes in training, (ii) PO/DO comprehension trial; (iii) Set
1/Set 2 used during training and (iv) Same/Different sets of verbs in training and test-
ing. Based on these four different variables, a subject could belong to one of sixteen
different conditions (2×2×2×2). The simulation was run for 64 different subjects, so
that there were four subjects under each condition. To run a simulation, we constructed
the stimuli files for each of the three phases and the model generated comprehension
and production files for the testing phase, which were analysed to obtain the results.
A sample file for the testing phase for a particular subject is shown in Figure 5.4.4 (a
similar file was also created for the training phase). From this file, we can see that
the subject received six groups of comprehension-filler-production sequences. Each
comprehension trial was a DO construction and picked the verb from the set {send,
hand}. This testing phase could have followed a training phase with either an equal
number of PO and DO primes (Equal condition), or a training phase with only PO
primes (Unequal condition). The training phase could not have been only DO primes
because the testing phase always uses the opposite construction for training and testing
phases under the Unequal condition.
The last step in the experiment design requires a specification of the free parameters
of the model. The duration of of fillers between prime and target and the duration of
filler between two consecutive trials during the testing phase were both set to τstm.
Note that we increase the duration of filler between prime and target. This is done to
reduce the lexical boost effect to a certain extent as this setup always repeats the verb
between comprehension and production trials leading to a large amount of priming.
All other parameters are kept at the same values as the first simulation.
§ 5.4.2.2. Results and Analysis.— We collected the data in a manner similar to the
first simulation. We calculated the proportion of POs and DOs produced in response
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c<: matt <nn1do> sent <verbdo> john <nn2do> book <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: matt handed john book HAND
f-: 50
c<: mary <nn1do> handed <verbdo> matt <nn2do> seat <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: mary sent matt seat SEND
f-: 50
c<: john <nn1do> sent <verbdo> mary <nn2do> dress <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: john handed mary dress HAND
f-: 50
c<: matt <nn1do> handed <verbdo> john <nn2do> book <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: matt sent john book SEND
f-: 50
c<: mary <nn1do> sent <verbdo> matt <nn2do> seat <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: mary handed matt seat HAND
f-: 50
c<: john <nn1do> handed <verbdo> mary <nn2do> dress <nn3do>
f-: 250
p>: john sent mary dress SEND
Figure 5.4.4: [Testing file] A sample file used for the testing phase while simulating
Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). Each line stands for a trial. Lines beginning with c<:
show comprehension trials and consist of the linguistic signal L (list of words and their
syntactic function), while lines beginning with p>: show production trial and consist of
a canonical representation CR (list of concepts and a schema).
to a PO or DO prime. In this case we also classified these proportions according to the
cumulative priming that the model underwent during the priming phase – i.e. whether
it received Equal or Unequal number of primes. Lastly, the results were classified by
whether the model received the verbs from the same or different sets during training
and testing phases – i.e. the Same-verb or Different-verb condition. We would like to
point out that the Same/Different-verb conditions in these results differs from that in
the previous simulation, where Same/Different-verb condition meant whether the verb
is repeated between a prime and a target. Here, the verb is always repeated between a
prime and the target. However, the verbs can be drawn from the same or different sets
during the training and testing. Since we are interested in whether an overlap in verbs
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affects the cumulative nature of priming, the Same/Different conditions here refer to
this overlap in verbs during training and testing phases.





















































Figure 5.4.5: [Results] The results for Experiment 1 from Kaschak and Borreggine
(2008): (a) Simulation results (Same-verb condition); (b) Simulation results (Different-
verb condition); (c) Original results from Kaschak and Borreggine (2008). In each case,
x axis shows the priming condition and the y axis shows the proportion of each syntactic
construction (normalised between 0 and 1).
We present the results of the simulation in Figure 5.4.5(a) and 5.4.5(b). Each plot in
the figure shows the (cumulative) priming condition along the x-axis and the proportion
of each syntactic construction under each priming condition along the y-axis. Results
can be compared both to the experimental study conducted by Kaschak and Borreggine
(2008) (Figure 5.4.5(c)) and the results of presenting the same stimuli to Model ® in
the previous chapter (Figure 4.5.8 on page 157).
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§ 5.4.2.3. Discussion.— A comparison of the results of the simulation with the
results obtained by Kaschak and Borreggine (2008) reveals a striking similarity. Under
the Equal condition, both the experimental study and the simulation show large priming
– i.e. when the model is trained on equal number of POs and DOs, it shows a large
structural priming during testing. However, this priming is substantially reduced under
the Unequal condition, when the model is trained on one kind of syntactic structure,
but tested for another structure. Thus priming between comprehension and production
during the testing phase shows influence of the sequence of primes during the testing
phase. In other words, priming shows a cumulative effect.
The reader may recall that we implemented learning using a modification of the
Hebbian learning algorithm with incremental adjustment for each episode and an up-
per bound on the weights. The results of this simulation show that such an algorithm
can explain the cumulative effect of structural priming. Each priming episode activates
a long term memory. The more priming episodes that one encounters, the more this
memory is consolidated (with an upper bound). During production, the system makes
syntactic decisions governed by a systematic analysis and integration of information
structures. This analysis and integration of information relies crucially on these long
term memories. Since these long term memories have accumulated information from
past episodes, the structural decisions made during production show a cumulative ef-
fect and come to rely on the sequence of primes.
These results also show similar difference in Equal and Unequal conditions whether
or not the verbs are drawn from same or different sets during training and testing
(Same/Different verb conditions). Not unlike the simulations on Model ®, these sim-
ulations show that the lack of long term lexical enhancement of priming can be ac-
counted using a model where priming and lexical influence on this priming rely on
two different kind of memory systems. In the current model, the lexical enhancement
of priming comes from the tensor-product memory that binds syntax and schema lay-
ers. Since we have proposed that this binding only exists for a short period of time (and
hence implemented it using a short term memory mechanism), it is not surprising that
the training phase shows no long term effect of overlapping verbs on testing phase.
Furthermore, we can vary the parameters of the model in order to see how internal
processes affect the system behaviour. We have concluded that the reduced priming
under the Unequal condition (as compared to the Equal condition) is a consequence of
the cumulative long term learning in the syntactic layer. We discussed at the beginning
of this section that the this long term learning can be controlled using the learning rate
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λ (equation 5.3.1 on page 5.3.1). Up till now, we had fixed λ such that Wmax = 4λ. This
meant that after four consecutive trials of the same type, the weights saturated and the
memory did not accumulate any further information. If this is true, then decreasing λ
in proportion to Wmax should increase the cumulative effect of the sequence of (ten)
prime trials during the training phase. On the other hand, increasing λ should have the
opposite effect – i.e. the priming should start to depend on more recent trials.

























(a) λ = 17Wmax

























(b) λ = 12Wmax
Figure 5.4.6: [Accumulation] How structural priming changes when we vary the learning
rate λ.
Based on these considerations we simulated the model for λ = 17Wmax and λ =
1
2Wmax. In the former case, λ was small, therefore we expected greater accumulation
(and hence larger decrease in Unequal condition). In the latter case, λ was large and
we expected low accumulation (and hence a smaller decrease in Unequal condition).
The results for the Same Verb condition are shown in figure 5.4.6. Similar results are
obtained for the Different Verb condition – so, in the interest of saving space, we do
not show those results here. It can be confirmed from the figure that as we expected,
a smaller λ leads to a large effect of the training condition (figure 5.4.6(a)) and hence
poor priming for the Unequal condition. In fact, the long term priming from training
phase dominates the short term priming during testing phase, so that the model seems
to show ‘reverse priming’ for the Unequal condition. On the other hand, figure 5.4.6(b)
shows larger priming under the Unequal condition, when λ was large and the system
showed recency.
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§ 5.4.3 Persistence of structural priming and lexical boost
Finally, we would like to investigate how long structural priming and lexical boost
persist. Bock and Griffin (2000) and Hartsuiker et al. (2008) showed that structural
priming seems to persist even when prime and target trials are separated by up to ten
filler trials. Hartsuiker et al. (2008) also analysed the comparative persistence of lexical
boost and observed that this lexical enhancement of structural priming was prevalent
when primes were immediately followed by targets, but disappeared when primes and
targets were separated by two filler trials or more.
While we already studied the cumulative effect of priming over a series of prime
trials, we also wanted to observe this explicit comparison between priming and lexical
boost when the priming is achieved by not a series of prime trials, but by only one trial.
Therefore, we simulated the model for the same data as Hartsuiker et al. (2008) and
observed how structural priming and lexical boost decay.
§ 5.4.3.1. Experiment Design.— Again, the experiment design was similar to the
first two simulations where the model was first trained so that it acquired a long term
memory and then tested for the designed stimuli. In fact the setup of this simulation
remained exactly the same as the first simulation, with two exceptions. Firstly, this
simulation changed the 2 (PO/DO) × 2 (Same/Different) design to a 2 × 2 × 3 (Lag
0/2/6) design used by Hartsuiker et al. (2008). Secondly, instead of having eight items
under each condition, we reduced the number of items under each condition to two, so
that the total length of the list was twenty four items.
Thus, each list contained pairs of comprehension and production trials where, just
like the first simulation, the comprehension trial could be a PO or a DO and the pro-
duction trial could use the same or a different verb to the comprehension trial. Addi-
tionally, the production trial could now follow the comprehension trial by either a zero
lag (i.e. no filler trials) or a lag of two or six fillers. Since we encode fillers as the time
of decay in the memory, we fixed the duration of one filler to be 1.5τstm. All other
parameters remain the same as the previous two simulations.
§ 5.4.3.2. Results and analysis.— Like the experiment design, the data analysis
for this study was quite similar to the first simulation. Again, we calculated the pro-
portion of PO and DO productions for PO and DO prime. We also classified the results
into repeated verb (Same-verb) and non-repeated verb (Different-verb) conditions. Be-
cause we want to find out the amount of priming at different lags, we also calculated
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this proportion under the three different lag conditions. Lastly, in order to compare the
results with Hartsuiker et al. (2008), we calculated the priming effect for each construc-
tion by subtracting the proportion of productions following the alternative construction
prime from the proportion of productions following the same construction prime. For
example, the priming effect for PO constructions is:
PropPOPO−PropDOPO
where PropPOPO is the proportion of PO primes followed by PO targets and Prop
DO
PO is
the proportion of DO primes followed by PO targets. The overall priming effect was
then calculated by averaging the priming effect for each construction.




























Figure 5.4.7: [Results] Results from (a) simulating the model, and (b) the original study
by Hartsuiker et al. (2008) (written session). The x-axis shows the three different lag
conditions – 0, 2 and 6 – and the y-axis shows the priming effect. The priming effect for
the Same-verb condition is shown using the solid line while that for the Different-verb
condition is shown using the dashed line. Note that we normalise the priming effect
between 0 and 1, while the original results used percentage.
Figure 5.4.7 shows results for simulating the model for the above data. The x-axis
shows the lag and the y-axis shows the priming effect calculated as mentioned above.
We observe that there is 94% priming effect at lag 0 under the Same-verb condition,
while 59% priming effect for the Different-verb condition. At lag 2, these priming
effects change to 57% and 45% respectively. The right hand side of the figure shows
the priming effect at lag 6, where it is 50% for the Same-verb condition and 52% for
Different-verb condition.
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§ 5.4.3.3. Discussion.— The key result in Figure 5.4.7 is that we get structural
priming for all three lags, while lexical boost diminishes considerably after lag 0. This
result is clearly evidenced by the fact that the figure shows a large difference between
the Same and different verb conditions at lag 0, but this difference diminishes at lag
2 and lag 6. These results are comparable to the results obtained by Hartsuiker et al.
(2008), who also observe that structural priming persists while lexical boost diminishes
after lag 0. A sample result from Hartsuiker et al. (2008), for the written session, is
shown in Figure 5.4.7(b) for comparison.
These results also mirror the results of the second simulation (above) which also
found no long term effect of overlap in verbs between training and testing phases. Our
results show that the same internal mechanism of a quick decay in the binding between
syntax and schema layers can be used to explain both the quick decay of lexical boost
and the lack of cumulative nature of the lexical enhancement of structural priming.



























Figure 5.4.8: Results for simulating the model
with τstm = 1000ms.
We can confirm that the mechanism
responsible for the quick decay in lexical
boost is indeed the short term memory
connecting syntactic and schema layers
by varying the rate at which this mem-
ory decays. So far, we have assumed that
the time-constant for the rate of decay in
short term memory, τstm, is 100ms. By
comparison, we have assumed that the
duration of a filler trial is 150ms. This
means that the short term memory gen-
erates a meaningful cue (step 3 during
production) only for about 200-300ms
(depending on the noise), after which the syntactic retrieval is completely dependent
on the syntactic memory. It is for this reason that a lag of 2 or more filler trials (300
or more ms) does not show significant lexical boost. If this reasoning is correct, then
increasing the time-constant of decay in short term memory should mean that the short
term memory is able to contribute a meaningful cue for a longer duration of time.
Therefore, if we increase τstm then the schema layer should be able to influence syn-
tactic selection for a longer duration, increasing the longevity of lexical boost.
To confirm this prediction, we increased τstm to 1000ms and simulated the model
with the same stimuli. The results are shown in figure 5.4.8 and can be compared
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with our previous results in Figure 5.4.7(a). We can observe that when τstm is large,
structural priming is consistently higher for the Same verb condition as compared to
the Different-verb condition. In other words, the model shows lexical boost for all
three lags. Thus, the results in figure 5.4.7 are contingent on the rate at which the
short term memory decays and these simulations show that the division of labour for
implementing structural priming and lexical boost in our model is key to explaining
the experimental observations made by Hartsuiker et al. (2008).
Our results do, however, seem to be different from Hartsuiker et al. (2008) in
one aspect. In some of their experiments, Hartsuiker et al. (2008) found that struc-
tural priming decays steadily as the number of fillers between prime and target trial
increase. In contrast, our results show a non-monotonic change in structural priming.
In figure 5.4.7(a) the structural priming for the Different-verb condition actually in-
creases slightly, from 45% at lag 2 to 52% at lag 6. The reason for this is the large
value of the time-constant for decay in long term memory. We had fixed τltm >> τstm
which means that over a short amount of lag, the decay in long term memory remains
negligible and because the long term memory modules are responsible for priming, we
see that structural priming under the Different-verb condition does not change signifi-
cantly up to lag 6. In other words, τltm is too large to let structural priming decrease by
a considerable amount for six filler trials. Before we hasten to suggest that the value
of τltm should be decreased, it should be noted that Bock and Griffin (2000) found
no decrease in structural priming for a lag of up to 10 trials and their data is an even
better match to our results for the persistence of structural priming. Also, in some
of their experiments Hartsuiker et al. (2008) did actually find that structural priming
was undiminished for the duration of the experiment. Therefore, it seems difficult to
calibrate these internal parameters of the model simply through existing experimental
evidence. While the goal of these experimental studies has been to establish that long
term persistence of structural priming, the mechanistic account provided in the model
demands further investigation into the exact length of this persistence. Such studies
would help us calibrate the parameters of the model and explain the cognitive modules
shed further light on the physiological modules responsible for structural priming.
5.5 General Discussion
None of the results from the three simulations are surprising. All three results
follow from the design of the model. But they do serve as a demonstration of the
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model’s ability to replicate patterns of structural priming and lexical boost. The model
suggests that cognitive processes analyse and integrate information during linguistic
processing and transform information from one representation to the other. The over-
lap of pathways during comprehension and production entangles the two procedures
and information processing during one affects the other. The results from the first sim-
ulation demonstrate that such an overlap between comprehension and production can
lead to priming.
The model’s representation scheme proposes that the language faculty can be di-
vided into different modules. Each module specialises in a particular type of represen-
tation. In our network, we suggest three modules – syntactic, conceptual and schematic
– which transform information between an utterance and its semantics. This modular
view of linguistic processing is not a new one and has its basis in both philosophical
arguments for the division of the mind along its functional purposes (Fodor, 1983) and
physiological findings of the specialisation of information processing in the brain (e.g.
place cells in the hippocampus (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978) and cells in the visual cortex
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962)). We propose that as each module processes linguistic infor-
mation, it activates, i.e. retrieves, a linguistic structure. This activation of a linguistic
structure, in turn, leaves a memory trace. Such memory traces increase the likelihood
of the reactivation of the linguistic structure and hence lead to priming. The first sim-
ulation demonstrates that unsupervised learning in each of the memory modules can,
indeed, lead to structural priming.
§ 5.5.0.4. Episodic learning and episodic buffer.— Because learning occurs as a
result of a single episode of information processing, we call such learning in each of
the modules episodic learning. However, this notion of episodic learning needs to be
distinguished from episodic memory (Tulving, 1995). While we propose that learning
in each of the modules is a consequence of a single episode of information process-
ing, we do not propose that this learning is the entire memory of the episode. Such
an episodic memory would require not only the memory of each of these (syntactic
and semantic) components of an utterance, but also how these components are linked
to each other. In addition, a memory of the episode requires the mechanism for en-
coding and retrieval of each of these components and their relationships. Therefore,
it is possible that a person lacks the episodic memory of an utterance but still under-
goes episodic learning of each of the components as a consequence of processing an
utterance. Indeed, Ferreira, Bock, Wilson, and Cohen (2008) observed that subjects
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with anterograde amnesia lacked such an episodic memory of the utterance but still
showed structural priming. We would like to argue that such priming is a consequence
of episodic learning in the syntactic memory module. However, unlike Ferreira et al.
(2008), we would not want to claim that this learning is procedural. Procedural learn-
ing takes place as a consequence of repeated presentation of an input stimulus. Because
structural priming is a consequence of a single presentation of a stimulus (prime), we
would like to argue that this learning is actually episodic. In other words, we would
like to argue that subjects show structural priming not because they adjust their (pro-
cedural) rules for grammatical processing, but because they retain an episodic memory
trace of the syntax of the utterance. Indeed, during each of the above simulations, the
rules of syntactic processing (such as grammatical relations ri and syntactic mapping
ψ) remain unchanged but the model still shows structural priming due to the episodic
learning of the activated syntactic structure.
While this modular architecture splits linguistic information into a set of spe-
cialised representations, our model also suggests that an integration mechanism binds
this disparate information into a whole. This integration mechanism bears a close sim-
ilarity to the episodic buffer of working memory proposed by Baddeley (2000), who
suggested that such an episodic buffer temporarily binds information held in long term
memory modules into a unitary episodic representation. We propose that, in a man-
ner similar to the episodic buffer, short term memory modules bind (pair-wise) the
long term memories activated during linguistic processing. Our model uses a tensor-
product representation for storing these bindings, and we suggest that such a binding
mechanism might be physically implemented through an activation based memory.
Similarly, Baddeley (2000) has proposed that the episodic buffer might be biologically
implemented by the frontal areas of the brain, which have been shown to display an
activation based memory (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989).
The results from our first simulation show that such a binding mechanism is capa-
ble of producing a lexical enhancement of structural priming. One can think of this
lexical enhancement as being due to a ‘flow of activation’ from the schema module to
the syntax module. But more precisely, our model implements a production procedure
which involves obtaining the cue for syntactic recall by unbinding a syntactic mem-
ory from the binding between syntax and schema layers. As this cue depends on the
activation pattern over the schema layer, the syntactic choice comes to depend upon
the schema representation as well. And because the verb in an utterance governs the
schema, a repetition of the verb leads to the repetition of the schema which, in turn,
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increases the likelihood of the repetition of syntactic choice. This is the lexical boost
effect.
We must, however, emphasise the distinction between comparing the episodic
buffer and long term episodic memory. The reader might conclude that since our model
implements (something like) an episodic buffer, it also stores the episodic memory for
each utterance. If this were true, then structural memory in the model becomes a
part of this episodic memory and a loss of episodic memory will lead to a loss of the
structural memory and structural priming. This conclusion contradicts the findings of
Ferreira et al. (2008), who observed that amnesic patients with poor episodic memo-
ries, still showed normal structural priming. However, the above reasoning is flawed
as it is based on the assumption that the existence of an episodic buffer (that binds
long term memories) is equivalent to a long term episodic memory. We emphasise
that just like the episodic buffer of Baddeley (2000) stores the bindings only temporar-
ily, our tensor-based binding mechanism also contains only temporary (i.e. short term)
storage for associations of long term memories. Evidence for such a temporary stor-
age of episodic information comes from studies done with amnesic patients, such as
B. A. Wilson and Baddeley (1988), who showed that while all severely amnesic pa-
tients show poor long term recall of prose, in some cases immediate recall of prose
can be virtually normal. Thus there is a dissociation between a temporary storage of
the linguistic episode and a long term storage of such episodes. How this temporary
episodic binding gets stored as a long term episodic memory is an open question that
we do not address in our model. Due to this dissociation, it is possible that subjects
with anterograde amnesia have a problem moving such a short term episodic memory
into a long term storage. So while it is possible that these subjects have a damage to
their mechanism of storing and retrieving associations between long term memories,
they are perfectly capable of binding such long term memories at least temporarily
during linguistic processing. Such subjects, like the ones studied by Ferreira et al.
(2008), will show poor long term recall of episodes but still be very much capable of
generating short term associations between long term memories.
The temporary nature of the episodic buffer, or equivalently the short term nature of
the bindings, also casts light on why lexical boost exists only for a short period, while
structural priming lasts over a longer period of time. Because lexical boost depends on
the syntax-schema binding in short term memory, it lasts only till the activation based
binding between these modules exists. On the other hand, the activation of a particu-
lar syntax is recorded in the long term syntactic memory and hence lasts for a much
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longer period. We implement this difference in the relative durations of the two kinds
of memories by fixing the decay time-constants τstm and τltm in such a manner that
τstm << τltm. As a result of these relative rates of decay in the two kinds of memory,
the third simulation replicates the results of Hartsuiker et al. (2008) and the second
simulation replicates the results of Kaschak and Borreggine (2008), both of which
show structural priming to have a long term effect which the lexical enhancement of
this priming to be short-lived.
§ 5.5.0.5. Coarse coding and semantic overlap.— In all of our simulations, we
have assumed a distributed representation for vectors representing syntax, schemata
and lexical concepts. We saw during the discussion of the formal representation of the
model that these vectors are generated by a function ψ which uniquely maps each sym-
bolic structure to a connectionist representation. In our simulations we have assumed
that this mapping is available through a lookup table but in reality this need not be the
case. In a cognitive system, each mapping needs to be generated by a combination
of learnt procedures and episodes. In a more sophisticated computational system, this
mapping can be generated by another neural network or a system of neural networks.
These more sophisticated systems could generate input vectors based on a set of
features for each vector. Each lexical concept, for example, could be represented by
a combination of a set of features. Different lexical concepts could have mutually
exclusive features, or these features could overlap. A coding mechanism that uses an
overlapping set of features is called coarse coding. This coarse coding mechanism is
particularly interesting to us for conceptual representations.
In the current study, we have investigated structural priming and lexical boost for
a set of concepts that we assume do not have any overlap. We have encoded this as-
sumption in our simulations by assuming that the vectors representing each concept
is linearly independent of vectors representing other concepts. This linear indepen-
dence makes the processes of retrieval and unbinding simple, but it also prevents us
from investigating how such an overlap in semantic space affects structural priming
and lexical boost. By making use of distributed representations, our model certainly
provides us the framework of testing such an overlap. The long term memory mecha-
nism implemented by the network of excitatory and inhibitory connections allows for
a partial overlap in patterns as does the tensor-product binding mechanism. Both these
mechanisms reduce performance with interference and this interference increases the
complexity of operating the system. Due to this increased complexity we have not
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investigated overlapping representations during the course of this study, but the model
provides the means for performing such an investigation.
While we mention that an investigation of semantic overlap will make for an inter-
esting future study, we hasten to add that by semantic overlap we mean an overlap in
lexical concepts but do not mean an overlap in thematic roles between different verbs.
The reason for studying one kind of overlap and not the other is based in the semantic
representation chosen by our model. While conceptual overlap can be studied by inves-
tigating the overlap in the vectors stored in the conceptual layer, thematic overlap has
no straightforward representation in our model since thematic relations are represented
independently for each frame in the schema layer.
In our representational scheme, each verb maps uniquely onto a frame. For ex-
ample, the verbs give and sell map onto two different frames, say, GIVE and SELL.
Each frame contains a list of roles and a set of relationships between roles. Crucially,
the relationships between the roles of GIVE and SELL do not have an independent
semantic representation, but are separately represented within each frame. Thus, the
roles GIVER and RECEIVER are related to each other, but this relationship is internal to
the GIVE schema and is not the same as the relation between SELLER and BUYER in the
SELL schema. In other words, thematic relationships have no independent existence,
but are part of each frame.
This independence of thematic relationships for each schema means that our model
predicts that thematic overlap between primes will have no effect on structural priming
– a result that has been found by Bock and Loebell (1990). We saw in Chapter 2 (page
25) that this study compares the amount of structural priming for sentences such as
The wealthy widow gave her Mercedes to the church and The wealthy widow drove
her Mercedes to the church on sentences that could be produced as, for example, IBM
promised a bigger computer to the Sears store or IBM promised the Sears store a bigger
computer. Bock and Loebell (1990) observed that both primes have the same form, but
different thematic relationships and when they found that both sentences show an equal
amount of priming of the dative sentence (e.g. the sold sentence above), they argued
that people frame their sentences independent of the properties of its meaning (which
includes its thematic relationships).
Our model uses independent thematic relationships for any two sentences with
different verbs. Thus sentence such as The wealthy widow gave her old Mercedes to
the church has no schema overlap with a sentence such as The wealthy widow sold
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her old Mercedes to the church.9 Thus the model does not receive a ‘boost’ from the
schema layer either for the locative prime or for the dative prime and hence both types
of primes show an equal amount of priming.
Although our model predicts the same result as Bock and Loebell (1990), it gives a
different explanation for the independence of structural priming and thematic overlap.
While Bock and Loebell (1990) argued that the lack of additional structural priming in
case of thematic overlap shows that structural decisions are made without a semantic
influence, we argue that syntactic decisions actually are based on semantic proper-
ties, but that thematic overlap does not necessarily bring these semantic properties any
closer and hence has no effect on structural priming.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a new framework for language comprehension
and production with a view of explaining the patterns of structural priming. This
framework is an extension of the models presented in the previous chapter and im-
proves both the representational scheme and the algorithms presented in the last chap-
ter. It provides a detailed mechanistic account of both comprehension and production
and how the two procedures overlap. It also implements a fuller account of how an
input signal might be converted into a mental representation for that signal during
comprehension and how this mental representation could be transformed into a speech
signal during production. We simulated this framework for three observed properties
of structural priming and found that it successfully replicates the results of each of
these studies. While these results are encouraging, we do emphasise that this frame-
work only looks at comprehension and production from the perspective of structural
priming and does not try to encode the complete set of processes entailed in each of
these procedures. It also looks at an adult speaker – one who has already acquired the
linguistic prowess to comprehend and produce utterances – and does not give a devel-
opmental account of how these abilities are acquired. In spite of these limitations, the
model provides a fertile ground for investigating the causes and properties of structural
priming in a mechanistic and formal manner.
9Or a more general statement would be that the sentence The wealthy widow gave her old Mercedes
to the church has as much in common in schema-space with The wealthy widow sold her old Mercedes
to the church as it does with The wealthy widow drove her old Mercedes to the church.
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Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to review our key findings and to look at them in the broader
context of human memory and cognition. The research goal of this thesis has been to
investigate the properties of structural priming and our research method has been to
construct computational models that can replicate experimental observations. In the
previous two chapters we have constructed a series of models. Each of these models
extends our knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for structural priming.
In this chapter, we will move away from the specific details and look at the general
cognitive principles that underlie the design of these models and the consequences of
these principles. We will begin with the general principles of organisation and justify
the adoption of the particular architecture of our models. Here we will connect the
architecture of our models with the general organisation of information by the human
brain. Then we will move to the choice of learning mechanism in each model and the
consequences of adopting these learning mechanisms. Again, we will generalise the
discussion and see what these learning mechanisms tell us about the place of structural
priming in human memory. In the third section, we will give our reasons for choosing
dynamical systems theory for studying structural priming. We will briefly review other
studies where this theory has been used and see how choosing this theory helps us bring
the psychology of structural priming closer to its neuroscience. Finally, we will also
list the ways in which we can take our investigations forward and better understand the
cognitive underpinnings of not only structural priming, but also language production.
6.1 Specialization and Integration
We begin by explaining the reasons for the functional organisation of various com-
putational models presented in previous chapters. This functional organisation is closely
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connected to how the computational models choose to represent information. In this
thesis, we have looked at language production (and comprehension) as a flow of in-
formation through the cognitive system. The extended model described in Chapter 5
made this view explicit by modelling production and comprehension as a transforma-
tion of information (between a linguistic signal L and a canonical representation CR )
as it passes through the language system. This view is also implicit in the three mod-
els considered in Chapter 4, which concentrated on the flow of information between
the lexical and syntactic representations. When we adopt the view that production
and comprehension of speech is equivalent to transforming information, we move our
domain of enquiry from the processes of production and comprehension to the mech-
anisms of information transformation. Instead of asking what the nature of production
and comprehension are, we can ask what is the nature of this transformation.
This latter question, about how information is transformed as it passes through
the system, can be answered in several ways. It is possible that information is trans-
formed in one step, from an auditory signal to a mental state, however, it could also
be transformed in several discrete steps. Furthermore, it is possible that one module
is responsible for transforming this information, or it could be that a set of modules
transform information independently. The arguments of this thesis rest on the assump-
tion that a number of functionally specialized, independent modules are responsible
for analysing information and that information analysed in this way is then combined
using another set of modules. Each of our models makes this assumption. And each
model then also assumes that the two types of modules (ones that perform analysis and
the ones that perform combination) rely on different kinds of memory. It is in this way
that these models are able to explain why structural priming and lexical boost show
different temporal properties. Because these assumptions are central to our arguments,
it is worth taking a closer look at them – laying out how each of our models makes
these assumptions, asking what are the implications of these assumptions for the na-
ture of cognition and explaining how we can justify these assumptions. We take up
each of these questions next.
§ 6.1.1 The analysis/combination division in the models
The division between the modules that perform analysis and those that perform com-
bination can be most clearly seen in our final model, described in Chapter 5. In this
model, each of the long term memory modules perform functionally specialized pro-
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cessing and is responsible for the analysis. Information is analysed (transformed) into
three different kinds of representations: syntactic, conceptual and schematic. Each of
these modules can be seen to be functionally specialized because the selection of a rep-
resentation is completely dependent on the previous memories stored in the module.
The goal of the module is to transform the input into the memory trace that forms the
closest match to the input. The second type of module in the network are the ones that
perform tensor-product binding between the conceptual, syntactic and schema mod-
ules. By storing the binding, these modules combine this information to form the
memory of an episode.
A similar division between two different kinds of modules exists in models ­ and
®. The functionally specialized modules in this case are the two winner-take-all layers
which implement syntactic and lexical representations. Just like the extended model,
the dynamics of each layer is independent of the other and each layer transforms the
input signal based on the memory (hysteresis) stored in each layer. The combination
between the two functionally specialized layers is again performed by the binding
layer. The only exception to this scheme of analysis and combination is our first model,
model ¬, which has two specialized layers that perform the analysis of the signal, but
does not have a layer that performs the combination.
The separation between the two kinds of modules is not just architectural, but also
functional. Models ­ and ® assume that the two analysis modules have mutually-
inhibitory connections which lead to winner-take-all dynamics. These dynamics are
required because these modules have to make a choice between the nodes. The syntax
layer has to choose between the PO or DO structures, while the lexical layer has to
choose one verb from a set of verbs. These winner-take-all dynamics are in contrast
with the dynamics of the binding layer which performs the combination. The nodes
in this binding layer are mutually excitatory and as a consequence they are either both
active together or both switched off. Unlike the winner-take-all dynamics, there is no
competition between the nodes. As a consequence of this contrast in dynamics, the two
kinds of modules exhibit different longevities of the memories stored in them. While
the winner-take-all layers show exponential decay, the mutually excitatory nodes show
catastrophic decay. This difference in longevity of the two types of modules allows us
to explain the experimentally observed difference in the longevity of structural priming
and lexical boost.
Similarly, the analysis and combination modules in the extended model are also
functionally different. The three analysis modules (syntax, concepts and schema) are
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implemented using long term memory. This long term memory chooses between dif-
ferent patterns through attractor-network dynamics. The combination modules are im-
plemented using a short term tensor-product memory. This functional division between
the two kinds of modules, again, allows us to explain the difference in the longevity of
structural priming and lexical boost.
§ 6.1.2 Evidence and reasons for an analysis/combination division
While we have justified the use of the two types of modules based on the longevities
of structural priming and lexical boost, we now have to ask if there is actual evidence
for the cognitive existence of such a division? First, let us consider the evidence for
functional specialization. We discussed in Chapter 2 how evidence for the functional
specialization of syntactic knowledge comes from structural priming. Experiments
conducted by Bock (1986), Bock and Loebell (1990) and Bock et al. (1992) showed
that structural priming exists independent of lexical, thematic or conceptual overlap
between prime and target. These results argue for a functionally specialized structural
memory, which is separate from memory of other aspects of the prime utterance.
But functional specialization is not restricted to syntactic representations, or in-
deed to linguistic processing, and is a well-known feature of other cognitive domains.
Hubel and Wiesel (1962) found receptive fields in the visual cortex based on single-cell
recordings from anesthetized cats. Based on these findings, they argued for a functional
architecture of the visual cortex. Since their experiments a number of advances have
been made in the study of the visual cortex and the definition and the functions of dif-
ferent functionally specialized areas have been reviewed and refined (see Carandini et
al. (2005) for a more recent review). However, the idea of demarcating the visual cor-
tex into these functionally specialized areas (and receptive fields) has endured (Zeki et
al., 1991). Similarly, functionally specialized areas have been found within the motor
cortex (Talati & Hirsch, 2005) and auditory cortex (Tian, Reser, Durham, Kustov, &
Rauschecker, 2001).
Given the existence of this functional specialization in different cognitive domains,
we can ask what are the general principles that lead to this method of information rep-
resentation. One answer comes from the study of how sensory (visual) information is
re-represented by the neural system. Our sensory signals arise from natural scenes that
are highly structured and consist of a set of well-defined objects, rather than pixels of
random activity, or noise. While this sensory data contains all this rich information, the
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representation of the sensory data itself is simply a set of colour and brightness values
picked by the photoreceptors in the retina. The visual system wants to re-represent
this sensory data so that the higher cognitive systems can operate directly on the set
of objects, or causes, underlying this sensory data. This problem of extracting a set of
underlying causes from sensory data needs to be solved not only by the visual system,
but also by the auditory and motor systems.
A number of computational models suggest possible ways in which the statistical
information present in sensory signals can be used to learn meaningful re-representations
of sensory data (Dayan & Abbott, 2001). All these models accept the sensory data as
the input and based on this input, they generate a probability distribution over a set of
latent variables as the output. These latent variables are interpreted as the underlying
causes in a sensory signal. Since these models are able to identify the causes under-
lying sensory data, they are called recognition models. Different recognition models
differ in the kind of latent variables that they extract from the input. Models exist
that extract statistically uncorrelated latent variables (Principal Component Analysis),
latent variables that have Gaussian distribution (mixture-of-Gaussians analysis) and
latent variables that are statistically independent (Independent Component Analysis
(Bell & Sejnowski, 1995)). Each model relies on a different algorithm and a different
property of latent variables, but they all build on the notion that recognition is per-
formed by analysing sensory input into a set of underlying causes or latent variables.
From our perspective, these recognition models highlight the reason behind functional
specialization in cognition. Friston (2005) hypothesized that sensory information is
analysed (or re-represented) by a set of functionally specialized modules because the
brain has evolved to extract the causes or latent variables in the input. Furthermore,
Friston (2005) pointed out that functional segregation and integration are not mutually
exclusive; they are complementary. He discussed evidence that these complementary
tasks are performed by forward and backward connections in the visual cortex. While
the forward connections are concerned with the segregation of information (which we
have called analysis), the backward connections mediate contextual effects and the
co-ordination of processing channel (which we have called combination).
Our models extend these arguments to the study of language comprehension and
production. Just as models of the visual stimuli extract information about objects in a
natural scene, our model extracts syntactic and semantic information from a linguis-
tic signal during comprehension. We also study the opposite procedure of production
where this segregated information needs to be combined in order to generate a linguis-
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tic signal. Thus, the organisation of different modules in our models is not arbitrary,
but can be justified based on the general principles of functional specialization and
integration pervasive in the human cognitive system.
6.2 Learning mechanism for structural priming
The second major concern of this thesis has been to address the debate surround-
ing the learning mechanisms underlying structural priming. We have frequently made
comments on this debate during previous chapters but here we confront the questions
head-on and review how our findings contribute to extending our knowledge on the
subject. Here is the obvious question at the heart of the debate: what are the learn-
ing mechanisms responsible for structural priming? Note that when we speak about
learning mechanisms, we do not simply mean the learning algorithm – this is only
one of the questions. Another question is the kind of memory this learning leads to.
Here, the debate revolves around the categorisation of structural priming as either im-
plicit or explicit memory (Ferreira & Bock, 2006). Another related question is the
longevity predicted by the learning mechanism: is it long-term or transient? And yet
another question is about the function of this learning: is this learning in service of
language acquisition (Chang et al., 2006) or is it in service of aligning mental states
of interlocutors (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), or both? Of course, these questions are
not completely independent. In this section we will see that evidence which answers
one of these questions is frequently misunderstood as evidence which also answers the
other questions. When Bock and Griffin (2000) found evidence for structural priming
to be long-term, they interpreted these results to mean that priming was also implicit.
When Ferreira et al. (2008) found evidence that structural priming was implicit, they
argued that it suggested priming was responsible for learning syntax. We would like
to argue in this section, that the connections between different aspects of the learn-
ing mechanism are not entirely straightforward and our models show a state of affairs
where the answer to one question can be independent of the answer to the others.
§ 6.2.1 Implicit, procedural and responsible for acquisition?
Structural priming is a form of memory – it connects two events that are separated in
time. A systematic study of human memory has shown that it is not one monolithic
structure, but consists of a number of systems (Tulving, 1995; Squire, 2004). Because
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structural priming is a form of memory, we can ask, to which of these systems does it
belong? This is an important question because different types of memory systems store
different kinds of knowledge. If we can determine which memory system structural
priming belongs to, we will also be able to determine the kind of knowledge that people
extract as a result of structural priming.
§ 6.2.1.1. Landscape of memory.— First, let us look at the landscape of mem-
ory. The stratification of memory has been under constant debate (see Tulving (2007)
for a list of 256 kinds of memory), but there seems to be a consensus on some of the
major categories. Tulving (1995) identified five major systems of human memory:
procedural, perceptual priming, semantic, primary and episodic (see Table 6.1). Pro-
cedural memory is a non-representational memory – i.e. it does not store true or false
propositions about the external world. Instead, it is dispositional and reflected through
performance rather than recollection (Squire, 2004). An example of procedural mem-
ory is skill learning such as hand-eye coordination during drawing. In contrast, the
other four forms of memory are representational or declarative – i.e. it is possible to
state the changes due to learning in these systems as falsifiable propositions. Percep-
tual priming (in the Perceptual Representation System) is a form of learning observed
in amnesic patients, who lose the ability to recognise previously presented information,
but still show facilitation in perception as a result of this information (Schacter, Chiu, &
Ochsner, 1993). Both semantic memory and episodic memory are memories of events
and propositions about the world. The distinction between these two kinds of memory
comes from the autobiographical nature of episodic memories; while semantic mem-
ory is simply a declarative memory of facts about the world, episodic memory shows a
capacity to re-experience the event in the context that it originally occurred (Tulving,
1984). Finally, primary or working memory provides a limited capacity system al-
lowing the temporary storage and manipulation of information necessary for complex
tasks such as comprehension, learning and reasoning (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
In addition to this categorisation of memory into five different systems, the process
of learning these memories can be classified based on the awareness of the acquisition
of the memory. The role of awareness in memory has been under investigation for a
long time. In a series of experiments, Reber (1967) demonstrated that subjects might
be capable of learning without being aware of the process. He asked participants in
an experiment to try and memorise a series of letter strings, generated by an artifi-
cial grammar. When the experimenter later asked the participants to classify whether
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Table 6.1: Major categories of human learning and memory (Tulving, 1995)
System Other terms Subsystem Retrieval





PRS Priming Structural description Implicit
Visual word form
Auditory word form
Semantic Generic Spatial Implicit
Factual Relational
Knowledge





new strings were generated by the same grammar, they were able to do this task at a
better-than-chance level, even though they lacked the ability to describe the rules for
the grammar. Based on these findings, Reber (1967) coined the term implicit learning
for a form of learning performed by subjects without forming explicit strategies for
responding to or recoding the stimuli. Since this original experiment, many studies
have been conducted (see Schacter et al. (1993) for a review) which show that sub-
jects can show a facilitation in responding to previously presented stimulus (i.e. can
be primed) without being aware of acquiring the memory. Usually, the facilitation of
recall is tested through priming while the awareness of acquiring the memory is tested
by asking the subjects to recognise the stimulus (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). The dif-
ference between the priming and recognition scores then shows a reliance on different
learning mechanisms. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that amnesic patients
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show impaired recognition without any impairment in priming (Hamann & Squire,
1997) signalling a dissociation between the brain areas responsible for implicit and ex-
plicit memory. Based on these arguments, different memory systems can be labelled as
showing either implicit or explicit learning. Tulving (1995) proposed that the first three
systems in Table 6.1 show implicit learning while the last two show explicit learning.
§ 6.2.1.2. Location of structural priming.— Having established this landscape
of different types of memory, we can now ask, where on this landscape is structural
priming located. There are several possible candidate locations. If subjects show struc-
tural priming because they are aware of the prime episode, then structural priming is
likely to be an explicit memory dependent on the episodic memory system. If subjects
are unaware of the memory acquisition during prime episodes, then structural prim-
ing is likely to be an implicit memory dependent on perceptual priming or procedural
memory. The distinction between perceptual priming and procedural memory lies in
the speed of learning. Procedural memory is acquired via gradual learning through
repeated exposure, while perceptual priming relies on a single episode of learning
(Squire, 2004). If structural priming is a result of learning to gradually extract com-
mon elements from a series of inputs, then it should rely on the procedural memory
system, and if not, on the perceptual priming system.
As seen in the last chapter, Bock and Griffin (2000) investigated the time-course of
priming and found that it does not show any consistent decay when prime and target
trials are separated for up to 10 filler trials. Based on these results and previous findings
that priming does not depend on an effort to remember the priming sentence (Bock,
1986) and that it does not require explicit attention to the form of priming sentence
(Bock et al., 1992), they suggested that structural priming is a procedural memory and
relies on implicit learning. One key property of implicit and explicit memories that
Bock and Griffin (2000) rely on to make their argument is that implicit memory seems
to persist for a longer time than explicit memory. However, in light of our previous
discussion, this reasoning seems slightly flawed. First of all, episodic memory seems
to use explicit learning and is known to exist for long periods of time (Tulving, 1995).
Thus, the longevity of priming does not necessarily imply implicit learning. Secondly,
Bock and Griffin (2000) seem to confound implicit learning with procedural memory.
Even if structural priming relies on implicit learning, it does not necessarily imply that
it relies on the procedural memory system. Indeed Table 6.1 shows three different
memory systems that could use implicit learning: procedural, perceptual priming and
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semantic. Structural priming could rely on any of the three memory systems.
The extended model presented in the last chapter shows a scenario where structural
priming could rely on implicit learning but not on the procedural memory system. We
saw that each of the long term memory layers in the model (page 217) relies on a single-
shot learning algorithm, where the pattern to be learnt is presented to the syntactic,
schema or conceptual layers only once. In contrast, we assumed that the procedural
knowledge – such as knowledge of how to order different syntactic functions in a
sentence – is stored in a lookup table ψ (section 5.3.2.2). Our model showed structural
priming solely by performing learning in the long term memory modules and without
making any changes to the procedural knowledge. We say that this learning is implicit
because the memory of the complete episode relies on the short term memory modules
that bind together the long term memory modules. At the end of the last chapter we
discussed that these short term memory modules can be viewed as an episodic buffer
(Baddeley, 2000) that temporarily stores the memory of the episode. After the pattern
of activation is lost from this episodic buffer, the memory of the entire episode cannot
be retrieved. Therefore, people asked to recognise a sentence will perform poorly on
the task as they no longer possess a representation of the complete utterance. However,
they would still show structural priming due to the learning in the long term syntax
module, demonstrating an implicit, but not procedural memory.
Another study that tries to locate structural priming on the memory landscape is re-
ported by Ferreira et al. (2008) who compared the performance of normal and amnesic
subjects on both structural priming and recognition. Much like the studies on implicit
learning (Tulving, Hayman, & Macdonald, 1991; Hamann & Squire, 1997), this study
found a comparable amount of structural priming for normal and amnesic patients, but
the amnesic patients performed worse on the recognition task. Ferreira et al. (2008)
argued that the reason behind these results was that the amnesic patients have an im-
paired declarative memory, but an intact procedural memory. The results can then be
explained, they argued, by assuming that structural priming relies on the intact pro-
cedural memory while recognition relies on the impaired declarative memory, leading
to poor recognition, in amnesic subjects, but a normal amount of structural priming.
Based on these results, they proposed that when people comprehend an utterance, they
update their abstract relational knowledge in their procedural memory and this learn-
ing leads to structural priming. As we have seen at several points in the thesis, this
argument is also made by the computational model proposed by Chang et al. (2006)
who showed that learning abstract syntactic knowledge through error-based learning
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Figure 6.2.1: A taxonomy of mammalian long-term memory systems along with the
brain structures thought to be especially important with each form of memory (Squire,
2004).
can lead to structural priming.
But again, this argument relies on a very broad classification of memory – simply
procedural versus declarative – a classification which was abandoned in the 1980s
in favour of the view that memory consisted of multiple (more than two) memory
systems (Tulving, 1995; Squire, 2004). Specifically, Ferreira et al. (2008) assumed
that if subjects show an impaired memory for recognition, then they must be relying
on procedural memory for performing structural priming. But an impaired memory
for recognition could be due to a variety of reasons. For example, damage to the
medial temporal lobe is frequently associated with poor recall and recognition (Milner,
1962; Squire, 2004). But as can be seen in Figure 6.2.1 (Squire, 2004), a variety
of other undamaged brain areas – striatum, neocortex, amygdala and cerebellum –
could be responsible for normal performance of structural priming. Ferreira et al.
(2008) assumed that the fact that subjects show structural priming in spite of loss of
their recognition memory implies that they rely on procedural memory for structural
priming. But this assumption is equivalent to assuming that if subjects show structural
priming despite damage to the medial temporal lobe then structural priming must rely
on the striatum and not the neocortex, amygdala or cerebellum. Without evidence
that the neocortex, amygdala and cerebellum play no part in structural priming, their
observations do not merit such a conclusion.
Hence we argue that a loss of recognition memory does not necessarily imply a loss
of all forms of declarative memories. The models in this thesis suggest that it is very
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much possible that some of the brain areas responsible for declarative memories (such
as recognition memory) are also responsible for structural priming. Structural priming
in the extended model is due to learning in the long term memory modules. On the
other hand, declarative memory for the entire episode is stored in the episodic buffer,
or the short term memory modules. This short-term memory is nothing but the binding
between different long term memory modules and hence serves as an index, or a pointer
into each long term memory. Thus a declarative memory of an episode consists of not
only the bindings (pointers) between the long term memories, but also of the long
term memories themselves. Thus the long term memory modules participate in both
declarative memories and structural priming.
If the memory of these pointers into long term memories is lost, the subject will
lose their ability to recognise the episode, without a loss in structural priming. So
according to our model, the difference between normal and amnesic subjects is that
normal subjects are able to transfer the content of their episodic buffer to a long term
episodic memory while amnesic patients cannot perform this transfer. Because normal
subjects are able to transfer the contents of their episodic buffer, containing the pointers
to the long term memory modules to a long term episodic memory, they are able to
use this long term episodic memory at a later point to perform recognition. Amnesic
patients, unable to store the contents of the episodic buffer in long term memory are
unable to recognise episodes and show poor explicit retrieval.
Thus our model presents a state of affairs where (a) the same modules participate
in both declarative memory and structural priming, and (b) these modules are not part
of the procedural memory system. We say that these modules are not part of the proce-
dural memory system because unlike procedural memory which performs skill learn-
ing through gradual adjustment, these modules perform single-shot learning, storing
a component (actually a transformation) of the utterance. Thus, our model presents
a state of affairs where the dissociation between structural priming and recognition
memory does not imply that structural priming is due to learning in procedural mem-
ory, showing that the conclusions made by Ferreira et al. (2008) about the location of
structural priming on the memory landscape are too strong.
Support for the state of affairs depicted by our model comes from the study of the
hippocampus and its role in the formation of memories. The hippocampus is a part of
the medial temporal cortex, damage to which is widely associated with a loss of declar-
ative memory (Squire, 2004). The function of the hippocampus in memory formation
is still under investigation, but several studies propose that the hippocampus binds to-
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gether different sites in the neocortex (Squire, 1992). Based on this idea, McClelland,
McNaughton, and O’Reilly (1995) proposed a computational model for learning in the
hippocampus which stores pointers to memories in the cortex and remembers specific
episodes by binding together these pointers. By making lesions to this model, McClel-
land et al. (1995) showed that the model captured patterns of recall shown by amnesic
patients. Thus the hippocampus fits the role of a candidate neural system that could
store the bindings in the episodic buffer of our model. If this was the case, then dam-
age to the hippocampus would lead to a loss of declarative (recognition) memory in
our model, much like it leads to a loss of declarative memory for amnesic patients.
§ 6.2.1.3. Procedural memory and syntactic acquisition.— So far our discus-
sion shows that the evidence presented by studies such as Bock and Griffin (2000) and
Ferreira et al. (2008) demonstrates that structural priming can be implicit (i.e. without
awareness), but it does not demonstrate that it relies on the procedural memory sys-
tem. Is this an important distinction? We would like to argue that it is. The function of
structural priming is contingent on this distinction.
One possible raison d’être for structural priming is the learning of the abstract
syntactic structure of language. Chang et al. (2006) and Chang, Dell, Bock, and Griffin
(2000) showed that a computational model aimed at learning the sequential structure
of utterances and how messages map onto this sequential structure will show structural
priming. This is a view supported by Bock and Griffin (2000) who argued that the
long term persistence of structural priming showed that it could play a role in language
learning. This view is articulated in the discussion of their results:
From a different perspective, the findings make a strong argument for con-
sidering an explanation of structural priming in terms of learning rather
than transient memory activation mechanisms. The implication of this
claim is not simply that a change in performance persists, although it
clearly does, but also that the change generalizes to new utterances involv-
ing different words. The relevant kind of learning appears to be implicit
or procedural. . .
Chang, Dell, Bock, and Griffin (2000; see also Dell, Chang, & Grif-
fin, 1999) implemented a model that adapts the principles of parallel dis-
tributed processing to the circumstances of language production. The
model explicitly incorporates a learning mechanism for priming, so that
its priming performance depends on the same kinds of weight changes
that are involved in its training. In other words, the mechanism of learning
is identical to the mechanism of priming. (Bock & Griffin, 2000)
This view emphasises that the same learning mechanism that is used to learn the syn-
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tactic structure of language during training (naı̈ve learners) is also the mechanism that
is responsible for priming during testing (fluent speakers). Because learning syntax is
a form of skill learning as it involves learning a set of implicit rules that are gradually
acquired over a series of episodes, Bock and Griffin (2000) assume this learning takes
place in the procedural memory. By showing that procedural memory is involved in
structural priming, Bock and Griffin (2000) want to show that syntactic learning and
structural priming are identical. Thus procedural memory is the glue that binds syn-
tactic learning to structural priming.
However, we have seen that evidence from neither Bock and Griffin (2000), nor
Ferreira et al. (2008) merits the conclusion that structural priming is necessarily due
to learning in procedural memory. In fact, we have argued that overlapping brain areas
might be involved in structural priming and declarative memory and that impaired re-
call in amnesic patients might be due to impaired access, rather than complete damage,
to this declarative memory. This hypothesis is supported by the computational mod-
els presented in this thesis. These models demonstrate the possibility that structural
priming could be due to learning during testing which is quite different from learning
during training. None of the models presented in this thesis tries to learn the procedural
rules for generating utterances. The final model assumes that these rules are available
from a lookup table that was generated during an (unimplemented) acquisition phase
and are unchanged during testing. The only learning performed by the model is in the
long term memory modules which, for the syntax module, stores the memory of using
a particular syntactic function. Complete loss in this memory would lead to complete
loss of priming, but the subject’s ability to produce syntactic utterances would remain
intact. Thus the mechanism of learning (during acquisition) in this model is not iden-
tical to the mechanism of priming.
§ 6.2.2 Supervised, error-based and predictive?
Another set of questions about the learning mechanism of structural priming deals with
the nature of the learning algorithm. We saw in Chapter 3 that learning could be either
supervised or unsupervised. We also saw that one algorithm for supervised learning is
error-backpropagation which is used by Chang et al. (2006) to implement their model
of language comprehension and production. Finally, we saw that this error required
for learning can be generated by making predictions about input data and comparing
these predictions with the actual input.
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In subsequent chapters we described computational models that have used a dif-
ferent learning algorithm. This learning algorithm is unsupervised – i.e. it does not
assume a teacher that can provide the correct response for a given input. For this rea-
son, the model does not generate any error and does not need to make predictions.
In addition, this learning algorithm does not try to generate an internal model of the
world. Rather, each episode of learning leaves a memory trace in the system which
affects future processing. Let us review some of the consequences of adopting such a
learning algorithm.
§ 6.2.2.1. Production-to-production priming.— One consequence of this scheme
is that system is now capable of showing production-to-production priming. The reader
may recall that one limitation of the CDB06 model mentioned in Chapter 3 was that
it is only able to show comprehension-to-production priming and not production-to-
production priming. The reason for this behaviour was that CDB06 requires an external
input with which it can compare its prediction to generate an error. This external input
is provided by the comprehension trial and not by a production trial. Thus the model
performs no learning during a production trial and hence cannot show production-to-
production priming.
In contrast, the models presented in this thesis perform learning on both compre-
hension and production trials. In the extended module, learning takes place in both
the long-term and short-term memory modules each time these modules are activated.
We assume that each retrieval from long term memory leads to learning – irrespective
of whether this retrieval takes place during comprehension or during production. We
also assume that the short term memory modules calculate and update their respective
bindings during both comprehension and production. Thus, each comprehension and
production trial leaves a memory trace in both kinds of modules. Because these mem-
ory traces are responsible for priming, the model will show structural priming from
comprehension as well as production.
§ 6.2.2.2. Prediction during comprehension.— Another consequence of the learn-
ing algorithm discussed in our models relates to performing prediction during compre-
hension. Chang et al. (2006) proposed that subjects actively use their language pro-
duction system to perform predictions during comprehension. Their model performs
incremental comprehension of an utterance, predicting each word and comparing the
input word with the prediction. Not only is this prediction mechanism central to learn-
ing, it also couples comprehension with production. Thus, their model has a natural
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explanation for the overlap in comprehension and production.
In similar vein, Pickering and Garrod (2007) proposed that language comprehen-
sion involves using ‘emulators’ that help the system to predict the linguistic signal
based on linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts. The idea of such emulators is taken
from the perception literature where it has been proposed that perception of other
people’s behaviour might involve covert imitation of their behaviour (M. Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005; Grush, 2004). Furthermore, Pickering and Garrod (2007) suggested
that the comprehension system is likely to use the production system to perform this
emulation, rather than implement a separate forward model of its own. They cited
neurological evidence which shows an overlap in comprehension and production in
support of this hypothesis. Finally, based on this hypothesis, they proposed a concep-
tual model which uses a production-based emulator to incrementally predict an input
signal and uses a Kalman filter to control the amount of influence that emulation has
on interpretation.
The extended model presented in the last chapter also showed an overlap between
comprehension and production (Section 5.3.3.2 on page 232). However, in contrast
to the two accounts above, this model does not require predictions to be made during
comprehension. We presented an algorithm for comprehension which involves a for-
ward and a backward pass through the modules. While the forward pass involves an
analysis of the input signal into three different kinds of representations, the backward
pass involves integrating this information and associating the roles in schemata with
syntactic elements. This process of associating roles in a schema with syntactic ele-
ments is actually a production process. The production algorithm also operates in two
passes and this backward pass of comprehension largely overlaps with pass two during
production. In this way the model can be construed as performing emulation during
comprehension, even though it does not perform prediction. Models ¬, ­ and ® do
not specify the processes of comprehension and production overtly, but assume that
the same modules (WTA layers) are used for both production and comprehension.
The crucial difference between our proposal and a prediction-based account is that
a predictive account hypothesises the use of a production system ahead of hearing
speech, while our account supposes that the two systems are used at the same time. In
fact, we do not suppose that the two systems are separable and comprehension is, in a
certain sense, partly production.
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§ 6.2.2.3. Implicit but not error-based.— A final point about our learning algo-
rithm is that it helps decouple the notions of implicit learning and error-based learning.
In Chapter 3 we saw several disadvantages of an error-based account of structural
priming. One of those disadvantages was the trade-off between the amount of learn-
ing and the amount of structural priming. An error-based account needs to keep the
amount of learning low because it wants to gradually extract a model of the syntactic
rules of a language from training data. However, as we illustrated, this low rate of
learning should lead to a low amount of structural priming and an error-based account
has difficulty explaining the amount of structural priming observed in some existing
experimental data (see section 3.4, page 70 for details). On the other hand, the gradual
extraction of syntactic rules through error-based learning shows how subjects could be
learning these syntactic rules without being aware of this process; having extracted the
rules, the subjects can discard their memory of the utterance itself and therefore show
no awareness of coming across the utterance. Therefore, an error-based account has
the advantage of being able to naturally explain why structural priming shows implicit
retrieval.
The unsupervised learning algorithms that we have proposed for our models do not
face a trade-off between priming and learning rate because these models do not aim to
extract the syntactic rules of a language. But in the absence of such a process of rule
extraction, how can we explain that structural priming shows implicit retrieval? As we
discussed in the previous section, the answer comes from the dissociation between the
two kinds of memories in our models. Short term memory is crucial for recognition and
recall of an utterance, while long term memory modules can show structural priming on
their own. When short term memory is lost, subjects will show failure to recognise the
utterance, even though they demonstrate structural priming. In other words, structural
priming will show implicit retrieval.
Thus our account shows that error-based learning, or indeed any form of learning
that tries to gradually extract a model of the world from stimuli, is not crucial to im-
plicit learning. Such learning is required for extracting procedural knowledge, but as
discussed in the previous section, there is no definitive evidence that structural priming
is due to learning in the procedural memory system.
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§ 6.2.3 Base-level and spreading activation
The idea of a division between a long-term and a transient learning mechanism has
led to another recent model proposed by Reitter (2008). This model is based on the
ACT-R cognitive architecture developed by J. R. Anderson (1993). Reitter proposed
that structural priming has two components, or adaptation effects: a short-term priming
effect which lasts from one utterance to the next and a long-term adaptation effect
which persists over a sequence of utterances and for a longer duration. This division
between short-term priming and long-term adaptation is akin to the difference in the
longevities of lexical boost and structural priming that we have been reviewing in this
thesis. Reitter presented evidence from corpus studies that corroborate this division
between the two adaptation effects.
In order to establish the cognitive bases of structural priming, Reitter (2008) devel-
oped a cognitive model of language production using the ACT-R framework. The basic
assumption at the heart of the ACT-R theory is that complex cognition emerges from
the interaction between declarative and procedural memory (J. R. Anderson, Budiu,
& Reder, 2001). Human knowledge is represented in two separate modules: (i) a
procedural memory which contains units called production rules governing the trans-
formation of information underlying cognition, and (ii) a declarative memory which
contains units called chunks that record the information transformed and generated by
the production rules. While chunks store factual information (such as “the sum of three
and seven is ten”), production rules store procedural knowledge such as mathematical
problem solving skills (for example, “if one wants to multiply n1 with n2, then one can
add n1 to itself n2 number of times”).
ACT-R is particularly useful for understanding the process of knowledge retrieval
from memory. Knowledge retrieval is a complex problem because of the amount of
knowledge in human memory. ACT-R uses the theory of rational analysis (J. R. An-
derson, 1990) to formalise the process of retrieval. According to this theory, the cog-
nitive system identifies the chunks and production rules in human memory that are
most likely to be useful in the current context. ACT-R formalises the notion of ‘being
useful’ by calculating the activation value of items in memory. This activation value
consists of two components: a base-level activation which quantifies how useful the
item has been in the past and spreading activation which quantifies the likelihood of
item being useful in the current context. The item with the largest activation value
(after accommodating noise) is selected for retrieval.
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Reitter (2008) developed a language production model which assigns a syntactic
structure to a semantic description using the ACT-R scheme of knowledge retrieval.
This model assumes that declarative memory stores not only lexical information (as
lexical chunks), but also associated syntactic categories (as syntactic chunks). For ex-
ample, the lexical chunk for the verb gave contains pointers to two kinds of syntactic
chunks: a ‘ditransitive-to’ chunk that accepts a prepositional-phrase complement and a
‘ditransitive’ chunk that accepts a double-object complement. The syntactic structure
of an utterance is governed by which of these two chunks is retrieved during pro-
duction. Each time a syntactic chunk is retrieved, its base-level activation increases
leading to an increased probability of the chunk’s selection for future retrieval. Reitter
(2008) argued that this increase in base-level activation explains the long-term adapta-
tion effect in structural priming because an increase in base-level activation records the
long-term usefulness of the item in memory and, as such, lasts a long period of time.
A third part of the ACT-R architecture (besides declarative and procedural mem-
ory) is a set of buffers that store the current state of the system. According to Reit-
ter (2008) these buffers perform a key role in explaining lexical boost. Chunks and
production rules retrieved from declarative and procedural memories are temporarily
stored in these buffers. Therefore, these buffers can be seen as a simplistic working
memory. In order to explain short-term priming and the lexical-boost effect, Reitter
(2008) assumed that lexical and syntactic chunks retrieved during one utterance, are
retained in these buffers across utterances. Furthermore, he assumed that chunks that
are co-present in the buffers will undergo associative learning. Due to this associa-
tive learning, activation from a lexical chunk will spread to a syntactic chunk during
the target trial, if the same lexical item is used during prime and target. Therefore, a
syntactic chunk will show an enhanced total activation (sum of base-level and spread-
ing activation) if a lexical item is repeated between prime and target, which is the
lexical boost effect. Because associative learning takes place between all lexical and
syntactic chunks present in the buffers and not just between the head (the verb) and
the syntactic chunk, this explanation of lexical boost predicts that lexical boost will
be shown by repetition of any word between utterances and not just repetition of the
head. Reitter (2008) confirmed this prediction by performing a corpus-study done on
the Switchboard corpus. He found that while repetition of a word strengthens decay,
the repetition of a head does not, concluding that any lexical repetition boosts priming
rather than specifically head repetition.
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§ 6.2.3.1. Similarities and differences with our models.— Although the model
developed by Reitter (2008) uses a different framework to ours (ACT-R rather than
dynamical systems), it comes to a similar conclusion regarding the two learning mech-
anisms with contrasting longevities underlying structural priming. Both our model and
the one based on ACT-R cognitive architecture propose a long-term adaptation mech-
anism that is responsible for structural priming itself and a short-term priming mech-
anism that is responsible for lexical boost. Furthermore, these accounts also share
the idea of activation spreading from lexical representations to syntactic representation
through associative links.
However, there are some important differences in the two accounts. These differ-
ences stem from differences in computational principles used for the two accounts and
from the difference in their architectures. In an ACT-R model, retrieval from memory
depends on activation. Therefore, learning in such a model can be performed by adjust-
ing the value of this activation. Because the activation has two components (base-level
and spreading activation), learning relies on adjustment to each of these components.
Reitter’s model attributes long-term adaptation and lexical boost to these two compo-
nents and uses this separation to explain the difference in their longevities. In contrast,
the dynamical systems outlined in this thesis perform learning through either an ad-
justment to input sensitivity, or due to hysteresis. Model ®, for example, proposes
that cumulative learning relies on the former mechanism (adjustment to input sensi-
tivity) while learning between a prime and trial depends on hysteresis. Simulations
performed on the model also show that learning performed amongst competitive (i.e.
mutually inhibitory) nodes show a different rate of decay as compared to learning per-
formed in STM (mutually excitatory) nodes. We use this difference in decay to explain
the difference in longevity of priming and lexical boost. Thus, even though the ACT-R
account and our account attribute the difference in learning to a difference in the under-
lying learning mechanisms, the two accounts differ significantly in the computational
principles that they propose to underlie each phenomenon.
One consequence of this difference in computational principles is each model’s
prediction about the cognitive mechanism responsible for priming and lexical boost.
While our models propose that the syntactic and lexical representations themselves
undergo a long-term learning and only the association between these representations
(the binding nodes) are held in a short-term memory, Reitter (2008) proposes that the
lexical items themselves are held in a short-term memory (buffers) and survive from
one utterance to the next. If these lexical items did not survive in the buffers from
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one utterance to the next, then Reitter’s account would not be able to explain why the
longevity of lexical boost is shorter as compared to structural priming. Reitter (2008)
argued that it is justifiable to assume that lexical items survive in buffers for a short
period of time to achieve coherence between utterances, leading him to predict that
coherence would increase lexical boost – i.e. sentences that continue a topic would be
more likely to show lexical boost than sentences that do not. In contrast, our model
assumes that it is the episode itself (i.e. the binding between long-term representations)
that survives for a short period of time and the lexical representations do not need to be
held in this short-term memory in order to show lexical boost. Therefore, our account
does not rely on coherence for displaying lexical boost.
We also saw above (section 6.2.1) how our account distinguishes implicit learning
from procedural memory and explains why the amnesic patients tested by Ferreira et
al. (2008) show structural priming comparable with controls but an impaired recogni-
tion memory. The ACT-R model proposed by Reitter (2008) can explain these results
if it assumes that structural priming is due to learning in the procedural rather than
declarative memory. The account can then assume that impaired recognition memory
in amnesic patients is due to impaired declarative memory. Since structural priming
relies on the unimpaired procedural memory, it will remain undiminished. However,
the model proposed by Reitter (2008) does not assume that structural priming relies
on learning in procedural memory. Instead, it proposes that structural priming (specif-
ically, its long-term adaptation) is due to the adjustment of base-level activation of
syntactic chunks. These chunks reside in declarative memory and a damage to declar-
ative memory would lead to impaired retrieval of these syntactic chunks, which, in turn
would lead to a decrease in structural priming, contradicting the experimental results.
Moreover, if the ACT-R model was to assume that priming is indeed due to adjustment
in base-level activation of production rules (in the procedural memory) rather than ad-
justment to base-level activation of syntactic chunks (in declarative memory), it would
make the same assumption as the model proposed by Chang et al. (2006) and lump
implicit learning with procedural memory. As we argued in section 6.2.1, our account
allows us to make the distinction between implicit learning and procedural memory.
Specifically, we argued that structural priming could be due to implicit learning with-
out relying on learning the rules stored in procedural memory. An ACT-R model is
not capable of making such a distinction because of its broad classification of memory
into simply procedural and declarative modules.
Finally, the model proposed by Reitter (2008) performs incremental processing
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using Combinatorial Categorial Grammar (Steedman, 2000) to generate the constituent
structure of utterances. It shares this feature of incrementality with CDB06, which
also processes sentences one word at a time. In contrast, our models do not assign a
hierarchical structure to the constituents in an utterance, picking the syntactic structure
from a lookup table. We will discuss below (in section 6.4) how our model can be
extended in the future to replace this lookup table with a module that generates the
hierarchical structure of an utterance.
To summarise, a production account based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture
shares several features with the models proposed in this thesis. Crucially, it arrives at a
similar conclusion about structural priming relying on two different kinds of learning
mechanisms. However, we also see that such an account has important distinctions
to our models stemming from the different computational principles and architectural
choices underlying the two accounts.
6.3 Models and experiments
Dynamical systems theory is a formalism used to study change in the qualitative
behaviour of physical systems. In this thesis, we have shown that this theory can also
be useful for studying change in a linguistic system, as a result of comprehension or
production. The most useful aspect of this theory, with respect to structural priming, is
that it allows us to track the behaviour of the system through time, providing a detailed
description of how information flows from the prime to the target through time.
But the application of dynamical system theory to the study of biological systems
is not unique to our study. This theory has been applied to study, mathematically, how
both single neurons and groups of neurons perform cortical information processing.
Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) applied dynamical system theory to show how a spike
of neural excitation travels through the membrane of a single cell. Hoppensteadt and
Izhikevich (1997) described how the theory of dynamical systems can be used to study
the different behaviours of neurons ranging from generation of single spikes to oscilla-
tory behaviour where neurons repeatedly generate spikes at fixed time intervals. H. R.
Wilson and Cowan (1972) showed how populations of excitatory and inhibitory neu-
rons can show qualitatively different behaviour in response to different class of stimuli.
They also showed how particular types of stimuli can lead to oscillations of activity in
neuronal populations, providing key insight into how neural tissue might encode differ-
ent types of stimuli. Amari (1977) showed how neural ‘fields’ with different stability
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characteristics could arise within a population of neurons depending on the kinds of
connections between the neurons and the type of stimuli given to these neurons. These
examples show that dynamical systems theory has a rich tradition in the study of neural
behaviour and its dynamics.
§ 6.3.1 Why use dynamical systems theory?
We had one pragmatic reason and one technical reason for using the dynamical sys-
tems theory for studying structural priming. The first, pragmatic, reason is evident
from the other studies listed above that use dynamical systems theory. These studies
describe the behaviour of neurons or populations of neurons. By adopting the formal-
ism of dynamical systems, our study paves the way to making a connection between
the psychology of structural priming and its neuroscience. So far, very little is known
about the characteristics of our neural system that make it capable of showing struc-
tural priming during linguistic processing. If our hypothesis about the computational
mechanisms of structural priming is correct, then we can understand something about
the neural implementation of this phenomenon by looking at neural systems that are
believed to have similar computational mechanism. For example, one key property
of the computational models presented in Chapter 4 is winner-take-all dynamics. In
order to understand which neural systems lead to structural priming, we can look at
the systems that demonstrate this property. Of course this is a very simplistic view
and there are all sorts of neural systems that might be able to display this property and
extensive research will be required before we can have any clarity on this issue. But,
at the very least, our models suggest a possible avenue for investigating the common
computational principles behind the relevant psychological and neural processes.
The other reason behind using the theory of dynamical systems is that it provides
a form of learning suitable for making the connection between structural priming and
trailing activation. The notion of ‘trailing activation’ is a conceptual and not a formal
one. The idea is simple – whenever a part of a system gets activated, some residue of
this activity remains in the system after the system has finished processing. This resid-
ual or trailing activation interferes with future processing. We saw in Chapter 2 that the
spreading activation theory formally defines how activation decays, but that this defi-
nition of decay in activation is far too quick to explain structural priming, which seems
to survive for at least 10 filler trials (Bock & Griffin, 2000). The alternative to such
rapidly decaying structural priming is provided by a process of gradual learning, which
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extracts general properties of signals from the environment through repeated exposure.
Both these formalisations – rapidly decaying activation and gradual learning – seem
to be poor matches for the conceptual notion of trailing activation, which suggests a
memory trace that is temporary, yet not transient.
Dynamical systems allow us to capture this idea of change in the behaviour of the
system as a result of information processing. Central to the study of the dynamics of a
system is the analysis of its stability. When a system is initialised in a state proximal
to a point of stability, it tends to approach this stable state. If the flow of information
through the system can change where the point of stability lies, then it can change the
state of the system to this stable state. We also saw that once a dynamical system is
taken beyond a particular point, called the bifurcation point, then the system shows a
reluctance to leave its stable state – a phenomenon known as hysteresis. Because of
hysteresis, the dynamics of the system come to depend not only on the current state
and the input, but also on the history of the system, giving the system a memory. The
last link in the chain is to assume that information processing, such as comprehension,
pushes the system beyond the bifurcation point, changing its stable states and hence
leaving a memory of the flow of information. Such a memory fulfills the criterion
of lasting from one episode of information processing to the next without trying to
gradually extract the structure (e.g. syntactic rules) of the environment.
As we have shown, this mechanism can lead to structural priming and we can math-
ematically track the decay in structural priming by specifying how the system adapts
or loses its hysteresis with time. Parameters that govern how quickly the system learns
and how quickly it adapts allow us to match the pattern of structural priming to the one
observed in experimental data. In return, these parameters tell us something about the
system. The learning rate tells us how the system changes its sensitivity as a result of
information processing. For example, we saw in the last chapter that when the system
has a large learning rate, its linguistic choices are governed by more recent information
and hence recency becomes a dominant characteristic of memory (page 244). The rate
of decay tells us how long the consequences of an episode of information processing
last in the system. Even more interesting than the rate of decay is the shape of the
decay function. We saw that contrasting shapes of decay function show contrasting
longevities for structural priming and its lexical enhancement (section 4.6.2 on page
164). Thus, the theory of dynamical systems provides a framework using which we can
formalise the idea of trailing activation and test the computational constraints on the
parameters of the formal model that allow it to replicate experimental findings about
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structural priming.
§ 6.3.2 Consequences for experimental studies
The consequences of our computational model are not restricted to the formal appa-
ratus for studying structural priming, but also feed back into its investigation through
psychological experiments. Through the thesis we have mentioned the predictions of
the model for structural priming. Here we review some general properties of structural
priming that should be kept in mind when designing future experiments.
§ 6.3.2.1. Priming could be nonlinear.— Cumulative priming over a series of
trials is implemented by model ® in Chapter 4 and the extended model in Chapter 5.
In both these chapters priming accumulates in a nonlinear fashion. For model ®, we
saw that an equal number of each type of prime during training did not mean that the
model will be primed equally for both types of primes. The amount of priming for each
construction will depend on the sequence in which the constructions are presented. For
example, both the sequences PO—PO—DO—DO and PO—DO—PO—DO contain
two POs and two DOs but might show different amount of priming because the first
sequence presents primes of the same type consecutively, while the second sequence
presents the two types of prime alternatively. The amount of priming incurred from a
particular trial depends not only on the trial itself, but also the context in which the trial
is presented. If a PO trial is presented after another PO trial, then it is likely to incur a
larger amount of priming than when it is presented after a DO trial (section 4.6.3).
Note that this prediction is the opposite of the one made by an error-based account.
We saw in Chapter 3 that an error-based account predicts that learning is larger when
consecutive trials have different structures (Section 3.4.1.4). We also noted in that sec-
tion that Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) presented some evidence from their study
that showed priming to be stronger when two primes were of the same type as com-
pared to when the two primes were of different types. This data seems to support the
prediction from model ®, which shows larger priming for two consecutive trial are of
the same type. In contrast, an error-based account predicts that the error generated by
the second trial will be small when it is of the same type as the first trial and the error
will be large when the second trial is of a different type to the first trial. Because prim-
ing in an error-based model depends on the error, this model predicts a small priming
from two consecutive trials of the same type and a large priming from consecutive tri-
als of different types. Therefore, the predictions of an error-based account seem to be
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the opposite of the results reported by Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000). However,
we do note that more investigation needs to be carried out on this behaviour because
the result reported by Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) is an isolated one and their
experiment was not designed to measure this behaviour.
The extended model in the last chapter also predicts a nonlinear accumulation of
priming. The learning mechanism used in this model is different to the one used by
model ® and therefore it shows nonlinearity for another reason. The reader may recall
that we used a learning algorithm which performs cumulative learning with bounded
weights (Equation 5.3.1 on page 221). This equation ensures that the weights connect-
ing the nodes in a long term memory module do not grow without an upper bound.
This means that priming will grow substantially if a construction is presented consec-
utively for the first few trials, but after some time it will show saturation. Thus a given
scenario in which the model is still ‘naı̈ve’ (i.e. has undergone little training), a sin-
gle prime trial might lead to a larger change in priming, as compared to a scenario in
which the model has recently undergone training for the construction. Note that this
is not the opposite of the prediction made by model ® – i.e. we are not saying that
the sequence PO—DO will lead to a larger priming for DO than DO—DO. Like model
®, the extended model predicts that priming will be larger in the latter case. But, in
addition, the extended model predicts that the increase in priming for the earlier DO
prime might be larger than the increase in priming after the latter DO prime. We say
that the increase in priming might be larger, rather than will be larger because our model
implements a fixed upper bound and whether or not the priming increases by a lesser
amount depends on how close the weights are to the upper bound. If the weights are
quite close to the upper bound (closer than the learning rate), then the increase in prim-
ing will, indeed, be lower for the latter prime. However, if the weights are not yet close
to the upper bound, then the increase in priming as a result of the two primes will be
equal.
§ 6.3.2.2. Priming is a multi-headed beast.— Our account of structural prim-
ing can be considered a multi-system account. The extended model presented in the
last chapter implements two kinds of modules in the system1 – the long term mem-
ory module, which remembers syntactic elements chosen during a trial, and the short
term memory module which remembers the binding between syntactic constructions
and schemata. We can think of the long term memory module as being part of a long
1The same is true for models ­ and ® from Chapter 4, but the different types of modules are most
clearly apparent in the extended model.
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term declarative memory system (this could be the perceptual priming system in the
categorisation proposed in Table 6.1), while we can think of the short term memory
modules as being part of episodic buffer in the working (primary) memory. Besides
these two systems, the selection of syntactic structure is also governed by syntactic
rules (such as subcategorization frames and ordering of syntactic elements in an ut-
terance) which we have not implemented in our system – or, more precisely, have
implemented but as a simple lookup table. As shown by Chang et al. (2006), this
kind of memory will also undergo change as a result of the prime trial and therefore
contribute to structural priming as well. This change will be a gradual adjustment of
the procedural knowledge and is likely to be implemented by a third kind of memory
system – procedural memory. Thus, the results of information processing during the
prime trial are likely to cause changes to, at least, three different kinds of memory
systems.
What does such a multi-system account of priming mean for experimental investi-
gations? Can the experimenter afford to overlook the distinction between the different
systems? We argue that a multi-system account has consequences for two aspects
of psychological experimentation – its design and the interpretation of results. With
regards to experiment design, the experimenter would need to be careful about two
aspects. The first are the materials used in the experiment. Different materials used
in the experiment might lead to variable contributions from different memory mod-
ules. For example, materials that assist the participant’s explicit retrieval would lead to
contributions from both explicit and implicit memory towards structural priming and
consequently lead to larger amounts of priming as compared to experiments that do not
assist explicit retrieval. We have suggested that the lexical boost (Pickering & Brani-
gan, 1998) and semantic boost (Cleland & Pickering, 2003) are two examples where
explicit memory aids recall. The second aspect of design that may be affected by the
multi-system account is the procedure of the experiment, specifically the temporal dis-
tance between prime and target. Since the memory in the short term memory modules
decays quickly, any procedure that tries to measure the contribution of explicit memory
to priming must ensure a short duration between prime and target.
The other aspect of experimental investigation which needs to consider the multi-
system account of priming is the interpretation of experiment results. Different mem-
ory systems might vary in their contribution to priming for different kinds of material
and in some cases might have opposing effects. Let us consider some hypothetical
cases in order to clarify this point. If we assume that procedural memory is imple-
282 Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions
mented as an error-based system, then, as we discussed above, procedural memory
will show larger priming after the DO when it is primed using the sequence PO—DO,
as compared to when it is primed using the sequence DO—DO. In contrast, the long
term memory in the priming system (as discussed in the case of model ¬) will show a
larger priming in the case of two consecutive DOs. Therefore, the two types of mem-
ory will have opposing contributions when measuring this effect. The experimenter
must take these opposing effects into account when interpreting the results of the ex-
periment. Similarly, when measuring the lexical boost, if the prime and target are
separated by an intervening second prime that uses a different verb, but a competing
syntactic structure, then the separate contributions from the long term and short term
memories would mean that the priming would diminish, but the lexical boost should
remain intact. Therefore, subjects will show greater priming when they are primed us-
ing the sequence [PO-Give]—[filler] and tested using [Give], than when they are primed
using the sequence [PO-Give]—[DO-Send]. But since the lexical boost arises from a
different memory system – one that did not have interference – it should be comparable
in the two cases. These examples demonstrate the need to consider the contributions
from different memory systems towards priming and not treat structural priming as a
monolithic process.
§ 6.3.2.3. Priming can be overcome.— The final property of structural priming
takes us back to our first model. While the other models chose to concentrate on the
memory system, model ¬ investigated the influence of automaticity in the system on
priming and lexical boost. This model showed that the amount of priming and lexical
boost in the system is not fixed, but can vary as a result of the balance between local
and nonlocal forces operating within the system.
The observation that structural priming is affected by both local and nonlocal con-
straints also helps us understand why structural priming shows properties of implicit
learning – i.e. learning without awareness. According to Bargh (1994), awareness is
one of the four components of automaticity (the others being intentionality, efficiency
and controllability). A subject is likely to be unaware of automatic processes. The im-
plicit learning literature is full of examples of experiments which show a dissociation
between priming and recognition (see Schacter et al. (1993) for a review), suggesting
subjects can be unaware of priming. Model ¬ explains why this might be the case.
This model suggests that priming is due to hysteresis, which is the reluctance of a dy-
namical system to change its qualitative behaviour. Hysteresis is a local process and in
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the absence of a nonlocal input, it ensures that the dynamical system will not change
its stable state. Thus, the model argues that priming is due to inertia in the system and
as such it is an automatic process. Being an automatic process, it does not need to be
available to awareness.
Assuming that priming is an automatic process, model ¬ also showed that it can
be overcome by nonlocal properties of the system. We grouped together such nonlocal
properties into an ‘arousal’ module which controls the external input to each winner-
take-all system. When the system is in a state of low arousal, it gives low external
input to the WTA system, making it more inertial and leading to repetition. In the re-
verse case, when the arousal is high, the stable solutions of the system are completely
governed by the external input and the system shows no inertia. In reality the arousal
in the system will vary between these two extremes and the system will make deci-
sions based on both automatic (local) and non-automatic (nonlocal) constraints. Bargh
(1994) argued that automaticity is not a binary process and that there can be degrees
of automaticity. Model ¬ implements these degrees of automaticity by controlling
the balance between local and nonlocal processes through the level of arousal in the
system.
Structural priming emerges as a robust phenomenon, repeatedly demonstrated in
psychological experiments. But the amount of structural priming may vary not only
based on the contribution from different memory systems (as we discussed above);
here we argue that it may also vary based upon the balance between automatic and
non-automatic cognitive processes. Many computational models such as the extended
model considered in the last chapter or the error-based model developed by Chang et
al. (2006) do not consider this critical balance between automatic and non-automatic
processes and thus propagate the myth that structural priming is an unalterable phe-
nomenon of human cognition. The case of the error-based model is particularly severe
as it assumes that the same learning which is responsible for structural priming is also
responsible for learning the syntactic rules of the language. This makes it impossible
for the speaker to use the syntactic rules without being primed. In fact any account
of priming which assumes that priming is due to (supervised or unsupervised) adjust-
ment to procedural knowledge will struggle to show how a speaker can keep using
procedural knowledge but still overcome priming.
Although experiments on lexical and semantic boost are a few experiments that
systematically investigate the change in structural priming based on different features
of an utterance, the topic requires much further investigation. Other features of dis-
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course, such as awareness, audience design and discourse context might affect the
degree of automaticity in the system and consequently also affect structural priming.
Experiments need to be conducted which can investigate the role of such features in
structural priming. These experiments will help to move this phenomenon from the
domain of laboratory experiments to the domain of day-to-day conversations.
§ 6.3.2.4. Predictions for future experiments.— Throughout the thesis, we have
made predictions for experimental studies based on insight gained from our theoretical
and computational investigations. Here is a summary of the major predictions made
during the thesis:
1. Based on the theory of priming due to error-based learning, developed in section
3.4, we predict that if learning is error-based then priming for consecutive trials
of the same type should be lower than priming for consecutive trials of different
types. [section 3.4.1.4]
2. Based on the same theory, we also predict that if learning is error-based, then
the relative frequency of stimuli during the experiment should have an impact
on the amount of priming. In particular, if the experiment consists of a larger
number of primes of the lower frequency structure then priming should be larger
than when the experiment consists of a larger number of primes of the higher
frequency structure. [section 3.4.1.5]
3. Model ¬ predicts that the amount of priming depends on the level of automatic-
ity (the arousal) in the system. When automaticity is high (and arousal is low),
syntactic decisions are made locally and consequently priming is large. We pre-
dict that an experimental manipulation of automaticity in the cognitive system
(e.g. through manipulation of a subject’s awareness) can lead to change in the
amount of priming. [section 4.6.1]
4. Model ¬ also predicts that the partial correlation between structural and lexi-
cal repetition, given the arousal in the system should be zero. That is, if we
partial out the effect of arousal in the system, then lexical repetition should be
uncorrelated to structural repetition. [section 4.6.1]
5. Model ­ predicts that structural priming and lexical boost rely on different cog-
nitive systems. Therefore it should be possible to find double dissociation be-
tween syntactic decision-making and the influence of lexical context on these
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decisions. Thus, it should be possible to find individuals with short-term mem-
ory impairment but showing structural priming and equally, individuals with
impaired syntactic processing should show a larger lexical boost than control
subjects. [section 4.6.2]
6. Model ® predicts that structural priming accumulates nonlinearly. Therefore, the
amount of priming accrued over a series of trials will depend on the sequence in
which the items are presented. [section 4.6.3]
7. The extended model decouples implicit learning from procedural memory and
predicts that syntactic priming relies on implicit learning, but could be indepen-
dent of learning of syntactic rules. Thus it separates syntactic acquisition from
syntactic priming. In an experiment where subject try to acquire novel syntac-
tic rules, this account predicts that it should be possible to decorrelate syntactic
priming from syntactic acquisition. [section 6.2.1]
6.4 Future Work
We have presented four computational models in this thesis, starting with a simple
model and moving towards more sophisticated models. We have also tried to explain
a wide range of observations about structural priming and replicated the patterns of
several experimental studies. Our final model has crossed over from the domain of
structural priming to the domain of language production and has tried to explain how
the cognitive processes during comprehension and production can lead to structural
priming. But this success has come at a cost. We have filled logical gaps with compu-
tational and theoretical assumptions that demand justification. Some other assumptions
require elaboration – perhaps into computational models that can form other subsys-
tems of linguistic processing. There are also a number of other psychological experi-
ments that we have not tried to replicate. Some of these experiments should be simple
to model, but most would require us to extend and enrich the model. In this section,
we describe various ways in which the work in this thesis can be taken forward. The
list is not exhaustive, but identifies some of the key directions in which this work can
be taken. We also make some speculative remarks about how to set out on each path.
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§ 6.4.1 Theoretical extensions
First, we look at some of the computational assumptions that we made in order to
implement the models and their alternatives. We also look at some natural extensions
that would allow us to model more general principles of linguistic processing.
§ 6.4.1.1. Binding mechanism.— There are two binding mechanisms that we have
implemented in this thesis. The first one, used in models ­ and ®, binds nodes in the
lexical and syntactic layers by allocating a node that stands for each conjunction be-
tween the two layers. The second binding mechanism, tensor-product binding, is an
extension of the first mechanism for distributed representations. Both these mecha-
nisms are static binding solutions – i.e. the nodes required to represent the bindings
need to be preallocated.
We mentioned in Section 4.2.3 that preallocating nodes causes a waste of storage
space. There will be certain nodes in the binding layer that will never be activated be-
cause the conjunction of patterns that they represent is never activated. This problem
is particularly acute in a scheme like tensor-product binding which allocates a node for
every possible combination. We saw that one alternative is to use something like holo-
graphic reduced representations (HRRs), but compressing information in this manner
leads to noise and loss of information. We discussed that a particular problem we
faced with these representations was that they required the vectors to be independent
and identically distributed, a requirement that was in conflict with the requirements of
the long term memory we were using.
A better solution to the problem of storage space is to use dynamic binding. In-
stead of preallocating nodes for each conjunction of nodes, this solution encodes the
association between nodes by tagging them together. A tag could be any property of
the system that can acquire at least two values. For the sake of illustration, let us say
this property is the colour of a node and that the colour can be one of three different
values – red, black or white. Let us also assume that nodes are white when they do not
participate in any binding. When we want to associate two nodes, all we have to do is
to paint them red or black. All nodes that are painted red will participate in one binding
while all nodes that are painted black will participate in the other binding. This way,
we can bind nodes together dynamically – i.e. without the need to specify a node for
every combination of nodes.
Our simple solution of colouring the nodes does provide a binding mechanism, but
a limited one. Firstly, it does not allow a node to participate in multiple bindings at
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the same time. We can rectify this situation, by assuming that we do not colour the
whole node, but instead just mark the node with a tiny spot. This way we can mark the
node with both red and black spots allowing it to participate in both kinds of binding
at the same time. The second problem with our simple solution is that it allows only
two bindings – red and black. This problem can also be rectified easily by simply
increasing the number of colours of the bindings. We can even choose a continuous
variable as a tag instead of the discrete colour scheme, which will allow us to have a
much larger (potentially infinite) number of tags. The last problem with the scheme
is its neurological realisation: instead of assuming a colouring tag, we would like to
replace it with a property that can be displayed by neurological systems. One popular
choice for this property is the timing of neural firing (von der Malsburg, 1981; Gray
& Singer, 1989; Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993). Physiological investigations show that
neurons fire regularly at different frequencies. Therefore, two neurons can be tagged
together if they fire in synchrony. Tagging nodes that fire synchronously makes sense
because neural circuits can build a ‘coincidence detector’ that gets activated only when
the two nodes fire at the same time (Kempter, Gerstner, Hemmel, & Wagner, 1998).
Evidence for synchronous firing on neurons comes from measurement of neural activ-
ity in the cat’s visual cortex which shows synchronous firing of neurons in response to
presentation of visual stimuli (Singer & Gray, 1995).
To overcome the problem of spatial complexity, we would like to replace our static
binding solution with a dynamic binding solution, such as binding through temporal
synchrony. However, there are a number of computational details that will need to be
worked out here. First of all, our current dynamical system assumes that the state of
a node is simply determined by the value of its activation. In the neural parlance, this
value of activation can be treated as the rate at which the neuron is firing. We will have
to replace this rate code with a temporal code that specifies the precise timing of spikes
in nodes. Furthermore, we will have to specify coincidence detectors that are temporar-
ily tuned to detect specific synchronous firing. In order to specify the longevity of the
binding, we will also have to specify how long this coincidence detection lasts, or when
nodes lose their synchrony. Needless to say, each of these mechanisms will introduce
complexity. However, they might also provide useful insight into the nature of decay
in binding.
Of course, it is also possible that we do not use temporal synchrony to encode the
binding between nodes at all and use another property of the system that allows us to
tag representations together. However, this property will need to fulfill the three criteria
288 Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions
for a useful dynamic binding mentioned above: it should allow a node to participate in
multiple bindings at the same time; it should allow a large number of bindings (equal
to the number of conjunctive relations); it should be neurally plausible.
The dynamic binding scheme also helps us to remove an unwanted property of the
tensor-product binding scheme. We noted above that the tensor product is wasteful
because it preallocates all possible associations between nodes. This property of the
tensor product also means that it replicates the information present in the associated
modules. A tensor product between the syntax and schema modules represents all in-
formation represented in both the syntax and schema modules. From a computational
perspective, this is obviously wasteful. Since the component patterns are stored in the
syntax and schema modules anyway, all that the binding needs to store are pointers to
the memories in these modules. The dynamic binding scheme gets rid of this profligacy
by representing the binding by tagging the nodes themselves. In this case, the relation-
ship between two modules can be stored in coincidence detectors which form pointers
into the component patterns and represent the association much more efficiently.
A related point about the binding mechanism has to do with the way we have
implemented the tensor-product binding. Currently we calculate this binding pair-wise
between the three long term memory modules. However, one of the reasons why we
chose to use the tensor-product binding and not just the outer product of two vectors
was that tensors are generalisations of vectors that allow multi-dimensional indexing
(Section 5.2.1.1). This means that tensor products allow us to bind representations in
the three different modules (syntax, schema and lexical concepts) at the same time.
Such binding would form a more accurate representation of an episode, which binds
together lexical, syntactic and schema representations at the same time. However, the
challenge is to perform this binding in such a manner that it preserves the structural
properties of an utterance. In an utterance like John gave Mary the book, we want
to bind the concept of John with the role of GIVER and the syntactic element Subject.
Simply finding a tensor product between the three representations will not preserve
this structural relationship. Ideally, the binding mechanism of the model should be
extended in such a manner that it should allow us to store all the elements of the
linguistic episode, whilst preserving the structural relationships.
§ 6.4.1.2. Filler time.— The filler trials in our simulations are modelled as a decay
in memory between prime and target trials. But this is not how psychological experi-
ments on structural priming implement fillers. Each filler consists of a comprehension
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or production trial and uses a ‘neutral’ syntactic construction – i.e. a syntactic con-
struction that is outside the cohort being tested. For example, Hartsuiker et al. (2008),
who used the picture-naming task, used pictures which displayed actions that could be
described with a transitive sentence. On the other hand, the prime and target trials used
pictures that could be described using a dative sentence. The filler is ‘neutral’ in the
sense that it does not overlap with the syntactic representations activated by the prime
and target trials.
Now consider how we implement such a filler phase during our simulations. The
prime and target trials in our experiment are separated by an adaptation phase. During
this phase, memory decays along a time-based function. Usually an input file or input
parameter specifies the time between prime and target. The shape of the function
is usually an exponential curve. The choice of an exponential function is based on
corpus analysis of how structural priming decays (Gries, 2005; Szmrecsanyi, 2006)
and considerations of the nature of information retrieval from memory (J. R. Anderson,
1990). The rate of forgetting can be controlled by the time-constant for the exponential
decay. The parameters specified at the beginning of the simulation set the rate of decay,
while an input file provides the time of the filler phase.
If we want to accurately compare the results of the experiments with the results of
the simulations, we have to calibrate the time and rate of decay in terms of a filler trial.
While our current results provide a proof of concept, they do not make an accurate
calibration, due to the lack of data available to perform such a calibration. One way
to achieve better comparisons is to conduct psychological experiments which provide
more information about these parameters. The memory literature is replete with exper-
iments that study the nature of forgetting and the functions that can best describe this
phenomenon (Wickelgren, 1970; Rubin, 1982; R. B. Anderson & Tweney, 1997). We
believe that a similar enterprise for structural priming and lexical boost will be helpful.
(The study conducted by Hartsuiker et al. (2008) is a step in the right direction).
But another way to obtain a better comparison between experiments and simulation
is by modelling the effect of a ‘neutral’ filler on the representations in the network.
We have assumed in our study that interference from the filler trials is manifested as
an exponential forgetting curve. But a way to extend our work would be to look at
how exactly a filler trial affects the retrieval of unrelated patterns presented during
a prime trial. Frequently, memory literature assumes that this decay in memory is
due to some cross-talk or interference between existing and newly stored patterns (an
idea going back to (Müller & Pilzecker, 1900)), but it could also be due to competition
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between representations (McGeoch, 1942), or perhaps purely a time-based decay (Page
& Norris, 1998). These different possibilities are worth further investigation because
they will provide a mechanistic explanation for the role of filler trials in psychological
experiments. This reasoning also points to the possibility that different types of fillers
are processed differently by the system and have different effects on the memory of
the prime.
§ 6.4.1.3. Syntactic knowledge.— The models presented in this thesis have cho-
sen to concentrate exclusively on the processes of memory that lead to grammatical
encoding. We have looked at the memory of syntactic constructions themselves as well
as the memory of the lexical concepts and the schema with which the construction was
associated. However, grammatical encoding is a more complex decision. Memory of
previous decisions plays only a part in grammatical encoding. Speakers use not only
the memory of previous utterances, but also the rules of their grammatical knowledge
in order to choose the grammatical form of an utterance. A more complete model of
grammatical encoding should use a combination of memory and syntactic knowledge
in order to achieve grammatical encoding.
The task of grammatical encoding can be broken down into a number of sub-
processes. According to the model of language production proposed by Levelt (1989)
and Bock and Levelt (1994), grammatical encoding consists of two stages: functional
processing and positional processing. Functional processing itself consists of lexical
selection and function assignment. It is this last process, that of function assignment,
on which we have mostly concentrated.
A number of factors control function assignment. Levelt (1989) suggested that
function assignment itself depends upon lexical selection – i.e. the process of function
assignment is lexically driven. The key lexical item that provides the functional struc-
ture of the utterance is the verb (Bock & Levelt, 1994). In the extended model, it is
the verb that provides the schema, or the frame, containing different roles. These roles
need to be assigned a syntactic function and we have chosen to assign this syntactic
function using the memory (stored in the tensor product) of the previous assignment.
However, it would be naı̈ve to suppose function assignment is done solely on the ba-
sis of previous memory. Clearly, our grammatical knowledge plays a major role in
performing this function assignment. In fact, our grammatical knowledge should also
constrain how function assignment is performed based on the memory of previous as-
signment. Evidence for the role of grammatical knowledge in sentence recall comes
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from experiments performed by Lombardi and Potter (1992) which showed that the
surface syntax of to-be-recalled sentence depended on the verb that was recalled. When
subjects were lured into recalling an incorrect verb, with a different surface structure,
they spontaneously adjusted the syntax of the recalled sentence to ensure grammatical-
ity of the sentence. Thus the process of function assignment cannot depend completely
on memory and needs to be constrained by the rules of grammar learnt by the subject.
Our model, therefore, needs to include an additional pathway between the schema and
syntax layers, which depends not on the memory of the association, but on the syntactic























Figure 6.4.1: [Syntactic rules] Two additional modules are incorporated to account for
the speaker’s grammatical knowledge. One module takes care of the syntactic con-
straints of the verbs, while the other is responsible for constituent assembly for a list of
function-marked words. For simplicity, the comprehension pathways are not shown.
The other place where the model needs to rely on grammatical knowledge is the
stage of positional processing. This stage consists of two sub-processes: constituent
assembly and inflection. The goal of our model is to provide correctly ordered words
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and we will ignore whether or not each word is in the correctly inflected form. The
process of constituent assembly, however, cannot be ignored. This process takes the list
of words marked with their syntactic function and places them in a sequential order. So
far, we have assumed that this knowledge is obtained from a lookup table which gives
the correct order for every construction. However, we have reason to believe (Bock
& Levelt, 1994) that constituent assembly takes places by hierarchically organising
different constituents in accordance with the phrase structure rules of a language. But
because this knowledge is abstract and independent of the function assignment process,
we can specify a separate module in our model that lies between the long term memory
of syntactic constructions and the output sequence of words.
Thus building in rules of procedural (grammatical) knowledge leads to the addition
of two modules to our extended model (figure 6.4.1). The first module is parallel to
the short term memory that binds the schema layer to the syntactic constructions. The
second module lies between the syntactic constructions and the output sequence of
words. Implementation of these additional modules will lead to a detailed account not
only of structural priming, but also grammatical encoding.
§ 6.4.1.4. Language acquisition.— Related to the use of syntactic knowledge is
its acquisition. Our model hypothesises that structural priming is due to a memory trace
in the cognitive system. We have put forward this account in contrast to an error-based
account of priming shown by Chang et al. (2006). This error-based account proposes
that structural priming is due to learning in the procedural knowledge of the subject.
We have discussed several drawbacks of such an error-based approach. However, a
major advantage is that this model is more general in scope than ours and explains
both structural priming and syntactic acquisition at the same time. Our model, on the
other hand is silent on the processes of language acquisition.
The challenge here is to show how the speaker uses the same information to both
participate in a linguistic activity (monologue or dialogue) and to acquire the rules of
the language, at the same time. One way to think about the problem is the approach
taken by the error-based model, which divides the system into two subsystems – one
which stores the rules (through error-based learning) and the other which stores an
episodic memory (not implemented by Chang et al. (2006)).
An alternative way of thinking about the problem is from an information process-
ing perspective. We saw in Section 6.1 that language processing can be considered
to be a transformation consisting of two kinds of processing – an analysis of infor-
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mation so that it can be represented in a number of functionally specialised modules,
and a combination of these representations. From this perspective, language acquisi-
tion consists of finding the right functions to perform this analysis and combination.
In our model, we have assumed that we can represent input information in each of
the three functionally specialised modules by looking up a connectionist representa-
tion for this input. Specifically, we have assumed a lookup table (ψ) that allows us to
transform information backwards and forwards between a symbolic structure and its
connectionist representation. One part of language acquisition is to understand how
the system can learn to transform a linguistic signal into each of the functionally spe-
cialised representations. For example, learning the mapping from a sequence of words
to the syntax module will involve learning the phrase structure rules that can derive the
syntactic relations from word sequences. The other part of language acquisition comes
from learning the combinations of the functionally specialised representations. For
example, learning the binding between the schema and syntax representations leads
to learning the syntactic constraints corresponding to each schema. Generalisation of
different bindings leads to abstract rules of combining schema and syntax representa-
tions.
Thus, in order to implement language acquisition, the system will have to learn two
principles of information transformation – analysis (or how the system learns to find
a set of latent variables in information) and combination (or how it learns to find the
functional relations that exist between the latent variables). In addition, a mechanistic
account of language acquisition will have to show how the system bootstraps – i.e.
how the system uses the principles of analysis and combination to determine which
functional specialisations it should generate.
§ 6.4.2 Further simulations
Let us now look at some enhancements to our work that are suggested by existing ex-
periments. We should be able to simulate some of these experiments with some minor
changes to our models, while other experiments will require more careful planning and
review of the models.
§ 6.4.2.1. Semantic boost.— Model ® considered the effect of lexical representa-
tions on syntactic choice. In the last chapter, we extended this model so that we could
also consider the flow of information from semantic representations (schema and lex-
ical concepts) to syntactic constructions. Using this model allowed us to explain how
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speakers might choose the syntactic structure of their utterances based on the schema
that they wish to express. We saw that usually it is the verb that governs the structure
of the schema and by studying the effect of the schema on the choice of syntax, we can
actually explain the effect of repeating the verb on structural priming.
But expanding the model to the semantic domain gives us a much more powerful
system that should allow us to test various other semantic influences on the choice of
syntax. One study that measured such a semantic influence on syntactic choice was
conducted by Cleland and Pickering (2003). This study used the picture-description
paradigm to elicit picture descriptions in one of two orders: an adjective-noun or-
der (the red sheep) or a noun-relative-clause order (the sheep that’s red). In addition
to observing structural priming and lexical boost, Cleland and Pickering (2003) also
observed that semantic relatedness between prime and target enhanced priming. Par-
ticipants were more likely to describe a picture as the sheep that’s red after hearing the
goat that’s red than after hearing the knife that’s red. They interpreted these results
as showing a semantic boost because the semantic relatedness of the concepts SHEEP
and GOAT led to an increase in priming as compared to the unrelated concepts SHEEP
and KNIFE.
The extended model can capture such a semantic boost effect by analysing the role
of connections between lexical concepts and syntactic structure. Currently, the short-
term memory between these two layers does not play any role in the selection of syntac-
tic structure during production. Moreover, different symbolic concepts are represented
by linearly independent connectionist representations. Thus, currently the model will
represent SHEEP and GOAT as two patterns of activation that do not overlap. In order
to capture the semantic boost effect, we will have to find a connectionist representation
that systematically encodes the semantic relationships between concepts.
One way to generate connectionist representations that encode semantic relation-
ships between concepts is to use a feature map (Kohonen, 1990). A feature map rep-
resents semantic similarity between concepts as distance on the map. Words that are
semantically similar are mapped close to each other while words that are different are
farther away from each other. So far we have been generating the connectionist rep-
resentations for each lexical concept using a lookup table (ψ). In order to represent
semantic similarity, we can replace this lookup table with a feature map which takes
the lexical symbol as an input and maps it onto a representation in semantic space.
However, implementing such a scheme in the current network will lead to some
complexity in recall because of interference between different patterns. While the long
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term memory does not assume completely independent representations, it is sensitive
to the number of nodes activated by input stimulus. If too many nodes are activated,
then the network has a chance of settling into either spurious or incorrect memories.
Thus, if we want to implement the relationships between different concepts, we will
have to overcome two challenges: (a) find the correct system of encoding these rela-
tionships, and (b) find a way to avoid spurious and incorrect retrievals due to interfer-
ence.
§ 6.4.2.2. Influence of primitive semantic features and thematic roles.— A
question related to the mechanism of semantic boost is the influence of other semantic
and message level information on selection of syntactic structure. Three experimental
studies are worth mentioning here. Bock and Loebell (1990) found that thematic role
information is irrelevant to structural priming. However, Bock et al. (1992) found
that primitive semantic features such as animacy influence the selection of syntactic
functions and therefore do show structural priming. Finally, Chang et al. (2003) found
in contrast to Bock and Loebell (1990), that subjects use thematic role information to
assign syntactic functions when such an assignment did not alter the order of phrasal
constituents (for details, see section 2.2.3.1).
We have already discussed in the previous chapter how the observations of Bock
and Loebell (1990) are compatible with our model. The basic argument was that, in our
representation scheme, thematic roles are local to each construction which meant that
repeating the thematic role between prime and target would not influence syntactic
priming, unless the thematic roles were part of the same construction. In order to
replicate these results, we would need to extend the syntactic representation to encode
locatives, in addition to datives. Otherwise, replication of these results should be fairly
straightforward.
The other two studies, on the other hand, would require more careful consideration.
Currently, our model does not have any representation of primitive semantic features,
such as animacy. The extension of the model to include a feature map for encoding
semantic representations should allow us to encode such semantic features. The next
step would be to see how these semantic features are mapped onto different roles in
a schema and then how these roles are mapped onto syntactic functions. The latter
mapping is more straightforward as it is constrained by the syntactic construction. For
example, a DO always maps the GIVER in the GIVE schema to the Subject. But the
reasons for the former mapping – i.e. why the GIVER is more likely to be animate in
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the target trial if it was animate in the prime trial, than when it was inanimate – will
require a closer inspection.
Similarly, simulating the experiment of Chang et al. (2003) will also require further
development. As noted above, our model assumes that the thematic role assignments
are local to each construction (schema). The influence of thematic roles on function
assignment means that there is some connection between different schemata, based on
thematic role overlap. Much like the representation of lexical concepts, the connec-
tionist representations of different schemata are linearly independent in the extended
model – i.e. there is no overlap between them. But, as suggested by construction
grammar (Fillmore & Kay, 1993; Langacker, 1987), different constructions are not
stored as an unstructured list, but hierarchically organised into a taxonomic network.
Different constructions are related to each other in such a network through a relation-
ship of schematicity or generality, with more general constructions occupying higher
nodes in the network (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Such a hierarchical organisation could
permit an overlap between different constructions that share thematic roles. However,
adopting such organisation must also explain why the influence of thematic roles on
function assignment is a weak one and only manifests itself when the two assignments
share the order of phrasal constituents, as illustrated by Chang et al. (2003). A number
of different explanations is possible, including the fact that the difference in priming
could be due to a difference of focus in the two types of primes rather than a difference
in the thematic roles.
§ 6.4.2.3. Production-to-production priming.— We have mentioned in the pre-
vious section that our model should be able to show production-to-production priming.
However, all the simulations considered in the last two chapters involve comprehension-
to-production priming. The model learns in the same manner during comprehension
and production – by retrieving long-term memories and storing bindings. In this sense,
the production trial leaves as much of a mark upon the system as the comprehension
trial. However, in order to demonstrate this, we must design a simulation that will
allow the model to show production-to-production priming.
The problem here is that the design of such a simulation is not completely obvious.
First of all, if the prime trial is a production trial, then the model can produce any
of the alternative structures during the prime. This makes it difficult to ensure that
both the structures will be produced roughly an equal number of times, so that we can
compare the amount of priming for each structure. Secondly, if the simulation contains
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only production trials, then the effect of structural priming will mean that it will tend to
produce the structure that it had produced in the previous trial. Thus, as the experiment
goes on, one of the structures will become more and more likely to be produced. In
fact, in the absence of noise, the model will get stuck producing only a single kind of
structure.
One possible design involves having comprehension trials at regular intervals dur-
ing the experiment, so that the model can ‘unlearn’ some of the priming incurred during
the production trials, making the alternative structures more balanced. While this so-
lution seems feasible, it is not ideal as it will become difficult to separate the effect of
priming from production and comprehension trials. Moreover, there do not seem to
be any psychological experiments available to which we can compare the results from
this simulation.
6.5 Final remarks
In this chapter, we have broadened the discussion of structural priming to other
aspects of human cognition, including its ability to perform functional specialization
and integration. We have seen how such functional specialization agrees with the ar-
chitecture of the models presented in this thesis and helps to explain the properties of
structural priming. We have focused on the temporal properties of priming and shown
how structural priming and lexical boost can show different rates of decay. The key to
understanding the difference in structural priming and lexical boost lies in how these
properties are encoded in our models. While structural priming is due to a module
responsible for functional specialization, lexical boost is due to a module responsible
for integrating (binding) such specialized representations. We have also discussed a
multi-system approach to structural priming, arguing that structural priming could be a
result of learning in different kinds of memory in the cognitive system. While treating
priming as a consequence of different types of memories brings the study of prim-
ing closer to the study of human memory systems, it also highlights the limitations
of our models. We have enumerated several possible ways in which this study can be
taken forward and the models can be extended to account for data available from other
psychological studies.
This thesis develops a series of mathematical models that enhance our understand-
ing of language production, in general, and structural priming, in particular. These
models present a detailed account of the learning mechanisms that could be responsi-
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ble for structural priming and move the debate about the existence of structural priming
from a functional domain (whether it is due to implicit or explicit learning) to a com-
putational domain (which learning algorithms are responsible for structural priming).
These models also provide the novel framework of dynamical systems for the study
of priming and memory. Concepts such as hysteresis, adaptation and winner-take-all
competition give a natural way of capturing cognitive processes that may underlie lan-
guage production and lead to the temporal properties of structural priming.
In this thesis, we have reviewed the importance of studying structural priming and
seen the limitations of an error-based account in explaining some properties and pat-
terns of priming. Our first model demonstrated how dynamical systems can be used
to implement structural priming and also showed how a balance between local and
nonlocal properties can lead to lexical boost. The second and third models provided
a detailed temporal analysis of the memory of an utterance and distinguished three
different types of learning that could lead to structural priming: hysteresis in mutu-
ally excitatory binding nodes, hysteresis in mutually inhibitory winner-take-all nodes
and incremental learning of input sensitivity. Using these mechanisms, these models
were able to account for the results from several psychological studies. The extended
model took this work further and overcame several computational and representational
limitations of previous models. By simulating this model, we showed how structural
priming may rely on different memory systems which are accessed during comprehen-
sion and production. We also showed how some processes and memory systems could
overlap between comprehension and production and hence how linguistic processing
during one could be intricately tied to linguistic processing in the other.
A
GUI
Figure A.0.1: The graphical user interface (GUI) used for testing model ®. The drop-





Part of a stimuli file used to test model ® is shown here. The file consists of blocks of
16 lines, where each block is used to train a particular subject. Each block consists of
two phases – the training phase and the testing phase. The training phase is made of
the first 10 episodes and the testing phase is made of the last six. Each episode consists
of prime and target trials. The prime trial specifies both the verb and the syntactic
construction (i.e. simulates comprehension), while the target trial specifies only the
verb. The target trials during the training phase do not specify any verb and allow the
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